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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 investigates	 the	 emergence,	 functioning	 and	 evolution	 of	 voluntary,	
informal	 networks	 of	 regulators.	 Via	 a	 combination	 of	 inductive	 and	 deductive	
reasoning,	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods,	this	research	sheds	light	on	thus	far	
unexplored	 mechanisms	 of	 networked	 regulatory	 collaboration.	 These	 are:	 the	
conditions	 leading	 to	 spontaneous	 network	 emergence	 and	 consolidation	 into	 an	
institutional	structure;	the	factors	determining	network	members’	ties	to	each	other;	
the	 strategies	 that	 network	 members	 deploy	 to	 ensure	 network	 survival;	 the	
conditions	facilitating	network	entrepreneurship;	and	the	role	of	informal	networks	
in	the	implementation	of	foreign	policy	agendas.		
Through	 six	 empirical	 chapters,	 divided	 in	 three	 parts,	 this	 thesis	 explains	 why	
regulators	network.	The	core	argument	is	that	regulators	use	networks	as	levers:	they	
leverage	 their	 collective	 collaboration	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 goals	 that	 are	 both	
individually	 and	 collectively	 desirable.	 The	 first	 part	 shows	 that	 they	 network	 for	
control:	regulators	form	networks	whenever	they	face	concrete	threats	to	the	scope	
of	 their	 authority	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 autonomy.	 The	 second	part	 shows	 that	
regulators	network	for	resources:	similarity	 in	the	political	economy	and	expertise	
explain	 the	 structure	 of	 regulators’	 relationships	 together	 with	 resources,	 as	
regulators	rely	on	their	peers	to	compensate	for	their	scarce	staff	numbers.	The	third	
part	shows	that	regulators	network	for	survival,	and	that	the	institutional	integration	
of	networks	facilitates	regulators’	network	entrepreneurship.	Further,	it	shows	that	
international	 organisations	 and	 regulators	 deem	 informal	 networks	 capable	 of	
fostering	 policy	 change;	 hence,	 they	 export	 regulatory	 networks	 to	 target	
jurisdictions	in	the	explicit	attempt	of	replicating	their	success	formula.	
The	thesis	accomplishes	this	ambitious	research	agenda	by	focusing	on	four	empirical	
cases	of	transnational/trans-jurisdictional	networks	of	energy	regulators:	the	Council	
of	European	Energy	Regulators	(CEER),	the	National	Association	of	Regulatory	Utility	
Commissioners	 (NARUC)	 of	 the	 USA,	 and	 their	 respective	 progeny,	 i.e.	 the	
Association	of	Mediterranean	Energy	Regulators	(MedReg)	and	the	Energy	Regional	
Regulatory	Association	(ERRA)	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	
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Introduction:	rationale	of	the	research	and	key	findings.		
	
- Why	do	you	think	regulators	take	part	in	these	networks?		
- The	word	“network”,	I	think	that’s	the	answer.	
	(interview	17)	
	
The	 motivation	 for	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 bring	 new	 theoretical,	 empirical	 and	
methodological	perspectives	to	the	study	of	regulatory	networks.	It	is	based	on	six	
empirical	chapters	divided	 in	three	parts	and	addressing	four	different	 literatures.	
The	 essential	motivation	 for	 such	 an	 ambitious	 undertaking	 is	 that	 the	wealth	 of	
contributions	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 examine	 them	 through	 a	 limited	 set	 of	
methodological	 and	 theoretical	 lenses.	 This	 research	 features	 new	 findings	 on	
regulatory	networks	of	substantive	academic	and	policy	interest.	By	investigating	the	
emergence,	operation	and	the	evolution	of	regulatory	networks,	it	offers	a	different	
approach	to	the	study	of	networks	to	those	taken	in	the	existing	literature	and	opens	
new	paths	of	inquiry.	
The	 key	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 regulators	 use	 their	 networks	 as	 levers;	
networks	afford	 regulators	 leverage,	at	both	domestic	and	 supranational	 level,	 to	
pursue	goals	that	are	both	individually	and	collectively	desirable.	The	focus	of	this	
analysis	is	on	the	inner	workings	of	trans-national	or	trans-jurisdictional	regulatory	
collaboration:	how	regulators	relate	to	and	rely	on	one	another	in	their	respective	
contexts.	Specifically,	I	investigate	the	conditions	leading	to	spontaneous,	voluntary	
network	emergence,	way	before	endorsement	by	political	principals	 (which	 is	 the	
point	 of	 departure	 of	 most	 existing	 literature).	 I	 also	 investigate	 the	 drivers	 of	
network	 collaboration,	 i.e.	 the	 factors	 explaining	 regulators’	 specific	 ties	 to	 their	
most	 regular,	 frequent	collaborators.	Finally,	 I	explore	 the	 leverage	 that	networks	
have	 even	 outside	 their	 jurisdiction	 (which	 I	 define	 as	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 territorial	
jurisdictions	 of	 network	 members),	 whenever	 they	 play	 a	 role	 in	 foreign	 policy	
agendas,	and	investigate	why	they	choose	to	play	such	a	role.			
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The	research	is	innovative	in	several	ways.	First	and	foremost,	my	approach	to	the	
study	of	regulatory	networks	starts	from	within	networks	themselves	and	from	the	
perceptions,	evaluations,	and	actions	of	network	members.	This	approach	allows	me	
to	avoid	taking	the	external	environment	of	networks	as	a	given,	and	to	articulate	
their	 relationship	 with	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 resource	 dependency	 (Pfeffer	 and	 Salancik,	
1978),	 as	well	 as	 to	 explore	 how	 regulators	 navigate	 this	 dependency	 over	 time.	
Secondly,	 and	 relatedly,	 I	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 regulators’	
institutional	 self-interest	 and	 their	 contribution	 to	 regulatory	 policy,	 which	 is	
mediated	 by	 their	 networks.	 Regulators	 leverage	 their	 network	 to	 manage	 their	
relationship	with	their	political	interlocutors	so	as	to	strengthen	and	preserve	their	
institutional	status,	while	also	proactively	feeding	into	regulatory	policy.			
Thirdly,	I	relinquish	the	assumption,	implicit	in	existing	literature,	that	regulators	are	
all	the	same:	they	differ	greatly	in	the	extent	of	their	resources,	in	their	expertise,	in	
terms	of	the	market	they	oversee	and	in	the	geographical	location	of	those	markets.	
I	show	these	factors	to	affect	regulators’	choices	regarding	whom	to	network	with,	
i.e.	 which	 relationships	 they	 maintain	 on	 a	 bilateral	 basis,	 beyond	 the	 policy	
requirements	 of	 their	 institutional	 setting.	 In	 turn,	 these	 choices	 determine	 the	
structure	of	the	network.	This	structure	is	susceptible	to	change;	in	this	thesis,	I	only	
manage	 to	 provide	 a	 snapshot	 of	 network	 structure	 in	 a	 given	 moment.	 If	 the	
structure	of	the	network	might	change,	the	determinants	of	that	structure	are	not	
likely	to:	expertise,	resources,	similarity	in	the	political	economy	emerge	from	this	
thesis	as	the	key	drivers	of	regulatory	informal	networking.		
Fourthly,	I	also	dismiss	another	assumption	that	is	implicit	in	most	existing	literature;	
namely,	 that	 regulatory	 networks	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 have	 emerged	
independently	 of	 one	 another	 and	 can	 or	 should	 be	 studied	 as	 independent	
observations.	In	this	thesis,	I	show	that	regulatory	networks	are	interdependent.	The	
histories	of	the	networks	examined	in	this	thesis	are	entwined,	and	pertain	to	foreign	
policy	 agendas:	 regulatory	 networks	 are	 “exported”	 from	 economically	 advanced	
countries	or	regions	to	economically	less	advanced	jurisdictions	within	the	context	of	
foreign	policy	programmes,	in	the	attempt	of	entrenching	or	fostering	policy	change.	
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I	examine	the	role	that	regulatory	networks	play	in	foreign	policy	programmes,	once	
again,	from	the	perspective	of	the	regulators	involved.	In	this	regard,	I	find	evidence	
of	multi-causality:	namely,	the	involvement	of	regulators	into	the	export	of	their	own	
“network	formula”	may	correspond	to	different	causal	mechanisms.	I	identify	two:	
network	survival,	and	institutional	entrepreneurship.		
This	 thesis	 does	 not	 view	 networks	 as	 simply	 a	 metaphorical	 recourse	 to	
conceptualize	 informal	 relationships	 amongst	 groups	 of	 regulatory	 professionals.	
Those	relationships	create	network	structures	that	can	be	measured	and	modelled.	
In	taking	this	approach,	this	thesis	rediscovers	and	builds	on	some	of	the	key	tenets	
of	the	political	science	literature	on	policy	networks	(e.g.	power	dependence,	policy	
influence,	 advocacy)	 but	 infuses	 them	 in	 with	 a	 dynamism	 that	 has	 largely	 been	
absent	 from	 existing	 scholarship,	 where	 networks	 have	 been	 largely	 static.	 By	
contrast,	 this	 thesis	 views	 networks	 as	 the	 results	 of	 generative	 processes,	 and	
structures	that	can	change	over	time	as	regulators	create	new	and	sever	old	links,	
redefine	the	functions	of	the	network	and	expand	the	mission	beyond	the	realm	of	
their	territorial	jurisdiction.		
The	 thesis	 draws	 on,	 and	 contributes	 to,	 several	 literature	 strands;	 from	 public	
administration	 and	 public	 policy	 to	 political	 economy,	 international	 relations	 and	
international	political	economy.	By	talking	to	these	different	literatures,	the	research	
highlights	the	breadth	of	scope	that	the	study	of	regulatory	networks	can	and	should	
have,	 and	 thereby	 reaches	 beyond	 well-trodden,	 low-risk	 paths	 of	 research.	 The	
thesis	brings	into	the	study	of	regulatory	networks	an	emphasis	on	emergence,	which	
is	revelatory	of	actors	and	interests,	incentives	and	ideas	driving	the	establishment	
of	networks.	It	adopts	an	evolutionary	perspective:	networks	change	over	time	as	the	
external	environment	 in	which	they	are	embedded	changes;	 regulators	 learn,	and	
modify	their	network	ties	accordingly.	It	takes	serious	the	agency	of	regulators	insider	
networks,	which	is	invariably	overlooked	in	existing	literature.	It	also	aims	to	break	
new	ground	by	addressing	a	hitherto	unexplored	connection	between	networks	and	
foreign	policy.	
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The	 analysis	 is	 pursued	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 a	 single	 sector	 and	 four	 case	
studies.	The	first	 two	cases	are	the	network	of	energy	regulators	of	the	European	
Union,	the	Council	of	European	Energy	Regulators,	(CEER)	which	is	compared	with	
the	National	Association	of	Regulatory	Utility	Commissioners	(NARUC)	in	the	United	
States	of	America	(USA).	The	second	two	case	studies	investigate	networks,	which	
are	the	offspring	of	the	first	two.	They	are	the	Association	of	Mediterranean	Energy	
Regulators	 (MEDREG),	 which	 brings	 together	 regulators	 from	 Southern	 European	
Member	States,	Balkan	countries,	Middle	East	and	North	African	countries,	and	the	
Energy	Regional	Regulatory	Association	(ERRA)	of	energy	regulators	of	Central	and	
Eastern	Europe.	The	comparative	approach	makes	it	possible	to	analyse	and	explain	
variance	in	networks	of	the	same	sector	but	across	different	time	periods,	macro-
regional,	and	institutional	contexts.		
The	reason	to	 focus	on	networks	of	 regulators	of	electricity	and	gas	–	 for	brevity,	
‘energy	regulators’	–	is	that	these	networks	have	been	less	often	investigated	than	
networks	 of	 other	 infrastructure	 sectors,	 notably	 telecommunications.	 Yet,	 the	
energy	sector	is	one	of	the	most	controversial	and	politicized	of	all	sectors	subject	to	
economic	 regulation.	 In	 addition,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 energy	 infrastructure	 are	
interesting	 to	 juxtapose	 to	 the	 study	 of	 networks	 of	 institutions	 charged	 with	
regulating	it.	Energy	grids	can	cross	national	borders,	but	fall	short	of	global	reach.	
They	 link	 the	 local,	 the	 national	 and	 the	 transnational	 dimensions	 of	 regulatory	
governance.	 Moreover,	 the	 energy	 grid	 is	 nothing	 but	 a	 carefully	 structured,	
constantly	 balanced	 network.	 Hence,	 in	 this	 thesis	 the	 geographical	 and	
technological	aspects	of	energy	infrastructure	feature	prominently.		
The	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 speaks	 to	 the	 public	
administration	literature	that	focuses	on	regulatory	networks	and	their	rationale.	It	
stems	 from	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 regulatory	 networks	 often	 emerge	
spontaneously	 (Kenis	 and	 Provan	 2008)	 and	 are	 endorsed	 by	 political	 institutions	
(e.g.	 the	 European	 Commission,	 see	 Eberlein	 and	 Newman	 2008	 or	 Coen	 and	
Thatcher	 2008)	 only	 later.	 It,	 therefore,	 asks:	 what	 are	 the	 conditions	 for	
spontaneous	regulatory	network	emergence?	In	responding	to	this	question,	the	two	
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chapters	 in	 this	 part	 rely	 on	 inductive	 reasoning	 and	 on	 a	 comparative	 research	
design.	I	carry	out	a	comparative	historical	analysis	of	the	emergence	of	the	Council	
of	European	Energy	Regulators	 (CEER)	and	 the	National	Association	of	Regulatory	
Utility	Commissioners	(NARUC)	on	the	basis	of	interview	material	(42	interviews	with	
regulators	 from	 both	 networks),	 documentary	 and	 archival	 analysis	 (only	 in	 the	
NARUC	case).	 I	 find	 that	network	emergence	can	be	usefully	distinguished	 from	a	
slightly	 later	 phase,	 which	 I	 name	 “network	 consolidation”.	 Network	 emergence	
results	from	the	emergence	of	regulatory	authorities	which,	in	both	cases	studied,	
resulted	from	the	emergence	of	the	Regulatory	State.	New	to	their	profession	and	
tasked	with	reforming	the	mode	of	governance	of	sectors	of	crucial	economic	and	
political	 relevance,	 such	 as	 infrastructure	 sectors,	 regulators	 are	 alone	 in	 their	
territorial	contexts,	with	no	precedent	to	refer	to	and	no	peers.	
Hence,	 they	begin	 interacting	with	peers	 in	 their	 jurisdictional	context	 in	order	 to	
compare	and	contrast	experiences	and	learning	from	each	other.	This	learning	effort	
is	 not	 just	 motivated	 by	 professional	 aims:	 regulators	 need	 to	 establish	 their	
legitimacy	 to	make	decisions	of	 great	 distributional	 consequences	 and	build	 their	
reputation.	However,	 this	 remains	 a	 loose	 set	 of	 informal	 relationships	 driven	 by	
informational	 asymmetries	 and	 expertise.	 The	 spark	 for	 network	 consolidation	
occurs	whenever	 regulators	 face	 the	 real	 threat	 of	 either	 losing	 their	 powers,	 or	
seeing	the	realm	of	their	authority	severely	diminished,	or	both.	Both	the	USA	and	
the	EU	are	systems	of	governance	articulated	across	levels.	As	the	Regulatory	State	
took	shape,	in	either	context,	regulatory	competence	was	distributed	across	levels	
and	horizontally	 across	 different	 institutions.	 Tensions	 for	 control	 and	primacy	 of	
regulatory	 power	 ensued.	 As	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 these	 tensions	 would	 become	
permanent	traits	of	the	regulatory	governance	system,	networks	consolidated	into	
semi-formal	organizations,	with	a	name,	headquarters	close	to	the	centre	of	power,	
set	budgetary	contributions,	work	plans,	etc.		
The	chapters	identify	a	further	key	challenge	for	regulatory	networks:	in	order	to	be	
viable,	they	have	to	be	policy	relevant.	Regulators	are	constantly	establishing	and	re-
establishing	their	 legitimacy	at	both	domestic	and	supranational	 (federal)	 level:	 in	
	
	
13	
order	 to	 credibly	 claim	 their	 individual	 legitimacy,	 regulators	 have	 to	 prove	 their	
collective	one	by	contributing	to	the	policy	process.	In	turn,	feeding	into	regulatory	
policy	allows	regulators	to	access	and	influence	the	early	stages	of	policy	formulation,	
thus	affording	them	an	enviable	position	for	furthering	policy	goals.	In	both	the	US	
and	 the	 EU,	 the	 interdependence	 across	 levels	 of	 governance	 creates	 a	 resource	
dependency	 between	 regulators	 and	 their	 supranational	 peers	 (the	 European	
Commission	in	the	European	case;	federal	regulatory	agencies	in	the	US	case):	the	
latter	rely	on	the	former	for	information	on	national	(state)	markets	and	companies;	
the	former	rely	on	the	latter	for	political	backing.	Although	these	relationships	have	
changed	over	time	(particularly	radically	in	the	US	case),	interdependency	between	
levels	of	regulatory	governance	has	proven	crucial	for	network	consolidation.		
Over	time,	however,	the	rationale	underpinning	this	interdependency	may	decline	in	
importance.	Two	reasons	for	this	decline	emerge	from	the	chapters:	in	the	US	case,	
the	gradually	increasing	legislative	empowerment	of	federal	agencies	began	eroding	
the	state	level	regulators’	sphere	of	control	over	utilities	in	their	state,	rendering	the	
US	 regulatory	 federalism	 increasingly	 confrontational;	 in	 the	 EU	 case,	 the	
formalization	 of	 previously	 informal	 relationships,	 e.g.	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 the	 Energy	 Regulators,	 rendered	 the	
European	 Commission’s	 reliance	 on	 the	 CEER	 for	 national	 market	 information	
redundant.	The	final	finding	of	this	first	part	of	the	thesis	is	that,	in	order	to	survive,	
networks	resort	to	two	strategies:	layering	and/or	conversion.	Chapter	3	shows	that	
the	CEER	is	converting	its	focus	to	topics	it	previously	did	not	concern	itself	with,	e.g.	
consumer	policy,	and	acquiring	new	functions,	e.g.	training	provision.	Chapter	2	hints	
at	the	layering	strategy	deployed	by	NARUC,	by	gaining	technical	assistance	functions	
in	aid	programmes,	which	is	further	detailed	in	chapter	6.		
The	second	part	of	the	thesis	relies	on	deductive	reasoning	and	focuses	on	explaining	
network	 structure	 by	 uncovering	 the	 drivers	 of	 regulators’	 informal	 ties	 to	 each	
other.	 It	 comprises	 chapters	 4	 and	 5,	 and	 bridges	 between	 network	 theory	 and	
analysis	and	the	political	economy,	as	well	as	the	public	administration,	 literature.	
This	part	relies	on	original	network	data	that	I	gathered	from	the	full	population	of	
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European	National	Energy	Regulatory	Authorities,	comprising	29	elements.	I	asked	
respondents	to	name	the	regulatory	authorities	with	which	their	authority	is	most	
regularly	in	contact	with	as	concerns	exchanges	of	information,	opinions	and	advice.	
I	 obtained	 replies	 from	 28	 regulatory	 authorities.	 For	 the	 missing	 one,	 I	 simply	
considered	 the	 ties	 they	 received	 as	 reciprocated.	 Respondents	 are	 all	 informed	
individuals	 at	 their	 national	 regulatory	 authority,	 because	 they	 are	 in	 charge	 of	
managing	and/or	supervising	the	external	affairs.	I	rely	on	this	data	in	both	chapters	
in	this	part.		
In	chapter	4,	 I	 formulate	several	hypotheses	as	concerns	the	drivers	of	 regulatory	
networking.	The	core	hypothesis	of	the	chapter	is	that	regulators	prefer	to	network	
with	 peers	 facing	 the	 same	 sort	 of	 sector	 structure	 and	 political	 economy.	 I	
operationalize	national	political	economies	by	relying	on	the	Varieties	of	Capitalism	
typology.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 Exponential	 Random	 Graph	 Model	 I	 develop	 in	 the	
chapter	 lend	support	 to	 the	hypothesis.	Moreover,	 the	analysis	demonstrates	 the	
importance	of	expertise	by	showing	that	certain	regulators	(those	overseeing	more	
advanced	energy	markets)	are	relatively	more	sought	after,	as	well	as	more	active,	
than	 others.	 Finally,	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 regulators	 with	 medium	 levels	 of	
resources	are	more	active	networkers	than	regulators	with	high	levels	of	resources.	
The	 pattern	 of	 electricity	 interconnections	 across	 Member	 States	 also	 bears	
explanatory	power	for	the	observed	network	structure,	confirming	the	relevance	of	
sectoral	characteristics	in	motivating	regulators’	ties.	However,	its	importance	was	
less	compelling	than	the	political	economy	factor.		
The	analysis	 reveals	 the	existence	of	a	divide	between	regulators	 from	EU-15	and	
those	 from	EU-13,	 particularly	 the	 newest	Member	 States.	 This	 finding	may	 be	 a	
function	of	time:	newer	Member	States	have	been	members	of	the	CEER	network	
(and	of	the	European	Union)	for	less	time	and	may,	therefore,	have	had	less	time	to	
build	stable	relationships	with	peers	from	the	EU-15.	At	the	same	time,	however,	this	
finding	 suggests	 that	 spontaneous	 regulatory	 collaboration	 may	 lead	 to	 the	
formation	 of	 cliques	 (i.e.	 small	 groups	 of	 close-knit	 communities)	 and	 that	 the	
establishment	of	a	European	Agency	may	have	been	necessary	to	ensure	that	the	
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flow	of	information	across	all	European	regulators,	and	coordination	between	them,	
actually	occurred.	
In	chapter	5,	I	explore	the	link	between	regulatory	networking	and	resources	in	more	
detail	and	develop	the	hypothesis	that	regulators	use	networks	to	compensate	for	
lacking	resources.	Individual	regulatory	authorities	are	very	different	in	terms	of	their	
resources.	Even	though	their	human	and	financial	resources	positively	and	strongly	
correlate	with	the	extent	of	 their	population	 (a	proxy,	 if	 imprecise,	 for	 the	size	of	
their	 market),	 the	 institutional	 economics	 literature	 argues	 that	 each	 regulatory	
authority	needs	to	fulfil	a	range	of	expert	tasks,	whatever	the	size	of	their	market	
(Glachant,	 Khalfallah	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Hence,	 resource	 constrained	 regulators	 may	
struggle	more	than	well-resourced	peers	to	fulfil	those	expert	tasks.	I	posit	that,	faced	
with	those	constraints,	regulators	resort	to	their	network	of	peers	in	order	to	access	
the	expert	information	they	cannot	afford.	The	result	of	the	analysis	lend	support	to	
the	hypothesis.	 This	 suggests	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 the	European	 context,	 even	 though	
regulatory	coordination	within	networks	had	scarce	impact	on	convergence,	it	may	
have	had	substantial	 impact	 in	terms	of	 improving	national	regulatory	governance	
beyond	what	national	resources	would	have	allowed	for.		
The	third	and	final	part	of	the	literature	goes	back	to	comparative	historical	analysis	
and	 inductive	 reasoning	 and	 asks:	 what	 explains	 US	 and	 European	 regulators	
involvement	into	foreign	policy/external	governance	programmes	such	as	those	that	
led	to	the	establishment	of	the	ERRA	and	the	MedReg?	In	order	to	respond	to	this	
broad	question,	in	chapter	6	I	retrace	the	history	of	the	establishment	of	ERRA;	in	
chapter	7,	I	retrace	the	history	of	the	establishment	of	MedReg.	This	part	of	the	thesis	
relies	on	 interview	material	as	well	as	documentary	analysis.	This	 final	part	of	the	
thesis	 is	 very	 dense	 empirically	 and	 contributes	 to	 several	 strands	 of	 research.	
Besides	contributing	to	the	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	as	tackled	
in	 the	 international	 relations	 and	 international	 political	 economy	 fields,	 it	 also	
addresses	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 aid	 and	 technical	 assistance	 through	
network	 collaboration.	 Indeed,	 the	 two	 chapters	 in	 this	 part	 demonstrate	 that	
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informal	networks	are	the	deliberately	chosen	instruments	of	foreign	policy	and	that	
fostering	informal	networks	can	be	part	of	a	security	strategy.	
The	empirical	 chapters	 are	 followed	by	 a	 short	 concluding	 chapter,	where	 I	 draw	
together	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research,	 its	 contributions	 and	 its	 limitations.	 I	 also	
outline	 two	 issues	 that	 represent	 promising	 avenues	 for	 future	 investigation	 of	
regulatory	 cooperation	 and	 coordination	 in	 the	 energy	 sector:	 electricity	
decentralization	and	the	integration	of	digital	and	energy	technologies.	
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1. Preparing	the	ground	for	analysis:	from	the	literature	
to	the	structure	of	the	thesis.	
	
The	literature	on	transnational/trans-governmental	regulatory	networks	has	literally	
boomed	since	the	early	2000s.	This	literature,	steeped	in	the	international	relations	
tradition,	 primarily	 focuses	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 of	 economic	 sectors	 of	 global	
extent,	 such	as	 finance,	 securities,	and	banking	 (Slaughter	1997,	Slaughter	2000a,	
Raustiala	2002,	Slaughter	2004,	Verdier	2009,	Zaring	2009,	Ahdieh	2010,	Bach	2010,	
Bach	and	Newman	2010a,	Bach	and	Newman	2010b,	Cao	2012,	Bach	and	Newman	
2014,	Farrell	and	Newman	2014,	Newman	and	Posner	2016,	Cao	and	Ward	2017,	
Henriksen	 and	 Ponte	 2018).	 This	 literature	 understands	 and	 analyses	 networks	
through	the	lens	of	milestone	contributions	on	neoliberal	institutionalism		(Keohane	
and	 Nye	 1974,	 Keohane	 1982,	 Keohane	 1988,	 Keohane	 1998)	 and	 international	
regimes	(Haas	1975,	Krasner	1981,	Krasner	1982)	as	alternatives	to	realism	to	bring	
order	into	the	anarchy	of	transnational	relations.	
In	 the	 same	 period,	 a	 burgeoning	 literature	 focused	 specifically	 on	 networks	 of	
European	regulators	also	emerged,	and	has	kept	developing	to	this	day	(Eberlein	and	
Grande	2005,	 Tarrant	 and	Kelemen	2007,	Coen	and	Thatcher	2008,	 Thatcher	 and	
Coen	2008,	Lavrijssen	and	Hancher	2009,	Levi-Faur	2011,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011,	
Yesilkagit	 2011,	 Van	 Boetzelaer	 and	 Princen	 2012,	Maggetti	 2013,	 Danielsen	 and	
Yesilkagit	2014,	Egeberg,	Trondal	et	al.	2014,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2014,	Blauberger	
and	 Rittberger	 2015,	 Vestlund	 2015,	 Blauberger	 and	 Rittberger	 2015b,	 Mathieu	
2016).	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 contributions	 in	 this	 literature	 stem	 from	 an	
acknowledgement	of	the	uniquely	peculiar	economic-political	construction	the	EU	is,	
and	therefore	tend	to	understand	and	analyse	networks	through	that	lens,	variously	
relying	 on	 the	 insights	 provided	 by	 the	 public	 policy	 and	 public	 administration	
literature,	as	condensed	in	the	more	recent	multi-level	governance	literature	(Marks,	
Hooghe	et	al.	1996,	Scharpf	1997,	Benz	and	Eberlein	1999,	Falkner	2000,	Hooghe	and	
Marks	2001,	Hooghe	and	Marks	2003,	Papadopoulos	2005,	Piattoni	2010),	which,	in	
itself,	has	always	had	an	almost	exclusive	focus	on	the	European	Union	(Stephenson	
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2013).	The	European	focus	transcended	the	relevance	of	sectors:	this	literature	has	
examined	 networks	 of	 European	 regulators	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 sectors,	 from	 the	
environment	to	competition	policy	to	banking.	Since,	however,	infrastructure	sectors	
have	 always	 been	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 integrationist	 aspirations	 of	 the	 EU,	 many	
contributions	in	this	literature	focus	on	such	sectors,	primarily	telecommunications	
and	energy.		
These	two	strands	of	literature	dominate	the	field	of	inquiry	on	regulatory	networks.	
Indeed,	their	theoretical	basis,	methods	and	findings	permeate	also	the	much	smaller	
set	 of	 contributions	 that	 devoted	 attention	 to	 regulatory	 networks	 in	 emerging	
markets	(Berg	and	Horrall	2008,	Horrall	2008,	Jordana	2011,	LaBelle	2012,	Dowdle,	
Gillespie	et	al.	2013,	Bianculli,	 Jordana	et	al.	2015,	Fernández-i-Marín	and	Jordana	
2015),	also	often	focused	on	infrastructure	sectors.	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 outline	 the	 strands	 of	 literature	 that	 this	 thesis	 addresses	 and	
contributes	to.	I	begin	by	noting	that,	somehow	surprisingly,	this	rich	literature	on	
regulatory	 networks	 rarely	 relies	 on	 a	 body	 of	 knowledge,	 which	 is	 extremely	
relevant	 to	the	study	of	collaboration	between	public	administrators,	wherever	 in	
the	world:	the	political	science	literature	on	policy	networks.	I	then	survey	the	key	
tenets	 and	 findings	 of	 existing	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 regulatory	 networks.	
Subsequently,	 I	 identify	 the	main	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 concerns	 approaches,	
topics	and	methods.	 I	 then	 justify	 the	 focus	on	energy	 regulators	and	explain	 the	
different	challenges	that	they	encounter	compared	to	regulators	of	other	economic	
sectors.	 Finally,	 I	 lay	 out	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 the	 hypotheses	 guiding	 this	
research,	the	methodological	framework,	and	the	rationale	for	case	selection.		
	
Transnational	networks	of	regulators.	
The	 literature	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 has	 an	 important,	 if	 rarely	 acknowledged,	
predecessor	 in	 the	 literature	on	group	politics	 (John	2012).	 In	 turn,	 the	 theory	of	
groups	 spawned	 the	 literature	 on	 policy	 networks	 and	 the	 many	 associated	
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definitional	and	substantive	debates.	Preceding	the	literature	on	networks	is	the	US	
notion	of	“sub-governments”,	i.e.	sub-systems	of	policy	making	composed	of	groups	
with	privileged	access	to	policy-makers	(Ripley	and	Franklin	1980).	The	famous	“iron	
triangles”	 label	 derives	 from	 this	 literature	 and	 described	 US	 policy	 making	 as	
happening	within	 a	 triangle	 featuring	Congressional	 committees,	 bureaucrats	 and	
interest	 groups	 (Freeman	 and	 Stevens	 1987).	 This	 literature	 entered	 the	 study	of	
British	politics	via	landmark	contributions	such	as	Heclo	and	Wildavsky	(1974),	who	
studied	 the	 UK	 budgeting	 process	 and	 Richardson	 and	 Jordan	 (1979),	 who	
distinguished	 specific	 “policy	 styles”	 determining	 the	 structure	 of	 interpersonal	
relations	in	the	networks	of	public	policy	making.		
To	 the	 best	 of	my	 knowledge,	 the	 only	 contribution	 understanding	 a	 network	 of	
regulators	(more	precisely,	of	national	competition	authorities)	through	the	lens	of	
the	policy	network	literature	is	Cengiz	(2013).	In	her	book,	Cengiz	outlines	the	main	
features	of	the	three	recognizable	European	“schools”	of	studies	on	policy	networks:	
the	British,	 the	German	and	 the	Dutch	 school.	 These	 three	 schools	 differ	 in	 their	
understanding	of	the	function	of	policy	networks,	although	they	are	relatively	similar	
in	their	evaluation	of	the	desirable	outcomes	of	network	collaboration:	better	policy.	
The	 British	 school	 understands	 policy	 networks	 as	 instruments	 of	 interest	
intermediation.	Key	contributions	(Marsh	and	Rhodes	1992,	Marsh	and	Smith	2000)	
focused	 on	 central-local	 government	 relations	 in	 the	 UK.	 The	 German	 school	
understands	networks	as	instruments	of	governance	and	emphasises	the	importance	
of	trust	as	the	main	engine	of	network	collaboration	for	superior	policy	outcomes	
(Kenis	and	Schneider	1991,	Schneider	1992,	Schneider	2001).	The	Dutch	school	of	
policy	network	studies	focuses	primarily	on	network	management	techniques,	which	
it	 considers	 essential	 to	 ensure	 productive	 network	 collaboration	 (Kenis	 and	
Schneider	 1991,	 Raab	 and	 Kenis	 2006,	 Provan	 and	 Kenis	 2008,	 Kenis	 and	 Provan	
2009)	
The	main	 criticism	addressed	 to	policy	network	 studies	 concerns	 their	 inability	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 networks	 are	 a	 determinant	 of	 policy	 decision	 and	 their	 overly	
descriptive	 nature	 (John	 2012).	 Policy	 network	 studies	 pioneered	 the	 usage	 of	
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network	analysis	 in	 the	study	of	policy	 relationships	and	their	character	 (Brandes,	
Kenis	et	al.	1999),	although,	initially,	mostly	to	descriptive	purposes.	Fierce	critics	of	
the	policy	network	approach,	such	as	Dowding	(1995),	(2001),	contended	that	the	
policy	network	approach	was	of	limited	theoretical	relevance	and	beset	by	inefficient	
analytical	 methods.	 At	 any	 rate,	 this	 literature	 was	 first	 in	 problematizing	 the	
complex	 patterns	 of	 informal	 networking	 among	 stakeholders,	 and	 seeking	 to	
evaluate	their	relevance	to	policy-making	and	influence	on	policy	outcomes	(O'Toole	
Jr	1997).	The	perceived	failure	of	the	policy	network	approach	to	explain	how	policy	
outcomes	 are	 due	 to	 networks	 may	 explain	 why	 contributions	 on	 transnational	
regulatory	 networks	 make	 scarce,	 if	 any	 reference	 to	 this	 important	 precedent	
literature.	A	further	reason	may	be	that,	differently	from	policy	networks,	regulatory	
networks	are	homogenous:	they	comprise	similar	entities	with	similar	tasks	(Borzel	
1997).	Therefore,	regulatory	networks	are	more	amenable	to	thorough	analysis	as	
they	do	not	suffer	from	the	boundary	problem	that	Kassim	(1994)	identified	in	the	
study	 of	 European	 policy	 networks:	 networks	 comprising	 all	 sorts	 of	 actors	 are	
virtually	 boundless,	 rendering	 the	 network	 concept	 unable	 to	 clearly	 specify	 its	
object.	 Sectoral	 networks	 of	 regulators,	 instead,	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 definitional	
ambiguities.	
Because	there	is	usually	one	regulatory	authority	(covering	one	or	multiple	sectors)	
per	 country,	 regulatory	 networks	 tend	 to	 be	 transnational	 –	 which	 attracted	 the	
interest	of	international	relations	scholars.	Indeed,	very	often,	literature	reviews	on	
transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 begin	 by	 mentioning	 Anne-Marie	 Slaughter’s	
(2004c)	 influential	 contribution,	 which	 acknowledged	 the	 emergence	 of	 “a	 new	
world	 order”.	 This	 contribution	 and	 the	 literature	 it	 spawned	 emerged	 at	 least	 a	
decade	 after	 the	 debate	 on	 policy	 networks	 in	 political	 science,	 and	 portrayed	
regulatory	networks	as	embodying	an	important	conceptual	shift	in	the	international	
system:	 from	 a	 system	 of	 unitary	 states	 negotiating	 within	 the	 framework	 of	
supranational	 institutions	 to	 a	 system	 of	 interactions	 among	 various	 (legislative,	
regulatory,	 judicial)	 components	 of	 the	 state,	 which	 interact	 across	 borders	 in	
disaggregated	 form.	 Trans-governmental	 networks,	 Slaughter	 (2004)	 contends,	
expand	regulatory	reach,	build	trust	among	their	participants,	exchange	information	
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and	develop	best	practices,	 besides	offering	 technical	 assistance	and	professional	
socialization	 to	 their	members.	These	 findings	are	common	to	previous	studies	of	
policy	networks.	In	her	view,	networks	are	the	response	to	the	globalization	paradox	
of	 needing	 global	 government	 but	 fearing	 the	 centralization	 of	 authority	 in	
supranational	structures:	through	the	power	of	suasion	and	the	lever	of	reputation,	
regulatory	networks	can	create	global	rules	in	absence	of	centralized	structures	of	
power,	while	remaining	accountable	to	their	national	principals1.		
After	Slaughter’s	(2004c)	contribution,	scholarly	interest	in	transnational	networks	of	
governmental	officials	blossomed.	In	particular,	the	focus	has	been	on	the	extent	to	
which	 they	 are	 able,	 and	 should	 therefore	 be	 relied	 upon,	 to	 improve	 global	
governance	(Raustiala	1997,	Slaughter	2002,	Slaughter	2004b,	Slaughter	and	Zaring	
2006).	Hence,	the	international	relations	literature	also	inherited	the	policy	network	
literature	concern	with	establishing	clear	links	between	networks	and	policy	change,	
or	policy	outcomes.	This	quest,	according	to	some,	has	proven	just	as	elusive	(Verdier	
2009).	The	debate	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	is	now	long	standing	and	has	
come	 to	 include	 a	 vast	 range	 of	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 accountability	 of	 networks	
(Slaughter	2000a,	Slaughter	2004a,	Maggetti	2010)	and	the	homogenizing	power	of	
regulatory	transfer	of	best	practices	throughout	the	world	(Raustiala	2002).	At	any	
rate,	 this	 research	 agenda	 set	 the	 foundations	 of	 continued	 academic	 and	 policy	
interest	in	understanding	transnational	networks	of	regulatory	officials.		
The	EU	pioneered	“regulation	by	networks”	as	a	mode	of	governance	when	faced	
with	 the	 conundrum	 of	 trying	 to	 achieve	 the	 extent	 of	 regulatory	 harmonization	
necessary	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 Single	 Market	 while	 avoiding	 the	 delegation	 of	
administrative	 and	 regulatory	 powers	 to	 European	 institutions	 (Sutherland	 1992,	
Hancher	1996,	Dehousse	1997).	The	European	Community’s	decision	to	encourage	
the	 coordination	 of	 regulatory	 practice	 between	 the	 representatives	 of	 national	
																																																						
1	In	her	most	recent	book	(Slaughter,	A.M.,	2017,	“The	chessboard	and	the	web:	Strategies	
of	Connections	 in	a	Networked	World”,	Yale	University	Press)	 the	author	goes	 further	by	
advocating	for	a	network	approach	in	American	foreign	policy,	much	in	line	with	the	notion	
of	transformational	development	discussed	later	in	chapter	6.	
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administrations	was	meant	to	achieve	the	necessary	degree	of	regulatory	uniformity.	
Several	 contributions,	 notably	 Nicolaides	 (2004),	 Mintrom	 and	 Vergari	 (1998),	
Eberlein	 and	 Grande	 (2005),	 Eberlein	 and	 Newman	 (2008),	 Van	 Boetzelaer	 and	
Princen	(2012),	converge	on	identifying	as	the	main	rationale	of	European	Regulatory	
Networks	the	task	of	filling	the	governance	gap	between	the	national	and	the	supra-
national/European	 level,	 thus	 engendering	 (the	 conditions	 for)	 harmonization.	
Recent	refinements	of	this	functionalist	argument	see	the	European	Commission	as	
an	orchestrator	of	 regulatory	compliance	via	networks	 (Blauberger	and	Rittberger	
2015).	
In	a	similar	fashion	to	scholars	of	policy	networks,	scholars	of	European	regulatory	
networks	have	assessed	their	ability	to	affect	policy	and,	specifically,	to	fulfil	 their	
stated	 aim	 of	 engendering	 regulatory	 convergence	 across	 the	 Member	 States	
(Maggetti	 2009,	Maggetti	 and	 Gilardi	 2011,	Maggetti	 2014,	Maggetti	 and	 Gilardi	
2014).	The	findings	of	these	contributions	show	a	mixed	record	of	effectiveness:	for	
instance,	whereas	the	network	of	European	regulators	of	securities	appears	to	have	
been	 able	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 soft	 rules	 across	 European	 Member	 States	
(Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011),	 the	network	of	European	energy	regulators	does	not	
(Maggetti	2014).	I	should	note	that,	in	this	type	of	contributions,	very	little	attention	
is	devoted	to	the	explanatory	power	of	the	sector	itself	in	making	sense	of	the	ease	
with	which	regulators	are,	or	are	not	able	to	foster	regulatory	convergence.		
Other	authors	argue	that	expecting	policy	impact	from	informal	regulatory	networks	
is	naïve:	networks	are	created	instead	of	formal	cooperation	frameworks	whenever	
the	 distributional	 implications	 of	 regulatory	 harmonization	 would	 be	 politically	
damaging	(Kelemen	and	Tarrant	2011,	Tarrant	and	Kelemen	2017).	According	to	this	
view,	networks	are	created	with	the	declared	intent	not	to	achieve	convergence.	It	
has	 also	been	 suggested	 that	 the	 interest	 of	 regulators	 in	networking	may	 reside	
more	in	bureaucratic	politics	than	in	contributing	to	governance	(Bach,	De	Francesco	
et	al.	2016).	Indeed,	recent	literature	on	regulatory	networks	in	a	European	setting	
has	relinquished	regulatory	convergence	as	 its	sole	focus	of	analysis	and	gradually	
come	 to	 encompass	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 network	 members,	 i.e.	 regulators	
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themselves.	Recent	findings	are	that	cooperation	within	networks	has	the	effect	of	
increasing	 regulators’	 powers	 (Maggetti	 2013),	 even	 though	 not	 their	 budgets,	
expanding	 their	autonomy	 (Yesilkagit	2011,	Danielsen	and	Yesilkagit	2014),	create	
new	common	resources	(Vestlund	2015).	Moreover,	recent	contributions	have	taken	
an	 historical	 perspective	 on	 European	 regulatory	 networks,	 given	 that,	 although	
apparently	unable	to	bring	about	convergence,	they	have	been	operating	for	over	
two	 decades.	 These	 contributions	 have	 illustrated	 that,	 through	 their	 networks,	
national	 regulators	were	able	 to	establish	 the	dialogic	 relationship	with	European	
institutions	 and	 that	 they	 played	 an	 active	 role	 in	 consolidating	 the	 European	
regulatory	framework,	in	the	cases	examined,	in	telecommunications	(Mathieu	2016,	
Boeger	and	Corkin	2017).		
The	literature	on	transnational	networks	often	discusses	the	leading	role	of	the	USA	
and	the	EU	on	the	global	governance	scene	for	standards	and	regulations	in	a	variety	
of	sectors.	However,	the	conspicuous	 literature	on	policy	diffusion	across	the	USA	
rarely	 discusses	 its	 networked	 aspects	 (even	 though	 Mintrom	 and	 Vergari	 1998	
represent	an	important	exception).	The	same	could	be	said	of	the	rich	literature	on	
the	USA	regulatory	federalism	(Gormley	Jr	1983,	Pierce	Jr	1984,	Hedge,	Scicchitano	
et	al.	1991,	Lawton	and	Burns	1996,	Gerber	and	Teske	2000,	Cho	and	Wright	2004,	
McGuire	2006,	Davis	and	Hoffer	2012,	Radaelli	and	Meuwese	2012),	which	focuses	
overwhelmingly	 on	 the	 character	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	 and	 across	
bureaucratic	as	well	as	governmental	levels.	However,	these	relationships	are	usually	
phrased	in	terms	of	federalism	and	intergovernmentalism.	Childs	(2001)	and	Beecher	
(2012)	 are	 important	 exceptions.	 Their	 insights	 on	 the	 network	 relationships	
between	US	state	level	energy	regulators	will	inform	chapter	2.		
The	USA	and	the	EU	systems	of	governance	share	two	key	attributes,	which	render	
them	suitable	for	comparison	(as	I	explain	in	more	detail	later):	both	are	premised	
on	 the	 choice	 of	 independent	 regulation	 as	 a	 means	 to	 achieve	 superior	 policy	
outcomes;	and	both	are	articulated	across	 levels	of	governance.	The	 literature	on	
multi-level	governance,	however,	has	exclusively	 focused	on	 the	European	Union.	
The	concept	of	multi-level	governance,	formulated	in	a	series	of	works	by	Marks	and	
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Hooghe	(Marks,	Hooghe	et	al.	1996,	Marks,	Scharpf	et	al.	1996,	Hooghe	and	Marks	
2001,	Hooghe	and	Marks	2003),	represents	the	scholarly	effort	to	integrate	different	
territorial	levels	in	a	unified	framework	of	analysis	in	order	to	conceptualize,	explain	
and	 understand	 the	 workings	 of	 EU	 governance	 (Eising	 2008).	 The	 initial	
conceptualization	of	the	EU	as	a	MLG	system	derived	from	analyses	of	the	politics	of	
the	structural	funds	and	the	role	of	regions	in	the	EU	(Marks,	Hooghe	et	al.	1996).	
Over	time,	the	territorial	focus	of	the	MLG	literature	has	broadened	to	include	a	more	
metaphorical	connotation,	portraying	the	complexity	of	 interactions	among	actors	
placed	at	different	political	and	sectoral	levels	(Stephenson	2013)	as	well	as	occurring	
at	different	times	(Goetz	2010).		
The	kinship	between	MLG	and	policy	networks	is	amply	recognized	in	the	literature	
(Eising	and	Kohler-Koch	2003,	Kohler-Koch	and	Rittberger	2006)	and	drawn	upon	to	
convey	the	interdependence	of	actors	across	levels	and	their	collaborative	attempts	
to	 influence	European	policy-making.	The	popular	notion	of	 the	EU	as	a	“network	
governance”	 polity	 defines	 the	 formation	 of	 coalitions	 of	 interest	 around	 certain	
“issue	areas”	(Heclo	1978),	encompassing	different	types	of	actors	placed	at	different	
governance	 levels	 (Piattoni	 2010).	 Networks	 of	 national	 regulators,	 however,	
exemplify	a	typology	of	network	governance	that	is	not	adequately	captured	by	the	
network	 governance	 metaphor	 (Piattoni	 2010).	 First	 and	 foremost,	 networks	 of	
national	regulators	gather	one	type	of	actor	(regulators)	placed	at	one	territorial	level	
(national);	 they	 are,	 therefore,	 homogenous	 networks.	 Secondly,	 networks	 of 
national	regulators	define	themselves	along	sectoral,	not	“issue	area”,	lines.	Thirdly,	
these	networks	feature	representatives	from	all	Member	States,	rather	than	variable	
constellations	of	actors. 	
These	 differences	 might	 explain	 why	 the	 MLG	 literature	 and	 the	 literature	 on	
regulatory	networks	have	rarely	met.	Yet,	the	multi-level	governance	literature	and	
the	 inter-governmental	 and	 cooperative	 federalism	 literature	 in	 the	 USA	 share	
important	commonalities	in	terms	of	the	goals	they	pursue	and	the	questions	they	
ask:	what	are	the	conditions	for	collaboration	across	levels	of	governance	to	deliver	
desirable	 outcomes?	 This	 question	 has	 often	 been	 asked	 in	 the	 literature	 on	
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regulatory	networks.	 I	 contend	that,	besides	 focusing	on	outcomes,	 this	 literature	
should	re-discover	the	importance	of	the	collaboration	process	and	how	that	fits	into	
the	broader	policy	process,	what	benefits	it	entails	for	network	members,	and	how	
they	concretely	use	their	relationships	to	each	other.		
Regulatory	 networks	 are	 structures	 of	 interaction	 generated	 by	 the	 agency	 of	
individual	regulators,	given	the	structural	constraints	they	face	at	both	domestic	and	
supranational	(federal)	level.	They	are	held	together	by	interdependencies	and	the	
realization,	via	networking,	of	both	individual	and	collective	benefits	(de	Bruijn	and	
ten	 Heuvelhof	 1995).	 Studying	 what	 these	 are	 leads	 enquiry	 from	 description	 to	
causal	explanation	and	inference.	Importantly,	many	of	the	assumptions	implicit	in	
existing	literature	need	to	be	abandoned	in	order	to	break	new	ground	in	the	study	
of	networks.	The	assumptions	debunked	in	this	thesis	are	those	of:	stationarity	(in	
the	 literature,	 networks	 never	 change	 in	 either	 shape,	 mission	 or	 rationale);	
homogeneity	(although	regulatory	authorities	are	the	same	type	of	institutions,	they	
differ	greatly	from	jurisdiction	to	jurisdiction);	passivity	(network	members	are	not	
merely	 implementing	 the	 directives	 of	 their	 political	 principals);	 and	 isolation	
(networks	 are	 often	 discussed	 as	 if	 they	 were	 isolated	 from	 their	 external	
institutional	environment).	There	needs	to	be	space	in	the	literature	for	discussing	
the	 conditions	 leading	 to	 spontaneous	network	 collaboration;	 how	and	when	 the	
rationale	 of	 network	 collaboration	may	 change;	 and	 how	 the	 differences	 among	
network	members	 in	 terms	 of	 resources,	 expertise,	 independence	 etc	may	 affect	
patterns	of	collaboration.	
	
The	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature:	 the	 emergence	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	
transnational	regulatory	networks.	
First	and	foremost,	I	contend	that	enlarging	the	time	span	of	analysis	of	regulatory	
networks	is	paramount	in	order	to	seriously	investigate	their	impact	on	policy	and	on	
the	 structure	 of	 policy-making.	 Existing	 literature	 is	 overwhelming	 ahistorical	 and	
focused	on	the	time	horizon	that	Paul	Pierson	recognized	as	increasingly	prevalent	in	
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the	social	sciences:	the	time	horizon	of	a	tornado,	which	develops	rapidly	and	only	
lasts	for	a	short	period;	“In	choosing	what	we	seek	to	explain	and	in	searching	for	
explanations,	we	focus	on	the	immediate;	we	look	for	causes	and	outcomes	that	are	
both	 temporally	 contiguous	 and	 rapidly	 unfolding.	 In	 the	 process,	we	miss	 a	 lot.”	
(Pierson	 2003,	 p.	 178).	 Many	 contributions	 focusing	 on	 European	 Regulatory	
Networks	(ERNs)	are	clear	examples	of	these	attitude:	on	the	one	hand,	contributors	
disregard	the	voluntary	networks	of	regulators	that	preceded	the	establishment	of	
ERNs	 and	 emerged	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 bottom	 up	 initiative	 of	 national	 regulatory	
authorities	(see	for	instance	Maggetti	2013a	and	2013b);	on	the	other	hand,	virtually	
no	 contributors	 have	 seriously	 attempted	 to	 explain	 the	 persistence	 of	 these	
voluntary	networks	once	the	corresponding	European	Regulatory	Network	or	even	
the	 corresponding	 European	 Regulatory	 Agency	 had	 been	 created	 (although	 see	
Thatcher	2011).		
The	contribution	by	Kaiser	 (2009)	 represents	a	notable	exception	 in	studies	of	EU	
governance	in	that	it	explicitly	calls	for	more	historical	research	into	the	emergence,	
the	evolution	and	the	impact	of	networks	of	politicians,	bureaucracies,	industry	and	
other	stakeholders	in	European	governance.	In	his	comprehensive	review,	however,	
Kaiser	(2009)	does	not	mention	networks	of	regulators.	Although	recent	 literature	
has	 engaged	 in	 investigation	 of	 regulatory	 networks	 in	 a	 historical	 perspective	
(Boeger	 and	 Corkin	 2012,	 Mathieu	 2016),	 it	 has	 focused	 on	 networks	 of	
telecommunication	regulators,	on	the	emergence	phase	only	and	on	the	relationship	
with	the	European	Commission	rather	than	of	regulators	with	each	other	within	the	
network.	
Second,	 I	 consider	 that	 the	 predominant	 functional	 approach	 to	 explaining	 the	
existence	 of	 regulatory	 networks	 is	 overly	 constraining	 in	 analytical	 as	 well	 as	
conceptual	 terms.	 Moreover,	 it	 attributes	 all	 the	 agency	 of	 establishing	 and	
maintaining	 networks	 to	 the	 single	 goal	 of	 achieving	 regulatory	 convergence.	
Recently,	the	literature	has	begun	shifting	its	attention	to	the	study	of	networks	from	
the	 perspective	 of	 regulators,	 emphasising	 their	 rational	 motives	 (see	 Bach	 and	
Ruffing	(2013),	Maggetti	(2013),	Bach,	Ruffing	et	al.	(2014),	Danielsen	and	Yesilkagit	
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(2014)).	However,	these	studies	either	study	networks	from	the	outside,	or	rely	on	a	
very	 limited	 number	 of	 cases	 in	 order	 to	 gauge	 regulators’	 perceptions	 of	 their	
networks.	 Although	 studies	 emphasising	 the	 socialization	 aspect	 of	 regulatory	
networks	 exist	 (Bianculli	 2013,	 Danielsen	 and	 Yesilkagit	 2014)	 and	 represent	 an	
additional	analytical	nuance,	they	rarely	venture	beyond	description.	In	this	thesis,	
socialization	is	understood	as	a	mechanism	promoting	network	longevity.		
Third,	the	literature	has	scarcely	relied	on	the	power	of	comparative	analysis	in	its	
study	of	networks.	Many	contributions	consider	more	than	one	network;	however,	
they	 do	 not	 carry	 out	 comparative	 analysis,	 but	 rather	 consider	 similarities	 and	
differences	between	networks	in	how	a	given	independent	variable	affects	them	or	
in	how	these	networks	affect	a	given	dependent	variable.	Other	contributions	either	
discuss	networks	in	very	general	terms,	or	focus	on	a	single	case.	In	the	latter	case,	
within	case	analysis	is	rare.	Contrarily	to	existing	research,	this	analysis	exploits	the	
leverage	offered	by	systematic	case	comparison	in	order	to	perform	a	reasoned	quest	
for	 discovering	 the	 rationale	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	 cooperation.	 Specifically,	
this	 research	 looks	 within	 networks	 to	 find	 these	 responses,	 rather	 than	 outside	
networks,	and	investigates	their	thrust	through	the	perceptions,	the	memories	and	
the	assessments	of	regulators.	
This	 point	 leads	 to	 the	 main	 contribution	 that	 this	 thesis	 makes	 to	 existing	
scholarship:	investigating	the	reasons,	the	perceptions,	and	the	expectations	of	the	
agents	that	are	embedded	in	transnational	regulatory	cooperation	–	the	regulators.	
Too	often	the	motives	of	regulators	for	collaboration	within	networks	are	assumed	
away,	or	simply	neglected.	This	attitude	is	common	to	both	enthusiasts	and	sceptics	
of	 regulatory	 networks	 and	 is	 deeply	 problematic	 because,	 by	 overlooking	 the	
motivations	 of	 the	 agents	 of	 cooperation,	 it	 neglects	 its	 very	 essence.	 Relational	
patterns	within	networks	as	well	as	between	networks	and	political	referents	(in	the	
case	 of	 networks	 of	 regulators	 in	 a	 macro-regional	 or	 federal	 setting,	 like	 the	
European	 Union	 or	 the	 United	 States,	 these	 exist	 at	 both	 domestic	 and	
supranational/federal	 level)	 represent	 a	 wealth	 of	 opportunity	 structures	 for	
regulators	to	further	their	preferences,	which	current	research	ignores.		
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The	 fifth	 limitation	 of	 existing	 scholarship	 addressed	 in	 this	 thesis	 concerns	 the	
methods	of	investigation.	At	first	sight,	it	is	surprising	to	notice	that	the	vast	majority	
of	the	literature	on	regulatory	networks	does	not	rely	on	network	analysis	in	order	
to	 investigate	networks.	 In	their	 insightful	 review	of	 the	treatment	of	networks	 in	
public	administration	scholarship,	Isett,	Mergel	et	al.	(2011)	highlight	three	main	uses	
of	 the	 term	 “network”	 in	 that	 body	 of	 research:	 metaphorical,	 utilitarian,	 and	
methodological.	Earlier	literature	uses	the	word	“network”	in	a	utilitarian	way,	as	a	
tool	to	understand	coordinated	public	service	provision;	more	recent	literature	uses	
the	term	metaphorically,	as	an	organizing	concept	of	the	features	of	a	certain	social	
context2.		
The	 utilitarian	 and	 metaphorical	 approaches	 predominate	 over	 methodological	
contributions	 on	 network	 structures.	 A	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 literature,	 however,	
reveals	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 shortcoming:	on	 the	one	hand,	gathering	data	on	 the	
actual	relations	between	the	regulators	that	are	members	of	a	network	is	a	daunting	
task,	as	regulators	are	reluctant	to	provide	such	information;	on	the	other	hand,	most	
analysis	of	networks	are	actually	not	focused	on	networks	but	on	either	the	political	
decisions	driving	their	establishment	by	political	principals	or	their	effects	on	policy	
convergence	 or	 harmonization.	 Yet,	 quantitative	 network	 analysis	 offers	 a	 rich	
reservoir	of	possibilities	for	the	researcher	of	networks,	allowing	for	the	discovery	of	
patterns	 and	 drivers	 of	 transnational	 cooperation,	 a	 better	 knowledge	 of	 which	
proves	inestimable	for	this	field	of	research	as	well	as	for	transnational	governance.	
																																																						
2	In	this	regard,	these	authors	correctly	highlight	“the	important	and	critical	issue	of	whether	
the	 actors	 in	 an	 attributed	 network	 (meaning	 a	 group	 where	 the	 network	 paradigm	 is	
applied)	must	acknowledge	and	accept	that	they	operate	in	a	network	for	it	to	actually	be	a	
network.”	(Isett	et	al	2011,	p.	i160).	This	necessity	has	represented	a	further	strong	reason	
to	 rely	 on	 interviews	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 research:	 transnational	 networks	 of	
regulators	 usually	 do	 not	 call	 themselves	 networks,	 but	 “associations”.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	
important	to	mention	that	none	of	my	interviewees	has	objected	to	using	the	term	or	has	
even	enquired	about	whether	 it	was	the	right	term	to	use	or	has	used	different	words	to	
indicate	the	subjects	of	this	research.	
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Why	the	focus	on	energy	regulators?		
The	1980s	and	1990s	have	seen	the	rapid	spread	of	market	reforms	in	infrastructure	
sectors,	in	particular	telecommunications	and	electricity,	across	the	world.	The	core	
of	these	reforms	has	consisted	in	the	introduction	of	private	capital	in	infrastructure	
sectors,	 followed	 by	 liberalization	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 competition	 and	
accompanied	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 regulatory	 institutions.	 Socio-economic	
interdependence	 (Lazer	 2001,	 Raustiala	 2002),	 membership	 in	 international	
organizations	(Rodine	Hardy	2008,	Cao	2009,	Rodine-Hardy	2015),	electoral	calculus	
(Murillo	and	Martínez-Gallardo	2007),	coercion	by	International	Financial	Institutions	
(Henisz,	Zelner	et	al.	2005,	Dubash	and	Morgan	2012),	emulation	of	policy	choices	
perceived	as	legitimate	(Meseguer	2004),	competition	for	foreign	direct	investment	
(Elkins,	Guzman	et	 al.	 2006)	 are	 only	 some	of	 the	 causes	 adduced	by	 scholars	 to	
explain	why	and	how,	over	 the	course	of	 two	decades,	nearly	all	 countries	of	 the	
world	 adopted	 very	 similar	 kinds	 of	 economic	 reforms,	 including	 in	 their	
infrastructure	industries.		
The	 infrastructure	 sector	 privatization	 reforms	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Thatcher	
government	in	the	late	1970s	had	enormous	impact	worldwide.	Even	though	utility	
regulation	had	been	practiced	already	for	over	a	century	in	the	USA,	it	had	always	
had	 the	 purpose	 of	 replacing,	 not	 promoting,	 competition;	 the	 British	 reforms	
introduced	 the	 notion	 of	 regulation	 promoting	 competition	 and	 markets.	 The	
accompanying	 establishment	 of	 independent	 regulatory	 authorities	 was	 also	
followed	with	great	interest	by	practitioners	and	observers	alike.	The	combination	of	
privatization,	 re-regulation	 and	 introduction	 of	 competition	 has	 entered	 the	
economics	but	also	the	public	policy	literature	under	the	notion	of	“British	model”	
(Stern	2014).		
This	 influence	 was	 primarily	 felt	 across	 the	 European	 Union.	 Before	 European	
legislation	on	 the	 subject	was	 even	drafted,	 several	Member	 States	 governments	
looked	at	the	UK	as	a	source	of	inspiration	for	the	liberalization	of	their	markets	and	
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the	creation	of	regulatory	authorities	(a	point	made	in	the	literature	–	e.g.	Kassim	
and	Menon	 1996	 –	 and	 confirmed	 by	 my	 interviews).	 Moreover,	 British	 officials	
enjoyed	substantial	influence	within	the	EU	as	concerned	the	legal	framework,	which	
essentially	mandated	the	steady	erosion	of	state	control	over	the	utilities	(Hancher	
1996).	The	subsequent	uncertainty	regarding	the	modes	of	sector	management	after	
reform	eased	the	emergence	of	regulatory	networking	in	the	EU,	as	shall	be	seen	in	
the	thesis.	
Gilbert	and	Kahn	(1996)	scrutinize	the	specificities	of	the	utilities	and	describe	the	
regulatory	problem	as	linked	to	the	following	characteristics	of	natural	monopolies:	
capital	 intensity	 and	 minimum	 economic	 scale;	 non-storability	 with	 fluctuating	
demand;	 locational	 specificity	 generating	 location	 rents;	 essentiality	 for	 the	
community;	 involving	 direct	 connection	 to	 customers	 (1996,	 p.	 2).	 The	 last	 two	
characteristics,	 which	 imply	 large	 exploitative	 power	 by	 the	 producer,	 render	
regulation	 politically	 inevitable.	 The	 consumer	 demand	 for	 “fair”	 regulation	 of	
electricity	prices	makes	investors	wary	that,	once	they	have	sunk	capital	in	electricity	
infrastructure,	they	will	be	“unfairly”	limited	in	the	prices	they	can	charge.	Authors	
converge	on	the	acknowledgement	that,	if	private	investment	is	to	be	successfully	
attracted	 to	 and	 remain	 into	 the	 sector,	 “what	 is	 critical	 is	 that	 there	 be	 some	
protection	against	political	intervention”	(Gilbert	and	Kahn,	p.	5,	see	also	Levy	and	
Spiller	1994).	This	is	the	rationale	for	regulation	of	utilities	by	independent	regulatory	
authorities.		
Energy	infrastructure	has	important	scale	and	scope	network	properties.	Simplifying	
considerably,	 increasing	 the	 size	 of	 the	 interconnected	network	of	 electricity	 grid	
lines	 and	 gas	 pipelines	 leads	 to	 substantial	 increases	 in	 efficiency.	 The	 strategic	
importance	of	energy	for	security	and	economic	purposes,	however,	has	determined	
the	fact	that	most	electricity	and	gas	infrastructure	systems	have	been	built	in	order	
to	 ensure	 national	 self-sufficiency	 (Lagendijk	 2008).	 Nevertheless,	 engineering	
reasons	of	network	stability	and	reliability	motivated	the	construction	of	cross	border	
interconnection	lines.	In	cases	of	shortages	or	of	overcapacity	on	either	side	of	an	
interconnection,	national	system	operators	(usually,	incumbent	vertically	integrated	
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state-owned	companies)	would	agree	for	the	one-off	import	or	export	of	electricity	
in	order	to	keep	both	systems	stable.		
With	the	advent	of	energy	markets,	each	of	those	lines	came	to	represent	a	market	
opportunity.	The	allocation	of	the	costs	of	energy	trade	in	its	physical	realization	(i.e.	
the	costs	that	the	nature	of	energy	infrastructure	networks	imposes	on	the	systems	
of	parties	that	are	not	involved	in	the	market	transaction)	as	well	as	the	allocation	of	
the	costs	and	the	benefits	of	new	interconnections	are	deeply	controversial	political	
and	economic	 issues.	These	 issues	represent	the	policy	rationale	 for	 transnational	
regulatory	 cooperation.	 Integrating	 energy	 markets	 should	 bring	 considerable	
benefits	(Pérez-Arriaga,	2014):	 increase	efficiency,	 improve	security	of	supply,	and	
facilitate	the	integration	of	renewable	energy	sources.	The	challenges,	however,	are	
great.	They	can	be	summed	up	in	the	necessity	that	countries	share	reserves	and	do	
not	discriminate	among	market	players	and	among	consumers,	giving	priority	to	their	
local	demand.	This	presupposes	wide-ranging	regulatory	harmonisation,	and,	most	
importantly,	an	acceptance	of	the	fact	that	a	regional	market	is	aimed	at	improving	
global	social	welfare,	which	implies	it	may,	even	though	only	temporarily,	bring	more	
benefit	to	some	than	to	others	(Pérez-Arriaga	2014).		
The	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	and	the	literature	on	electricity	
and	gas	reforms	have,	however,	only	rarely	met.	Researchers	have	devoted	most	of	
their	attention	to	networks	having	global	scope,	such	as	those	involving	regulators	
from	the	banking	and	financial	services	sectors	(Verdier	2009,	Bach	2010,	Bach	and	
Newman	2010a,	Bach	and	Newman	2014).	The	most	visible,	and	among	the	most	
thoroughly	 investigated,	 such	 network	 is	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	
Supervision	 (Zaring	1998,	Verdier	2009,	Zaring	2009,	Zaring	2012,	Goldbach	2015,	
Reisenbichler	2015).		
The	 diffusion	 of	 the	 regulatory	 authority	 as	 institutional	 form	 is,	 indeed,	 often	
ascribed	to	the	virtues	of	the	figure	of	the	central	banker:	expertise,	clear	objectives,	
and	depoliticized	operation	(Cukierman,	Web	et	al.	1992,	Kapstein	1992,	McNamara	
2002,	Stern	and	Trillas	2003,	Simone	Polillo	and	Mauro	F.	Guillén	2005,	Gilardi	2007).	
Over	time,	the	growth	in	the	importance	and	visibility	of	networks	of	central	bankers	
	
	
32	
or	 financial	 and	 insurance	 sector	 regulators	 eased	 the	 task	of	 investigating	 them,	
given	the	appearance	of	reliable	longitudinal	data	on	their	membership,	decisions,	
and	 meetings.	 Transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 have	 been	 understood	 as	 the	
coordinated	 regulatory	 response	 to	 the	 mobility	 of	 capital,	 which	 would	 enable	
regulatory	forum	shopping	and	races	to	the	bottom	of	regulatory	standards.	
Academic	 investigation	 of	 networks	 of	 regulators	 of	 infrastructure	 sectors	 (i.e.	
electricity,	gas,	telecommunications,	water,	railways)	is	less	widespread	and	mostly	
focused	on	the	telecommunications	sector	(Barendse	2006,	Maitland	and	van	Gorp	
2009,	 Jordana	2011,	Boeger	and	Corkin	2012,	Mathieu	2016),	 followed	by	energy	
(Vasconcelos	2009,	Beecher	2012,	Bianculli	2013,	Maggetti	2014),	as	these	are	the	
two	sectors	where	the	most	extensive	reforms	have	taken	place	in	the	EU	and	around	
the	world.	 A	 considerable	 amount	 of	 research	 on	 European	Regulatory	Networks	
displays	 the	 same	 sectoral	 focus.	 However,	 the	 specificities	 of	 these	 sectors	 are	
rarely,	 if	ever,	acknowledged.	Contrary	 to	 financial	 services,	 infrastructure	sectors	
are	territorially	bound	natural	monopolies.	This	means	that	it	is	anti-economical	to	
build	two	or	more	infrastructure	systems	in	any	given	territorial	unit,	hence	affording	
a	 monopoly	 position	 to	 the	 owner	 and/or	 manager	 of	 the	 infrastructure.	 The	
conditions	at	which	this	monopoly	is	held	are	the	object	of	regulation.	
Nowadays,	 the	 telecommunications	 sector	 appears	 to	 have	nearly	 lost	 its	 natural	
monopoly	 characteristics.	 Technological	 innovation	has	 rendered	 Information	 and	
Communication	Technologies	(ICT)	markets	more	and	more	contestable.	Moreover,	
telecommunications	represent	the	 infrastructure	sector	that	 is	most	embedded	 in	
international	 institutional	 arrangements:	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organizations	 (WTO)	
agreements	 cover	 telecommunications	 services,	 and	 stipulate	 the	 obligation	 for	
countries	to	establish	a	separate	regulatory	agency	for	the	sector;	the	International	
Telecommunications	Union	(ITU)	is	the	long-standing	United	Nations	agency	for	the	
ICT	 sector,	 involving	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 stakeholders	 and	 providing	 for	 technical	
standards.	 None	 of	 this	 applies	 to	 the	 electricity	 and	 gas	 sectors.	 The	 relevant	
infrastructures	 retain	 very	 strong	 natural	 monopoly	 characteristics.	 Liberalization	
and	 privatization	 processes	 have	 not	 matched	 the	 levels	 reached	 in	
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telecommunications.	The	WTO	agreements	do	not	contemplate	energy	services.	No	
single	world	agency	or	organization,	 comparable	 to	 the	 ITU,	exists	 for	 the	energy	
sector3.		
Most	 importantly,	 the	 main	 difference	 between	 scholarship	 on	 financial	 sector	
regulatory	networks	and	extant	research	on	networks	of	infrastructure	regulators	is	
that	the	latter	is	very	informative,	if	descriptive,	thus	lacking	full	appreciation	of	the	
politics	of	this	networking	activity.	In	a	sector	as	politically	salient	as	energy,	this	is	
an	important	omission.	Differently	from	the	global	scope	of	transnational	regulatory	
networks	 in	 banking	 or	 securities	 regulation,	 transnational	 networks	 of	 energy	
regulators	tend	to	have	regional	scope.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	characteristics	of	
the	 infrastructure:	electricity	grids	and	gas	pipelines	have	 limits	to	their	extension	
before	they	become	anti-economical.		
Moreover,	 because	 the	 provision	 of	 energy	 service	 has	 a	 very	 visible,	 direct	 and	
measurable	(through	the	bills	and	through	the	outages)	impact	on	the	quality	of	life	
of	 the	 citizenry,	 it	 has	 the	 characteristic	 of	 being	 at	 once	extremely	 complex	 and	
extremely,	immediately	political.	If	the	core	of	the	regulatory	problem	in	globalized	
financial	services	is	taming	swift	capital	mobility,	regulators	of	infrastructure	sectors	
have	 to	 tackle	 the	 opposite	 issue:	 sunk	 costs.	 In	 other	words,	 capital	 invested	 in	
infrastructure	 is	 unrecoverable.	 The	assets’	 long	 lives	 and	 the	 time	 span	 required	
before	revenues	cover	the	cost	of	the	investment	make	investing	in	 infrastructure	
risky	in	absence	of	regulatory	credibility	and	policy	stability	(Spiller	1996,	Spiller	and	
Tommasi	2005).		
The	 regulatory	 problem	 in	 infrastructure	 sectors	 is	 providing	 private	 capital	 with	
sufficiently	credible	commitments	and	incentives	to	invest	in	the	infrastructure.	The	
																																																						
3	The	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA)	finds	its	origins	and	is	still	mostly	concerned	with	the	
politics	of	energy	sources	(in	particular	oil	and	gas	and	their	alternatives),	particularly	insofar	
as	 they	 involve	 relations	 between	 producer	 and	 consumer	 countries,	 but	 not	 regulatory	
aspects.	
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rationale	 for	 network	 coordination	 for	 regulators	 of	 infrastructure	 sectors	 is,	
therefore,	 qualitatively	 different	 from	 that	 of	 regulators	 of	 financial	 services.	 The	
latter	 have	 to	 tame	 capital;	 the	 former	 have	 to	 attract	 it.	 Hence,	 the	 underlying	
determinants	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 are	 sector	 specific.	 Moreover,	 the	
inescapable	 territorial	 dimension	 of	 infrastructure	 renders	 regulatory	 authorities	
constrained	not	only	 in	their	 jurisdiction,	but	also	in	their	autonomy	from	political	
principals.	 For	 this	 reason,	 researching	 networks	 of	 energy	 regulators	 presents	
familiar	as	well	as	new	challenges	and	corroborates	known	results	while	yielding	new	
ones.	
	
Analysing	 transnational	 networks	 of	 energy	 regulators:	 the	
questions,	the	concepts	and	the	hypotheses	guiding	this	research.	
The	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	has	maintained	a	rather	narrow	
focus	insofar	as	theoretical	frameworks,	approaches	and	methods	are	concerned.	As	
mentioned,	analyses	of	regulatory	networks	treat	them	as	if	they	were	“frozen”	in	
time.	The	assumption	that	network	establishment	was	driven	by	some	external	actor,	
i.e.	a	supranational	institution	such	as	the	European	Commission,	is	omnipresent	in	
the	literature.	In	the	few	contributions	recognize	to	regulators	the	paternity	of	their	
networks,	the	process	of	emergence	is	usually	neglected.	The	need	for	regulators	to	
network	 and	 exchange	 information	 is	 treated	 as	 almost	 self-evident,	 plausibly	
because	the	policy	 literature	has	established	that	exchange	of	 information	among	
stakeholders	 is	conducive	to	policy	 input	 (König	and	Bräuninger	1998,	Coen	2005)	
and/or	because	the	new	institutional	economics	approach	recognized	in	asymmetric	
information	 between	 regulators	 and	 companies	 one	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 to	
effective	 regulatory	 performance	 (Ogus	 2002,	 Guerriero	 2010).	 Yet,	 network	
formation	(which	is	an	issue	of	emergence)	may	reveal	important	information	on	the	
goals	of	exchange	and	on	the	incentives	of	the	actors	involved.	
In	their	contribution	on	the	evolutionary	phases	of	policy	networks,	Provan	and	Kenis	
(2008)	 distinguish	 between	 spontaneous,	 or	 member-driven	 regulatory	 networks	
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(that	they	call	non-brokered)	versus	networks	whose	establishment	is	mandated	by	
an	 external	 agent	 (that	 they	 call	 brokered).	 Within	 the	 brokered/non-brokered	
dichotomy,	 these	 authors	 recognize	 three	 network	 governance	 modes:	 self-
governed;	 lead-organization;	and	externally-governed.	 In	the	first	mode,	members	
are	in	the	driving	seat:	they	set	up	the	network	and	exert	shared	governance	over	it.	
In	the	second	mode,	one	of	the	network	members,	usually	the	one	with	the	greatest	
interest	 in	 the	 network	 objectives,	 takes	 up	 the	 role	 of	 lead	 organization.	 This	
member	may	provide	administration	 for	 the	network	and	underwrite	 the	 relative	
costs,	or	seek	access	to	external	funding.	In	the	third	mode,	networks	are	governed	
“by	 a	 unique	 network	 administrative	 organization	 (NAO)	 which	 may	 be	 either	
voluntarily	 established	 by	 network	members	 or	mandated	 as	 part	 of	 the	 network	
formation	 process”	 (p.	 234).	 Provan	 and	 Kenis’	 framework	 is	 parsimonious	 and	
includes	 an	 element	 evolution	 of	 networks.	However,	 it	 is	 very	 deterministic	 and	
relinquishes	consideration	of	the	reasons	why	brokered	or	non-brokered	networks	
are	established.		
Given	this	background,	the	question	guiding	the	first	part	of	the	thesis	is:		
1. What	explains	the	emergence	of	transnational/trans-jurisdictional	networks	
of	energy	regulators?	
I	rely	on	the	insights	of	the	literature	but	also	let	the	evidence	I	gathered	through	
interviews,	documentary	analysis	and	archival	research	speak	to	the	matter.	I	expect	
this	 evidence	 to	 point	 to	 some	 of	 the	 motivations	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	
literature	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 but	 also	 on	 regulatory	 agencies:	 for	 instance,	 I	
expect	regulatory	networks	to	emerge	during	policy	crises	or	policy	change,	in	line	
with	assessments	reached	by	Bernstein	(1955)	and	Downs	(1967).	Interdependence	
is	 plausibly	 going	 to	 prove	 pivotal	 in	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 desirability	 of	
transnational	 regulatory	 coordination	 (Haas	 1975,	 Keohane	 1982,	 Keohane	 1998,	
Lazer	2001,	Gilardi	2002,	Baccini	and	Dür	2012,	Van	Boetzelaer	and	Princen	2012,	
Farrell	and	Newman	2014,	Farrell	and	Newman	2015,	Saz-Carranza,	Salvador	Iborra	
et	al.	2016).	At	the	same	time,	by	focusing	on	the	regulators’	motives	to	establish	
networks,	 I	 extract	 from	 the	 research	 new	material	 that	 reveals	 how	 regulatory	
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institutions	 benefit	 from	 networking	 and	 how	 networks	 empower	 them	 towards	
both	their	domestic	interlocutors	and	supranational	ones.		
Just	like	to	individual	organizations	do,	networks	may,	over	time,	grow	(in	size	and	
importance)	and	learn	to	perform	better	and	routinize	their	procedures,	therefore	
undergoing	 a	 process	 of	 consolidation.	 Transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 usually	
display	some	elements	of	formalization,	such	as	legal	registration	(usually	as	not-for-
profit	 entity),	 a	 small	 coordinating	 secretariat,	 fixed	 budgetary	 contributions	 and	
schedules	of	activities,	meetings,	roundtables	and	the	like.	The	moment	of	passage	
from	completely	informal	and	spontaneous	interaction	between	peers	to	the	kind	of	
“light”	formalization	described	above	is	invariably	overlooked	in	the	literature.		
The	 sociological	 literature	 on	 inter-organizational	 networks	 provides	 useful	
instruments	 to	 understand	 the	 developments	 leading	 from	 a	 phase	 of	 network	
existence	to	the	next.	In	his	study	of	inter-organizational	relationships,	Powell	(1995)	
contends	 that	 trust,	 which	 is	 necessary	 for	 networks	 to	 be	 viable	 (Uzzi	 1997),	 is	
actually	 a	 product	 of	 interaction	 rather	 than	 a	 precondition	 for	 it	 (a	 point	
underpinning	 the	 arguments	 made	 in	 Slaughter	 (2017)).	 Drawing	 from	 game	
theoretic	contributions,	Powell	affirms	that	organizations	decide	to	network	when	
they	are	aware	that	 the	probability	of	 future	association	 is	high.	 In	his	view,	 trust	
cannot	be	calculated	or	enforced,	as	much	as	it	is	not	embedded:	rather,	it	emerges	
as	a	by-product	of	networking.	However,	cooperation	implies	vulnerability,	from	a	
sociological	point	of	view,	or	costs,	from	a	public	choice	perspective;	at	any	rate,	it	
requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 some	 governance	 structures	 to	 allow	 for	 constant	
monitoring	and	consultation,	leading	to	institutionalization.		
Therefore,	the	second	research	question	guiding	this	research	is:	
2. What	 explains	 the	 consolidation/formalization	 of	 transnational/trans-
jurisdictional	networks	of	energy	regulators?		
The	answers	that	are	present	in	the	literature	include	growth	in	size	and	importance,	
awareness	 of	 the	 prospect	 of	 future	 cooperation,	 and	 desire	 to	 monitor	
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counterparts’	contributions	to	the	network.	These	responses	are,	however,	confined	
to	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	 network.	 They	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 consider	 whether	 the	
relationship	between	network	members	and	their	external	institutional	environment	
may	explain	the	transition	of	a	network	from	a	looser	to	a	more	consolidated	state.	
Yet,	 this	 is	 a	 plausible	 hypothesis,	 given	 that	 regulators	 exist	 within	 complex	
institutional	systems	or	regulatory	spaces	(Hancher	and	Moran	1989),	populated	by	
a	myriad	other	actors.	
One	 of	 the	 main	 goals	 of	 this	 research	 is	 investigating	 the	 concrete	 usage	 that	
individual	 regulatory	 authorities	 make	 of	 their	 network	 ties.	 In	 examining	 the	
purpose	 of	 networking,	 I	 deviate	 from	 the	 historical	 approach	 and	 analyse	 the	
network	ties	of	the	members	of	a	single	network	at	a	single	point	in	time.	This	choice	
is	mainly	due	to	lack	of	data	on	regulators’	ties	at	different	moments	in	time.	Despite	
this	shortcoming,	the	analysis	fits	with	the	overall	approach	of	the	thesis	as	it	relies	
on	 a	 generative	 model	 that	 assumes	 that	 the	 currently	 observed	 network	
configuration	is	the	result	of	the	network	evolution	over	time.		
3. What	are	the	main	determinants	of	network	ties	across	a	network	of	energy	
regulators?	
I	derive	my	main	hypothesis	from	one	widely	acknowledged	tendency	of	members	
of	social	networks:	individuals	tend	to	associate	with	similar	others.	This	tendency	is	
captured	by	the	term	“homophily”.	In	the	case	at	hand,	I	expect	similarities	in	market	
and	sector	arrangements	to	influence	regulators’	choices	of	their	preferred	and	most	
frequent	 network	 partners,	 therefore	 pushing	 them	 to	 establish	 direct	 links	with	
those.	 In	 order	 to	 assess	 this	 hypothesis,	 I	 rely	 on	 the	 ‘Varieties	 of	 Capitalism’	
approach,	 which	 has	 recently	 been	 shown	 to	 affect	 the	 character	 of	 regulatory	
institutions	(Guardiancich	and	Guidi	2016).	I	use	the	approach	as	a	heuristic	in	the	
case	at	hand;	namely,	 to	categorize	 the	regulators	on	the	basis	of	 the	specifics	of	
electricity	sector	arrangements	that	are	found	in	their	country	of	origin.	Moreover,	
inspired	by	the	work	of	Alcañiz	(2016),	who	finds	that	sudden	budgetary	cuts	prompt	
nuclear	sector	regulators	and	experts	in	Latin	America	to	rely	on	networking	in	order	
to	pool	their	scarce	resources.	
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I	formulate	therefore	the	following	core	hypotheses:		
• Regulators	are	more	likely	to	network	with	peers	from	countries	sharing	
the	same	Variety	of	Capitalism	as	themselves,	all	else	equal.		
• Regulators	are	more	likely	to	network	with	peers	having	more	resources	
than	themselves,	all	else	equal.	
The	first	two	research	questions	concerned	specific	key	moments	in	the	history	of	a	
transnational	regulatory	network:	emergence	and	consolidation.	Once	consolidated,	
how	do	networks	evolve?	 In	particular,	 I	am	interested	 in	examining	whether	and	
how	networks	are	able	to	reinvent	themselves	once	their	original	“regulatory	policy	
function”	(to	paraphrase	Downs)	has	diminished	in	importance	as	a	result	of	changes	
in	their	institutional	environment.		
Historical	 researchers	 have	made	wide	 use	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 path	 dependence	 to	
explain	the	longevity	of	institutions.	According	to	this	approach,	institutions	emerge	
when	a	path-breaking	event	 (referred	 to	 in	 this	 literature	 as	 a	 “critical	 juncture”)	
occurs,	“moving	the	pressure	on	the	status	quo	to	a	new,	much	higher	level	–	very	
close	 to	 the	 threshold	 level	 for	 major	 political	 change”	 (Pierson	 2003,	 p.	 213).	
Outcomes	at	critical	junctures	induce	path	dependent	processes,	creating	“dynamics	
of	 self-reinforcing	 or	 positive	 feedback	 processes	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	
recurrence	 of	 the	 original	 event	 or	 process”	 (2003,	 p.	 214).	 By	 implication,	
institutions,	once	created,	persist	unaltered	(in	a	state	of	“lock-in”,	Thelen	2003)	until	
another	exogenous	shock	occurs.	A	key	point	in	the	logic	of	path-dependency	is	that	
the	factors	responsible	for	the	genesis	of	an	institution	may	be	different	from	those	
that	sustain	it	over	time.	Moreover,	the	configurations	emerging	from	path-breaking	
events	set	constraints	on	subsequent	developments,	 leaving	 less	space	for	agency	
and	contingency	and	more	for	adaptation	to	institutional	incentives	and	constraints.		
In	her	discussion	of	the	analytical	devices	that	can	be	used	to	understand	institutional	
evolution	and	change,	Thelen	(2003)	argues	that	path-dependency	is	ill-suited	to	this	
purpose.	The	path-dependent	logic,	she	argues,	is	more	apt	at	explaining	institutional	
reproduction,	i.e.	how	institutions	persist,	than	at	explaining	evolution.	Hence,	she	
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introduces	the	concepts	of	layering	and	conversion	as	analytical	constructs	that	help	
making	sense	of	evolution	and	change.	She	also	calls	for	introducing	more	structure	
at	 the	“front	end”	of	 institutional	emergence	and	more	agency	at	 the	“back	end”	
(2003,	 p.	 225).	 This	 means,	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 considering	 the	 role	 that	 existing	
structures	 played	 when	 path-breaking	 events	 led	 to	 institutional	 creation,	 by	
constraining	 the	 range	of	options	 available	 to	 actors;	 on	 the	other	 side,	 it	means	
investigating	the	agency	of	institutional	actors	within	the	framework	of	their	existing	
institutional	structures	when	faced	with	changes	in	their	environment.	The	feedback	
loops	reinforcing	path-dependent	processes	are	usually	conceived	as	constraints	on	
actors	 going	 forward;	 Thelen	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 they	 may	 also	 represents	
opportunities.	This	approach	
“…helps	understanding	why,	over	time,	institutional	arrangements	may	come	
to	 serve	 functions	 that	 are	 quire	 remote	 from	 those	 originally	 intended	by	
their	designers,	how	they	can	affect	(rather	than	just	reflect)	the	prevailing	
balance	of	power	among	societal	groups	and	how	they	can	become	resources	
for	(rather	than	just	constraints	on)	actors	engaged	in	contests	over	the	types	
of	practices	that	are	coded	as	appropriate	or	desirable.”	
	(Thelen	2003,	p.	220)		
Over	 time,	 networks	 may	 evolve	 in	 response	 to	 a	 changed	 environment	 that	
confronts	them	with	new	problems	and	challenges	that	they	address	by	using	the	
existing	structure	to	new	purposes.	They	do	so	via	a	process	of	layering,	i.e.	by	either	
partially	 renegotiating	 some	 elements	 of	 their	 mandate,	 while	 leaving	 others	 in	
place;	 or	 via	 conversion,	 i.e.	 by	 redirecting	 the	 network	 to	 new	 purposes.	 These	
themes	 emerge	 in	 early	 American	 literature	 on	 “life	 cycle”	models	 of	 both	 state	
regulatory	 commissions	 (Bernstein	 1955)	 and	 federal	 regulatory	 bureaus	 (Downs	
1967).		
As	summarized	in	Mitnick	(1980),	Bernstein	(1955)	argued	that	there	are	four	phases	
in	the	life	cycle	of	a	regulatory	commission:	gestation,	youth,	maturity	and	decline.	
Gestation	 is	 a	 phase	 during	 which	 the	 demand	 for	 regulation	 emerges:	 rising	
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dissatisfaction,	for	instance	due	to	business	practices	perceived	as	unfair,	activates	
affected	 groups	 who	 begin	 pressurizing	 government	 to	 protect	 their	 interests.	
Conflict	between	these	groups	and	the	groups	to	be	regulated	ensues.	Protracted	
struggle	 ends	 when	 a	 statute	 with	 vague	 wording	 is	 passed	 and	 regulatory	
commissions	are	created.	During	its	youth,	the	regulatory	commission	operates	in	a	
conflictual	 environment	 and	 aggressively	 fulfils	 its	 mandate,	 while	 accumulating	
experience.	 Over	 time,	 the	 policy	 crisis	 giving	 rise	 to	 regulation	 dissipates	 as	 the	
groups	that	called	for	 it	retire	and	as	regulated	industry	 is	successful	 in	appeasing	
regulators.	The	maturity	phase	sees	the	regulatory	agency	relying	on	precedent	and	
routine	and	becoming	increasingly	parochial;	regulators	are	eventually	captured	by	
industry,	leading	to	scandals	that	set	the	life	cycle	back	in	motion.		
Downs’	 (1967)	 life	cycle	of	bureaus	also	seeks	 to	explain	 the	ultimate	 rigidity	and	
capture	 of	 regulatory	 agencies	 by	 the	 regulated	 industry.	 Initially,	 the	 bureau	
emerges	from	the	demand	for	regulation	but	must	seek	external	support	in	order	to	
survive,	 as	 the	 groups	 supporting	 it	 conflicts	 with	 other	 groups.	 The	 bureau	 is	
vulnerable	 to	 termination	 initially,	 but	 overcomes	 its	 “survival	 threshold”	 and	
stabilizes	once	it	is	able	to	offer	useful	services	and	to	routinize	relationships	with	its	
major	 clients.	 The	 bureau	 grows	 because	 over	 time	 it	 learns	 to	 perform	 better,	
develops	 rules	and	procedures	and	records	 its	own	experience.	Competition	 from	
other	 bureaus,	 or	 simply	 the	 decline	 of	 its	 social	 function,	 however,	 cause	 the	
bureau’s	decline.	Bureaus	react	to	decline	by	acquiring	additional	functions	in	order	
to	survive.	“As	time	passes,	bureaus,	like	firms,	tend	to	diversity	to	protect	themselves	
from	fluctuations	 in	demand”	 (Downs	1967,	p.20).	Hence,	established	bureaus	are	
unlikely	to	die,	because	they	will	adapt	their	functions	to	changes	in	the	environment	
while	also	expanding	their	client	base.		
Thatcher	and	Coen	(2008)	have	indeed	conceptualized	the	evolution	of	the	European	
regulatory	space	in	terms	of	layering	and	conversion:	once	separate	national	policies	
gradually	evolved	to	a	European	one.	Thatcher	 (2011)	argued	that	the	creation	of	
European	agencies	has	involved	layering	and	conversion	of	the	pre-existing	informal	
	
	
41	
regulatory	networks.	At	any	rate,	those	networks	did	not	disband	with	the	creation	
of	the	agency,	leaving	open	the	question	of	their	current	rationale.		
4. What	explains	regulatory	networks	longevity?	
Network	 expansion	 may	 entail	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 functions	 performed	 by	 the	
network,	of	 the	 issue	areas	 it	concerns	 itself	with,	or	of	 its	membership.	Network	
expansion	 may	 also	 mean	 establishing	 connections	 with	 new	 clients	 for	 new	
purposes.	 Expansion	 takes	 place	 as	 the	 networks	 continues	 to	 fulfil	 some	 of	 its	
original	tasks,	whose	usefulness	to	network	members	is	still	high	even	though	it	has	
diminished	 for	actors	outside	of	 the	network,	 from	which	 the	network	derives	 its	
relevance.		
	
Definitions	of	key	concepts		
This	 research	 revolves	 around	 a	 few	 important	 concepts,	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	
define.	In	many	places	in	the	chapters	that	follow,	I	argue	that	regulators	network	
for	 legitimacy.	 I	 also	make	 references	 to	 regulators’	 credibility	 and	 reputation	 as	
being	enhanced	by	networking.	 	Further,	 I	show	that	the	agency	of	regulators	 is	a	
crucial	 determinant	 of	 network	 structure;	 and	 that	 regulators	 can	 be	 network	
entrepreneurs.	The	topic	of	the	legitimacy	of	regulatory	decision-making	permeates	
the	 literature	 on	 regulation	 (Majone	 1999,	 Lodge	 2002,	 Black	 2008,	 Black	 2009,	
Maggetti	2010,	Prosser	2010,	Keegan,	Craufurd-Smith	et	al.	2013).	Nominally,	 the	
legitimacy	of	regulators	descends	from	the	act	of	delegation	of	regulatory	authority	
from	elected	representatives	(Maggetti	2010)	and	from	their	expertise.	However,	the	
contested	nature	of	the	regulatory	process	of	decision-making	and	the	consequences	
of	regulatory	decisions	on	market	and	societal	interests	have	often	triggered	debate	
on	whether	the	act	of	delegation	sufficiently	legitimizes	regulatory	authorities.	Early	
literature	contended	that	regulatory	decision-making	would	only	affect	the	efficiency	
of	regulated	industries,	but	not	have	re-distributional	consequences	(Majone	1997).	
However,	 these	 expectations	 were	 not	 met	 in	 reality:	 regulatory	 decisions	 have	
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profound	re-distributional	consequences	and	the	regulatory	activity	 is	 ridden	with	
societal	implications	(Prosser	2010).		
In	the	context	of	regulatory	governance,	“a	statement	that	a	regulator	is	‘‘legitimate’’	
means	that	it	is	perceived	as	having	a	right	to	govern	both	by	those	it	seeks	to	govern	
and	 those	on	behalf	of	whom	 it	purports	 to	govern”	 (Black	2008,	p.144).	 In	other	
words,	a	regulator	needs	to	be	perceived	to	be	legitimate	by	those	affected	by	their	
decision.	The	legal	legitimacy	inherent	in	the	statutes	of	the	regulatory	authority	is	
not	 sufficient	 for	market	 actors	 to	 deem	 the	 regulator	 legitimate;	 if	 they	 do	 not	
consider	the	regulator	legitimate,	affected	interests	have	little	incentive	to	conform	
to	the	regulator’s	decisions.	In	other	words,	regulators	need	to	possess	legitimacy	in	
order	 to	 induce	 the	 hoped-for	 behavioural	 responses	 (Black	 2008,	 p.148).	
Importantly,	regulators	are	not	just	passive	recipients	of	legitimacy	but	can	actively	
construct	 their	 own	 legitimacy	 (Black	 2008,	 p.146),	 including	 by	 forming	 and	
maintaining	 ties	 to	 organizations	 in	 their	 institutional	 environment,	 which	 are	
perceived	 to	 be	 legitimate	 by	 those	 whose	 legitimacy	 claims	 they	 want	 to	meet	
(Meyer	 and	 Rowan	 1977).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 multi-level	 governance,	 individual	
regulators	 need	 to	 establish	 their	 legitimacy	 both	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 industry	 and	 of	
domestic	and	supranational	political	institutions.	By	networking	across	jurisdictions,	
regulation	conquer	an	 intermediary	 space	between	 levels	of	governance	 (Jordana	
2017),	which	they	can	leverage	to	increase	their	legitimacy	in	both	directions.		
Furthermore,	 I	contend	that	regulators	network	 in	order	to	boost	their	credibility.	
One	 of	 the	main	 rationale	 for	 delegation	 of	 regulatory	 authority	 to	 independent	
regulatory	 bodies	 at	 national	 level	 has	 been,	 indeed,	 enhancing	 the	 credibility	 of	
regulatory	policy	(Majone	1994,	Gilardi	2002).	The	need	for	credible	regulatory	policy	
is	heightened	in	the	context	of	market	integration,	as	uncertainty	and	differences	in	
legal,	 economic	 and	 institutional	 traditions	 impose	 further	 costs	 on	 industry.	 As	 I	
show	 in	 this	 research,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 multi-level	 governance	 systems,	 the	
regulatory	 network	 represents	 a	 repository	 of	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 information	 on	
individual	markets,	which	it	would	be	very	difficult	and	time-consuming	to	gather.	
Supranational	regulatory	institutions	benefit	from	having	a	single	point	of	access	to	
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such	information.	Hence,	regulators,	via	their	network,	are	able	to	contribute	to	the	
supranational	policy	formulation	process.	Collaborative	relationships	across	levels	of	
governance	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	 policy	 strengthens	 the	 credibility	 of	 regulatory	
commitments	at	both	domestic	and	supranational	level.		
The	 notion	 of	 reputation	 is	 very	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 mechanism	 of	 regulatory	
networking	and	 the	 regulators’	 legitimacy	and	 role	 in	policy	 formulation.	 I	do	not	
tackle	 the	 link	 between	 networking	 and	 reputation	 directly.	 However,	 interviews	
suggested	 that	 regulators	 perceived	 that	 collaboration	 within	 networks	 had	
reputation-enhancing	effects	on	them.	Arguably,	reputation	is	one	of	the	main	assets	
of	regulatory	bodies.	So	important	that	regulators	with	lower	levels	of	expertise	may	
even	be	overly	generous	with	 industry	 in	order	to	prevent	 industry	from	exposing	
their	lower	competence	and	ruining	their	reputation	(Leaver	2009).	A	reputation	for	
impartial,	 informed,	expert	decision-making	has	several	positive	consequences	 for	
regulators:	 it	 enhances	 their	 legitimacy	 (Schrefler	 2012),	 it	 produces	 desirable	
behavioural	responses	in	regulated	entities	(Cambini	and	Rondi	2011),	and	it	protects	
the	 regulators’	 autonomy	 (Carpenter	 2001)	 from	 political	 interference.	 Recent	
literature	has	argued	that	regulators’	willingness	to	cooperate	with	other	institutions	
depends	 on	 their	 calculations	 of	 the	 reputational	 benefits	 of	 the	 cooperation	
(Busuioc	 2016).	 Moreover,	 the	 position	 that	 regulators	 hold	 within	 horizontal	
network	structures	of	collaboration	is	a	determinant	of	their	reputation	(Ingold	and	
Leifeld	2014,	Fischer	and	Sciarini	2015).	In	sum,	reputation	is	a	source	of	power	for	
regulators	(Carpenter	2010).	I	contend	that	network	collaboration	has	a	reputation-
enhancing	effect	on	regulators,	as	a	result	of	their	control	on	the	information	that	is	
collected	and	generated	by	the	network.		
The	first	part	of	this	thesis	argues	that	regulators	network	for	“control”.	 I	use	this	
word	as	meaning,	essentially,	 turf,	 i.e.	a	regulatory	authority’s	 jurisdiction	(Wilson	
1980).	I	also	use	the	words	“sphere	of	authority”	to	convey	the	same	concept.	The	
reason	why	I	use	“control”	in	the	text,	rather	than	“turf”,	is	that	“control”	is	the	word	
used	by	many	of	my	 interviewees.	All	 through	the	analysis,	 I	often	emphasise	the	
importance	of	 regulators’	 agency	 in	 shaping	 and	using	 their	 network.	 The	debate	
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concerning	whether	agency	or	structure	is	more	important	for	explaining	behaviour	
is	 a	 crucial	 one	 in	 the	 institutional	 theory	 of	 organizations	 (Heugens	 and	 Lander	
2009).	The	results	of	the	process-tracing	analysis	in	this	thesis	suggest	that	regulatory	
networks	are	able	to	exert	agency	on	their	environment	by	responding	to	change	and	
pressures	in	autonomous	ways,	and	that	individuals	within	them	are	able	to	exploit	
the	network	institutionalization	to	display	policy	entrepreneurship	(DiMaggio	1988).	
This	becomes	particularly	evident	 in	the	 last	part	of	the	thesis,	where	 I	depict	the	
emergence	of	the	network	of	Euro-Mediterranean	energy	regulators	(MedReg)	as	an	
act	of	network	entrepreneurship.		
The	historical	 reconstructions	 in	 this	 thesis	 show	 that	network	emergence	always	
appears	 to	 be	 due	 to	 the	 initiative	 of	 specific	 individuals.	 However,	 the	 case	 of	
MedReg	is	different	from	all	others.	The	other	three	regulatory	networks	studied	in	
this	 thesis	 emerged	 in	 very	 similar	 circumstances:	 radical	 reform,	 uncertainty,	
governance	 tensions.	 Individual	 initiative,	 in	 those	 cases,	 sparked	 a	 process	 of	
collaboration	for	which	a	huge	window	of	opportunity	had	been	opened	by	changes	
occurring	in	the	institutional	environment.	In	contrast,	MedReg	emerged	in	absence	
of	comparable	circumstances.	Initiative	was	the	determinant	of	its	emergence.	Policy	
entrepreneurs	are	actors	capable	of	acting	as	catalysts	for	action	(Carpenter	2001),	
who	 possess	 considerable	 expertise	 and	 enjoy	 strong	 reputation	 (Arnold	 2014).	
Expertise	 and	 delegated	 authority,	 however,	 are	 not	 sufficient	 for	 policy	
entrepreneurs	to	further	their	goals;	network	ties	are	also	essential	(Newman	2008).	
	
The	methods	of	enquiry	and	case	selection.	
The	interest	of	comparative	historical	analysis	with	embedding	causal	propositions	
into	historical	processes	in	comparative	perspective	across	a	range	of	cases	affords	
the	researcher	considerable	freedom	in	terms	of	methods	and	considerable	leverage	
in	 terms	 of	 results	 (Mahoney	 and	 Rueschemeyer	 2003).	 This	 approach	 combines	
consideration	 of	 objectively	 changing	 circumstances	 and	 contexts	 with	 close-up	
analysis	of	the	actors	involved:	the	ways	in	which	they	understand	the	situations	they	
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face	are	not	assumed	away	but	integral	part	of	the	data	collection	and	analysis	(2003,	
p.	16).	For	this	reason,	the	method	of	process	tracing	is	often	used	in	comparative	
historical	research.	
The	interest	of	process	tracing	is	reconstructing	the	mechanisms	linking	a	cause	to	
an	 outcome	 within	 specific	 cases.	 As	 such,	 it	 finds	 its	 roots	 and	 most	 common	
application	 in	 analyses	 concerned	with	 the	 sequencing	 of	 events	 and	 the	 role	 of	
temporality	in	leading	from	the	cause	to	the	outcome	(Blatter	and	Haverland,	2014).	
Suitable	starting	points	for	process	tracing	are	often	critical	junctures	(Bennett	and	
Checkel,	2013),	as	they	offer	the	conditions	of	uncertainty	and	contingency	ideal	for	
an	investigator	to	reason	on	alternative	explanatory	paths.	Early	notions	of	process	
tracing	 confined	 themselves	 to	 outlining	 the	main	 thrust	 of	 the	method,	 that	 is,	
exploring	“the	chain	of	events	or	the	decision-making	process	by	which	initial	causal	
conditions	are	translated	into	case	outcomes”	(Van	Evera,	1997,	p.	64).	
Later	scholarly	debate	sought	to	strengthen	the	internal	validity	of	process	tracing	as	
instrument	 to	 open	 “the	 black	 box	 of	 causality”	 (Beach,	 2013).	 It	 underlined	 the	
invariant	nature	of	the	mechanisms	the	researcher	ought	to	test	or	to	find	within	the	
case	study,	which	are	not	to	be	confused	with	the	intervening	variables	between	two	
events	(Beach,	2013):	they	are	necessary	parts	of	a	mechanism	of	causation,	whose	
force	rests	in	its	uniqueness	and	certainty.	Those,	in	turn,	can	be	assessed	through	
tests	 confirming	 or	 disconfirming	 the	 hypothesised	mechanism	 (Mahoney,	 2012).	
Process	tracing	can	be	used	not	only	to	test	theory,	but	also	to	generate	it	(Van	Evera,	
1997;	 Beach	 and	 Pedersen,	 2012),	 raising	 issues	 of	 external	 validity,	 to	 be	 tested	
through	application	of	the	theory	generated	to	other	cases.		
From	the	standpoint	of	historical	 institutionalism,	institutions	are	characterized	by	
stability	 or	 constrained,	 adaptive	 change.	 The	 concept	 of	 path-dependence,	 as	
previously	 mentioned,	 underlies	 this	 view.	 Any	 explanation	 of	 the	 regulatory	
networks	considered	here	must	adopt	the	logic	of	path-dependence,	since	they	have	
outlived	their	initial	raisons	d'être,	sometimes	quite	considerably.	The	perspective	of	
this	 school	 of	 thought	 on	 institutions’	 formation	 and	 change	 emphasizes	 the	
identification	of	the	moment	when	these	occur.	The	choice	of	the	“when”	is	essential	
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to	then	make	the	case	that	the	patterns	created	in	that	initial	moment	persisted	and	
exerted	long-term	influence	on	the	organization	(Peters,	2011,	p.	76).	Contributors	
have	understood	major	change	to	happen	at	“critical	junctures”,	being	the	starting	
points	 for	 new	 path-dependent	 processes	 (Collier	 and	 Collier,	 1991;	 Mahoney,	
2001a,	2001b).	“Critical	 junctures”	happen	 in	moments	of	political	 indeterminism,	
when	multiple	 courses	 of	 action	 are	 possible	 the	 usual	 structural	 constraints	 on	
action	 are	 relaxed,	 allowing	 “wilful	 actors”	 to	 shape	 circumstances	 “in	 a	 more	
voluntaristic	fashion	than	normal	circumstances	permit”	(Mahoney,	2001a,	p.	7).	
Historical	institutionalism	also	emphasizes	the	role	of	ideas	in	shaping	the	formation	
of	 institutions.	 However,	 ideas	 require	 individuals	 to	 be	 translated	 into	 an	
organization.	Hence,	agency	is	crucial	in	this	perspective.	This	is	why	I	chose	to	rely	
on	 elite	 interviews	 with	 individuals	 who	 were	 directly	 involved	 or	 well-informed	
about	the	events	retraced	in	this	research.	Elite	interviews	represent	the	necessary	
complement	to	documentary	and	archival	research	in	this	context,	as	many	of	the	
events,	 the	 actions,	 the	 choices	 made	 by	 actors	 at	 the	 inception	 of	 network	
cooperation	have	never	been	recorded,	if	not	in	some	memo	notes	buried	in	these	
actors’	desks.	Interviewees	were	selected	according	to	purposive	sampling:	my	aim	
was	 to	 talk	 to	 individuals	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 establishment	 and/or	 the	
management	of	each	of	the	networks	considered	as	well	as	to	individuals	who	are	
(or	have	been)	“simple”	network	members.	I	was	acquainted	with	several	key	actors	
(including	 regulators,	 academics,	 and	 consultants)	 of	 each	 of	 the	 networks	
considered	thanks	to	previous	work	experience.	The	names	that	some	of	them	made	
during	the	interviews	helped	selecting	further	interviewees.	
I	use	Social	Network	Analysis	(SNA)	to	investigate	the	drivers	of	network	connections	
among	 regulators.	 SNA	 is	 a	 powerful	 tool	 of	 analysis	 because	 it	 allows	 for	 the	
measurement	 of	 physically	 immaterial	 relationship	 structures	 that	 constitute	 the	
fabric	of	networked	cooperation.	Through	SNA,	one	can	analyse	regulatory	networks	
in	 relational	 terms	 rather	 than	 in	 organizational	 ones.	 The	 interplay	 between	
structure	 and	 agency	 that	 is	 encountered	 when	 analysing	 networks	 is	 also	
acknowledged	 by	 researchers	 who	 have	 made	 use	 of	 the	 method	 in	 historical	
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research	(Padgett	and	Ansell	1993,	Gould	2003).	The	SNA	only	concerns	the	network	
of	European	energy	regulators.		
I	 gathered	 complete	 network	 data	 from	 regulators.	 I	 asked	 the	 Communication	
Officers	of	each	member	regulatory	authority	the	following	question:	“Think	of	the	
individuals	 you	 (or	 somebody	 at	 your	 regulatory	 authority)	 exchange	 information	
with	more	regularly	and	frequently.	Which	regulatory	authority	do	they	belong	to?”.	
The	questionnaire	asked	regulators	to	list	the	regulatory	authorities	they	are	most	
often	in	touch	with	for	exchange	of	opinions	and	suggestions.	It	also	asked	them	to	
name	the	most	active	network	members	in	their	opinion,	and	the	most	competent.		
Finally,	a	few	words	on	the	cases	selected	for	investigation.	In	this	thesis,	I	examine	
four	transnational	or	trans-jurisdictional	networks	of	energy	regulators:	
1. The	 National	 Association	 of	 Regulatory	 Utility	 Commissioners	 (NARUC)	
comprising	50	state	level	utility	regulators	from	the	United	States	of	America	
(USA).	
2. The	 Council	 of	 European	 Energy	 Regulators	 (CEER)	 comprising	 28	 full	
members	from	the	28	Member	States	of	the	European	Union	(EU).	
3. The	 Energy	 Regional	 Regulatory	 Association	 (ERRA)	 comprising	 initially	 24	
members	 from	 countries	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 and	 the	 New	
Independent	States	(CEE/NIS).	
4. The	Association	of	Mediterranean	Energy	Regulators	(MedReg)	comprising	24	
members	 from	21	countries	 in	 the	EU-defined	Euro-Mediterranean	region,	
comprising	Southern	European	Member	States,	Accession	countries	to	the	EU	
and	most	of	the	countries	comprised	in	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy.		
The	 first	 two	networks	 are	 non-brokered	networks,	 born	 out	 of	 the	 spontaneous	
initiatives	 of	 their	members	 (Provan	 and	 Kenis	 2008).	 NARUC	 and	 CEER	 are	 long	
standing	 actors	 in	 their	 respective	 regulatory	 space	 that	 have	 had	 significant	
influence	 on	 the	 policy	 process,	 as	 the	 chapters	 will	 outline.	 Chapter	 2	 and	 3	
investigate	 the	 conditions	 allowing	 them	 this	 opportunity.	 The	 second	 couple	 of	
networks	investigated	in	this	thesis	are	mandated,	or	brokered	networks	(Provan	and	
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Kenis	2008).	Their	inception	is	inter-related	with	the	developments	of	the	previous	
two	networks.	Specifically,	the	establishment	of	ERRA	was	coached	by	NARUC,	which,	
since	1998,	has	been	cooperating	with	the	US	Agency	for	International	Development	
(USAID)	 in	the	delivery	of	regulatory	technical	assistance	throughout	the	world.	 In	
contrast,	 MedReg	 is	 a	 transversal	 case:	 although	 CEER	 was	 not	 involved	 in	 its	
establishment	directly,	MedReg	originated	from	the	initiative	of	a	small	group	of	EU	
energy	regulators,	who	set	 it	up	on	the	basis	of	their	experience	within	CEER.	The	
analysis	of	 these	 two	cases,	which	 is	 carried	out	 in	 the	 third	and	 final	part	of	 the	
thesis,	shows	that	regulatory	networks	are	considered	capable	of	entrenching	policy	
change.		
Comparison	of	all	 four	cases	with	each	other	reveals	that	NARUC,	CEER	and	ERRA	
underwent	similar	evolutionary	phases,	although	at	different	paces	and	over	time	
spans	of	different	lengths.	All	three	emerged	in	the	context	of	radical	change	in	the	
policy	paradigm	of	the	energy	sector	(Hall	1993).	Moreover,	the	members	of	NARUC,	
CEER	and	ERRA	belong	to	a	well-defined	polity:	the	USA,	the	EU,	and	initially	within	
ERRA,	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 intending	 to	 enter	 the	 EU.	
MedReg,	 in	 contrast,	 did	not	 emerge	out	of	 a	policy	 crisis	 or	 a	paradigm	change,	
entailing	 uncertainty	 and	 opportunity	 structures.	 Moreover,	 the	 so-called	 “Euro-
Mediterranean”	 region	 is,	 at	 present,	 more	 of	 a	 denomination	 concocted	 by	
European	policy-makers	than	an	actual	regional	polity	with	shared	institutions,	rules,	
or	at	least	goals.	These	facts	distinguish	MedReg	from	the	other	cases	examined	in	
this	work	and	may	explain	its	lukewarm	achievements	in	terms	of	policy	contribution.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	MedReg	may	well	 represent	 an	empirical	 case	of	 collaborative	
initiative	having	mutual	trust	as	its	outcome	rather	than	its	premise	(Powell	1995).	 	
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PART	 ONE	 -	 EMERGENCE	 AND	 CONSOLIDATION	
OF	NETWORKS	OF	ENERGY	REGULATORS	
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Part	 I.	 Introduction:	 the	 spontaneous	 emergence	 and	
consolidation	of	transnational	regulatory	networks.	
	
The	literature	on	regulatory	networks	has	often	discussed	the	circumstances	of	their	
official	 establishment,	usually	 tracing	 it	back	 to	 the	preferences	of	either	political	
principals	 or	 supranational	 institutions.	 The	 spontaneous,	 bottom-up	 origins	 of	
regulatory	 networks	 are	 sometimes	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 but	
rarely	 investigated.	 Yet,	 understanding	 the	 rationale	 of	 spontaneous	 regulatory	
networking	across	jurisdictions	is	key	to	understanding	why	regulators	network,	or,	
more	precisely,	 how	 they	benefit	 from	networking.	 This	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 in	
systems	 of	 governance,	 articulated	 across	 multiple	 levels.	 In	 these	 systems,	
regulatory	 authority	 is	 distributed	 across	 levels	 to	 regulatory	 institutions,	 whose	
mission	 and	mandates	partially	 overlap.	 Regulators	 at	 lower	 levels	 of	 governance	
come	to	occupy	an	intermediary	position	(Jordana	2017)	between	levels	as	they	fulfil	
their	tasks	in	compliance	with	the	policy	mandates	deriving	from	either	level.			
Therefore,	In	this	first	part	of	the	thesis,	I	pose,	and	answer,	the	following	questions:		
- what	 are	 the	 conditions	 leading	 to	 the	 spontaneous	 emergence	 of	 trans-
jurisdictional	regulatory	networks?		
- what	are	the	conditions	prompting	network	consolidation	from	a	loose	set	of	
informal	ties	to	an	entity	with	some	of	the	properties	of	organizations?	
The	findings	of	the	analysis	are	that	regulators	begin	networking	whenever	they	are	
facing	great	uncertainty	in	the	fulfilment	of	their	tasks.	Being	unique	institutions	in	
their	jurisdictional	context,	regulators	reach	out	to	peers	in	other	countries	who	are	
facing	 similar	 uncertainty	 and	 are	 therefore	 likely	 to	 be	 facing	 similar	 challenges.	
Hence,	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 first	 question	 is	 that	 similar	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 drive	
network	formation.	Regulators	begin	networking	for	expertise,	using	each	other	as	
sources	 of	 information	 and	 of	 epistemic	 legitimacy	 in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 their	
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decision-making	domestically.	Initially,	their	collaboration	as	an	exclusively	peer-to-
peer	dimension,	confined	to	their	professional	community.		
Consolidation	of	their	loose	set	of	professional	ties	happens	as	a	result	of	the	tensions	
across	levels	of	governance	become	permanent.	Network	consolidation,	thus,	occurs	
as	a	result	of	the	interaction	between	regulators	and	the	institutional	environment	
surrounding	 them.	 Regulatory	 decisions	 have	 distributional	 as	 well	 as	 economic	
consequences.	In	other	words,	their	decisions	create	winners	and	losers.	As	a	result,	
regulators	 face	 domestic	 opposition	 from	 interests	 that	 are	 damaged	 by	 their	
decision-making.	Hence,	as	government	seeks	to	appease	constituencies,	regulators	
face	the	concrete	threat	of	losing	their	powers	and/or	see	their	autonomy	curtailed.	
Hence,	 regulatory	 networks	 emerge	 as	 organizational	 entities	 as	 a	 result	 of	
governance	 tensions	 that	 pose	 the	 continuous	 threat	 of	 partially	 reducing	 their	
powers	or	their	authority.		
Whenever	 this	 threat	 is	 common,	 regulators	 strengthen	 their	 collaboration	 by	
consolidating	their	network	into	a	representative	body	of	all	of	the	regulators	in	their	
jurisdictional	setting	(whereas	previously	smaller	subsets	of	regulators	in	the	multi-
level	 governance	 system	 would	 gather	 more	 frequently)	 displaying	 some	 of	 the	
properties	 of	 organizations:	 headquarters,	 legal	 personality,	 set	 budgetary	
contributions,	etc.	Moreover,	 regulators	use	their	network	to	seek	allies	at	higher	
levels	of	governance,	e.g.	the	supranational	level,	by	exploiting	the	latter’s	quest	for	
information	on	their	local	markets	in	order	to	formulate	policy.	Partnership,	in	the	
form	of	a	symbiotic	interdependence	(Pfeffer	and	Salancik	1978),	with	supranational	
(federal)	 institutions	 wielding	 supranational	 regulatory	 authority	 represented	 an	
enabling	factor	for	network	consolidation	and	participation	in	the	policy	process.	This	
opportunity	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 increasing	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 regulators	 and	 of	
further	strengthening	the	network.		
I	focus	my	analysis	on	the	empirical	cases	of	the	National	Association	of	Regulatory	
Utility	 Commissioners	 (NARUC)	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 European	 Energy	 Regulators	
(CEER).	These	gather,	respectively,	state	Public	Utility	Commissioners	(PUCs)	of	the	
USA	and	National	energy	Regulatory	Authorities	(NRAs)	of	the	EU.	NARUC	emerged	
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in	 1884	 and	 was	 officially	 established	 in	 1889;	 CEER	 emerged	 in	 1997	 and	 was	
officially	established	in	2000.	Both	organizations	have	risen	from	being	constituted	
as	little	more	than	informal	professional	associations	to	becoming	key	actors	in	the	
regulatory	 policy	 formulation	 process	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions.	 In	 the	 two	
chapters	to	follow,	I	retrace	their	emergence	and	consolidation.	In	doing	so,	I	identify	
the	critical	junctures	that	shaped	the	network	identity	and	mission.	In	the	conclusions	
to	this	part	of	the	thesis,	I	discuss	their	stories	in	comparative	perspective.		
The	USA	and	the	EU	are	two	“regulatory	powerhouses”	(Drezner	2007).	Both	have,	
over	 time,	 increasingly	 relied	 on	 regulatory	 policy,	 substituting	 “rowing”	 the	
economy	 with	 “steering”	 market	 actors’	 behaviour	 towards	 socially	 desirable	
outcomes	(Osborne	and	Gaebler	1993).	Therefore,	the	USA	and	the	EU	represent	the	
embodiments	of	the	notion	of	the	“regulatory	state”	(Sunstein	1989,	Majone	1997,	
Baldwin,	Scott	et	al.	1998,	Moran	2002,	Lodge	2010).	Whereas	in	the	USA	the	notion	
of	 the	 regulatory	 state	has	been	associated	with	 the	 rise	of	 federal	agencies	and,	
more	generally,	of	the	federal	layer	of	government,	in	the	European	context	the	rise	
of	the	regulatory	state	has	been	qualified	both	as	the	rise	of	the	European	layer	of	
governance	 at	 supranational	 level,	 and	 as	 the	 move	 from	 positive	 to	 regulatory	
governance	(Majone	1997)	at	national	level,	entailing	the	retreat	of	the	state	from	
the	provision	of	certain	services,	e.g.	energy	services.	In	both	polities,	the	deepest	
roots	of	the	regulatory	state	are	found	in	the	regulation	of	economic	sectors,	and,	in	
particular,	infrastructure	(Kanazawa	and	Noll	1994,	Lodge	2008).		
For	both	NARUC	and	CEER,	the	moment	of	official	foundation	represented	little	more	
than	 a	 formality,	 their	 real	 identities	 having	 formed	 at	 different	 stages	 in	 their	
evolution	 in	 response	 to	 certain	events.	 In	 their	origins	 and	evolution	“time	 itself	
becomes	an	element	of	the	causal	explanation,	a	factor	in	the	model”	(Büthe	2002,	
p.	486).	Investigating	cases	over	time	allows	the	identification	of	causal	mechanisms	
and	explanatory	factors	rooted	in	previous	phenomena	or	events,	whose	significance	
informs	 later	 events	 (Farrell	 and	 Newman	 2010,	 Farrell	 and	 Newman	 2014).	
However,	defining	the	moment	or	the	event	triggering	the	path-dependent	sequence	
of	 events	 that	 leads	 to	 the	 outcome	 is	 a	 delicate	 task,	 which	 researchers	 in	 this	
	
	
53	
tradition	are	 sometimes	accused	of	performing	arbitrarily	 (Capoccia	 and	Kelemen	
2007).	 “Critical	 junctures”	 are	 moments	 presenting	 institutional	 actors	 with	
opportunity	 structures	 that	 they	 may	 exploit	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 their	 own	
preferences.		
Capoccia	and	Kelemen	(2007)	address	a	major	shortcoming	in	the	existing	literature	
on	critical	 junctures:	 lack	of	methodological	guidance	on	how	to	recognize,	define	
and	analyse	them.	The	literature	is	rich	in	macro-historical	analyses	identifying	the	
emergence	 of	 critical	 junctures	 as	 a	 result	 of	 broad,	 structural	 causes	 of	 change,	
rather	than	from	actions	and	decisions	made	during	the	critical	juncture	itself.	Their	
model,	therefore,	aims	to	provide	a	solid	framework	to	recognize	and	analyse	critical	
junctures.	The	criteria	they	advance	are	as	follows:	
• The	 critical	 juncture	 must	 be	 a	 moment	 characterized	 by	 political	
indeterminism	 and	 uncertainty,	 when	 multiple	 courses	 of	 action	 are	
possible	but	only	one	is	chosen	thanks	to	circumstances	combined	with	
the	agency	of	wilful	actors.	• The	length	of	the	critical	juncture	has	to	be	much	shorter	than	the	length	
of	 the	 process	 it	 generates:	 the	 briefer	 the	 juncture	 relative	 to	 the	
outcome,	the	more	critical	it	is	(they	call	this	measure	temporal	leverage).		• In	 order	 to	 identify	 a	 critical	 juncture,	 one	 should	 enquire	 on	 the	
counterfactuals	 (alternative	 courses	 of	 action	 that	 might	 have	 been	
chosen,	but	were	not,	as	much	as	available	information	allows).		• The	farthest	the	probability	of	the	outcome	being	achieved	in	absence	of	
the	juncture	is	from	1	(they	define	this	measure	as	probability	jump),	the	
higher	the	likelihood	it	is	a	critical	juncture.		• The	higher	the	probability	of	the	outcome	producing	itself	post-juncture,	
the	higher	the	likelihood	that	the	juncture	is	a	critical	one.		• Contingency	is	the	key	element	of	critical	junctures.		
Critical	junctures	need	not	be	perceived	as	path-breaking	moments	as	they	occur;	to	
the	contrary,	they	could	be	small,	apparently	not	very	meaningful	events	or	decisions	
whose	posterior	impact	is	almost	surprisingly	strong.	In	the	two	chapters	that	follow,	
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I	inductively	build	the	causal	narrative	linking	critical	junctures	to	network	emergence	
and	 consolidation	 through	 process	 tracing,	 by	 relying	 on	 documentary	 analysis,	
archival	research	and	elite	interview	material.	A	rarely	highlighted	feature	of	process	
tracing	concerns	its	reliance	on	the	testimony	of	those	who	were	directly	involved	in	
the	process	under	study	(Van	Evera,	1997)	to	make	sense	of	their	decision-making	
process	and	of	the	effect	that	institutional	arrangements	and	other	stimuli	had	on	it	
(George	and	McKeown,	1985).	Blatter	and	Haverland	(2014)	 include	“confessions”	
among	 the	elements	needed	 for	process	 tracing,	 as	 actors’	 perceptions,	 although	
biased,	 can	 shed	 light	 on	 decisions	 as	 well	 as	 non-decisions,	 given	 anticipated	
consequences.	 Such	 emphasis	 on	 contingent	 individual	 behaviour	 matches	 the	
concerns	of	analyses	of	critical	junctures,	thus	bringing	the	two	frames	of	reference	
to	converge.		
The	following	two	chapters	are	informed	by	a	total	of	41	face-to-face	semi-structured	
interviews	I	carried	out	with	current	and	former	regulators	and	staff	executives	from	
NARUC	and	CEER.	Interviewees	have	been	selected	on	the	basis	of	their	role	(past	
and	present)	within	 the	network:	 chairs,	 vice-chairs,	 executive	 directors	 and	 staff	
executives.	At	the	same	time,	I	interviewed	as	many	network	members	not	holding	
official	 leadership	 or	 coordinating	 roles	 in	 the	 network	 as	 time	 and	 resources	
allowed,	in	order	to	grasp	their	perceptions	of	the	network.	Finally,	I	also	interviewed	
individuals	 who	 gravitated	 around	 both	 networks	 in	 different	 capacities,	 such	 as	
private	consultants	and	representatives	of	academia	and	international	organizations.	
All	interviewees	have	been	guaranteed	full	anonymity.	A	complete	list	of	summary	
interviewee	information	is	provided	in	Appendix	1.		
NARUC	and	CEER	are	the	by-product	of	the	inner	workings	of	the	environment	that	
generated	 them.	 Their	 importance	 grew,	 perhaps	 unexpectedly,	 for	 the	 response	
they	managed	to	articulate	to	certain	events.	In	the	case	of	NARUC,	regulators	were	
facing	the	threat	of	progressive	disempowerment	because	of	the	rise	of	the	federal	
level	 of	 government;	 in	 the	 case	 of	 CEER,	 regulators	 enjoyed	 progressive	
empowerment,	 and	 the	 network	 grew	 in	 importance,	 until	 regulators	 were	
mandated	to	coordinate,	because	a	federal	level	of	government	would	not	arise.		
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2. The	history	of	 the	NARUC:	defending	the	turf	of	 the	
Public	Utility	Commissions.	
The	long	history	of	utility	regulation	in	the	USA	is	also	the	long	history	of	the	NARUC.	
The	NARUC	membership	consists	of	utility	 regulators	 from	the	50	states	 (plus	 the	
District	 of	 Columbia,	 Puerto	 Rico	 and	 the	 Virgin	 Islands).	 Hence,	 it	 has	 a	
homogeneous	 and	 horizontal	 membership	 structure.	 Despite	 its	 longevity,	 the	
NARUC	has	rarely	been	object	of	in-depth	study.	Paul	Rodgers,	NARUC’s	Executive	
Director	from	1965	to	1996	(Beecher,	2012),	retraces	the	history	of	NARUC	from	its	
origins	to	1978.	The	book,	published	by	the	NARUC	itself,	only	exists	in	a	few	copies4.	
Childs	 (2001)	 provides	 the	 only	 thorough	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 NARUC,	
highlighting	the	 instrumental	role	 it	had	in	defending	the	PUCs’	turf	 in	the	federal	
system.	Investigation	of	NARUC	as	network	is	much	more	recent	(Beecher,	2012).		
In	his	seminal	paper	on	issue	networks,	Heclo	(1978)	remarked	how	in	the	USA	the	
politics	of	public	administration	usually	aroused	less	interest,	and	thus	scrutiny,	than	
the	Presidency	and	Congress.	Childs	(2001)	echoes	this	view,	noting	that	study	of	the	
politics	of	 regulation	 in	America	has	overwhelmingly	 focused	on	 federal	agencies.	
Studying	the	NARUC	is	an	important	step	towards	addressing	both	of	these	concerns.	
	
The	emergence	of	the	NARUC:	the	public	demand	for	regulation	of	
the	railroads.	
The	birth	of	regulation	in	the	USA	is	entwined	with	the	appearance	of	the	railroads	
(Kolko	 1965,	 Kerr	 1968,	 Nice	 1987,	 Himmelberg	 1994,	 Kanazawa	 and	 Noll	 1994,	
Dobbin	 1995,	Dowd	and	Dobbin	 2001).	 The	 sequence	of	 events	 leading	 from	 the	
appearance	of	railroads	to	state	regulation	comprises	technological	progress,	abuse	
of	 market	 dominance,	 popular	 discontent,	 litigation,	 and	 eventually	 political	
																																																						
4	The	NARUC,	very	kindly,	made	the	book	available	to	me.	
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intervention	establishing	a	new	 institution	 for	 the	resolution	of	controversies:	 the	
Public	Utility	Commission	(PUC).		
In	 the	 late	 1820s,	 the	 steam-powered	 locomotive	 technology	 revolutionized	
transportation	 across	 the	 American	 states.	 The	 railroad	 increased	 the	 speed	 of	
transportation	across	the	main	centres	of	commerce,	quickly	gaining	business	at	the	
expense	 of	 the	 incumbent	 water	 and	 turnpike	 transportation	 companies.	 Private	
railroad	 companies	quickly	multiplied,	 each	building	 their	own	 infrastructure.	 The	
technological	 disruption	 caused	 a	 series	 of	 abuses:	 wherever	 the	 railroads	 faced	
competition	 from	 other	 technologies	 --	 typically,	 over	 long	 distances,	 where	
competition	 from	 canal	 and	 riverboats	 kept	 prices	 low	 (Law	 and	 Long,	 2011)	 --	
customers	demanded	below-cost	service;	in	the	short	haul,	however,	railroads	had	
virtually	no	competitors	and	exploited	their	monopoly	power.		
The	 ensuing	 volume	 of	 litigation,	 between	 companies,	 shippers,	 and	 customers	
quickly	made	evident	the	limits	of	states	legislatures	in	regulating	railroad	operations	
and	responding	to	business	and	consumer	complaints	over	their	practices.	The	courts	
lacked	the	necessary	expertise	to	deal	with	economic	regulation	of	technical	sectors	
and	had	a	typically	passive	role,	as	they	would	take	action	upon	filing	of	suits	only	
(Rodgers,	 1979).	 In	 the	 early	 1870s,	 the	 protests	 of	 the	 farmers	 prompted	 the	
legislatures	of	four	Midwest	states	(Iowa,	Illinois,	Wisconsin	and	Minnesota)	to	pass	
legislation,	imposing	regulation	of	railroad	companies	by	regulatory	commission. 
As	Fainsod	and	Gordon	(1948)	note,	American	regulation	was	not	the	product	of	a	
farsighted	plan,	but	rather	“a	series	of	empirical	adjustments	to	felt	abuses”.	Railroad	
companies	felt	that	regulatory	legislation	damaged	their	interests,	and	challenged	its	
constitutionality	 in	a	series	of	 legal	cases.	 In	one	case,	Munn	v	Illinois	(1876)5,	the	
Supreme	Court	affirmed	that	when	private	property	becomes	affected	with	a	public	
interest	 it	can	be	subject	to	governmental	regulation	(Rodgers,	1979).	This	verdict	
represented	the	cornerstone	of	the	 legitimacy	of	state	regulation	of	the	railroads.	
“The	first	of	these	“commissions”	appeared	in	Rhode	Island	in	1839,	New	Hampshire	
																																																						
5	Munn	v.	Illinois,	94	U.S.	113	(1876)	
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in	1844,	Connecticut	in	1853,	New	York	and	Vermont	in	1855,	Maine	in	1858,	Ohio	in	
1867,	and	Massachusetts	in	1869”	(Rodgers,	p.	3).		
These	early	PUCs	did	not	have	ratemaking	powers;	their	responsibilities	were	limited	
to	 undertaking	 an	 appraisal	 of	 the	worth	 of	 a	 company’s	 property	 and	 enforcing	
railroad	 safety	 standards.	 They	 often	 consisted	 of	 only	 one	 commissioner.	 Their	
recommendations	 about	 rates	 were	 often	 plainly	 ignored	 by	 the	 railroads.	 Their	
establishment	 had	 been	 motivated	 by	 the	 willingness	 to	 calm	 public	 unrest	
(Kanazawa	and	Noll	1994).		
These	early-established	PUCs	met	six	times	before	the	creation	of	NARUC	itself.	The	
earliest	of	 these	meetings,	held	 in	1874,	 involved	Commissioners	 from	Wisconsin,	
Illinois	and	Minnesota	(Rodgers,	p.	5).	Rodgers	does	not	comment	extensively	on	the	
content	 of	 those	 informal	 meetings.	 He	 mentions	 a	 common	 willingness	 of	 the	
regulators	to	share	experiences,	compare	and	contrast	their	powers	and	obligations,	
and	 the	challenges	 they	were	 facing	 in	 regulating	 railroads.	As	more	commissions	
were	created	in	the	various	states,	they	also	joined	these	informal	meetings.	The	last	
recorded	meeting	was	held	in	1881.		
In	1886,	the	Supreme	Court,	in	the	Wabash	vs	Illinois6	case,	affirmed	the	exclusive	
competence	of	Congress	over	 interstate	commerce,	confining	the	authority	of	the	
state	commissions	to	their	state.	Only	a	year	later,	in	1887,	Congress	created	the	first	
federal	regulatory	agency	of	the	United	States:	the	Interstate	Commerce	Commission	
(ICC).	 The	 first	 president	 of	 the	 ICC,	 Judge	 Thomas	 M.	 Cooley	 of	 Michigan,	
“recognized	 that	 his	 new	 agency	 then	 lacked	 the	 resource	 to	 carry	 out	 even	 the	
modest	tasks	set	for	it	by	Congress”	7		(Rodgers,	p.	9).	Therefore,	Cooley	decided	to	
																																																						
6	Wabash,	St	Louis	and	Pacific	Railway	Company	v.	Illinois,	118	U.S.	557	(1886)		 	
7	The	ICC	powers	foreseen	in	the	Act	were	limited	and	vaguely	worded:	it	had	the	power	to	
require	 comprehensive	 information	 from	 carriers,	 as	 well	 as	 testimony;	 to	 deal	 with	
complaints,	 including	 from	 PUCs;	 to	 request	 the	 carrier	 to	modify	 its	 behaviour	 if	 found	
contravening	to	the	requirements	of	the	act,	but	in	case	of	incompliance	it	had	to	refer	the	
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call	 upon	 the	 state	 regulators	 to	 provide	 information	 on	 the	 operations	 of	 the	
railroad	 and	 their	 regulation	 in	 the	 different	 states.	 In	 order	 to	 establish	 such	
dialogue,	 Judge	 Cooley	 convened	 the	 first	meeting	 of	 the	 Convention	 of	 Railroad	
Commissioners,	 which	 was	 to	 become	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Railroad	
Commissioners,	at	ICC	offices	on	March	5,	1889	(Rodgers,	p.	8).	Representatives	of	
21	 PUCs	 attended	 the	 Convention8.	 Judge	 Cooley	 became	 the	 association's	 first	
president.	 Hence,	 the	 ICC	 and	 NARUC	 first	 chairmen	 were	 the	 same	 person,	
representing	their	cooperative	relationship.		
The	period	during	which	these	events	unfolded	ranges	from	the	early	1890s	to	World	
War	 I	 (WWI)	 and	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Progressive	 Era.	 Progressives	
nurtured	 the	 conviction	 that	 regulation	 should	 and	 could	 be	 depoliticized	 by	
entrusting	expert	 regulatory	 commissions	with	 regulatory	powers	 to	be	exercised	
independently	of	politics	and	 industry	 (Bernstein,	1977).	These	 ideas	concurred	 in	
the	establishment,	in	1907,	of	the	first	“modern”	state	commissions,	properly	staffed	
and	 overseeing	 several	 utility	 markets:	 New	 York	 and	 Wisconsin,	 which	 quickly	
became	models	for	all	other	PUCs	(Anderson	1980).		
																																																						
case	to	a	court	of	law	in	the	state	where	the	carrier	held	office	or	where	the	infraction	had	
taken	place.	http://www.historycentral.com/documents/Interstatecommerce.html	
8	The	intent	of	the	convention	to	encourage	regulatory	convergence	in	the	railroad	sector	
emerged	 since	 the	 first	meeting:	 the	 first	 reports	 to	 the	 convention	 concerned	 “Uniform	
Railway	 Statistics”	 and	 “Uniformity	 in	 Reports	 from	 Railroad	 Companies”.	 A	 third	 report	
concerned	“Uniform	Classification	of	Freights”.	These	reports	resulted	in	the	promotion	of	
resolutions.	 One	 of	 them,	 initially	 recommending	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 uniform	 freight	
classification	 for	 the	 roads	 across	 the	 country,	 was	 modified	 into	 a	 lesser	 prescriptive	
formulation	 upon	 a	 roll	 call	 vote.	 Significantly,	 Rodgers	 remarked	 (p.	 10)	 “only	 State	
representatives	voted	[…]	and	each	representative	had	one	vote	irrespective	of	the	number	
of	representatives	present	from	a	State”.	Clearly,	this	kind	of	voting	system,	coupled	with	
direct	 access	 to	 federal	 regulators,	 represented	a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 state	 regulators	 to	
attend	convention	meetings	in	order	to	make	their	interests	heard.		
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The	Progressive	 Era-inspired	decisions	 to	 grant	more	powers	 to	 the	 ICC,	with	 the	
Hepburn	Act	of	1906	and	the	Mann-Elkins	Act	of	19109,	marked	the	beginning	of	the	
conflicted	 relationship	 between	 state	 and	 national	 regulators	 (Childs,	 2001).	
Eventually,	a	 logic	of	“pragmatic	federalism”	(Childs,	2001)	prevailed,	according	to	
which	federal	agencies	and	state	regulators	cooperated	in	the	interest	of	preserving	
their	 respective	 regulatory	 powers.	 However,	 the	 railroads’	 lobbying,	 public	
discontent	with	the	railroads,	and	some	PUCs’	discriminatory	ratemaking	practices	
resulted	in	a	legal	battle,	which	had	lasting	consequences	for	regulatory	federalism	
in	the	United	States.	
	
	The	Shreveport	case	and	WWI:	questioning	the	legitimacy	of	state	regulation.	
The	story	of	how	the	process	whereby	NARUC	became	the	single	voice	of	American	
PUCs	 centers	 on	 the	 Shreveport	 case10.	 Both	 Rodgers	 (1979)	 and	 Childs	 (2001),	
identify	this	case	as	crucial	in	the	history	of	PUCs.	The	Shreveport	case	represented	
the	 beginning	 of	 their	 conflicted	 relationship	with	 the	 federal	 level	 of	 regulation,	
since	then	perceived	to	be	constantly	attempting	at	depriving	them	of	their	powers.		
In	1912,	the	PUC	of	Louisiana	filed	a	complaint	with	the	ICC	against	a	Texan	railroad	
company.	 The	 Louisiana	 PUC	 complained	 that	 intrastate	 railroad	 rates	 in	 Texas	
(established	by	the	Texan	PUC)	were	much	lower	than	interstate	rates	between	Texas	
and	Louisiana	(established	by	the	 ICC).	This	resulted	 in	Louisianan	shippers	paying	
																																																						
9	The	Hepburn	Act	gave	ICC	rulings	the	force	of	law	and	empowered	it	to	change	a	railroad	
rate	to	one	it	considered	"just	and	reasonable,"	after	a	full	hearing	of	a	complaint.	The	Mann-
Elkins	Act	placed	the	burden	of	proof	on	the	railroads;	for	the	first	time,	they	would	have	to	
actively	demonstrate	that	a	rate	was	reasonable.	Interstate	telegraph,	telephone,	and	cable	
companies,	were	declared	to	be	common	carriers	within	the	purpose	of	the	Act,	and	were	
placed	under	the	regulating	authority	of	the	Commission.	On	impulse	of	the	railroads,	the	
Act	also	created	the	Commerce	Court	to	review	ICC	decisions	(Kerr,	1968).	
10	Houston,	East	and	West	Texas	Railway	Company	vs	United	States,	234	US	342,	58	L.	Ed.	
1341	–	the	paragraphs	on	the	case	are	based	on	Rodgers	(1979)	and	Childs	(2001)	accounts.	
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higher	prices	to	reach	commercial	cities	in	eastern	Texas,	close	to	the	border,	than	
Texan	shippers	did,	even	though	the	latter	had	to	cover	much	longer	distances	within	
Texas.	 The	 case	 took	 the	 name	 from	 the	 city	 in	 Louisiana,	 which	 the	 shippers	
competed	to	serve	and	originated	the	case:	Shreveport.	
The	initial	decision	of	the	ICC	was	to	cap	the	interstate	rates	and	to	order	the	railroad	
companies	to	adjust	intrastate	rates	so	as	to	not	be	discriminatory	when	compared	
to	interstate	ones.	They	could	do	so	by	either	raising	intrastate	rates	to	the	interstate	
level,	or	by	lowering	the	interstate	rates.	The	decision,	instead	of	filling	it,	seemed	to	
make	the	institutional	and	decisional	vacuum	over	the	matter	more	evident,	as	the	
railroads	seemed	to	be	authorized	to	make	these	decisions	without	the	approval	of	
either	the	relevant	PUC,	whose	authority	was	entirely	bypassed,	or	the	ICC.	
This	long	case	culminated	in	a	1914	Supreme	Court	decision	stating	that	the	power	
to	alter	intrastate	rates	when	those	discriminated	against	interstate	ones	rested	in	
the	 ICC	 (Childs,	2001).	This	was	 in	stark	contrast	with	the	provisions	of	 the	Act	 to	
Regulate	Commerce,	instituting	the	ICC,	which	stated	“the	provisions	of	this	act	shall	
not	 apply	 to	 the	 transportation	 of	 persons	 or	 property	 wholly	 within	 one	 state”	
(Rodgers,	1979).	The	court	considered,	however,	that	discriminatory	intrastate	rates	
would	constitute	an	undue	burden	on	interstate	commerce.	In	effect,	the	primacy	of	
federal	regulation	had	been	established.		
This	legal	battle	represented	the	consolidation	of	NARUC	as	the	representative	body	
of	US	PUCs.	Through	NARUC,	PUCs	strongly	opposed	the	Supreme	Court	decision,	as	
it	was	factually	subordinating	their	 jurisdiction	to	the	federal	one.	A	delegation	of	
NARUC	representatives	even	went	to	see	one	of	the	judges	deciding	the	case	at	their	
vacation	home	(Rodgers,	p.	28)	in	order	to	make	their	case.	The	Shreveport	Doctrine	
de	facto	deprived	PUCs	of	their	authority	over	railroads.	By	this	time,	PUCs	existed	in	
most	 states	 and	 oversaw	 other	 utilities	 as	 well	 (i.e.	 telephone,	 electricity,	 gas)11.	
																																																						
11	 The	 history	 of	 how	 PUCs	 came	 to	 regulate	 other	 sectors,	 besides	 the	 railroads,	 in	
interwoven	with	the	history	of	the	electricity	utilities	in	the	USA	and	in	particular	with	the	
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NARUC	drafted	resolutions	meant	to	regain	the	PUCs’	lost	leverage	or	at	least	avoid	
being	 further	 deprived	 of	 authority	 (Childs,	 2001).	 The	 political	 response	 from	
Congress	was	to	create	a	“special	joint	subcommittee	[…]	to	conduct	an	investigation	
into	government	regulation	of	interstate	and	foreign	transportation	and	government	
ownership	of	all	public	utilities”.	The	subcommittee	never	completed	its	task	because	
the	USA	entered	WWI.		
	
The	consolidation	of	the	NARUC:	post-WWI	arrangements.	
When	the	USA	decided	to	engage	in	WWI,	it	became	evident	that	the	railroad	system	
was	unable	to	meet	the	coordination	demands	of	the	war	and	risked	plunging	into	
chaos.	This	prompted	the	Council	of	National	Defence	to	ask	railroad	companies	to	
halt	 competitive	 activities	 and	 to	 coordinate	 their	 operations	 nationally.	 The	
companies	created	the	Railroads	War	Board	to	that	effect.	Initially,	the	ICC	tried	to	
preserve	 the	 extant	 system	 of	 regulation	 and	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	War	 Board,	
although	rejecting	their	calls	for	general	rate	increases.	However,	it	later	agreed	to	
unified	operation	under	the	direction	of	the	President	(Splawn	1939).		
In	1918,	President	Wilson	created	the	temporary	US	Railroad	Administration	(RA),	to	
manage	the	railroads	for	the	duration	of	the	war.	Mr	McAdoo,	Secretary	of	Treasury,	
President’s	 son-in-law	 and	 main	 advisor	 on	 the	 matter,	 became	 the	 RA	 Director	
General.	 He	 populated	 the	 RA	 with	 railroad	 executives,	 who,	 empowered	 with	
federal	 executive	 powers	 by	 the	 Federal	 Control	 Act	 of	 1918,	 set	 off	 to	 improve	
railroads	management.	 In	 so	doing,	however,	 they	disrupted	 the	political	 balance	
characterizing	the	Progressive	Era.	Swift	rate	increases	were	authorized,	damaging	
shippers.	The	ICC	was	only	called	upon	for	advice,	its	powers	virtually	abrogated.	Only	
one	NARUC	representative	sat	in	one	of	the	RA	committees	(Kerr,	1968),	so	that	the	
																																																						
figure	 of	 Samuel	 Insull.	 Insull	 was	 a	 powerful	 and	 influential	 utility	 executive	 who	 was	
instrumental	in	the	very	creation	of	modern	State	Public	Utility	Commissions,	as	shall	be	seen	
later	in	the	chapter.	By	the	1910s,	PUCs	regulated	all	of	the	utilities.	
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representativeness	of	PUCs	was	reduced	to	the	minimum	possible.	Recognizing	that	
tension	was	mounting	against	the	RA	and	its	managers,	McAdoo’s	successor,	Walker	
Hines,	 who	 was	 also	 a	 railroad	 executive,	 tried	 to	 re-gain	 the	 shippers’	 and	 the	
NARUC’s	support	by	increasing	their	representation	within	the	RA.	He	tried	to	co-opt	
PUCs	by	setting	up	a	Public	Service	Division,	headed	by	the	then	president	of	NARUC.	
These	 decisions	 improved	 the	 relations	 between	 state	 regulators	 and	 the	 RA;	
however,	state	regulators	were	painfully	aware	of	their	considerable	loss	of	control	
over	 the	 practice	 of	 industry	 in	 their	 state	 and	 concerned	 about	 post-war	
arrangements.		
At	the	end	of	the	war,	the	entire	regulatory	and	ownership	system	of	the	railroads	
was	 put	 under	 discussion.	 Hence,	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 opened	 for	 all	
stakeholders	to	advance	their	preferences.	More	than	thirty	plans	for	reform	were	
proposed	 to	 Congress	 (Waterman,	 1919).	 Hines	 proposed	 the	 regionalization	 of	
regulation	(and	of	PUCs)	within	the	States	under	the	aegis	of	the	ICC	(Kerr,	p.	134).	
The	 railroad	 companies	 called	 for	 the	 elimination	 of	 state	 regulation	 and	
centralization	of	regulatory	powers	at	the	federal	level	(Post,	1918;	van	Metre,	1918).	
Part	of	public	opinion	was	in	favour	of	government	ownership	(Stonex,	1919).	In	its	
1919	 annual	 report,	 the	 ICC	 recommended	 continued	 private	 ownership	 and	
operation	under	governmental	 regulation	 (Eastman,	1919;	Splawn,	1939).	The	 ICC	
wanted	 its	 powers	 expanded	 and	 regulation	 to	move	 beyond	 rates	 to	 involve	 all	
aspects	of	railroad	service,	ensuring	its	stability,	and	efficiency.	Shippers	wanted	a	
return	to	the	status	quo	ante	(Kerr,	1968).		
The	NARUC	“urged	the	elimination	of	federal	control	of	the	railroads	[…],	an	ICC-State	
cooperative	 mechanism	 for	 ratemaking,	 and	 the	 eradication	 of	 the	 Shreveport	
Doctrine.”	(Rodgers,	p.	20).	“But	the	commissioners’	most	important	role	in	the	post-
war	 legislative	 debate	 was	 to	 communicate,	 through	 the	 National	 Association	 of	
Railway	and	Utilities	Commissioners,	with	 the	 Interstate	Commerce	Commission	 in	
developing	arguments	to	counter	the	railroad	attack	on	the	regulatory	system”	(Kerr,	
p.	202).	The	final	outcome	of	the	struggle	was	the	Transportation	Act	of	1920,	which	
strengthened	the	powers	of	the	ICC,	but	still	enshrined	the	Shreveport	Doctrine.		
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The	attitude	of	PUCs	towards	the	ICC	had	become	extremely	guarded,	as	exemplified	
by	 the	 following	 extract	 from	 a	 NARUC	 record	 dated	 December	 10,	 1920	 and	
consisting	of	a	letter	the	NARUC	sent	to	the	ICC	in	relation	to	a	pending	proceeding	
brought	to	the	ICC	by	railroad	companies.		
“In	this	connection,	I	call	your	attention	to	the	provisions	of	paragraph	17	of	
Section	1	of	 the	 Interstate	Commerce	Act	 as	 amended,	which	provide	 that	
nothing	in	the	Act	shall	impair	or	affect	the	right	of	a	state	in	the	exercise	of	
its	 powers	 to	 require	 just	 and	 reasonable	 service	 for	 intrastate	 business	
“except	insofar	as	such	requirement	is	inconsistent	with	any	lawful	order	of	
the	Commission	made	under	the	provisions	of	this	Act”.	If	the	commission	has	
power	 to	make,	 and	 does	make,	 an	 order	 against	 carriers	 prescribing	 the	
terms	 of	 side-track	 agreements,	 the	 effect	 of	 it	 may	 be	 to	 prevent	 state	
authorities	from	making	orders	controlling	the	terms	upon	which	side-tracks	
shall	be	 installed	and	service	provided.	These	are	 local	matters,	concerning	
which,	if	the	federal	commission	has	power,	it	is	a	serious	question	whether	it	
will	desire	to	act	in	such	a	way	as	to	interfere	with	the	jurisdiction	of	the	state	
authorities.”		
A	Supreme	Court	decision	 in	1922	(Wisconsin	Passenger	Fare	Case)	mandated	the	
ICC	to	be	receptive	of	PUCs	instances	in	those	cases	when	it	intervened	on	intrastate	
rates.	 In	that	year,	most	 ICC	members	were	former	NARUC	members:	6	of	the	11	
positions	 in	the	ICC	board	were	held	by	former	state	regulators,	and	even	the	ICC	
head	was	a	former	NARUC	President	(Childs,	2001).	Cooperation	between	the	two	
organizations	resumed	and	gradually	deepened,	until	NARUC	managed	to	eradicate	
the	 Shreveport	 Doctrine	 and	 to	 prevent	 its	 reappearance	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	
subsequent	 federal	 agencies.	 According	 to	 Childs,	 state	 regulators,	 “battling	
attempts	to	centralize	regulatory	action	in	Washington”	(p.	702),	managed	to	work	
out	 a	 role	 for	 themselves	 “in	 the	 emerging	 modern	 regulatory	 state”	 (p.	 703).	
Although	 PUCs	 eventually	 lost	 their	 powers	 in	 railroad	 regulation	 following	 the	
deregulation	 reforms	 of	 the	 1980s	 (Goldin	 and	 Libecap	 2008),	 the	 experience	
consolidated	NARUC’s	role	as	their	representative	organ	towards	federal	institutions.	
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Critical	 junctures	 in	the	history	of	the	NARUC:	battling	attempts	to	get	rid	of	
PUCs.	
Critical	 junctures	 are	 events	 determining	 change	 from	 the	 status	 quo	 ante	 in	
unexpected	ways.	There	were	several	definitional	moments	in	the	history	of	NARUC:	
the	 foundational	 moment,	 in	 1889;	 the	 Shreveport	 case	 in	 1912	 and	 ensuing	
doctrine;	the	period	following	WWI,	when	the	allocation	of	regulatory	competence	
over	 US	 railroads	 was	 put	 into	 question.	 However,	 not	 all	 moments	 bear	 the	
properties	of	critical	junctures	as	defined	by	Capoccia	and	Kelemen	(2007).	The	first	
two	 events	 lack	 the	 necessary	 contingency	 and	 unpredictability:	 PUCs	 had	 been	
informally	meeting	since	1874	and	it	was	Judge	Cooley	to	call	for	their	convention,	
establishing	NARUC,	 not	 the	 regulators.	 As	 for	 the	 Shreveport	 case,	 although	 the	
Interstate	Commerce	Act	safeguarded	PUC’s	authority	within	their	own	states,	the	
practice	of	cutting	a	State	shipper’s	costs	to	bolster	their	competitiveness	was	bound	
to	trigger	litigation	and	then	stumble	upon	federal	oversight.		
The	post-WWI	and	post-RA	setting	of	uncertainty	over	the	future	of	the	railroads,	
instead,	qualify	as	critical	junctures:		
1) Uncertainty	was	high	and	usual	constraints	on	action	were	relaxed,	so	that	all	
parties	 could	 advance	 their	 own	 preferences,	 including	 calls	 for	 public	
ownership;	
2) The	counterfactuals	were,	therefore,	many;	influential	groups	(railroads,	ICC,	
politicians)	all	had	a	different	vision;	
3) Indeterminacy	 was	 high.	 A	 complex	 puzzle	 of	 preferences	 had	 emerged:	
railroads	wanted	to	keep	private	ownership	but	to	dispose	of	competition	in	
favour	of	centralized	regulation.	The	ICC	was	calling	for	an	expansion	of	 its	
own	powers	 as	well.	 Therefore,	 PUCs	were	 seriously	 at	 risk	of	 losing	 their	
competences	over	railroads.		
4) Eventually,	 NARUC	 and	 PUCs	 remained	 and	 subsequent	 legislation	
institutionalized	their	involvement	in	ICC	decision-making	when	this	touched	
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upon	intrastate	rates.	This	meant	cementing	PUCs	and	NARUC	into	the	USA	
regulatory	 system,	 which	 is	 the	 real	 outcome	 of	 the	 struggle.	 Hence,	 the	
probability	of	NARUC	becoming	a	stable	actor	in	US	utility	regulatory	policy	
dramatically	increased	post-juncture.	
5) Contingencies	 were	 key	 in	 this	 case.	 In	 particular,	 the	 attitude	 of	 RA	
executives	during	the	war	period	brought	regulators	at	both	levels	to	form	a	
coalition	and	to	bring	shippers	on	their	side.		
Most	 importantly,	 the	 events	 surrounding	 the	 post-WWI	 struggle	 for	 regulatory	
authority	triggered	regulators’	awareness	that	conflict	over	the	degree	of	regulatory	
control	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 federal	 level	 had	 become	 inherent	 to	 the	 US	
regulatory	 federal	 system.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 was	 the	 moment	 of	 NARUC	
consolidation;	the	occasion	that	transformed	NARUC	from	a	loose	set	of	ties	to	an	
institution.		
After	the	war,	Congress	essentially	abode	by	the	pre-war	system.	Faced	with	many	
contrasting	pressures	from	different	sides,	 it	shifted	the	burden	to	the	ICC,	whose	
powers	 were	 expanded.	 However,	 at	 that	 time	many	 ICC	members	 were	 former	
NARUC	 members.	 Cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 organizations	 resumed	 and	
gradually	deepened,	until	the	NARUC	managed	to	eradicate	the	Shreveport	Doctrine,	
by	 preventing	 its	 appearance	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	 subsequent	 federal	 agencies.	 The	
weapon	 PUCs	wielded	was	 the	 NARUC	 itself:	 “once	 the	 state	 commissioners	 had	
persuaded	national	regulators,	Congress,	and	the	courts	to	accept	the	cooperative	
approach,	 they	 employed	 the	 power	 of	 their	 association,	 NARUC,	 to	 solidify	 their	
victories	with	a	concerted	movement	to	"professionalize"	the	business	of	regulation”	
(p.	704).	The	fact	that	the	outcome	of	the	juncture	was	continuity	should	not	put	in	
doubt	its	criticality.	As	Capoccia	and	Kelemen	(2007)	confirm,	a	critical	juncture	need	
not	necessarily	bring	about	change.	
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Electricity:	the	utilities’	demand	for	regulation	of	themselves.	
Since	 the	 early	 1900s,	 the	 relationships	 between	 PUCs	 and	 electricity	 industry	
executives	 evolved	 in	 parallel	 to	 their	 relationships	 with	 the	 railroad	 industry.	
However,	 they	 were	 markedly	 less	 confrontational.	 Whereas	 railroad	 executives	
struggled	 to	 eliminate	 state	 level	 regulation	 of	 their	 business,	 electric	 utility	
executives	engaged	in	the	opposite	battle:	they	actively	sought	state	regulation	and	
protected	 it	 from	 federal	 and	 local	 encroachment	 already	 since	 1898,	 when	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 case	 reviewed	 the	 method	 of	 rate	 regulation	 (Anderson	 1980,	
Anderson	 1981,	 Hausman	 and	 Neufeld	 2011).	 Anderson’s	 narrative	 retraces	 the	
inception	of	 state	 regulation	of	electricity	 in	 the	simultaneous	action,	 in	 the	early	
1900s,	 of	 three	 types	 of	 actors:	 the	 utilities,	 civil	 society	 and	 certain	 reformer	
governors,	sharing	a	common	interest	into	maintaining	regulation	at	local	level	and	
locating	it	into	independent	commissions.	
The	utilities	called	for	state	regulation	as	alternative	to	state	franchises,	which	were	
subject	 to	 corruption,	 and	municipal	 ownership.	 As	Hausman	 and	Neufeld	 (2011)	
note,	 “state	 rate	 regulation	 did	 not	 replace	 open	 competition	 among	 utilities;	 it	
replaced	regulation	by	municipalities”	(2011,	p.	727).	State	franchises	were	contracts	
whereby	 municipalities	 allowed	 the	 utilities	 to	 provide	 services	 by	 placing	 their	
equipment	on	municipal	land.	They	usually	lasted	for	several	decades.	The	terms	of	
the	franchises	varied	considerably	among	municipalities	and	did	not	foresee	constant	
oversight.	Also,	utilities	were	not	normally	offered	monopoly	protection	beyond	the	
first	few	years	of	operation,	so	that	“entry	by	competing	utilities	could	and	did	occur”	
(2011,	p.	727).	However,	municipal	governments	often	appropriated	the	quasi-rents	
generated	by	the	difference	between	the	revenue	needed	to	cover	the	utilities’	short	
run	 operating	 costs	 and	 the	 revenue	 needed	 to	maintain	 economic	 viability	 and	
threatened	the	utilities	with	entry	and	competition	unless	a	bribe	was	paid	(Hausman	
and	Neufeld,	2011).	The	introduction	of	state	regulation	gave	those	quasi-rents	the	
status	of	a	constitutional	right	protected	by	both	state	and	federal	courts.		
In	1907,	National	Electric	Light	Association	 (NELA)	 released	a	report,	outlining	the	
utilities’	 position:	 some	 form	 of	 public	 interference	 in	 their	 business	 appeared	
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inevitable,	judging	also	from	the	events	regarding	the	railroads;	they	would	rather	
have	 it	 exerted	 by	 a	 regulatory	 commission	 than	 by	municipal	 governments.	 The	
report	 was	 extremely	 timely,	 as	 in	 that	 same	 year	 the	 first	 “modern”	 PUCs	 (i.e.	
possessing	actual	regulatory	powers)	had	been	created	in	New	York	and	Wisconsin.	
In	Wisconsin,	a	Republican	politician	who	was	also	vice-President	of	a	local	electric	
utility	 actively	 lobbied	 for	 electricity	 to	 be	 regulated	by	 PUC.	 In	 California,	where	
support	for	electricity	regulation	was	fuelled	by	discontent	over	the	railroads,	utilities	
were	among	its	earnest	supporters.	As	Anderson	put	it,	“the	widespread	historical	
impression	that	the	most	important	leaders	of	all	public	utilities	were	dragged	kicking	
and	screaming	into	a	system	of	state	regulation	is	simply	wrong”	(p.	9).	At	the	time,	
electricity	networks	did	not	extend	across	state	boundaries.	The	typical	utility	served	
a	small	area	from	a	single	generating	plant	in	a	single	state	(Hausman	and	Neufeld,	
2011).	Hence,	PUCs	had	full	jurisdiction	over	the	utilities	and	regulation	effectively	
guaranteed	the	utilities	protection	from	competition.	
The	second	actor	in	Anderson’s	reconstruction	is	the	National	Civic	Federation	(NCF),	
a	group	of	“civic	reformers	and	corporate	liberals”	(p.	10).	The	NCF	published	a	report	
in	1907	stating	“public	utilities	are	so	constituted	that	it	is	impossible	for	them	to	be	
regulated	by	competition	[…]	and	the	question	is	whether	to	regulate	or	to	operate”.	
Their	reply	to	this	question	was	state	regulation.	They	feared	municipal	ownership	
would	have	perpetuated	the	corruption	machinery	around	the	granting	of	franchises.	
It	 was	 the	 Progressive	 Era,	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	 politics	 was	 at	 its	 peak.	 In	
Wisconsin,	 the	 governor	 asked	 an	 NCF	member	 to	 draft	 the	 law	 extending	 state	
regulation	to	municipal	public	utilities.	Eventually,	therefore,	the	NCF	report	served	
as	outline	for	state	legislation,	in	Wisconsin	and	elsewhere	in	the	USA.	
The	last	actors	in	Anderson’s	account	are	several	governors,	who	used	the	issue	of	
public	control	of	private	enterprise	as	a	springboard	to	launch	their	political	career	
at	 national	 level.	 He	 focuses	 on	 the	 case	 of	Governor	 C.	 E.	 Hughes	 of	New	 York.	
Hughes,	known	as	close	 to	private	 interests,	had	 led	an	 investigation	 into	utilities	
rates	and	the	insurance	industry.	Contrarily	to	expectations,	he	exposed	the	abusive	
practices	of	the	private	sector.	This	made	him	a	national	figure.	As	soon	as	elected	
	
	
68	
governor	of	New	York,	he	created	two	PUCs	whose	members	he	could	remove	at	will:	
one	for	New	York	City,	one	for	the	rest	of	the	state.	A	month	later,	the	Wisconsin	
legislature	 followed	 suit.	 In	 the	 following	 six	 years	 most	 States	 created	 PUCs	 to	
regulate	electric	and	other	utilities.	Importantly,	Anderson	retrieved	most	of	its	data	
on	 PUCs	 relationships	 from	 NARUC’s	 archives,	 and	 underlines	 NARUC’s	 role	 in	
gathering	regulators	and	providing	them	with	a	platform	for	exchange	of	experiences	
and	expertise.		
During	the	New	Deal,	many	new	federal	agencies	were	created,	such	as	the	Federal	
Power	 Commission	 (FPC	 –	 created	 in	 1920	 to	 regulate	 hydroelectric	 projects,	
reinforced	 in	 1935	 and	 given	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 sale	 and	 transportation	 of	
electricity	and	gas)	and	 the	Federal	Communications	Commission	 (FCC,	created	 in	
1934).	Both	were	enlisted	in	NARUC’s	membership.	NARUC	purposefully	shaped	its	
relationships	with	all	new	federal	agencies	in	a	cooperative	fashion.	As	a	matter	of	
fact,	previous	NARUC	members	were	often	Board	members	in	these	new	agencies.	
NARUC	representatives	helped	drafting	these	agencies’	statutes,	careful	to	prevent	
the	Shreveport	doctrine	from	being	enshrined	in	them	(Childs,	2001).		
The	 Federal	 Motor	 Carrier	 Act	 of	 1935	 was	 particularly	 important	 as	 it	
institutionalized	the	ICC	–	NARUC	cooperation.	The	Act	negated	the	application	of	
the	Shreveport	Doctrine	to	intrastate	rates	and	provided	for	the	use	of	State	joint	
boards,	nominated	by	PUCs	and	appointed	by	the	ICC,	to	decide	motor	carrier	issues	
involving	not	more	than	three	States	(Rodgers,	p.	31).	According	to	Rodgers,	these	
were	 NARUC’s	 proposals,	 which	 ended	 up	 in	 the	 law.	 The	 Act	 also	 provided	 for	
NARUC	to	have	office	space	in	or	close	to	the	ICC	building	in	Washington.		
The	 tension	 between	 federal	 agencies	 and	 state	 PUCs	 had	 become	 a	 permanent	
feature	 of	 American	 regulatory	 federalism.	 However,	 for	 a	 relatively	 long	 period	
between	the	end	of	the	Second	World	Was	and	the	1970s,	the	energy	sector	enjoyed	
a	 relative	 calm	 (Hausman	 and	 Neufeld,	 2011).	 As	 Anderson	 (1980)	 outlines,	 the	
industry	 was	 growing	 and	 reaping	 the	 benefits	 of	 economies	 of	 scale;	 increased	
consumption	was	rewarded	with	lower	tariffs	and	rates	were	perceived	as	“just	and	
reasonable”.		
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In	1965,	Professor	Harry	Trebing,	a	former	academic	turned	regulator,	established	
the	very	first	“school	of	regulation”	in	the	USA	and	the	world:	the	Institute	of	Public	
Utilities	(IPU)	headquartered	at	the	University	of	Michigan	(Miller	and	Samuels	2002).	
Commissioners	 from	 all	 over	 the	 USA	 began	 receiving	 their	 training	 at	 the	 same	
institution,	which	enhanced	their	knowledge	of	 regulation	 in	both	 theoretical	and	
practical	 terms,	 and	 further	 strengthened	 their	 bond	 to	 NARUC	 as	 their	 “natural	
home”	(interview	39).	To	this	day,	the	IPU	is	the	main	provider	of	regulatory	training	
to	US	PUCs	staff.	As	shall	be	detailed	in	the	next	chapter,	the	creation	of	a	“school	of	
regulation”	was	of	primary	importance	in	the	development	and	strengthening	of	ties	
and	cooperation	among	European	regulators.		
Before	 the	 1970s,	 Anderson	 writes,	 the	 job	 of	 being	 a	 state	 Public	 Utility	
Commissioner	was	placid	and	attracted	former	politicians	looking	for	an	occupation	
after	 retirement,	 with	 close	 links	 to	 state	 governors.	 The	 whole	 approach	 to	
regulation	at	state	level	was	premised	on	a	pact	of	sort	between	the	utilities	and	the	
state	legislature:	utilities	would	be	afforded	protection	from	competition,	provided	
they	were	subject	to	public	control.	Regulation	would	perform	both	protection	and	
control	functions.	Until	the	1970s,	developments	in	the	sector	followed	a	smooth,	
predictable	 linear	 pattern	 of	 growth	 in	 consumption	 and	 in	 utility	 revenue.	 It	 is	
perhaps	not	by	chance	that	the	first	critiques	of	regulation	were	formulated	at	this	
time,	and	that	they	focused	on	the	regulation	of	the	electricity	sector	at	state	level	
(Stigler	and	Friedland	1962,	Peltzman	1971)	before	producing	their	widely	influential	
contributions	on	the	topic	of	regulatory	capture	(Stigler	1971,	Peltzman	1976).		
This	 period	 of	 calm	 ended	 once	 economies	 of	 scale	 were	 exploited	 to	 the	 then	
possible	maximum	 and	 utilities	 began	 facing	 difficulties	 in	 raising	 capital.	 The	 oil	
embargoes	 of	 the	 1970s	 gave	 a	 blow	 to	 the	 industry,	 by	 making	 rates	 soar	 and	
pushing	several	big	utilities	on	the	verge	of	bankruptcy	(Anderson,	1980).	A	sudden	
and	massive	 increase	 in	 rates	 was	 deemed	 inevitable.	 A	 conspicuous	 amount	 of	
litigation	 ensued,	 with	 consumers	 and	 environmentalists	 becoming	 increasingly	
involved	in	the	regulatory	process.	Deciding	what	was	“just	and	reasonable”	became	
a	contested	process,	requiring	skilled,	timely	and	informed	decision-making.	Public	
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utility	 commissioners	 got	 under	 the	 spotlight	 of	 the	 stakeholders,	 who,	 in	 turn,	
became	professionalized	in	how	they	defended	their	interests.	The	whole	regulatory	
process	became	much	more	contested,	as	did	PUCs’	relationships	with	the	federal	
agencies.	
	
The	expansion	of	the	federal	agencies’	jurisdiction.	
Since	it	was	conferred	authority	over	the	sale	and	transportation	of	electricity	and	
gas	 in	 1935,	 the	 federal	 energy	 agency	 FERC	 has	 seen	 its	 jurisdiction	 constantly	
expanding,	by	allowing	it	increasing	policy	relevance	and	control.	The	introduction	of	
competitive	generation	through	the	Public	Utility	Regulatory	Policies	Act	(PURPA)	of	
1978	 and,	 in	 particular,	 through	 the	 Energy	 Act	 of	 1992	 entailed	 increased	
competencies	for	FERC	as	it	was	tasked	with	developing	new	rules	that	would	open	
access	 to	 utility-owned	 transmission	 systems	 allowing	 the	 private	 independent	
generators	to	compete	in	wholesale	markets.	The	political	support	for	restructuring	
and	deregulating	both	generation	and	retail	grew	unabated	across	the	states	during	
the	1980s	and	the	1990s;	until	the	California	electricity	crisis	of	2000-2003	reversed	
the	 trend	 (Hausman	 and	Neufeld,	 2011).	 At	 any	 rate,	 over	 time	 state	 regulators’	
control	over	the	utilities	in	their	state	diminished.	Most	recently,	the	regulations	of	
the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	 in	matters	related	to	the	environment	
and	 climate	 change	 (most	 notably,	 President	 Obama’s	 signature	 environmental	
initiative	called	Clean	Power	Plan)	also	have	tangible	consequences	for	PUC’s	powers	
and	for	electricity	rates.		
The	route	towards	centralization	of	regulatory	power	is	also	marked	in	case	law:	the	
PUCs	and	NARUC’	efforts	to	expunge	the	Shreveport	doctrine	in	the	1920s	have	not	
prevented	the	emergence	of	a	new	doctrine,	which	PUCs	perceive	as	“giving	control	
	
	
71	
to	the	feds”	(interviews	35	and	40),	i.e.	the	so-called	Chevron	deference	doctrine12	
(interview	40).	State	regulators	defended	their	powers	 in	 the	telecommunications	
sector	with	equal	resolve	(Wallsten	2006).	Events	in	that	sector	mirror	those	in	the	
electricity	sector	to	a	great	extent.	Deregulation	and	greater	network	integration	in	
both	 the	 telecommunications	 and	 electricity	 and	 gas	 sectors	 determined	 a	
diminished	 role	 of	 state	 regulation,	which	 not	 even	 the	NARUC	 could	 be	 able	 to	
reverse.		
It	 is	 in	this	context	that	the	evolution	of	NARUC	took	place.	 I	discuss	the	NARUC’s	
strategy	of	survival	as	one	of	“layering”	 (Thelen	2003):	 in	 the	early	1990s,	NARUC	
seized	the	opportunity	to	expand	the	scope	of	its	activities	by	incorporating	a	new	
rationale.	Just	like	at	its	foundation,	that	opportunity	presented	itself	in	the	form	of	
a	proposition	from	a	federal	agency.		As	chapter	6	discusses	in	detail,	the	next	critical	
juncture	 in	NARUC’s	 history	 occurred	 in	 1998,	when	 the	USAID	 and	 the	US	 State	
Department	invited	the	NARUC	to	cooperate	into	a	technical	assistance	programme	
aimed	 at	 establishing	 regulatory	 authorities	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe.	 The	
success	of	that	programme	marked	the	beginning	of	the	continued	involvement	of	
the	NARUC	in	regulatory	technical	assistance	provision	around	the	world,	which	has	
risen	to	represent	the	main	source	of	NARUC’s	income.		
	
	 	
																																																						
12	“Chevron	deference”	principle	in	administrative	law	holds	that	a	reasonable	interpretation	
of	 an	 ambiguous	 statute	 by	 an	 agency	with	 subject	matter	 jurisdiction	 prevails.	 Chevron	
U.S.A.,	Inc.	v.	Natural	Resources	Defense	Council,	Inc.,	467	U.S.	837	(1984).	
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3. The	history	of	CEER:	the	quest	for	legitimacy.	
The	emergence,	consolidation,	growth	and	evolution	of	the	CEER	has	always	been	
entirely	driven	by	national	European	regulators.	This	single	fact	differentiates	CEER	
from	all	 the	other	cases	examined	 in	 this	 thesis.	Differently	 from	other	networks,	
which	benefited	from	funding	from	external	sources	 in	their	 transition	from	loose	
communication	to	consolidated	networked	organizations,	the	CEER	has	always	been	
financed	by	regulators	exclusively.	This	fact	testified	to	the	clear	intent	of	European	
regulators	to	maintain	their	autonomy,	as	well	as	to	their	agency	in	shaping	the	role	
of	their	collaborative	network	in	the	European	energy	regulatory	policy	process.			
In	most	of	 the	United	States,	 the	creation	of	PUCs	predated	 the	establishment	of	
federal	agencies.	The	same	occurred	 in	 the	EU:	after	 the	 first	 regulatory	“offices”	
were	 created	 in	 the	 UK	 (Stern	 2014),	 the	 institutional	 format	 of	 the	 regulatory	
authority	 spread	 to	 other	 European	 countries.	 Their	 establishment	 was	 only	
subsequently	mandated	by	European	legislation.	The	creation	of	National	Regulatory	
Authorities	predates	the	establishment	of	European	Agencies,	which	has	occurred	
only	very	recently.		
The	 key	 difference	 between	 these	 two	 cases	 is	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 regulatory	
authority	 across	 levels	 of	 governance.	 In	 the	 USA,	 which	 is	 a	 federal	 system,	
regulatory	authority	 is	vertically	split	between	the	federal	and	the	state	 level.	The	
competence	of	federal	agencies	is	limited	to	interstate	infrastructure	and	issues.	The	
competence	of	 state	 level	 regulators	 is	 confined	 to	 the	boundaries	of	 their	 state.	
However,	this	apparently	neat	separation	of	powers	does	not	prevent	the	emergence	
of	conflicts	of	authority,	because	of	the	inherent	interdependent	nature	of	the	object	
of	 regulation:	 energy	 infrastructure	 is	 a	 network	 industry.	 Hence,	 infrastructure	
placed	 at	 state	 level	 feeds	 into	 interstate	 infrastructure.	 The	 interdependent,	
networked	character	of	the	infrastructure	has	caused	federal	agencies’	authority	to	
come	to	impinge	on	the	authority	of	state	regulators.		
In	contrast,	there	are	no	supranational	regulatory	authorities	in	the	EU.	Each	national	
regulatory	 authority	 is	 competent	 for	 the	 infrastructure	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	
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their	country.	The	European	Union	is	not	a	federal	state,	but	a	peculiar	political	and	
economic	 construction.	 The	 allocation	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 in	 the	 realm	 of	
infrastructure	sectors	is	not	as	clear-cut	as	in	the	US	case.	Rather,	various	institutional	
entities	placed	at	various	levels	of	governance	hold	and	compete	for	more	regulatory	
authority	on	the	sector.	Regulators	have	been	voluntarily	networking	for	a	decade	
before	the	European	Commission	mandated	them	to	coordinate	within	the	European	
Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER),	which,	however,	does	not	
have	actual	regulatory	powers.	This	results	from	the	Member	States’	reluctance	to	
delegate	regulatory	powers	to	the	European	level,	particularly	since	interconnection	
issues,	 and	 the	 repartition	 of	 the	 relative	 costs,	 are	 one	 of	 the	 longest	 standing	
matters	of	controversy	in	the	European	energy	policy	(Olmos	Camacho	and	Pérez-
Arriaga	2007).	Hence,	currently	regulatory	authority	resides	mostly	at	national	level.	
However,	 the	 ACER	 is	 managed	 by	 the	 European	 Commission.	 Therefore,	 the	
preferences	of	the	European	Commission	weigh	in	on	ACER’s	processes;	regulators	
are	not	alone	in	the	driver’s	seat.		
The	literature	has	analysed	CEER	empirically:	its		policy	relevance	(Vasconcelos	2005,	
Thatcher	and	Coen	2008,	Vasconcelos	2009);	its	empowering	effects	on	regulators	
(Maggetti	2013)	and	its	ability	to	successfully	bargain	its	gradual	absorption	(Eberlein	
and	 Newman	 2008)	 into	 the	 European	 institutional	 framework	 (Lavrijssen	 and	
Hancher	2009)	by	securing	a	central	role	for	Board	of	Regulators	into	the	Agency	for	
the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER)	(Thatcher	2011).	However,	there	are	
no	detailed	analyses	on	its	emergence	and	the	rationale	driving	it.	Investigations	of	
the	 agency	 of	 regulators	 within	 it,	 their	 motivations	 to	 network,	 and	 the	 CEER’s	
evolution	are	missing	from	the	literature.		
	
Before	 the	 Regulatory	 State:	 the	 role	 of	 engineers	 in	 promoting	
interconnections	and	cross	border	energy	trade.	
The	topic	of	cross	border	energy	trade	has	deep	roots	in	European	history,	as	shown	
by	 Vincent	 Lagendijk	 (2008)	 in	 his	 book	 on	 the	 history	 of	 electricity	 networks	 in	
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Europe.	Although	often	linked	to	the	integration	efforts	of	the	European	Commission	
and	 its	 tendency	 to	 self-aggrandizement,	 energy	 markets	 integration	 across	 the	
European	continent	has	been	a	longstanding	concern	of	(initially)	private	utilities	and,	
in	 particular,	 of	 the	 technicians	 and	 engineers	 that	 worked	 in	 the	 power	 sector.		
Langedijk’s	historical	reconstruction	underlines	the	key	role	engineers	played	in	the	
electrification	of	Western	Europe	and	in	shaping	the	debate	of	the	time	concerning	
the	desirability	of	interconnection	across	European	countries.		
Engineers	 maintained	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 European	 power	 sector	 also	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	World	War	II.	The	following	extended	quotations	portray	the	encounter	
between	US	and	European	engineers	in	the	context	of	the	Marshall	plan.	
“In	 April,	 1949,	 a	 group	 of	 European	 engineers	 was	 welcomed	 by	 their	
American	hosts.	The	visitors	from	Europe,	most	of	them	system	operators	in	
their	 respective	 countries,	 flew	 across	 the	 Atlantic	 to	 see	 firsthand	 the	
American	state-of-the-art	in	the	electricity	industry.	This	Technical	Assistance	
(TECAID)	Mission	was	an	integral	element	of	the	electricity	programs	set	up	
within	the	framework	of	the	European	Recovery	Program	(ERP),	also	known	
as	the	Marshall	Plan.	The	overall	intention	of	the	ERP	with	regard	to	electricity	
was	 to	 expand	 generation	 capacity,	 by	 building	 national	 and	 international	
power	plants	on	 the	one	hand,	and	making	better	use	of	new	and	existing	
capacity	by	creating	European	power	pools	on	the	other.	These	power	pools,	
should	 be	 brought	 about	 by	 building	 both	 physical	 and	 institutional	
interconnections	between	countries.”	(p.	107)	
“As	an	outcome	of	these	efforts,	organizations	representing	regional	power	
pools	 eventually	 became	 the	 face	 of	 European	 cooperation.	 (…)	 European	
engineers	 clearly	 had	 differing	 opinions	 from	 American	 ERP	 officials,	 who	
argued	for	international	–	and	even	supranational	–	ownership	and	operation	
of	 power	 plants	 and	 networks.	 The	 ideas	 of	 Western	 European	 engineers	
showed	 remnants	 of	 interwar	 plan,	 in	 stressing	 the	 solidarity	 effects	 of	 a	
European	network.	At	the	same	time,	their	proposed	way	of	creating	such	a	
network	was	rather	similar	to	the	consensus	that	emerged	in	the	course	of	the	
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1930s	that	national	and	international	interconnections	should	develop	side-
by-side.	 To	 them,	a	European	 system	should	 consist	of	nationally	operated	
networks,	working	in	close	coordination.”	(p.	108-109)	
Producer	 organizations	 were	 the	 main	 promoters	 of	 cross	 border	 electricity	
infrastructure	 integration	 in	 Europe.	 The	 UNIPEDE	 (Union	 Internationale	 des	
Producteurs	 et	 Distributeurs	 d’Énergie	 Électrique	 i.e.	 International	 Union	 of	 the	
Producers	 and	 Distributors	 of	 Electric	 Energy),	 set	 up	 in	 1925,	 was	 the	 platform	
where	the	ideas	of	engineers	regarding	interconnection	of	European	electricity	grids	
were	 first	 voiced.	 The	UCPTE	 (Union	pour	 la	 Coordination	de	 la	 Production	 et	 du	
Transport	 de	 l’Électricité	 -	 the	 Union	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 Production	 and	
Transportation	of	Electricity)	an	informal,	regional	network	of	utility	representatives	
from	 eight	Western	 European	 countries	 established	 in	 1951	 that	 set	 up	 the	 first	
mechanisms	of	 regular	 communication	 among	utilities13.	 Both	organizations	were	
very	 influential	 in	 framing	the	debate	on	 infrastructure	 integration	across	Europe.	
They	 evolved	 into	 what	 today	 are	 the	 Eurelectric	 (the	 association	 representing	
European	electric	utilities	in	Brussels)	and	the	ENTSO-E	(the	association	of	European	
system	operators).	
Lagendijk’s	 historical	 narrative	 compellingly	 attests	 to	 the	 relevance	 of	 technical	
experts	to	the	constitution	of	a	supranational	European	order,	linking	in	not	only	with	
well-established	research	on	the	contribution	and	impact	of	transnational	networks	
of	experts	on	national	and	transnational	policy-making	(Haas	1975,	Haas,	Williams	et	
al.	1977,	Haas	1992,	Djelic	and	Sahlin-Andersson	2006,	Ambrus	and	et	al.	2014)	but	
also	with	contributions	from	the	social	and	geographical	theory	underscoring	how	
technological	 interconnection	 and	 integration	 shaped	 the	 conceptualization	 of	
																																																						
13	Similar	groupings	were	created	over	the	years,	e.g.	one	gathering	Scandinavian	utilities,	
another	 gathering	 utilities’	 representatives	 from	 Spain,	 Portugal	 and	 France,	 another	 for	
utilities	from	Italy,	Austria	and	Yugoslavia.	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	remained	
relatively	 isolated	 from	 developments	 in	 Western	 Europe.	 Gradually,	 however,	 they	
established	similar	structures	of	cooperation	among	their	utilities’	representatives.	
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European	integration	(Barry	1996),	and	stressing	the	role	of	experts,	engineers	and	
scientists	as	physical	carriers	of	policy-impacting	knowledge	(Larner	and	Laurie	2010).		
Moreover,	 it	outlines	the	core	features	of	the	European	energy	 infrastructure	and	
market	integration	policy:	the	tension	between	national	and	supranational	authority	
and	a	preference	 for	expert	coordination	rather	 than	the	creation	of	 fully-fledged	
supranational	institutions.	On	this	background,	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	CEER	
find	their	place.	I	have	investigated	the	history	of	CEER	by	way	of	face-to-face	elite	
interviews	with	 key	 individuals	who	were	 directly	 involved	 into	 its	 establishment	
and/or	who	 previously	 or	 currently	 work	 in	 its	 ranks.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	
retrace	the	events	leading	to	its	emergence,	its	consolidation,	its	reproduction	over	
time	as	influential	actor	on	the	European	energy	regulatory	policy,	and	its	ongoing	
evolutionary	path.	
	
	The	emergence	of	the	CEER:	networking	for	legitimacy.	
“It	is	a	very,	very	interesting	story…	I’ll	give	you	an	outline	of	the	key	
stages…	 from	my	point	of	 view,	of	 course.	 I’ll	 tell	 you	my	personal	history,	
although	I	believe	it	is	similar	to	that	of	many	others”.	(interview	1)	
In	February	1997,	representatives	of	the	few	then	existing	energy	NRAs	(from	Italy,	
Spain,	Portugal,	Sweden,	Norway,	and	the	UK)	met	for	the	first	time	at	a	conference	
on	electricity	market	restructuring14	organized	by	the	European	Union	and	the	World	
Bank.	The	laws	establishing	Southern	European	NRAs	had	been	passed	in	1995	(Italy	
and	Portugal)	and	1994	(Spain).	Their	respective	governments	had	followed	in	the	
steps	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 which	 had	 undertaken	 the	 utility	 privatisation	 and	
liberalization	 process	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 had	 established	 independent	 energy	
regulatory	 authorities	 in	 1989.	As	 for	 the	 Scandinavian	 countries,	 at	 the	 time	 the	
																																																						
14	Second	World	Conference	on	Restructuring	and	Regulation	of	the	Electricity	Market,	3-5	
February	1997,	Vasteras	(Sweden).	
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liberalization	of	electricity	markets	was	well	under	way,	with	Norway	pioneering	the	
process	in	1992.	The	first	comprehensive	European	legislation	on	energy	markets	was	
released	in	1996.	The	so-called	“first	Electricity	Directive”	mandated	the	end	of	the	
energy	monopolies	and	set	the	goal	of	achieving	the	creation	of	a	European	Internal	
Energy	Market	(IEM).	However,	it	did	not	mention	regulation	or	regulators	at	all.	The	
establishment	 of	 independent	 regulatory	 authorities	 depended	 exclusively	 on	
national	governments’	initiative.		
The	 head	 of	 the	 British	 electricity	 regulatory	 authority	 (called	 Office	 of	 Energy	
Regulation,	 or	OFFER)	was	presenting	 at	 the	 conference.	At	 the	 time,	OFFER	was	
perceived	as	being	the	paradigmatic	NRA.	The	newly	established	Southern	European	
regulators	were	eager	 to	 learn	 from	 its	 experience	 (interviews	1,	 2,	 3,	 4,	 13,	 14).	
Scandinavian	 regulators,	 also	 in	 attendance,	 had	 a	 long-standing	 history	 of	
collaboration	already.	In	those	countries,	governmental	regulatory	departments	for	
infrastructure	 sectors	 were	 created	 in	 the	 early	 1900s.	 Differently	 from	 their	
Southern	European	and	British	counterparts,	which	were	constituted	as	Independent	
Regulatory	Authorities	(IRAs),	Scandinavian	regulatory	authorities	had	developed	out	
of	 former	 ministerial	 departments.	 The	 newly	 established	 Southern	 European	
regulators	 were	 more	 interested	 in	 learning	 from	 the	 British	 experience	 of	
independent	regulation.	However,	British	regulators	observed	with	more	interest	the	
massive	privatization	programmes	then	ongoing	in	South	America	and	Australia	than	
the	embryonic	opening	of	southern	European	markets.		
United	 in	 their	 quest	 for	 benchmarks,	 and	 given	 the	 strong	 similarities	 in	 their	
national	 markets,	 the	 three	 Southern	 European	 regulators	 agreed	 to	 start	
communicating	on	 a	 regular	 basis	 to	 exchange	 information	 about	 the	 issues	 they	
faced.	They	started	meeting	quarterly,	once	in	each	country.	Their	first	joint	meeting	
took	place	 a	month	after	 the	Vasteras	 conference,	 in	March	1997,	 in	 Lisbon.	 The	
second	meeting	was	held	in	San	Sebastian	(Spain)	in	June	1997.	Their	third	meeting	
took	place	in	Milan	in	December	1997.	They	established	three	working	groups,	each	
chaired	by	one	of	them.	They	charged	their	staff	with	maintaining	regular	contact	
with	the	other	two	regulators	in-between	meetings.	The	first	topics	they	addressed	
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were	 the	 new	 regulatory	 framework,	 in	 particular	 the	 development	 of	 incentive	
regulation,	and	regulatory	 independence	from	government	and	 incumbent	energy	
companies.	In	this	way,	the	three	Southern	European	regulators	lay	the	foundation	
of	what	would	become	the	CEER.		
	
The	European	Commission	co-opts	the	regulators.	
At	the	time,	the	Commission	was	severely	under-resourced,	especially	in	sectors	for	
which	 it	did	not	have	well-defined	competence,	 such	as	energy	policy.	Therefore,	
officials	in	the	Directorate	General	for	Energy	had	only	limited	knowledge	of	national	
energy	markets	and	actors.	Their	only	providers	of	information	at	the	time	were	the	
national	energy	incumbents,	which	had	clear	incentives	to	provide	a	biased	picture.	
For	 these	 reasons,	 European	Commission	 officials	 began	 reaching	 out	 to	 national	
regulators.	
In	 the	 course	 of	 1997,	 the	 then	 Director	 of	 the	 EC	 Directorate	 General	 (DG)	 on	
Transport	and	Energy	(TREN,	now	DG	ENER)	learnt	about	the	ongoing	meetings	of	
the	three	Southern	European	regulators.	Their	developing	collaboration	inspired	him	
to	conceive	of	a	multi-stakeholder	Forum,	whose	task	would	be	to	foster	dialogue	
between	stakeholders	on	energy	market	reforms,	and	encourage	progress	towards	
the	 creation	 of	 the	 Internal	 Energy	Market	 (IEM).	 He	 envisioned	 it	 as	 a	 regularly	
scheduled	 gathering	 of	 “those	 actors	 who,	 like	 itself,	 felt	 the	 need	 for	 market	
integration”	 (interview	 3),	 i.e.	 regulators,	 operators,	 and	 other	 energy	 market	
stakeholders.	It	was	also	a	mechanism	to	bring	transparency	into	a	sector	that,	at	the	
time,	was	impervious	to	the	outside	observer.		
The	European	Commission	had	realized	that	mandating	the	abolition	of	the	state-
owned	utility	monopolies,	as	the	1996	First	Electricity	Directive	had	done,	was	not	
enough	to	stimulate	cross	border	energy	trade.	However,	it	was	too	early	to	begin	
negotiating	 a	 second	 piece	 of	 legislation.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 Member	 States	
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representatives	were	still	negotiating	the	first	Gas	Directive	as	these	discussions	were	
taking	place.		
The	 Director	 General’s	 idea	 resonated	 with	 sector	 stakeholders	 and	 rapidly	
materialized	 into	what	was	called	 the	European	Electricity	Regulatory	Forum.	The	
first	meeting	of	the	Forum	was	held	in	Florence	(Italy)	in	February	1998.	Henceforth	
it	 was	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 “the	 Florence	 Forum”.	 Florence	 appeared	 as	 a	
suitably	neutral	location	because	it	hosted	a	European	apolitical	institution,	i.e.	the	
European	 University	 Institute	 (EUI15).	 The	 following	 year,	 the	 European	 Gas	
Regulatory	Forum,	or	“Madrid	Forum”,	was	set	up,	focused	on	the	gas	sector.	Now	a	
consolidated,	 taken-for-granted	 event	 concerning	 EU	 electricity	 markets	 and	
regulatory	policy	matters,	at	the	time	the	Florence	Forum	represented	a	veritable	
revolution	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 a	 bold	 initiative	 of	 the	
Commission.	The	idea	of	bringing	together	regulators16,	operators,	utility	companies	
and	European	Commission	officials	was	literally	unheard	of.	Attendees	of	the	very	
first	meeting	of	the	Florence	forum		
“…included	 senior	 representatives	 of	 national	 regulators	 or	 ministries	
responsible	 for	 electricity	 regulation,	 the	 EU	 Director	 General	 for	 Energy,	
Pablo	 Benavides,	 European	 Commission	 officials	 (DGs	 XVII	 and	 IV),	
representatives	 of	 the	 electricity	 industry	 and	 of	 major	 consumers.	 All	 EU	
Member	States	were	represented	as	well	as	Unites	States,	New	Zealand	and	
Norway.	The	main	areas	addressed	by	the	forum	covered	transmission	pricing	
methods	 and	 cost	 accounting,	 (…)	 non-discrimination	 and	 unbundling,	 and	
treatment	 of	 public	 service	 obligations	 and	 environmental	 ‘costs’	 in	 a	 pro-
competitive	environment.	(…)	Mr	Benavides	emphasised	that	the	objective	is	
not	simply	the	liberalisation	of	15	national	systems,	but	also	the	establishment	
																																																						
15	The	EUI	is	the	only	European	university,	whose	existence	is	based	on	a	legal	agreement	
between	 the	 EU	 and	 22	 Member	 States,	 initially	 signed	 in	 1970s1972,	
https://www.eui.eu/About/HistoryofEUI.	
16	Because	most	Member	States	had	not	established	a	regulatory	authority	yet,	their	energy	
Ministers	were	invited	instead.	
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of	an	Internal	Market	in	electricity:	i.e.	not	just	liberalisation	but	also	"internal	
marketisation".	This	means	that	the	imperative	of	subsidiarity	co-exists	with	
the	need	for	a	certain	degree	of	homogeneous	interpretation	on	the	part	of	
the	Member	States.”	(First	Florence	Forum	Meeting	1998	-	minutes)	
Besides	 presentations	 from	 the	 European	 Commission,	 key	 Transmission	 System	
Operators	 (TSOs	 –	 from	 the	 UK,	 Sweden,	 Germany,	 Spain)	 and	 European	 and	
American	consultants,	a	roundtable	of	regulators	also	took	place	during	the	meeting.	
Participants	 included	 regulators	 from	 Italy,	 Spain,	 Portugal,	 Sweden,	 Norway,	
Finland,	Denmark,	the	UK,	and	the	US.	All	regulators	recognized	the	need	to	allow	for	
national	 diversity	 and	 to	 increase	 transparency.	 However,	 clear	 differences	 in	
approach	emerged	in	the	discussion.	According	to	the	minutes,	while	the	Portuguese	
regulator	made	 the	 clearest	 calls	 for	 harmonized	 regulatory	 approaches,	 German	
industrial	consumers	expressed	satisfaction	with	the	hands-off	approach	in	place	in	
their	country	and	clearly	auspicated	that	“stronger	regulation	will	not	be	called	for”.	
The	hopes	of	German	industrial	consumers	stood	to	be	disappointed:	at	the	second	
meeting	of	the	Forum,	which	took	place	six	months	later,	the	topic	of	the	regulation	
of	 TSO	 took	 centre	 stage	 together	 with	 key	 aspect	 of	 market	 opening,	 such	 as	
unbundling.	
The	first	meeting	of	the	corresponding	gas	Forum,	held	in	Madrid	for	the	first	time	
and	henceforth	renamed	“the	Madrid	Forum”	took	place	in	the	same	year	–	1998.	
The	 minutes	 of	 that	 first	 meeting	 suggest	 a	 cautious	 approach	 concerning	 the	
integration	of	European	gas	markets.	
	“The	fundamental	objective	of	the	Forum	is	to	develop	consensus	amongst	all	
the	parties	involved	in	this	process;	governments,	regulators	and	industry,	in	
order	to	make	rapid	progress	on	these	highly	technical	issues.	This	mechanism	
acts	as	a	complement	to	harmonisation	measures	that	may	be	necessary	to	
achieve	the	basic	goal	of	an	effectively	functioning	single	market.”		
Similar	to	its	electricity	counterpart,	the	meeting	was	attended	by	officials	from	the	
European	Commission,	national	regulatory	authorities	and	EU	Energy	Ministries,	as	
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well	as	 representatives	 from	 international	organisations,	such	as	 the	 International	
Energy	Agency,	and	associations	representing	the	gas	industry	and	gas	and	electricity	
consumers.	While	the	meetings	of	the	Florence	Forum	took	place	every	six	months,	
the	 second	 meeting	 of	 the	 Madrid	 Forum	 took	 place	 two	 years	 after	 the	 first,	
testifying	to	the	considerable	reluctance	of	Member	States	to	openings	of	the	gas	
sector.	 Nevertheless,	 the	minutes	 from	 the	 second	meeting	 show	 a	 considerably	
stronger	resolve:		
“The	representatives	of	the	European	Commission,	the	Member	States,	and	
the	European	Council	of	Energy	Regulators,	invite	the	European	gas	industry	
to	 establish,	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible,	 a	 new	 body	 or	 grouping	 that	 brings	
together	 representatives	 of	 all	 those	 responsible	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
transmission	network	for	gas	 in	Europe.	(…)	The	objective	of	this	body	 is	to	
work,	 inter-alia	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Madrid	 Forum,	 together	 with	 the	
Commission,	 Member	 States	 and	 national	 regulators,	 to	 resolve	 issues	 of	
mutual	 concern	with	 respect	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 competitive	 internal	
European	 gas	 market,	 and	 to	 provide	 technical	 data	 regarding	 the	
transmission	 systems	 within	 Europe	 at	 the	 request	 of	 the	 Commission,	
national	Regulators,	and	the	Member	States.”		
The	second	meeting	of	 the	Florence	Forum	 in	1999	had	similarly	put	 forward	 the	
necessity	for	TSOs	to	form	an	association	to	dialogue	with	the	Commission	and	the	
association	 of	 the	 regulators.	 The	 Florence	 and	 Madrid	 Fora	 became	 important	
appointments	and	boosted	the	working	relationship	between	national	regulators	and	
the	European	Commission.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 at	 this	 stage,	 the	 CEER	 did	 not	 officially	 exist	 yet.	
Regulators	 would	 sign	 the	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 officialising	 their	
cooperation	only	in	2000.	Under	these	completely	informal	and	loose	arrangements,	
European	regulators	emerged	from	the	Florence	and	Madrid	Fora	as	key	players	in	
the	formulation	of	the	regulatory	framework.		
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The	necessity	of	homogenous	interpretation,	and	implementation	of	the	regulation	
of	energy	markets	across	the	Member	States	has	always	been	the	leitmotiv	of	the	
European	Commission’s	policy	initiatives	in	this	sector.	The	literature	has	understood	
the	Commission’s	insistence	on	regulatory	convergence	and	harmonization	as	a	self-
aggrandizing	 strategy	 (Schmidt	 1998,	 Eberlein	 2008,	Mayer	 2008,	 Diathesopoulos	
2010,	 Torriti	 2010,	 Maltby	 2013,	 Goldthau	 and	 Sitter	 2014,	 Herweg	 2015):	 by	
transferring	the	formulation	of	energy	regulatory	policy	to	the	European	level,	the	
European	 Commission	 inherently	 transferred	more	 power	 to	 itself.	 As	 previously	
mentioned,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 scholarly	 contributions	 on	 European	 regulatory	
networks	 stem	 from	 consideration	 of	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 integrationist	
pushes	in	energy	policy.	Early	literature	on	networks,	in	particular,	has	assumed	that	
the	preferences	of	the	European	Commission	and	the	regulators	coincided.	It	has	not	
investigated	whether	that	is,	indeed,	the	case,	and	why.	This	section	suggests,	and	
following	 sections	 confirm,	 that	 the	 regulators,	 similarly	 to	 the	 Commission,	
endorsed	 the	 policy	 goal	 of	 Europeanizing	 energy	 regulation	 because	 that	would	
enhance	their	institutional	role.	
	
	The	 consolidation	 of	 the	 CEER:	 the	 tensions	 of	 multi-level	
governance.	
“In	the	beginning	most	of	the	work	was	national.	There	was	so	much	
to	 do	 nationally	 (…)	 the	 CEER	 was	 a	 club,	 it	 was	 interesting	 to	 go	 there	
because	you	met	colleagues,	on	a	national	level	you	did	not	have	colleagues	
(…)	you	had	nobody	to	talk	to	and	find	out	“Oh	this	is	a	usual	problem	or	my	
issues	 are	 totally	 different	 from	 everybody	 else’s?	 Am	 I	 doing	 something	
wrong?	(…)	In	the	meantime,	the	CEER	continued	to	develop	and	we	found	
that	as	a	group	we	have	some	influence	at	EU	level,	so	it’s	not	just	exchanging	
best	practices	and	learning	from	each	other,	which	is	also	a	component,	but	
we	also	have	an	impact	on	what	happens	next”	(interview	28).	
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“Let’s	put	it	this	way,	if	my	goal	would	be	to…	implement	or	to	achieve	
very	nationalistic,	specific	solutions,	probably	it	would	not	be	successful	to	do	
it	 at	 EU	 level.	 But	 if	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 develop	 solutions	 that	make	 sense	 in	 a	
general	economic	way	in	a	European	perspective	then	you’re	much	better	off	
to	try	to	push	that	at	EU	level”	(interview	25).	
	
The	CEER	had	begun	as	informal	contacts	between	a	handful	of	regulators,	meeting	
occasionally	in	European	capitals.	With	the	exceptions	of	France	(that	did	so	in	2003)	
and	Germany	(in	2005),	all	EU-15	Member	States	established	energy	NRAs	quickly	
thereafter.	The	group	of	regulators	expanded	in	size:	newly	established	authorities	
did	not	hesitate	to	reach	out	to	the	forming	network	of	European	regulators	and	to	
establish	ties	with	it.	In	order	to	take	stock	of	the	state	of	energy	regulation	across	
the	Member	States,	in	1999,	the	Italian	regulatory	authority	organized	a	seminar	on	
“Criteria	for	electricity	tariffs	and	pricing”,	held	in	Rome	(Italy).	All	other	European	
NRAs	 were	 invited	 to	 take	 stock	 of	 their	 experiences.	 Representatives	 from	 18	
institutions	 attended	 and	 gave	 a	 presentation,	 including	 NRAs	 from	 Italy,	 Spain,	
Portugal,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Finland,	 Ireland,	 Belgium,	 the	 UK,	 Northern	 Ireland,	
Sweden,	Norway,	Hungary,	Poland,	Romania;	Ministers	from	France,	Germany	and	
Switzerland,	and	an	observer	from	the	European	Commission	(AEEGSI,	Annual	Report	
2000,	p.	291;	CNE	database17).		
The	exchanges	preceding	and	following	this	meeting	showed	that,	in	their	different	
national	contexts,	regulators	were	facing	very	similar	challenges:	primarily,	domestic	
opposition	 from	 industry	 and	 government	 as	 prices	 increased	 as	 a	 result	 of	 cost-
reflective	 tariffs,	 and	 government	 subsidies	 were	 phased	 out.	 A	month	 after	 the	
meeting,	in	December	1999,	during	the	fourth	meeting	of	the	Florence	Forum,	the	
three	 regulators	 publicly	 expressed	 the	 intention	 to	 establish	 an	 association	 of	
																																																						
17	CNE	Online	Database	http://www.cne.es/cgi-
bin/BRSCGI.EXE?CMD=VERDOC&BASE=TODO&DOCR=14&SORT=-
FECH&RNG=20&SEPARADOR=&&desc-c=+DISE%D1O+Y+ESTRUCTURA+DE+PRECIOS+Y+TARIFAS	
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European	 energy	 regulators.	 Just	 like	 European	 Energy	 Ministers	 met	 at	 the	
European	Council	in	Brussels,	regulators	“would	have	their	own	council”	(interview	
1),	 as	well.	 Hence,	 they	 decided	 to	 call	 their	 association	 the	 Council	 of	 European	
Energy	Regulators	(CEER).		
Not	only	had	the	regulators	found	that	they	faced	similar	challenges;	they	also	had	
understood	that	the	process	of	reforming	national	energy	markets	and	integrating	
them	would	take	a	long	time,	and	that	opposition	to	their	decision-making	activity	
would	 not	 dissipate:	 the	 activity	 of	 regulation	 consists	 of	 imposing	 costs	 on	 (and	
creating	 benefits	 for)	 different	market	 actors	 as	 a	 result	 of	market	 design.	More	
broadly,	just	like	their	US	counterparts	had	experienced	a	century	earlier,	European	
regulators	 realized	 that	 the	 tensions	 and	 contrasts	 inherent	 in	 the	distribution	of	
regulatory	authority	across	levels	of	governance	entailed	issues	of	regulatory	control.	
They	would	 always	 face	 the	 threat	 of	 having	 their	 powers	 or	 authority	 curtailed,	
whether	“from	below”	(i.e.	by	national	governments)	or,	as	they	soon	realized,	“from	
above”	(e.g.	by	the	European	Commission).	Therefore,	they	needed	a	mechanism	of	
collective	 representation	 to	 address	 the	 supra-national	 level	 and	 to	 refer	 to	 at	
domestic	level.		
In	the	early	2000s,	the	regulators	understood	that	establishing	an	association	would	
have	allowed	the	“regulatory	position”	to	come	across	directly	to	the	Commission	
(interview	4).	This	opportunity	changed	the	attitude	of	the	UK	regulatory	authority	
(OFGEM),	 which	 had	 initially	 been	 lukewarm	 towards	 the	 idea	 of	 regularly	
cooperating	 with	 their	 European	 counterparts.	 Therefore,	 in	 January	 2000,	 the	
representatives	 of	 10	 regulatory	 authorities	 met	 at	 OFGEM	 offices	 in	 London	 to	
discuss	the	form	and	the	goals	of	their	association.	On	7	March	2000,	representatives	
from	 Belgium,	 Finland,	 the	 UK,	 Ireland,	 Northern	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Norway,	 the	
Netherlands,	Portugal,	Spain	and	Sweden	met	in	Brussels	to	sign	the	Memorandum	
of	 Understanding	 (MoU)	 establishing	 the	 Council	 of	 European	 Energy	 Regulators	
(CEER).	 Several	 interviewees	 recalled	 the	endorsement	of	 the	CEER	by	OFGEM	as	
decisive	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 association.	 The	 British	 model	 of	 energy	
regulation	was	 so	 influential	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 beyond	 that	many	 felt	 an	 association	
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without	the	British	NRA	would	have	been	somehow	less	credible	(interview	3).	The	
MoU	was	non-binding	and	merely	declared	the	intention	of	regulators	to	coordinate	
in	 the	 interest	 of	 achieving	 the	 IEM.	 The	 formalization	of	 regulators’	 cooperation	
occurred	 three	 years	 later,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 first	 attempt	 of	 the	 European	
Commission	 to	appropriate	 the	space	of	 cooperation	 that	 regulators	had	built	 for	
themselves.	
	
ERGEG	and	the	officialised	CEER:	cherishing	the	NRAs’	self-rule.	
In	 the	 year	 2000,	 the	 European	 Council	 launched	 a	 policy	 programme	 called	 the	
Lisbon	 Agenda.	 Among	 other	 things,	 it	 encouraged	 the	 full	 liberalization	 of	 the	
national	energy	markets	and	the	achievement	of	the	IEM.	To	that	end,	the	Council	
asked	the	Commission	to	prepare	legislative	proposals.	In	their	turn,	the	European	
Commission	sought	the	regulators’	views.	At	this	point,	CEER	members	felt	that	their	
network	 could	 no	 longer	 remain	 an	 informal	 association	 of	 professionals:	 the	
constant	 interaction	 with	 the	 Commission	 required	 resources	 and	 updated	
knowledge	of	the	latest	policy	proposals.	Moreover,	providing	policy	input	required	
closeness	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 policy	 formulation.	 This	 was	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 from	
national	capitals.		
Until	 that	point,	 the	 financial	 viability	of	 the	CEER	had	been	assured	by	voluntary	
contributions:	regulators	did	not	have	fixed	dues;	they	covered	their	CEER-related	
expenses,	 which	 mainly	 consisted	 in	 travelling	 to	 meetings	 around	 Europe,	
individually	and	autonomously.	The	opportunity	to	contribute	to	the	drafting	of	the	
European	Commissions’	 legislative	proposals,	however,	represented	a	rather	more	
consequential	 commitment.	 Regulators	 decide	 to	 provide	CEER	with	 structure,	 as	
well	as	headquarters	 in	Brussels,	 secretariat	staff,	a	work	plan,	and	set	budgetary	
contributions.		
At	the	same	time,	the	European	Commission	needed	to	formalize	its	relationship	with	
the	regulators.	As	one	interviewee	pointed	out,	the	EC	could	not	continue	to	explicitly	
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and	extensively	rely	on	a	private	association	of	individual	professionals	to	carry	out	
important	market	reforms	(interview	1).	“Formalizing”	the	Commissions’	relationship	
to	the	regulators	was	necessary	to	ensure	transparency	and	accountability.	At	the	
same	time,	regulators	feared	that	the	Commission	would	have	imposed	its	decisions,	
should	it	have	the	opportunity	–	they	decided	to	retain	their	own	informal	network	
to	retain	their	independence	from	both	of	their	principals	(Egeberg	2006):	the	“old”	
one	(i.e.	national	governments)	and	the	“new”	one,	i.e.	the	European	Commission.		
Hence,	the	Commission	gave	leeway	to	the	regulators	to	propose	a	model	for	their	
coordinated	dialogue.	The	regulators’	proposals	were	very	ambitious.	Besides	market	
design	rules,	in	the	first	draft	of	what	then	became	the	second	Energy	Package,	there	
was	the	creation	of	a	European	body	of	regulators	with	ample	regulatory	powers,	“on	
the	model	 of	 the	 American	 FERC	 [Federal	 Energy	 Regulatory	 Commission];	 a	 true	
European	 regulator,	 with	 real	 powers,	 so	 that	 you	 could	 move	 from	 national	 to	
European	regulatory	agency”	(interview	4).	Therefore,	some	regulators	envisioned	a	
regulator-only	 European	 agency,	 similar	 to	 the	 USA	 FERC,	 and	 their	 careers	 as	
ascending	 from	 the	 national	 to	 the	 supranational	 level.	 The	 EC	 Legal	 Service,	
however,	 in	 application	 of	 the	 Meroni	 doctrine18,	 restrained	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
foreseen	regulators’	body	to	no	more	than	consultative	powers.		
																																																						
18	 The	 Meroni	 doctrine	 arose	 from	 cases	 C-9/56	 and	 C-10/56	 (Meroni	 v	 High	 Authority	
[1957/1958]	ECR	133)	and	relates	to	the	extent	to	which	EU	institutions	may	delegate	their	
tasks	to	regulatory	agencies.	The	European	Court	of	Justice	rules	that	it	"cannot	be	excluded"	
that	power	might	be	delegated	 to	bodies	whose	existence	was	not	 contemplated	by	 the	
Treaties,	 if	 doing	 so	 appears	 compatible	 with	 the	 regulatory	 powers	 conferred	 on	 the	
institutions	 (in	 that	case,	 the	High	Authority	of	 the	Coal	and	Steel	Community).	However,	
such	delegation	is	permissible	only	when	"it	involves	clearly	defined	executive	powers	the	
exercise	of	which	can,	therefore,	be	subject	to	strict	review	in	the	light	of	criteria	determined	
by	the	delegating	authority",	whereas	delegation	of	"a	discretionary	power,	implying	a	wide	
margin	 of	 discretion"	 is	 to	 be	 excluded	 in	 all	 cases.	
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/02/020201-03.html	This	is	to	respect	
the	 institutional	 balance	 of	 powers	 of	 the	 European	 institutions,	which	 is	 a	 fundamental	
	
	
87	
In	November	2003,	a	Commission	decision	created	the	European	Regulatory	Network	
(ERN)	of	energy	regulators:	the	European	Regulators	Group	for	Electricity	and	Gas	
(ERGEG).	A	few	days	earlier,	the	CEER	had	been	registered	as	a	no	profit	association	
under	Belgian	law.		
“The	 Commission	 wanted	 to	 consolidate	 the	 CEER	 as	 advisory	
organ	to	itself.	It	was	the	regulators	who	said	“Well,	we	don’t	want	to	be	
part	 of	 something	 that	 can	 only	 be	 convened	 by	 the	 Commission…	we	
want	 to	 be	 able	 to	 convene	 meetings	 and	 talk	 about	 our	 things,	 for	
instance	training,	exchanges	of	information,	of	help….	We	have	a	series	of	
things	that	interest	us	so	we	don’t	dissolve	the	CEER”.	And	so	there	were	
the	CEER	and	the	ERGEG.”	(interview	1)	
As	the	above	suggests,	the	actual	process	leading	to	the	establishment	of	the	ERGEG	
followed	a	rather	informal,	under-the-radar	path.	If	the	formal	aspects	of	this	process	
may	be	described	as	consisting	of	a	“double	round	of	delegation”	(Coen	and	Thatcher	
2008),	its	informal	core	consisted	of	regulators’	acceptances	of	closer	monitoring	by	
and	collaboration	with	the	European	Commission,	provided	the	network’s	advisory	
role	remained	essentially	the	same.	Coen	and	Thatcher	(2008)	do	not	focus	on	the	
energy	regulators’	network,	because	of	its	weak	powers	and	formal	autonomy.	This	
statement	 reinforces	 the	 importance	 of	 investigating	 the	 informal	 dimension	 of	
regulatory	networks,	since,	like	in	this	case,	it	may	be	the	dominant	one.	
The	CEER	and	the	ERGEG	coexisted	under	the	same	roof	between	2003	and	2011.	
These	 arrangements	 suited	 the	 circumstances	 –	 the	 Commission	 could	 barely	
devolve	any	resources	to	the	ERGEG;	the	existing	organisational	infrastructure	of	the	
CEER	 supported	 it	 entirely.	 The	 creation	 of	 the	 ERGEG	 faced	 regulators	 with	 the	
option	 of	 terminating	 the	 CEER.	 Several	NRAs	were	 in	 favour	 of	 this	 solution,	 on	
account	 that	 it	 would	 have	 reduced	 the	 expenses	 on	 travelling	 to	 Brussels	 for	
																																																						
guarantee	 afforded	 by	 the	 Treaty	 to	 European	 citizens.	 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/institutional_balance.html		
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meetings	(interviews	4,	15,	19).	Nevertheless,	the	majority	of	CEER	members	voted	
during	their	General	Assembly	in	favour	of	retaining	the	CEER	as	the	regulators’	own	
association,	 independent	of	any	other	institution.	Some	regulators	feared	that	the	
European	Commission	was	“too	ideological”	(interviews	4,	5)	and	too	eager	to	speed	
up	the	pace	of	market	integration,	regardless	of	national	circumstances.	
	
The	 training	 of	 regulators:	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Florence	 School	 of	
Regulation.	
Since	1997,	European	energy	regulators	had	been	regularly	exchanging	information.	
In	 the	 early	 2000s,	 they	 reckoned	 that	 the	 body	 of	 knowledge	 that	 they	 were	
developing	on	the	field	would	be	useful	to	current	and	future	European	regulators.	
One	of	the	Spanish	Commissioners	volunteered	to	organize	a	course	on	electricity	
tariffs.	He	had	gained	considerable	experience	in	providing	regulatory	training	while	
working	as	consultant	for	Latin	American	governments	and	NRAs	in	the	mid-1990s.	
The	first	training	course,	attended	on	a	voluntary	basis	by	only	a	few	CEER	members,	
was	 held	 in	 March	 2002	 in	 a	 hotel	 conference	 room	 in	 Palma	 de	Mallorca.	 The	
location	was	chosen	to	keep	participation	costs	at	a	minimum	thanks	to	low	season	
hotel	prices,	given	that	most	of	the	participants	financed	their	own	participation	out	
of	 their	 own	 pocket	 (interview	 1).	 The	 course	 was	 not	 labelled	 a	 “CEER	 training	
course”.	Not	all	members	would	be	ready	to	endorse	such	a	statement	at	that	point	
(interview	1).	The	course	was	attended	by	all	EU	regulators	as	well	as	by	the	head	of	
the	 Hungarian	 regulatory	 authority	 (interview	 3),	 which	 had	 been	 established	 in	
1994.	Hungary	was	not	an	EU	Member	State	at	that	time,	but	interactions	between	
EU	 and	 Eastern	 European	 regulators	 were	 becoming	 more	 frequent	 in	 the	 early	
2000s,	as	will	be	recalled	in	chapter	6.	
The	success	of	this	first	training	programme	prompted	European	regulators,	as	their	
North	 American	 counterparts	 had	 done	 in	 the	 1960s,	 to	 set	 up	 a	 “school	 of	
regulation”.	They	decided	to	test	the	idea	by	locating	the	future	school	of	European	
energy	regulators	within	an	existing	institution.	The	choice	fell	upon	the	European	
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University	Institute	(EUI)	based	in	Florence	(Italy)	–	it	had	hosted	the	first	Florence	
Forum	meetings	 and	 still	 appeared	as	 a	 suitably	neutral	 location.	 Supported	by	 a	
communication	to	the	EUI	president	from	the	EC	vice-President	Loyola	de	Palacio,	
regulators	arranged	for	a	second	training	course	to	be	held	at	the	EUI.	The	course	
took	 place	 in	 October	 2003	 and	 represented	 the	 foundational	 moment	 for	 the	
Florence	School	of	Regulation	(FSR),	which	was	officially	created	in	2004.	The	head	
of	the	Italian	NRA,	a	professor	who	had	created	the	CEER	together	with	its	Spanish	
and	 Portuguese	 counterparts,	 became	 its	 first	 Director	 upon	 finishing	 his	 NRA	
mandate.		
	
The	CEER	as	a	policy	lever:	policy	influence	and	institutional	goals.	
“…A	 strong	 unbundling	 (…)	 would	 not	 have	 found	 a	 majority	 in	
parliament	 (…),	even	 if	 the	ministry	of	economy	had	supported	 that	 (…)	 so	
early	on	I	said	it’s	not	worth	try	to	lobby	nationally	because	we	will	fail	but	at	
EU	 level	 it’s	a	different	story…	so	we	did	succeed	to	get	quite	a	number	of	
those	provisions	 into	 the	3rd	package	 (…)	 like	 it’s	a	 separate	branding,	 you	
know,	it	would	be	totally	impossible	to	get	this	in	XXXXX	but	in		Brussels	it	was	
not	such	a	big	issue	because	a	number	of	countries	had	already	done	it	so	they	
felt,	yeah,	it’s	a	good	idea,	let’s	do	it,	and	those	countries	that	were	strongly	
opposed	were	few,	(…),	but	they	did	not	have	the	majority	in	the	comitology	
process	 therefore	 we	 got	 some	 rules	 we	 would	 never	 have	 gotten	 on	 a	
national	level”	(interview	25).	
“A	good	example	is	the	third	energy	package	where	with	luck	at	that	
moment	in	time	we	were	able	to	influence	quite	a	bit	the	outcome,	so	in	the	
third	energy	package	there	are	many	provisions	that	we	have	drafted…		and	
at	that	time	we	had	extremely	good	cooperation	with	the	Parliament	so	we	
were	able	to	bring	in	many	amendments	to	the	Parliament	and	strengthen	the	
role	of	regulators,	the	independence	of	regulators,	strengthen	the	unbundling	
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rules,	 things	 that	we	would	not	have	been	able	 to	do	on	a	purely	national	
basis”	(interview	15).	
Preparatory	work	 for	 the	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 represented	 a	 key	opportunity	 to	
further	 market	 integration.	 Regulators	 used	 the	 opportunity	 to	 shape	 the	
institutional	 design	 of	 their	 national	markets	 by	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 formulation	of	
binding	European	legislation.	The	second	Energy	Package	had	represented	the	first	
occasion	 for	 regulators	 to	 influence	 European	 legislation	 on	 energy	 markets.	
However,	it	resulted	into	much	less	ambitious	legislation	than	regulators	would	have	
preferred.	Eventually,	it	mandated	regulatory	independence	from	industry,	but	not	
from	government,	and	provided	for	minimal	monitoring	and	advisory	powers.		
Furthermore,	in	the	early	2000s	the	European	Commission	had	realized	that	market	
integration	was	 not	 progressing.	 In	 2004,	 the	 European	enlargement	 brought	 ten	
new	Member	States	into	the	EU	and	ten	new	NRAs	into	the	CEER	and	the	ERGEG.	The	
scope	of	the	IEM	had	thus	greatly	expanded	and	came	to	encompass	jurisdictions	at	
different	stages	of	institutional	and	market	development.		As	the	policy	relevance	of	
the	coordination	taking	place	within	the	CEER/ERGEG	kept	growing,	and	the	push	for	
market	 integration	 and	 liberalization	 of	 retail	 markets	 grew	 stronger,	 these	
differences	came	to	be	seen	as	hampering	the	effectiveness	of	such	coordination.	
Specifically,	 some	 regulators	 could	 not	make	 commitments	 to	 their	 counterparts,	
because	very	often	they	either	 lacked	jurisdiction	over	cross	border	 issues	or	they	
shared	 it	 with	 the	 government.	 Until	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 early	 2000s,	 most	
regulators	still	needed	government	approval	of	most	of	their	decisions.		
However,	no	entity	existed,	which	could	impose	its	decisions	on	any	of	the	actors	of	
the	 EU	 energy	 regulatory	 space.	 The	 regulators,	 together	 with	 the	 Commission,	
crafted	an	 interim	solution	by	promoting,	 in	2006,	 the	division	of	national	energy	
markets	into	regional	blocks,	which	would	integrate	their	markets	first.	These	blocks,	
called	Regional	Initiatives,	became	the	building	blocks	of	the	Internal	Energy	Market	
(IEM).	“There	was	no	grand	scheme	behind	it.	It	was	more	like…	what	the	hell	do	we	
do!”	(interview	25).	Hence,	regulators	came	to	see	the	establishment	of	a	European	
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Agency	as	necessary	to	force	market	integration	and	as	an	opportunity	to	enhance	
their	decision-making	authority	(Thatcher	2011).	
	“I	 said	 we	 need	 to	 keep	 our	 autonomy	 from	 everyone.	 I	 cannot	
gradually	lose	autonomy	as	I	get	closer	to	Brussels.	So	I	wanted	the	Agency	to	
be	a	regulators’	agency.	Autonomous,	independent,	that	had	to	be	very	clear.	
I	wanted	it	to	be	financed,	like	national	ones	are,	through	levies.	(…)	At	that	
time,	the	Parliament	 listened	to	us.	They	 listened	to	us	and	eventually	that	
hybrid	resulted,	with	at	least	a	strong	board	for	the	regulators”	(interview	4).	
	
The	European	Commission,	however,	saw	itself	in	the	driving	seat	of	the	Agency.	This	
competition	 led	 to	 a	 hybrid	 agency,	 where	 the	 regulators	 retain	 considerable	
authority	but	under	the	aegis	of	the	Commission.	Although	falling	short	of	Euro-wide	
regulatory	competences,	the	ACER	gained	exclusive	authority	over	the	formulation	
of	the	rules	that	would	ensure	the	viability	of	an	integrated	EU	energy	market	–	the	
network	codes	(Jevnaker	2015).	The	entry	into	operation	of	the	ACER	in	2011	ended	
the	 path-dependent	 progression	 of	 the	 CEER	 and	 triggered	 the	 third	 and	 current	
phase	of	its	existence:	re-invention.		
	
	Re-inventing	the	CEER:	layering	or	conversion?		
	“The	CEER	has	been	incredibly	successful	but	its	initial	role	is	finished,	it’s	gone,	
pretty	much,	it’s	transferred	to	ACER.	So	now	CEER	is	still	working	but	I	think	it’s	
got	 a	 philosophical	 purpose,	 which	 is	 to	 preserve	 the	 interest	 of	 independent	
energy	regulators.	(…)	It	can	also	lobby,	of	course…	lobby	is	the	wrong	word…	it	
can	also	try	to	influence	the	political	establishment	in	Europe	in	ways	which	ACER	
can’t,	really,	because	technically	ACER	is	kind	of	an	arm	of	the	EC	so	it	would	be	
wrong	 for	 it	 to	 lobby	 for	new	policy	 initiatives	or	 lobby	publicly	 in	ways	which	
disagree	with	where	the	EC	is	coming	from	because	it	would	be	like	the	EC	arguing	
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with	itself,	but	CEER	can	do	these	things	and	that	I	think	is	the	real	example	of	the	
independent	voice	of	regulators”	(interview	14).	
Virtually	all	interviewees	acknowledged	that	the	creation	of	the	Agency	has	partially	
deprived	the	CEER	of	its	institutional	and	policy	relevance.	By	creating	the	ACER,	the	
European	 Commission	 institutionalized	 regulatory	 coordination,	 rendering	 the	
informal	space	of	interaction	it	previously	had	with	the	regulators	redundant.		
In	their	discussion	of	the	institutionalization	of	the	network	of	European	civil	aviation	
authorities	 into	 a	 European	 Agency,	 Pierre	 and	 Peters	 (2009)	 conceptualize	
institutionalization	as	an	outcome	determined	by	the	environment	surrounding	the	
network.		
“Institutionalization	should	be	seen	as	a	set	of	contingent	choices	made	by	
actors,	rather	than	as	some	type	of	natural	evolution	of	organizational	 life.	
Institutionalization	 could	 in	 some	 instances	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 process	 in	 which	
actors	with	an	interest	in	controlling	the	regulation	of	a	policy	sector,	or	a	part	
thereof,	struggle	to	control	the	domain	or	‘space’	of	the	emerging	institution	
(…)	To	the	extent	that	the	environment	is	populated	by	powerful	actors,	and	
there	are	technical	demands	for	uniformity,	there	will	be	greater	demands	for	
institutionalization.	For	example,	public-sector	 institutions	 face	demands	to	
create	 legal	 instruments	 rather	 than	 informal	 instruments	 for	 controlling	
policy	sectors.”	(Pierre	and	Peters	2009,	p.342)	
The	 outcome	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 regulatory	 control	 over	 the	 European	 energy	
regulatory	 policy	 resulted	 in	 a	 hybrid	 agency,	 where	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
regulators	share	the	driver’s	seat.		
However,	 CEER	did	not	dissolve.	Rather,	 it	 re-invented	 itself.	On	 the	one	hand,	 it	
began	focusing	on	policy	issues,	outside	of	the	official	remit	of	ACER,	such	as	retail	
markets	 and	 consumer	 issues;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 added	 a	 new	 function	 to	 its	
mission	by	engaging	in	training	provision.	Finally,	in	the	past	few	years	CEER	has	been	
welcoming	regulators	from	FYROM,	Montenegro,	Moldova,	Bosnia-Herzegovina	and	
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Kosovo	as	affiliate	members,	in	an	effort	to	revamp	its	representativeness	(interview	
32)	 and	 potentially	 representing	 the	 European	 energy	 policy	 in	 the	 EU	
neighbourhood	(interview	21).		
Moreover,	 regulators	 emphasise	 the	 CEER’s	 twenty-year	 networking	 experience,	
conferring	it	an	advantage	over	the	European	Agency	in	terms	of	speed	and	flexibility:		
“We	have	more	resources.	ACER	is	always	limited	by	the	Commission	
resources	(…)	today	ACER	has	60	people	and	the	regulators	have	about	180	
full	time	equivalents	that	work	for	ACER,	(…)	the	regulators	as	a	whole	group	
probably	have	3500	people	in	Europe	so	we	can	quickly	come	up	with	5	or	10	
people	on	something,	ACER	would	have	to	go	to	the	EC,	to	the	administrative	
service,	get	a	budget	increase,	has	to	hire,	to	follow	a	procedure,	so	it	takes	
them	almost	a	 year	 to	 find	another	 10	people.	We	 can	do	 this	 in	 a	week”	
(interview	25).	
“They	 [CEER	 representatives]	 really	 negotiated	with	 the	 Parliament	
and	there	are	a	lot	of	things	in	the	Third	Package	that	are	actually,	even	
our	wording…	which	the	Agency	could	not	have	done,	I	mean	it	didn’t	exist,	
but	 we	 couldn’t	 have	 done	 that	 through	 ERGEG,	 we	 could	 only	 do	 it	
through…	and	we’ve	still	got	that”	(interview	15).	
	
	Critical	junctures	in	the	history	of	the	CEER.	
The	history	of	CEER	is	marked,	similarly	to	NARUC’s,	by	key	definitional	moments.	
Four	stand	out	for	their	significance	to	CEER	developments,	as	emerging	from	the	
interviews:	 the	meeting	 of	 the	 Italian,	 Spanish	 and	 Portuguese	 regulators	 at	 the	
conference	in	Sweden	in	1997,	which	set	in	motion	the	process;	the	endorsement	of	
the	British	NRA;	 the	 launch	of	 the	 Florence	 and	Madrid	 Fora	 in	 1998;	 the	 call	 on	
regulators	to	collaborate	with	the	European	Commission	to	speed	up	energy	market	
integration	 following	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Agenda	 (2000),	 which	 led	 to	 the	
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creation	 of	 ERGEG	 (the	 European	 Regulatory	 Network)	 in	 2003;	 and	 the	
establishment	of	the	ACER	in	2009.		
Only	 one,	 however,	 displays	 the	properties	 of	 a	 critical	 juncture	 according	 to	 the	
diagnostic	guidelines	in	Capoccia	and	Kelemen	(2007).	The	fortuitous	encounter	of	
the	three	southern	European	regulators	in	Vasteras	and	their	decision	to	maintain	an	
informal	collaboration	was	absolutely	key,	in	that	it	represented	the	emergence	of	
CEER.	However,	the	Florence	Forum	represented	the	first	occasion	where	regulators	
confronted	 other	 stakeholder’s	 preferences	 and	 interests	 concerning	 the	 future	
direction	of	the	European	regulatory	framework	and	realized	that	the	tensions	they	
experienced	 in	 their	 national	 context	 existed	 across	 the	 EU.	 In	 other	words,	 they	
realized	 that	 those	 tensions	 and	 divergences	 would	 remain	 a	 feature	 of	 the	
regulatory	system	and	that,	therefore,	regulators	would	benefit	from	collaborating	
and	constituting	a	single	entity.	Moreover:		
• The	length	of	the	events	following	the	first	meeting	of	the	fora	in	terms	of	
regulators’	network	relations	and	interaction	with	the	European	Commission	
greatly	exceeded	the	perceived	importance	of	the	event	at	the	time,	and	its	
duration.	
• After	the	critical	juncture,	the	likelihood	of	network	participation	in	the	policy	
process	increased	exponentially.	
• Contingency	 was	 paramount,	 as	 the	 initiative	 had	 originated	 from	 the	
institutional	environment	of	the	regulators…	
• …	thanks	to	the	proactive	agency	of	a	single	individual,	the	Director	General	
for	Energy	at	that	time.	
One	important	feature	of	a	critical	juncture	as	per	Capoccia	and	Kelemen	(2007)	that	
appears	missing	from	the	CEER	history	is	the	availability	of	counterfactuals.	In	other	
words,	the	CEER	does	not	seem	to	have	emerged	out	of	a	period	of	crisis	or	political	
uncertainty,	 when	 it	 became	 the	 favoured	 option	 amongst	 several	 alternatives.	
However,	a	more	thorough	reflection	shows	that	this	impression	is	inaccurate.	In	the	
early	 to	 the	 mid-1990s,	 the	 existing	 European	 energy	 NRAs	 faced	 considerable	
indeterminism:	the	legal	framework	at	EU	level	was	being	established;	NRAs	had	no	
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guidance	as	to	how	to	steer	the	liberalization	process;	the	first	Directives	had	just	
been	released,	and	only	a	few	Member	States	had	established	NRAs.	All	that	NRAs	
had	 to	 guide	 their	 decision-making	was	 the	White	Paper	 the	EC	had	published	 in	
1995,	 outlining	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 policy,	 and	 the	 first	 liberalization	
Directive	 for	 electricity	 markets	 (96/92/EC)	 where	 NRAs	 as	 such	 are	 not	 even	
mentioned.		
Moreover,	as	the	initial	outcome	of	the	Vasteras	meeting	in	1997	shows,	regulators	
came	 from	 national	 backgrounds	 that	were	 so	widely	 different	 that	 they	 initially	
ruled	out	 the	possibility	of	 cooperating.	 The	UK	 regulator	was	more	 interested	 in	
establishing	 links	with	 regulatory	agencies	 in	overseas	countries,	where	vast	 scale	
privatizations	were	under	way.	Scandinavian	 regulators	were	embedded	 in	a	very	
specific	governance	settings	bearing	no	comparison	to	 that	of	Southern	European	
regulators.	The	initiative	of	the	three	Southern	European	regulators,	however,	had	
two	effects.	Firstly,	by	exchanging	information,	regulators	setup	their	network	as	a	
rapidly	 accessible	 repository	 of	 information	 on	 different	 national	 markets;	 this	
attracted	more	members	since	the	mere	existence	of	these	connections	reduced	the	
new	regulators’	uncertainty.	This	condition	led	to	the	expansion	of	the	three-node	
network	 formed	 by	 the	 three	 Southern	 European	 regulators.	 Secondly,	 by	 facing	
stakeholders	 from	 different	 Member	 States	 at	 the	 Florence	 forum,	 regulators	
realized	that	they	faced	common	challenges,	which	were	unlikely	to	vanish.	Hence,	
they	 would	 all	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 mechanism	 of	 collective	 action	 and	
representation	and	decided	to	consolidate	the	CEER	into	a	network,	displaying	the	
properties	of	an	organization	and	the	rules,	norms	and	longevity	of	an	institution.	
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Part	I.	Conclusion:	networking	for	control.	
Having	 emerged	 in	 different	 historical	 epochs	 and	 in	 response	 to	 diametrically	
different	institutional	and	market	circumstances,	NARUC	and	CEER	have	apparently	
little	in	common.	However,	I	selected	these	two	networks	as	case	studies	because	
both	gather	 regulatory	 authorities	 embedded	 in	 a	multi-level	 governance	 system,	
that	 has	made	 the	 political	 decision	 to	 organize	 the	 provision	 of	 certain	 services	
through	 independent	 regulatory	bodies	with	delegated	authority.	 Furthermore,	 in	
both	the	USA	and	the	EU,	the	establishment	of	regulatory	authorities	derived	from	a	
radical	change	in	the	policy	paradigm	governing	the	sector:	from	competition	under	
municipal	 franchise	 in	the	former	case;	 from	state	ownership	and	management	 in	
the	latter	case.	In	both	cases,	regulatory	networks	emerged	spontaneously	from	the	
coordinated	action	of	small	groups	of	network	members	(Provan	and	Kenis	2008).	
The	 literature,	 however,	 has	 rarely	 investigated	 their	 reasons,	 and	 the	 interplay	
between	regulators’	network	initiative	and	their	surrounding	environment.			
The	question	guiding	the	analysis	in	the	foregoing	two	chapters	is,	therefore:	what	
are	 the	 conditions	 leading	 to	 network	 emergence?	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	
reconstructed	the	events	and	circumstances	leading	to	network	emergence	in	both	
cases.	 The	 origins	 of	 NARUC	 date	 back	 to	 the	 1880s;	 hence,	 I	 relied	 on	 archival	
sources	and	existing	literature	to	reconstruct	its	emergence.	The	origins	of	CEER	are	
much	more	 recent,	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 late	 1990s;	 hence,	 I	mostly	 relied	 on	 elite	
interviews	 with	 individuals	 involved	 in	 its	 emergence.	 The	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	
inductive	reasoning	based	on	these	information	sources,	on	the	background	of	the	
findings	and	insights	of	the	institutional	theory	of	organization	but	also	theories	of	
bureaucratic	politics.	
Spontaneous	 regulatory	 cooperation	 emerges	 soon	 after	 the	 establishment	 of	
regulatory	bodies:	regulators	are	unsure	about	the	boundaries	of	their	role	and	face	
domestic	opposition.	The	willingness	to	learn	from	the	experience	of	counterparts	in	
their	broader	institutional	environment,	constituted	by	the	nascent	Regulatory	State,	
undergirds	 the	 emergence	 of	 both	 networks.	 Regulators	 pursued	 their	 peers’	
expertise	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 increasing	 their	 domestic	 legitimacy,	 from	 which	 they	
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would	 derive	 their	 authority.	 Although	 the	 American	 process	 was	 marked	 by	
litigation,	while	the	European	process	by	informal	elite	networking	(John	2012),	the	
inception	 of	 the	 network	 was	 the	 regulators’	 response	 to	 the	 uncertainty	
surrounding	 them.	 I	distinguish	 this	early	phase	of	 regulatory	networking	 from	 its	
subsequent	 one,	 where	 loose	 professional	 ties	 transform	 into	 consolidated,	
politically	consequential	collective	action.	
The	findings	of	 the	comparative	historical	analysis	are	that	regulators	network	for	
control.	Namely,	they	decide	to	consolidate	their	networks	as	entities,	bearing	the	
properties	of	organizations	(e.g.	legal	personality,	physical	headquarters,	secretarial	
staff,	budgetary	contributions,	work	plans	etc),	as	they	realize	that	the	governance	
tensions	 inherent	 in	 the	 multi-level	 governance	 system	 will	 always	 represent	 a	
potential	 threat	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 autonomy	 and	 authority.	 These	 tensions	
originate	in	the	allocation	of	regulatory	authority	across	levels	of	governance.	Even	
where	this	allocation	has	seemingly	very	clear	boundaries,	as	in	a	federal	state	such	
as	the	USA,	regulators	at	different	levels	of	governance	collide	over	the	extent	of	the	
primacy	of	their	respective	decisions	within	given	territorial	jurisdictions.	In	contexts	
where	 the	 allocation	 of	 regulatory	 power	 across	 levels	 of	 governance	 is	 far	 from	
having	clear	boundaries,	given	the	absence	of	supranational	regulatory	authorities,	
such	as	in	the	European	Union,	the	issue	of	regulatory	control	is	even	more	politically	
complex,	 as	 regulators	 derive	 their	 legal	 authority	 from	 the	 previous	 holder	 of	
regulatory	power:	the	national	government.		
Comparative	 examination	 of	 the	 cases	 shows	 that,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	
development,	NARUC	and	CEER	faced	different	kinds	of	opposition.	 In	the	case	of	
NARUC,	railroad	industry	representatives	long	battled	to	eliminate	state	regulation;	
Public	 Utility	 Commissioners	 were	 only	 able	 to	 retain	 their	 regulatory	 power	 by	
allying	with	the	nascent	federal	agency	and	the	primary	customers	of	the	railroads:	
shippers	of	goods.	Soon	after	their	inception,	European	national	regulators	also	faced	
harsh	 opposition	 from	 the	 energy	 industry,	 organized	 in	 powerful	 “national	
champions”	having	close	ties	to	government.	Consumers,	who	stood	to	benefit	from	
regulation,	were	not	vocal	supporters	of	regulation	also	because	the	onset	of	cost-
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reflective	tariffs	and	the	elimination	of	subsidies	in	Europe	improved	the	quality	of	
service	but	also	 implied	much	higher	prices.	European	 regulators’	only	 strong	ally	
were	 supranational	 institutions	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 European	 Commission.	
Regulators	and	the	European	Commission	entered	 into	a	relationship	of	symbiotic	
interdependence	(“the	output	of	one	is	the	input	of	the	other”,	Pfeffer	and	Salancik	
1978,	p.	41)	because	the	fulfilment	of	the	latter’s	policy	agenda	because	necessarily	
implied	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 former.	 As	 discussed	 at	 the	 end	 of	
chapter	3,	however,	the	establishment	of	a	European	Agency	for	the	Coordination	of	
Energy	Regulators	changed	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	Commission	
and	 the	 CEER,	 transforming	 it	 from	 one	 of	 symbiotic	 to	 one	 of	 competitive	
interdependence	(“the	outcome	achieved	by	one	can	only	be	higher	if	the	outcome	
achieved	by	the	other	is	lower”,	p.	41).	Arguably,	the	same	mechanism	undermined	
the	initially	cooperative	relationship	between	state	regulators	and	federal	agencies	
in	the	USA:	as	the	latter	were	gradually	more	empowered	by	legislation,	what	had	
hitherto	been	a	horizontal	collaborative	relationship	became	a	vertical	competitive	
relationship.		
I	relied	on	the	concept	of	critical	 juncture	(Collier	and	Collier	1991)	to	capture	the	
shift	 in	the	essence	of	regulatory	networking	from	mere	professional	 interest	to	a	
strategy	 of	 preservation.	 I	 adopted	 Capoccia	 and	 Kelemen’s	 (2007)	 diagnostic	
framework	 to	 pin	 down	 the	 regulators’	 realization	 of	 the	 permanency	 of	 the	
governance	tensions	to	specific	moments.	The	moments	I	identified	as	representing	
critical	 junctures	derive	from	the	evidence	I	gathered	to	trace	the	history	of	these	
two	networks.	Their	validity	may	be	disputed:	although	clearly	emerging	as	critical	
from	my	data,	one	might	argue	that	additional	data	may	have	pointed	to	additional	
moments	or	 events,	 or	 that	different	 interviewees	may	have	pointed	 to	different	
events	as	critical.	This	potential	critique	is	well	taken,	but	does	not	change	the	validity	
of	 the	 finding:	 regulators	 consolidated	 their	 networks	 into	 entities	 with	
organizational	and	institutional	properties	as	a	result	of	the	realization	that	their	turf	
would	be	always	potentially	subject	to	erosion	from	competing	sources	of	regulatory	
authority	at	different	levels	of	governance.		
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Thus	 far,	 I	 have	 discussed	 networks	 of	 regulators	 as	 unitary	 actors	 (and	 units	 of	
analysis).	In	reality,	however,	not	all	regulators	make	the	same	use	of	the	networks	
they	belong	to.	They	are	not	equally	active	or	equally	influential	within	their	network.	
Interviews	clarified	that	there	always	is	a	subset	of	network	members	who	are	more	
active	 than	 the	 rest:	 they	 attend	 all	 meetings,	 contribute	 material,	 bring	 new	
information	into	the	network,	and	eventually	shape	the	agenda.	These	regulators	are	
the	 engines	 of	 network	 activities.	What	 explains	 the	 actual	 structure	 of	 network	
relationships	within	a	transnational	network	of	regulators?	Why	are	some	regulators	
more	active	networkers	than	others?	These	questions	are	posed	and	answered	in	the	
next	two	chapters.
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PART	 TWO	 –	 EXPLAINING	 NETWORK	
STRUCTURE,	NETWORK	ACTIVISM	AND	NETWORK	
INFLUENCE.	
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Part	II.	Introduction:	measuring	network	cooperation.		
	
The	literature	on	transnational	networks	has	often	treated	networks	as	organisations	
within	whose	 framework	 regulatory	 officials	 interact.	 Various	 contributors	 to	 the	
literature	on	regulatory	networks,	as	well	as	policy	practitioners,	often	use	the	word	
“network”	 metaphorically,	 to	 describe	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 informal	 association	 of	
professionals	 (Isett,	Mergel	 et	 al.	 2011).	 In	 social	 networks,	 nodes	 choose	 which	
relationships	to	pursue	and	maintain.	Networks	are	measurable	structures,	whose	
analysis	can	reveal	information	about	the	relationships	between	the	nodes	and	about	
the	character	of	those	relationships.Recently,	inferential	social	network	analysis	has	
made	inroads	into	the	social	sciences	allowing	for	the	modelling	of	networks.	These	
models	 afford	 the	 researcher	 considerable	 explanatory	 power	 as	 concerns	 the	
drivers	of	network	ties	and	the	determinants	of	network	structure.		
In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 research,	 the	 social	 network	 analysed	 is	 the	 network	 of	
European	national	energy	regulators.	Using	original	data	collected	between	late	2015	
and	early	2017,	in	this	part	of	the	thesis	I	investigate	the	explanatory	factors	of	their	
network	structure	and	 the	determinants	of	 their	 ties.	 I	asked	regulators	 to	 report	
their	most	frequent	and	regular	ties	as	concerns	exchange	of	information,	opinions	
and	advice.	I	gathered	data	from	all	29	European	national	energy	regulators	that	are	
members	of	 the	CEER	 (i.e.	 from	all	28	EU	Member	States	plus	Norway).	Only	one	
regulator	did	not	respond	to	my	question;	for	that	regulator,	I	considered	their	ties	
as	 reciprocated.	 In	 chapter	 4,	 I	 develop	 an	 Exponential	 Random	Graph	Model	 of	
network	structure.	In	chapter	5,	I	investigate	the	determinants	of	regulators’	bilateral	
ties	to	each	other.		
In	the	model	developed	 in	chapter	4,	 I	hypothesise	that	the	ties	among	European	
regulators	 would	 display	 a	 pattern	 of	 homophily	 (McPherson,	 Smith-Lovin	 et	 al.	
2001).	Homophily	is	the	tendency	of	individuals	to	associate	and	bond	with	similar	
others,	as	in	the	proverb	"birds	of	a	feather	flock	together".	Its	presence	has	been	
discovered	 in	 a	 vast	 array	 of	 network	 studies.	 Specifically,	 I	 hypothesise	 that	
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European	 regulators	 tend	 to	 network	with	 peers	 overseeing	markets	 that	 have	 a	
similar	structure	to	theirs.	Since	the	European	regulatory	policy	for	energy	markets	
is	 premised	 on	 liberalization,	 I	 further	 hypothesise	 that	 regulators	 overseeing	
markets	at	more	advanced	stages	of	liberalization	would	receive	significantly	more	
incoming	 ties,	 as	 their	 peers	 seek	 to	 learn	 from	 them.	 Furthermore,	 previous	
literature	 points	 to	 resources	 as	 a	 powerful	 motivation	 for	 cooperation	 among	
experts	and	regulators	(Cengiz	2007,	Alcañiz	2010,	Alcañiz	2016);	therefore,	 in	the	
chapters	I	also	test	the	hypothesis	that	regulators	with	lower	(financial	and	human)	
are	likely	to	have	more	outgoing	ties	than	their	peers.		
The	 results	 of	 the	model	 show	 that,	 indeed,	 regulators	 are	 homophilous	 in	 their	
choices	of	network	partners;	in	other	words,	they	tend	to	establish	direct	ties	with	
regulators,	facing	similar	sector	structure	and	political	economy.	Furthermore,	the	
UK	 energy	 regulatory	 authority	 emerges	 as	 overall	 more	 sought	 after	 than	 their	
peers,	 in	accordance	with	the	second	hypothesis	concerning	market	 liberalization.	
Finally,	human,	rather	than	financial,	resources	appear	to	be	associated	with	a	higher	
number	 of	 outgoing	 ties.	 The	 model	 also	 reveals	 that	 geographic	 contiguity	 and	
common	membership	 in	one	of	 the	European	Electricity	Regions	also	matter,	and	
that	regulators	tend	to	cluster	around	particularly	active	networkers.		
Chapter	5	further	develops	analysis	on	regulators’	resources	and	how	they	relate	to	
their	network	tie	choices.	The	models	developed	in	chapter	4	suggests	that	regulators	
with	intermediate	levels	of	staff	resources	are	more	active	compared	to	peers	with	
large	resources.	 In	contrast,	regulators	with	very	low	staff	resources	are	not	more	
likely	than	resourced	peers	to	be	proactively	using	their	networks:	this	suggests	that	
the	 link	 between	 resources	 and	 activism	 holds	 as	 long	 as	 regulators	 are	 not	 so	
resource-constrained	as	to	being	unable	to	devote	resources	to	networking,	or	so	
well-resourced	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 acquire	 or	 generate	 information	 in-house.	 In	 the	
chapter,	 network	 activism	 is	 operationalized	 as	 the	 count	 of	 regulators’	 non-
reciprocal	ties.	Non-reciprocal	ties	suggest	a	weaker	(i.e.	less	frequent)	relationship	
than	that	implicit	in	mutual	ties	(Granovetter	1973).	This,	in	turn,	suggests	different	
assessments	of	the	strength	of	the	relationship	on	the	part	of	the	involved	regulators.	
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This	 chapter	 stems	 from	 the	 notion	 that	 regulators	 with	 more	 outgoing	 non-
reciprocated	ties	are	information	seekers,	and	understands	them	as	proactively	using	
network	ties	to	compensate	for	lacking	resources.	
The	hypothesis	underlying	chapter	5	 is	 that	 lower	 resources	correspond	to	higher	
counts	 of	 non-reciprocated	 ties.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 analysis	 lend	 support	 to	 the	
hypothesis,	 but	 only	 for	 staff	 resources.	 Budget	 resources	 are	 measured	 by	 a	
categorical	variable	resulting	from	the	categorization	of	budgetary	data	referring	to	
2013);	exploration	of	the	data	reveals	a	linear	relationship,	which,	however,	fails	to	
achieve	significance.	However,	this	data	is	older	than	staff	data	and	therefore	may	
suffer	from	measurement	error.		
The	combined	findings	of	chapters	4	and	5	are	that	regulators	are	homophilous	in	
their	tie	choices	according	to	market	structure;	that	regulators	from	markets	at	an	
advanced	 stage	 of	 development	 are	 more	 sought	 after;	 that	 better	 resourced	
regulators	 are	 more	 sought	 after	 while	 less	 resourced	 regulators	 are	 the	 most	
proactive,	 exception	 made	 for	 regulatory	 authorities	 having	 extremely	 small	
resources,	 for	whom,	plausibly,	 regulatory	networking	 represents	 too	high	a	 cost.	
Arguably,	the	interdependence	engendered	by	the	process	of	European	integration	
underpins	this	mechanism	of	resource	compensation	by	creating	the	opportunity	for	
regulators’	interaction.	The	patterns	emerging	from	analysis	suggest	that	regulatory	
networking	may	have	improved	(national)	governance	more	than	national	resources	
alone	 would	 have	 allowed.	 This	 conclusion	 is	 noteworthy	 for	 the	 literature	 on	
transnational	regulatory	networks,	which	overwhelmingly	focused	on	the	potential	
for	networks	to	improve	global	governance.	Arguably,	this	analysis	calls	for	reflection	
and,	given	further	hypothesis	development	and	testing,	acknowledgment	that	 the	
feedback	 effects	 of	 transnational	 networking	 on	 national	 governance	 have	 been	
consistently	improving	national	regulatory	practice.	
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4. The	 drivers	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	 networking:	
Varieties	 of	 Capitalism	 between	 homophily	 and	
convergence.	
	
Introduction	
The	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	has	literally	boomed	since	the	
early	2000s	(Raustiala	2002,	Eberlein	and	Grande	2005,	Slaughter	and	Zaring	2006,	
Tarrant	and	Kelemen	2007,	Berg	and	Horrall	2008,	Coen	and	Thatcher	2008,	Verdier	
2009,	Zaring	2009,	Ahdieh	2010,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011,	Yesilkagit	2011,	Jordana	
and	Levi-Faur	2012,	Maggetti	2013,	Newman	and	Zaring	2013).	The	combination	of	
their	pervasiveness	and	their	relative	mysteriousness	has	fuelled	academic	and	policy	
curiosity	 about	 their	 inner	 dynamics.	 What	 are	 the	 criteria	 according	 to	 which	
regulators	choose	whom	to	network	with?	In	other	words,	what	are	the	drivers	of	
regulatory	networking?	This	chapter	answers	this	question	by	analysing	network	ties	
among	National	Energy	Regulatory	Authorities	from	EU	Member	States.		
The	 governance	 literature	 has	 converged	 on	 the	 overarching	 understanding	 that	
transnational	 (or	 trans-governmental)	 networks	 are	 meant	 to	 improve	 the	
governance	of	economic	sectors	or	phenomena,	whose	reach	extends	beyond	any	
single	 country.	 Within	 networks,	 regulators	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 exchange	
information	and	to	coordinate	their	 regulatory	practice	 in	order	 to	 facilitate	cross	
border	 trade	and	 investment.	These	conclusions	 resonate	with	 the	stances	of	 the	
liberal	 school	 of	 international	 relations	 (Keohane	 and	 Nye	 1974,	 Keohane	 1998),	
which	 has	 emphasised	 how	 increased	 interdependence	 motivates	 transnational	
cooperation	and	coordination,	leading	to	the	creation	of	international	regimes	(Haas	
1980,	Keohane	1982).	 In	 this	 view,	 regulators	network	 transnationally	 in	order	 to	
tackle	the	challenges	of	interdependence	while	reaping	the	opportunities.		
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Beyond	 interdependence,	 the	 drivers	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 have	 rarely	 been	
investigated.	More	recent	explanations	have	pointed	to	the	importance	of	autonomy	
and	 resources	 in	 prompting	 regulators	 to	 network	 transnationally	 (Reisenbichler	
2015,	Vestlund	2015,	Bach,	De	Francesco	et	al.	2016).	Overall,	in	existing	literature	
the	word	“network”	usually	constitutes	a	useful	descriptive	metaphor,	rather	than	a	
relational	structure	(Isett,	Mergel	et	al.	2011).	Yet,	the	real	thrust	of	networks	resides	
in	the	connections	between	the	nodes	forming	them.	Regulators	maintain	informal	
network	ties	with	peers	from	other	countries	because	they	find	it	worthwhile.	Even	
when	semi-formalized	networked	organizations	(such	as	European	networks)	exist,	
individual	 regulators	 are	 unlikely	 to	maintain	 regular	 informal	 ties	with	 each	 and	
every	one	of	their	peers;	more	plausibly,	they	sustain	bilateral	frequent	and	stable	
ties	to	a	subset	of	them,	reaching	out	to	others	more	sporadically.	
In	 this	 article,	 I	 investigate	 the	 drivers	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 by	 analysing	 the	
directed	 network	 of	 connections	 between	 the	 28	 National	 Energy	 Regulatory	
Authorities	of	EU	Member	States,	plus	Norway.	 I	develop	an	Exponential	Random	
Graph	 Model	 (ERGM)	 premised	 on	 hypotheses	 aimed	 at	 testing	 whether	 the	
Varieties	of	Capitalism	(VoC)	framework	(Hall	and	Soskice	2001,	Hancké,	Rhodes	et	
al.	 2007)	 holds	 relevance	 for	 explaining	 network	 structure.	 The	 results	 show	 that	
regulators	 are	 homophilous	 in	 their	 tie	 choices,	 which	 means	 that	 they	 tend	 to	
establish	ties	with	counterparts	that	are	similar	to	them;	namely,	this	study	finds	that	
similarity	 in	 the	 structure	of	 the	energy	 sector	 across	 countries	 –	operationalized	
through	the	VoC	framework	–	is	a	powerful	determinant	of	network	ties	for	some	
clusters	of	regulators.	Moreover,	the	British	regulator	emerges	as	considerably	more	
active	and	influential	than	its	peers,	and	a	divide	is	observable	between	regulators	
from	EU-15	and	others.	Contrary	to	expectations,	the	results	of	the	model	indicate	
that	 higher,	 not	 lower	 resources	 are	 associated	 with	 more	 active	 regulators,	
suggesting	that	more	resourceful	regulators	are	both	more	sought	after	and	more	
active	networkers.	
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Overall,	 these	results	 lend	support	 to	contributions	underlining	the	 importance	of	
expertise-driven	 policy	 learning	 as	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	
networking.	The	paper	confirms	the	relevance	of	the	VoC	framework	to	understand	
network	 industries	 and	 regulatory	 institutions	 and	demonstrates	 its	usefulness	 to	
also	 explain	 the	 transnational	 networking	 choices	 they	 make.	 Although	 co-
membership	 in	EU	policy	frameworks	and	transnational	flows	of	electricity	and/or	
gas	also	partially	explain	network	structure,	VoC-related	factors	are	associated	with	
much	higher	odds	of	tie	existence.		
The	homophily	effect	is	strongest	for	some	newer	Member	States,	suggesting	they	
form	a	rather	detached	clique	from	the	core	of	the	network.	If	placed	in	the	context	
of	European	energy	market	integration,	this	result	suggests	that	the	establishment	
of	a	European	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER)	was	probably	
necessary	 to	 compel	 all	 EU	 energy	 regulators	 to	 coordinate	with	 and	 learn	 from	
counterparts	 regulating	 very	 differently	 organized	 markets,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 spur	
convergence	across	the	whole	EU.	
	
The	determinants	of	network	ties:	literature	review	and	
hypotheses.		
The	 structures	 of	 interconnection	 or	 interaction	 among	 a	 set	 of	 nodes	 can	 be	
measured,	explained,	and	predicted	using	Social	Network	Analysis	(SNA).	The	usage	
of	SNA	for	 transnational	or	national	networks	of	civil	 servants	or	other	regulatory	
official	has	recently	made	inroads	into	the	social	sciences,	as	shown	by	the	growing	
number	 of	 contributions	 employing	 the	 technique	 (Alcañiz	 2010,	 Cranmer	 and	
Desmarais	 2011,	 Ingold,	 Varone	 et	 al.	 2013,	Maggetti,	 Ingold	 et	 al.	 2013,	 Alcañiz	
2016,	Boehmke,	Chyzh	et	al.	2016,	Cranmer,	Leifeld	et	al.	2017,	Lazega,	Quintane	et	
al.	2017).	Patterns	of	regulatory	interactions	have	often	been	operationalized	using	
co-affiliations,	 such	 as	 co-membership	 in	 certain	 policy	 fora	 or	 platforms,	 or	
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perceived	 influence	and	resources	 (Cranmer,	Leifeld	et	al.	2017).	Further,	 the	fact	
that	 nodes	 prefer	 to	 connect	 to	 nodes	 that	 they	 perceive	 as	 being	 similar	 to	
themselves	 in	 some	 theoretically	 or	 empirically	 relevant	 respect	 (a	 pattern	 called	
“homophily”)	 has	 often	 emerged	 as	 having	 considerable	 explanatory	 power	
(McPherson,	Smith-Lovin	et	al.	2001,	Lee,	Lee	et	al.	2012,	Maoz	2012,	Barberá	2015,	
Alcañiz	2016).		
Scholars	 have	 conceptualized	 transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 as	 the	 functional	
response	 to	 interdependence.	 Indeed,	 networks	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 affect	 rule	
adoption	across	countries	(Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2014)	via	
a	process	of	regulatory	coordination	at	supranational	level	leading	to	the	creation	of	
soft	rules	to	be	implemented	at	national	level.	In	a	sociological	perspective,	networks	
have	been	depicted	as	arenas	where	regulators	can	exchange	information,	opinions	
and	experiences	and	therefore	learn	from	each	other	(Majone	1997,	Humphreys	and	
Simpson	 2008,	 Sabel	 and	 Zeitlin	 2008,	 Bianculli	 2013).	 In	 a	 policy	 learning	
perspective,	networked	cooperation	that	is	sustained	over	time	enables	regulators	
to	experiment	with	the	outcomes	of	their	collaboration,	to	conceive	new	approaches	
to	old	and	new	problems	(Sabel	and	Zeitlin	2012).		
More	 recently,	 the	 literature	 has	 complemented	 these	 understandings	 with	
perspectives	emphasising	domestic	circumstances	and	challenges	as	motivations	for	
transnational	networking.	 In	particular,	contributors	have	highlighted	the	strategic	
use	 that	 regulators	 make	 of	 their	 networks	 to	 achieve	 more	 independence	 and	
autonomy	 (Danielsen	 and	 Yesilkagit	 2014,	 Ruffing	 2015)	 from	 government	 by	
exploiting	 the	 informational	 advantages	 deriving	 from	 transnational	 networking	
(Eberlein	and	Grande	2005,	Jordana	2017).	Additionally,	regulators	appear	to	pool	
resources	 through	networking,	 thereby	 compensating	 for	 those	 they	 lack	 (Alcañiz	
2010,	Vestlund	2015).	
However,	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 literature	 have	 thus	 far	 overlooked	 the	 rationales	
explaining	 regulators’	 choices	 regarding	 their	 network	 connections.	 Regulators	
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maintain	 informal,	 bilateral	 network	 ties	 beyond	 the	 official	 policy	 framework,	
because	 they	 find	 it	worthwhile.	 They	are	unlikely	 to	devote	an	equal	 amount	of	
effort	to	networking	with	each	of	their	network	counterparts;	more	plausibly,	they	
choose	their	strong	ties.	Analyses	of	the	motivations	for	these	choices	are,	however,	
lacking.	 Filling	 this	 gap	 requires	 close-up	observation	and	analysis	of	 the	 ties	 that	
each	regulator	has	within	a	network,	as	this	would	allow	for	a	clearer	grasp	of	the	
aims	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 and	 the	 formulation	 of	 generalizable	 statements	
about	transnational	regulatory	networks.	
In	this	article,	I	use	original	network	data	gathered	through	email	and	phone	inquiries	
from	all	28	energy	regulatory	authorities	of	EU	Member	States,	plus	Norway19.	Their	
self-reported	bilateral	ties	constitute	a	network	structure.	The	model	developed	in	
this	 chapter	 is	 aimed	 at	 explaining	 that	 structure.	 The	 literature	 on	 European	
Regulatory	Networks	(key	contributions	 include	Coen	and	Thatcher	2008,	Eberlein	
and	Newman	2008,	Thatcher	and	Coen	2008,	Kelemen	and	Tarrant	2011,	Levi-Faur	
2011,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011)	and	more	generally	on	networks	of	regulators	of	
infrastructure	 sectors	 has,	 thus	 far,	 scarcely	 relied	on	 the	 richness	 of	 insight	 that	
network	theory	and	network	analysis	could	afford	it.	In	other	words,	the	literature	
has	 often	 used	 the	 term	 “network”	without	 using	 the	methods	 pertaining	 to	 the	
quantitative	analysis	of	networks.		
There	 are	 notable	 exceptions:	 several	 contributions	 have	 used	 measurements	
derived	 from	 network	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 quantify	 influence	 and	 reputation	 of	
																																																						
19	 I	have	 included	 the	energy	 regulatory	authority	of	Norway	 in	 this	analysis	because	 the	
regulatory	authority	is	a	member	of	the	Council	of	European	Energy	Regulators	(CEER),	the	
voluntary	 network	 of	 European	 energy	 regulators,	 and	 the	 country	 has	 an	 obligation	 to	
comply	with	 the	provisions	of	 the	EU	energy	 law.	 I	have	not	 included	 the	NRA	of	 Iceland	
because	it	is	not	compelled	to	adopt	the	EU	legal	framework	in	energy.	
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different	 bureaucratic	 and	 political	 actors	 in	 the	 Swiss	 telecommunication	 sector	
(Ingold,	 Varone	 et	 al.	 2013)	 or	 the	 independence	 and	 accountability	 of	 different	
regulatory	 authorities	 (Maggetti,	 Ingold	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Few	 contributions,	 however,	
have	investigated	the	explanatory	factors	of	the	relational	structure	connecting	the	
members	 of	 a	 network.	 Alcañiz	 (2010,	 2016)	 is	 a	 rare	 exception:	 her	 model	 of	
network	structure	finds	that	common	geographical	origins	and	lack	of	resources	drive	
the	 frequency	 of	 regulatory	 cooperation	 among	nuclear	 experts.	 At	 any	 rate,	 the	
mere	 existence	 of	 semi-formalized	 frameworks	 of	 cooperation,	 such	 as	 European	
Regulatory	 Networks,	 offers	 no	 insight	 onto	 the	 drivers	 of	 informal	 bilateral	 ties	
among	 regulators.	 Yet,	 the	 importance	 of	 trans-governmental	 networking	 for	 the	
shaping	of	EU	energy	policy	in	particular	can	hardly	be	overlooked	(Eberlein	2008,	
Kaiser	2009).		
Recent	 scholarly	 contributions	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 characteristics	 of	 network	
industries	 and	 national	 regulatory	 authorities	 are	 associated	with	 the	 “Variety	 of	
Capitalism	(VoC)”	of	the	country	(Thatcher	2007,	Guardiancich	and	Guidi	2016).	The	
VoC	 framework	 subdivides	 OECD	 countries	 according	 to	 “the	way	 in	 which	 firms	
resolve	 the	 coordination	problems	 they	 face”	 (Hall	 and	Soskice,	 2001,	p.	 7)	 in	 the	
country	 where	 they	 operate.	 The	 main	 watershed	 is	 between	 Coordinated	 and	
Liberal	 Market	 Economies	 (CMEs	 and	 LMEs).	 In	 LMEs,	 firms	 predominantly	
coordinate	 their	 activities	 via	 markets;	 transparency	 is,	 therefore,	 essential	 and	
regulatory	authorities	and	policy	are	tasked	with	ensuring	it.	In	CMEs,	firms	rely	more	
heavily	 on	 relational	 modes	 of	 coordination	 with	 other	 actors	 in	 the	 political	
economy	than	on	market	signals.	In	Continental	Europe,	CMEs	are	the	majority.	The	
only	LMEs	are	found	to	be	the	United	Kingdom	and	Ireland	(Hall	and	Gingerich	2009).	
CMEs	can	be	further	differentiated:	Scandinavian	countries	appear	to	have	a	specific	
type	 of	 social-democracy,	 different	 from	 the	 coordinated	 economies	 of	 Germany	
(the	only	 pure	CME),	Austria,	 Belgium,	 and	 the	Netherlands.	Moreover,	 Southern	
European	countries	(France,	Italy,	Spain	and	Portugal)	have	been	defined	as	“mixed”	
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(or	“Mediterranean”)	economies	(or	MMEs),	where	coordination	(or	lack	thereof)	co-
exists	with	an	interventionist	and	compensating	state.		
Thatcher	 (2007)	studies	the	 interplay	between	the	VoC	framework	and	regulatory	
institutions	 in	 network	 industries.	 He	 examines	 the	 cases	 of	 the	 UK,	 France	 and	
Germany	and	states	that,	while	the	1980s	UK	privatization	and	liberalization	reforms	
of	network	industries	occurred	largely	independently	from	EU	developments,	the	EU	
regulatory	 framework	 for	 network	 industries	 dovetails	 the	 LME	 paradigm,	 being	
premised	on	the	effort	 to	bring	about	competition	through	the	unbundling	of	 the	
sector,	 the	 introduction	 of	 private	 capital,	 cost-reflective	 pricing,	 market	
transparency,	and	cross-border	energy	trade.	The	EU	choice,	according	to	Thatcher	
(2007),	 forced	 all	 other	 Member	 States	 to	 converge	 towards	 the	 LME	 model	 of	
regulation	of	network	industries.	Indeed,	before	the	EU	began	legislating	on	network	
industries,	 France	 and	 Germany	 displayed	 very	 different	 approaches	 to	 those	
sectors:	 in	 France,	 the	 state	 owned	 or	 controlled	most	 of	 the	 sectoral	 firms	 and	
steered	technological	and	sector	development;	in	Germany,	industrial	associations	
performed	 self-regulatory	 functions	 and	 the	 state	 accepted	 to	 keep	 itself	 at	 a	
distance,	while	retaining	a	monitoring	role.	
After	long	resistances,	France	and	Germany,	as	all	other	Member	States,	eventually	
complied	with	the	requirements	of	European	legislation	in	formal	respects,	inter	alia	
by	setting	up	regulatory	authorities.	Upon	closer	examination,	however,	it	becomes	
evident	that	both	retained	the	key	features	of	their	distinctive	mode	of	coordination	
in	the	 informal	networks	undergirding	the	sector	(Thatcher,	2007).	Thus,	in	France	
the	state	preserves	a	key	steering	role,	while	in	Germany	industry	continues	leading	
sector	development,	even	though	both	at	least	formally	converged	to	an	LME-type	
sector	organization.		
The	VoC	of	the	country	also	affects	the	characteristics	of	regulatory	institutions:	in	
both	France	and	Germany,	lack	of	political	support	prevented	regulatory	authorities	
from	 enjoying	 the	 wide-ranging	 independence	 that	 is	 characteristic	 of	 an	 LME	
111	
	
	
approach	and,	therefore,	of	UK	regulators.	His	stances	echo	Coen	(2005),	who	found	
regulators	 in	 Germany	 to	 be	 less	 independent	 than	 in	 the	 UK.	 Guardiancich	 and	
Guidi’s	 (2016)	 analysis	 confirms	 these	 patterns:	 in	 the	 UK,	 where	market	 signals	
shape	market	 players’	 interactions,	 the	 independence	of	 the	 regulatory	 authority	
from	 both	 government	 and	 industry	 is	 crucial	 to	 ensure	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
regulatory	system;	in	CMEs,	strategic	coordination	among	firms	precludes	regulatory	
detachment	from	market	actors	and	government;	in	MMEs,	the	highly	discretionary	
role	of	 the	 state	 leaves	 little	 room	 for	 regulators’	autonomy.	 Indeed,	 institutional	
complementarities	 play	 a	 role	 in	 this	 regard,	 as	 market	 players	 and	 government	
demand	 of	 regulators	 to	 perform	 the	 role	 best	 suited	 to	 the	 extant	 mode	 of	
coordination.	These	contributions	show	that	 the	original	 classification	by	Hall	and	
Soskice	 (2001),	 by	 and	 large,	 is	 able	 to	 explain	 variation	 in	 national	 regulatory	
arrangements.	Moreover,	 these	 studies	 show	 that	 VoC	 is	 an	 inherently	 relational	
framework.		
How	does	this	translate	on	the	transnational	arena	of	regulatory	networking?	Does	
the	VoC	of	their	country	affect	regulators’	networking	choices?	I	argue	that	it	does,	
possibly	through	more	than	one	mechanism:	on	the	one	hand,	regulators	may	gain	
more	value	from	communication	with	peers	dealing	with	a	similar	sector	structure,	
as	these	are	more	likely	to	face	similar	challenges	as	themselves;	on	the	other	hand,	
regulators	from	certain	VoC	may	enjoy	more	influence	than	others,	prompting	their	
peers	 to	 seek	 them	out	as	 frequent	 interlocutors.	 Since	 the	EU	energy	 legislation	
conforms	 to	 the	 LME	variety,	 one	 should	expect	 regulators	 from	LMEs	 to	 receive	
more	incoming	ties	as	all	other	VoC	slowly	converge	(or	adapt	their	extant	mode	of	
coordination	in	network	industries)	to	the	LME	mode	of	coordination.		
In	 a	 recent	 contribution	 on	 the	 European	 network	 of	 broadcasting	 regulators,	
Papadopoulos	(2017)	emphasises	that	regulators	learn	from	peers	they	hold	in	high	
esteem	and/or	who	are	facing	problems	perceived	as	similar,	but	does	not	explore	
this	pattern	any	further.	 In	their	study	of	the	European	network	of	patent	 judges,	
112	
	
	
Lazega,	Quintane	et	al.	(2017)	find	that	“It	is	clear	that	judges	do	sort	each	other	in	
social	networks	based	on	their	belonging	to	blocks	of	countries	with	similar	types	of	
capitalism.”	(p.	19).	The	vague	explanation	they	provide	is	that	judges	from	similar	
VoC	 probably	 refer	 to	 similar	 bodies	 of	 law.	 Both	 studies	 also	 note	 that,	 within	
networks,	certain	regulators	are	much	more	influential	than	others	and	perceived	as	
models	by	their	peers,	who	seek	access	to	their	experience	and	suggestions.	
The	reason	why	regulators	belonging	to	countries	with	similar	modes	of	coordination	
in	the	political	economy	are	more	likely	to	choose	each	other	as	network	partners	is	
that	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 encounter	 the	 same	 bottlenecks	 in	 the	 formulation	 and	
implementation	of	regulatory	policy.	The	energy	sector	is	well	suited	to	illustrate	this	
argument:	 EU	 energy	 legislation	mandates	 the	 unbundling	 (or	 separation)	 of	 the	
network	 infrastructure,	 consisting	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 high	 voltage/capacity	
(transmission)	 and	 low	 voltage/capacity	 (distribution)	 grids	 from	 the	 potentially	
competitive	segments	of	the	electricity	and	gas	sectors,	i.e.	generation/production	
and	 supply.	 Previously,	 production	 and	 investment	decisions	were	made	within	 a	
single	vertically	integrated,	usually	state-owned	energy	company.	The	unbundling	of	
generation	 of	 electricity	 (and	 gas	 production)	 from	 transmission,	 distribution	 and	
supply	 is	meant	to	ensure	that	coordination	between	energy	demand,	supply	and	
construction	 of	 infrastructure	 happens	 through	 market	 signals	 (as	 per	 the	 LME	
model)20.	
																																																						
20	The	EU	legislation	has	mandated	full	separation	(i.e.	functional,	accounting	and	legal);	the	
so-called	Ownership	Unbundling	(OU).	Under	OU,	the	Transmission	network	is	owned	and/or	
managed	by	a	separate	company	(so-called	Transmission	System	Operator	-	TSO),	having	no	
but	 a	 minority	 interest	 in	 generation	 or	 retail	 activities.	 Alternative	 models	 deemed	
admissible	include	the	Independent	System	Operator	(ISO)	model,	which	foresees	that	the	
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The	 economics	 literature	 has	 recognized	 that	 national	 regulators	 need	 to	 make	
informal	“regulatory	contracts”	(Stern	and	Trillas	2003,	Helm	2009,	Stern	2012)	 in	
their	 national	 markets,	 with	 government,	 infrastructure	 managers,	 equipment	
manufacturers	and	suppliers.	These	contracts	concern	the	regulatory	approach,	the	
objectives	of	the	regulatory	policy	and	the	boundaries	set	to	firms	operating	in	the	
sector.	The	stability	and	credibility	of	regulatory	contracts	are	pivotal	to	regulators’	
legitimacy	 and,	 therefore,	 authority.	 Regulators	 have	 to	 conclude	 regulatory	
contracts	 that	are	acceptable	 to	all	parties,	hence	corresponding	 to	 the	prevalent	
mode	of	coordination,	while	also	fulfilling	the	objectives	of	the	EU	legislation,	which	
is	 clearly	 LME-inspired.	 Therefore,	 I	 argue	 that	 European	 regulators	 seek	 out	
counterparts	from	similar	national	modes	of	coordination,	as	these	are	best	suited	
to	respond	to	their	requests	with	replies,	grounded	in	the	knowledge	of	the	structure	
of	 interaction	the	regulator	faces	at	home.	At	the	same	time,	however,	regulators	
use	 networks	 to	 access	 the	 experience	 and	 expertise	 of	 other	 counterparts,	
particularly	influential	ones.	
My	first	hypothesis	is,	therefore,	that	European	energy	regulators’	connections	are	
governed	by	a	pattern	of	homophily	(Cranmer	and	Desmarais	2011)	driven	by	similar	
VoC	as	exemplified	in	the	energy	sector	structure.		
H1:	Regulators	network	more	with	regulators	from	their	same	Variety	of	Capitalism.	
																																																						
network	is	owned	by	the	vertically-integrated	company	and	leased	to	a	separate	company.	
The	third	model,	the	Independent	Transmission	Operator	(ITO),	implies	that	the	transmission	
network	 is	 owned	 by	 the	 vertically-integrated	 company	 and	 managed	 by	 a	 department	
within	it,	walled	by	strict	independence	requirements	in	its	operations.	The	three	models	co-
exist	across	EU	Member	States,	although	the	OU	is	the	most	common.	
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My	second	hypothesis	is	that	the	UK	regulator	should	be	highly	sought	after	by	its	
peers,	 given	 that	 all	 EU	Member	 States	 have	 had	 to	 converge,	 at	 least	 partially,	
towards	an	LME	type	of	energy	sector	organization.		
H2:	Regulators	from	Liberal	Market	Economies	have	significantly	more	incoming	ties	
than	their	peers	from	other	Varieties	of	Capitalism.	
One	of	the	main	criticisms	levelled	at	the	VoC	framework	is	its	stationarity.	Indeed,	
the	 VoC	 of	 a	 country	 is	 virtually	 time-invariant.	 Studying	 connections	 between	
regulators	 as	 depending	on	 the	VoC	of	 their	 country	 implies	 considering	 them	as	
rather	 stationary.	 The	 data	 underlying	 this	 analysis,	 indeed,	 concerns	 regulators’	
frequent,	regular	connections.	Yet,	the	flexibility	of	informal	social	networks	is	one	
of	their	key	attributes:	participants	can	add	or	sever	links	as	opportunity	and	need	
require.	 However,	 the	 reasons	 for	 tie	 formation	 and	 elimination	 may	 be	 highly	
idiosyncratic,	 and	 last	 for	 limited	 time	 periods.	 There	 are,	 however,	 time-variant	
factors,	 which	 may	 consistently	 affect	 the	 likelihood	 of	 tie	 formation:	 resources	
(Glachant,	 Khalfallah	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Alcañiz	 (2010,	 2016)	 finds	 that	 the	 sudden	
budgetary	cuts,	especially	in	developing	countries,	represent	a	strong	incentive	for	
nuclear	experts	to	collaborate	with	their	peers	in	transnational	joint	projects.	They	
compensate	for	the	sudden	decrease	in	their	resources	by	pooling	their	competences	
with	 those	 of	 their	 peers	 in	 neighbouring	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 accomplish	 their	
ongoing	 technical	 activities.	 Less	 resourceful	 regulators,	 therefore,	 should	 use	
informal	networking	to	compensate	for	their	lacking	resources.	These	considerations	
lead	me	to	formulate	the	third	hypothesis.	
H3:	Regulatory	authorities	with	 lower	 (budgetary	and	human)	 resources	are	more	
active	networkers	(i.e.	have	significantly	more	outgoing	ties	than	their	peers).	
This	analysis	comprises	the	full	sample	of	European	energy	regulatory	authorities,	
including	Eastern	European	Member	States.	However,	the	original	VoC	classification	
by	 Hall	 and	 Soskice	 (2001)	 only	 includes	 OECD	 countries,	 which	 then	 excluded	
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Eastern	European	countries.	Scholars	of	VoC	have	investigated	the	usefulness	of	the	
framework	 for	understanding	 the	political	 economy	of	newer	EU	Member	States.	
There	is	some	degree	of	consensus	about	the	Baltic	countries	being	closest	to	the	
LME	model,	and	Slovenia	to	the	CME	model	(Feldmann,	2006).	While	acknowledging	
these	definitional	efforts,	Hancké,	Rhodes	et	al.	(2007)	underline	that	new	Member	
States	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 transitioning	 towards	 models	 of	 capitalism,	 and	
cluster	them	as	Emerging	Market	Economies	(EMEs).	Nölke	and	Vliegenthart	(2009)	
rely	on	a	 specific	 trait	 (i.e.	provision	of	 capital	 through	 foreign	direct	 investment)	
found	in	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland,	and	the	Slovak	Republic	to	label	them	
Dependent	Market	Economies	(DMEs).		
I	categorize	the	VoC	of	EU	Member	States	with	respect	to	the	market	structure	of	
their	 energy	 sector.	 The	 resulting	 categorization	 differs	 from	 the	 “traditional”	
breakdown	 in	some	respects;	principally,	 in	not	considering	 Ireland	as	an	LME,	as	
done	in	Hall	and	Gingerich	(2009),	given	that	its	energy	sector	is	almost	entirely	under	
government	 control.	 I	 find	 a	 neat	 distinction	 between	 countries	 where	 the	
transmission	 and	 distribution	 segments	 are	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 different	
companies,	and	are	separate	from	generation	and	retail	(only	the	UK)	and	countries	
where	 companies	 active	 in	 distribution	 are	 also	 active	 in	 retail	 and	 sometimes	 in	
generation,	too	(as	in	most	CMEs).	In	MMEs,	the	dominance	of	formerly	state-owned	
incumbents	 has	 been	 restrained	 through	 regulation	 (as	 in	 France),	 mandatory	
divestment	(as	in	Italy	and	Greece)	or	privatizations	(as	in	Portugal	and	Spain);	still,	
these	 former	 incumbents	 have	 the	 largest	 market	 shares.	 Scandinavian	 Market	
Economies	 have	 a	 good	 level	 of	 competition	 in	 both	 generation	 and	 retail,	 even	
though	 state-controlled	 incumbents	 are	 also	 active	 in	 those	 segments,	 and	 are	
characterised	by	locally-owned	distribution	systems	and	state-owned	transmission	
systems.	The	penetration	of	foreign	capital	(mostly	from	Western	European	national	
companies)	 in	 the	 generation,	 distribution	 and	 retail	 segments	 of	 the	 electricity	
sector	 in	 several	Eastern	European	countries	 resonates	with	 their	 classification	as	
Dependent	 Market	 Economies	 (DMEs).	 Finally,	 a	 prevalence	 of	 direct	 state	
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ownership	 and	 control	 in	 all	 segments	 of	 the	market	 is	 evident	 in	 other	 Eastern	
European	countries,	Cyprus,	Malta	and	Ireland	(details	 in	Appendix).	The	resulting	
classification	used	in	this	chapter	is	as	follows:	
- LMEs:	only	the	UK;	
- CMEs:	Germany	(the	only	pure	CME),	Austria,	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands;	
- “Government-owned”:	 Ireland,	 Croatia,	 Cyprus,	 Estonia,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	
Malta	and	Slovenia;	
- Dependent	 Market	 Economies	 (DMEs):	 Czech	 Republic,	 Hungary,	 Poland,	
Slovak	Republic,	Bulgaria	and	Romania;	
- MMEs:	Italy,	France,	Greece,	Portugal	and	Spain;		
- Scandinavian	Market	Economies:	Finland,	Sweden,	Norway	and	Denmark.	
The	tie	choices	of	regulators	of	network	industries,	however,	may	hardly	be	choices	
at	all:	geography	plays	such	a	dominant	role	in	energy	infrastructure	as	to	potentially	
overcome	or	obscure	any	other	rationale	for	informal	cooperation,	as	regulators	are	
bound	to	communicate	often	with	regulators	from	neighbouring	(or,	more	precisely,	
interconnected)	 countries.	 Regular	 communication	with	 neighbours,	 in	 turn,	may	
engender	stable	patterns	of	exchange	of	information.	In	order	to	assess	this	effect,	
rather	than	geographic	contiguity,	one	should	consider	the	actual	direction	of	 the	
flows	of	electricity	and	gas	that	are	transmitted	across	borders	and	seas	within	the	
EU.	Consequently,	I	include	electricity	and	gas	flows,	both	across	land	and	sea,	in	the	
analysis,	as	their	directionality	may	be	strongly	determining	regulatory	interactions	
and	potentially	obscuring	any	other	explanatory	factor.	
Furthermore,	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 EU,	 exchange	 of	 information	 is,	 beyond	
beneficial,	actually	made	compulsory	by	the	presence	of	a	shared	policy	framework	
that	national	regulators	have	to	implement	at	national	level.	The	declared	aim	of	the	
EU	energy	policy	is	achieving	a	fully	integrated	Internal	Energy	Market	(IEM).	As	an	
interim	 step	 towards	 the	achievement	of	 the	 IEM,	 the	European	Commission	has	
launched	 the	 so-called	 Regional	 Energy	 Initiatives	 for	 Electricity	 and	 Gas.	 The	
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Regional	Initiatives	group	regulators	into	eight	regions	for	electricity	and	three	for	
gas	 with	 the	 intent	 of	 achieving	 integrated	 regional	 markets	 for	 both.	 Frequent	
interaction	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Regional	 Initiatives	 may	 have	 engendered	
socialization	dynamics	leading	to	trust	and	thus	to	the	maintenance	of	ties	beyond	
the	official	policy	framework.	I	therefore	include	co-membership	into	the	Regional	
Initiatives	 as	 a	 suitable	 control	 and	 proxy	 for	 the	 relevance	 of	 European	 policy	
requirements	to	explain	regulators’	informal	ties.		
	
Data	and	method:	an	Exponential	Random	Graphs	Model	of	strong	
ties	among	European	regulators.	
The	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks,	both	European	and	global,	has	
scarcely	exploited	the	power	of	quantitative	network	analysis	to	explain	patterns	of	
transnational	networking.	This	is	plausibly	due	to	lack	of	data	on	the	connections	that	
individual	 regulators	maintain.	 Those	 contributions	 that	 use	 the	 tools	 of	 network	
analysis	 usually	 concern	 multi-level	 and	 multi-actor	 networks	 of	 experts	 around	
specific	issue	areas,	such	as	the	environment,	and	usually	rely	on	data	concerning	co-
membership	in	cooperation	initiatives	and/or	co-attendance	of	certain	events.	The	
assumed	 link	 between	 co-membership	 and	 collaboration,	 however,	 is	 not	 self-
evident,	 as	 actors	 may	 be	 members	 of	 the	 same	 initiative	 but	 not	 collaborate	
regularly.	Very	recent	contributions	in	the	policy	studies	literature	have	resorted	to	
asking	 network	members	 about	 their	 regular	 and	 frequent	 ties	 to	 other	 network	
members	(Fischer,	Ingold	et	al.	2017,	Hamilton	and	Lubell	2017)	in	order	to	attempt	
to	capture	the	essence	of	coordination.	This	analysis	adopts	a	similar	approach	 in	
studying	the	empirical	case	of	a	homogenous	network	(i.e.	comprising	one	type	of	
actor)	of	transnational	scope:	the	network	of	ties	linking	European	energy	regulators,	
as	reported	by	regulators	themselves.	
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I	gathered	the	data	used	in	this	chapter	between	the	second	half	of	2015	and	late	
2016.	Specifically,	I	wrote	to	the	Heads	of	International	Affairs	departments	and	to	
Communication	 Officers.	 Not	 all	 European	 energy	 regulatory	 authorities	 have	
dedicated	International	Affairs	offices,	but	all	have	staff	dedicated	to	international	
affairs,	such	as	Communication	Officers.	 I	asked	these	respondents	to	reply	to	the	
following	 question21:	 “Think	 of	 the	 individuals	 you	 (or	 somebody	 at	 your	 NRA)	
exchange	information	with	more	often.	Which	NRAs	do	they	belong	to?”.	Network	
analysis	is	very	sensitive	to	missing	data;	it	 is	important	to	possess	information	on	
the	whole	network	in	order	to	make	accurate	analyses.	Therefore,	I	chose	to	rely	on	
a	 single	 question	 in	 order	 to	 maximize	 my	 chances	 of	 receiving	 a	 reply	 from	 all	
network	members.	Indeed,	I	have	obtained	replies	from	all	European	national	energy	
regulatory	authorities,	bar	one.	For	that	missing	respondent,	I	have	just	considered	
the	nominations	of	other	regulators	as	reciprocated.		
Being	 aware	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 “most	 frequent”	 may	 mean	 different	 things	 to	
different	 people,	 and	 that	 regular	 exchanges	 of	 information	 may	 include	 mostly	
routine	exchanges	due	to	shared	borders	and	interconnected	infrastructure	rather	
than	be	occasions	for	learning,	I	added	to	my	requests	explanatory	text	specifying	to	
respondents	that	they	should	name	the	peers	they	get	in	touch	with	when	they	seek	
advice	 or	 an	 exchange	 of	 opinions	 or	 suggestions,	 not	 just	 routine	 exchanges	 of	
information.	Moreover,	 I	complemented	the	question	with	a	request	to	name	the	
regulatory	authorities	with	which	they	are	in	contact	above	and	beyond	European	
policy	 requirements	 (including	 participation	 into	 the	 European	 Agency	 for	 the	
Coordination	of	Energy	Regulators).	I	guaranteed	anonymity	to	all	respondents.		
																																																						
21	 In	half	of	the	cases	I	obtained	regulators’	replies	over	the	phone.	Because	the	question	
asked	during	phone	conversations	was	identical	to	those	in	the	email	messages,	there	is	no	
need	to	account	for	whether	regulators	responded	to	the	email	or	were	contacted	by	phone	
in	the	models.	
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The	resulting	network	is	a	“thinned”	network	(Cranmer	and	Desmarais,	2011),	i.e.	a	
network	consisting	of	only	 the	strong	relationships	between	the	nodes.	 If	 the	ties	
across	European	regulators	were	a	valued	network	(with	ties	having	different	weights	
depending	on	their	 importance),	the	network	studied	in	this	chapter	 is	the	one	of	
highly	 valued	 ties.	 I	 chose	 to	 focus	 on	 strong	 ties	 because	 energy	 regulatory	
cooperation	 in	 the	 EU	 has	 a	 long	 history,	 dating	 back	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	
(Vasconcelos	2005).	Moreover,	European	energy	legislation	imposes	an	obligation	on	
European	regulators	to	cooperate	within	the	European	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	
of	 Energy	 Regulators	 (ACER).	 Therefore,	 every	 European	 energy	 regulator	 is	
connected	 to	 all	 others.	 I	 was	 specifically	 interested,	 however,	 in	 the	 informal	
bilateral	ties	that	regulators	maintain	more	regularly	and	frequently.		
I	set	up	an	Exponential	Random	Graph	Model	 (ERGM)	of	the	network	of	relations	
among	European	energy	 regulators.	 ERGM	are	generative	models:	 the	underlying	
assumption	 is	 that	 the	 observed	 network	 structure	 has	 emerged	 from	 an	
evolutionary	process	of	tie	formation	over	time,	explained	by	a	series	of	predictive	
factors	(Robins,	Lewis	et	al.	2012).	The	researcher	selects	the	relevant	factors,	which	
could	be	attributes	of	individual	nodes	or	attributes	of	dyadic	ties,	on	theoretical	and	
knowledge	bases;	the	analysis	reveals	the	probability	that	the	observed	network	is	
drawn	from	the	distribution	of	the	network	structures	that	are	plausible,	given	the	
number	of	nodes	and	the	network	density,	and	the	factors.	The	coefficients	of	the	
model	are	to	be	interpreted	as	log	odds,	as	in	a	logit	model.	ERGMs	also	allow	the	
modelling	 of	 the	 interdependencies	 existing	 within	 networks,	 and	 represent	 a	
technique	for	inferential	network	analysis	where	the	outcome	of	interest	is	a	set	of	
relationships	(i.e.	the	ties	among	the	nodes	of	the	network)	(Cranmer,	Leifeld	et	al.	
2017).		
The	graph	in	Figure	1	reports	the	structure	of	the	relations	among	European	energy	
regulators.	 The	 network	 appears	 characterized	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 highly	
connected	 nodes,	 a	 small	 number	 of	 peripheral	 nodes,	 and	 a	 majority	 of	 nodes	
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having	an	intermediate	number	of	connections.	Figure	1	shows	that	two	nodes	have	
not	 been	 nominated	 by	 any	 of	 their	 colleagues	 as	 their	 most	 frequent	 contacts	
(hence	 have	 an	 in-degree	 of	 zero).	 Figure	 1	 also	 shows	 that	most	 of	 the	 ties	 are	
reciprocal,	which	validates	the	data,	considering	that	I	did	not	set	a	minimum	or	a	
maximum	 number	 of	 nominations	 for	 regulators.	 The	 promise	 of	 anonymity	
concerning	 respondents’	 identities	 and	 their	 replies	 prevents	 me	 from	 assigning	
labels	to	the	nodes	in	the	graph.		
Figure	4-1	-	Visualization	of	the	network.		
	
EU National Energy Regulators Network
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As	mentioned,	I	expect	the	ties	in	this	network	to	depend	on	both	exogenous	and	
endogenous	factors.	As	for	the	exogenous	factors,	the	hypotheses	I	developed	in	the	
previous	 section	 point	 to	 homophily,	 activism	 and	 influence	 according	 to	 VoC,	
controlling	for	EU	policy	requirements,	interconnection	and	flows	across	borders.	I	
also	 include	 in	 the	model	 several	 endogenous	 dependencies	 to	 account	 for	 likely	
patterns	of	social	interaction	that	may	have	contributed	to	determine	the	network	
structure:	the	density	of	the	network;	the	reciprocity	of	ties;	and	the	transitivity	of	
ties,	whereby	 if	node	 i	 is	connected	to	 j	and	 j	 is	connected	to	k,	 there	 is	a	higher	
probability	that	i	and	k	are	also	connected.	I	also	include	dependencies	to	account	
for	 the	 centralization	 of	 the	 network,	 i.e.	 to	 verify	whether	 the	 network	 is	more	
centralized	 around	 particularly	 active	 (i.e.	 many	 outgoing	 ties)	 or	 particularly	
influential	(i.e.	many	incoming	ties)	nodes	than	would	be	expected	by	chance.		
Therefore,	the	predictors	employed	in	the	model	include	electricity22	and	gas23	flows,	
over	land	and	sea,	across	EU	Member	States	(plus	Norway);	co-membership	in	the	
European	Regional	 Initiatives	for	Electricity	and	for	Gas24;	data	on	each	regulatory	
																																																						
22	A	matrix	reporting	electricity	flows	in	both	directions	across	EU	Member	States	in	GWh	in	
2015.	 Data	 from	 ENTSO-E	 website,	
https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/statistics/electricity-in-europe/Pages/default.aspx	
(last	accessed	3	November	2017).	
23	A	matrix	reporting	gas	flows	in	both	directions	across	EU	Member	States	in	cubic	meters	
of	 gas	 in	 2015.	 Data	 from	 UK	 government	 website	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579632/
Physical_gas_flows_across_Europe_in_2015.pdf	(last	accessed	3	November	2017).	
24	 An	 affiliation	matrix	 of	 the	 Regional	 initiatives	 in	 Electricity	 and	 Gas.	 Data	 from	 ACER	
website,	 http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/regional_initiatives/pages/default.aspx	
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authority’s	budget	and	staff	numbers25;	and	the	VoC	categorisation.	As	previously	
outlined,	 the	 VoC	 categories	 derive	 from	 my	 assessment	 regarding	 similarity	 of	
electricity	and	gas	sector	structure	across	EU	Member	States,	as	indicated	essentially	
by	the	number	and	the	identity	of	firms	active	in	different	market	segments	and	the	
extent	of	public	ownership	(details	in	the	Appendix).	The	quantitative	data	has	been	
standardized	before	proceeding	to	the	analysis	by	subtracting	the	mean	and	dividing	
by	the	standard	deviation.		
	
Results	of	the	model.	
For	the	sake	of	clarity,	let	me	recall	the	hypotheses	I	formulated	together	with	the	
variables	describing	them	and	the	corresponding	mechanisms	in	the	ERGM,	as	well	
as	 the	 factors	 I	 am	 using	 as	 controls	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 interconnection	 and	 co-
participation	in	EU	Regional	Initiatives.	
	
	
	
																																																						
and	 http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/gas/regional_%20intiatives/pages/gas-regional-
iniciatives.aspx	(last	accessed	3	November	2017).	
25	The	budget	and	staff	numbers	of	each	the	regulatory	authority	in	2012	(for	lack	of	more	
recent	 data).	 Data	 from	 the	 European	 Commission	 DG	 Energy	 website	
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/single-market-progress-
report	 Country	 reports	 2014,	 last	 accessed	 on	 3	 November	 2017,	 complemented	 with	
regulatory	authorities’	annual	reports	in	some	cases.	
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Table	4-1	–	Hypotheses,	Variables	and	Mechanisms	
	 HYPOTHESES	 VARIABLE	 MECHANISM	
1	 Regulators	network	more	with	
regulators	from	countries	
belonging	to	the	same	Variety	of	
Capitalism	as	themselves.	
VoC	 Homophily		
2	 Regulators	from	Liberal	Market	
Economies	have	significantly	
more	incoming	than	their	peers	
from	other	Varieties	of	
Capitalism.	
VoC	 More	incoming	ties	
3	 Regulatory	authorities	with	
lower	(budgetary	and	human)	
resources	are	more	active	
networkers	(i.e.	have	
significantly	more	outgoing	ties	
than	their	peers).	
Budget	
Staff	units	
More	outgoing	ties		
Control	1	 The	structure	of	the	network	of	
relationships	existing	among	
European	energy	regulators	
mirrors	the	paths	of	electricity	
and	gas	flows	across	EU	Member	
States.	
Electricity	
flows	and	
gas	flows	
Matrix	of	network	ties	
mirrors	matrix	of	
electricity	and	gas	flows	
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Control	2	 The	structure	of	the	network	of	
relationships	existing	among	
European	energy	regulators	
mirrors	the	subdivision	operated	
through	the	Regional	Initiatives	
for	Electricity	and	Gas,	
respectively.	
Regional	
Initiative	
(electricity)	
and	
Regional	
Initiative	
(gas)	
Matrix	of	network	ties	
mirrors	matrix	of	co-
participation	in	EU	
Regional	Electricity	
and/or	Gas	Initiative	
	
	
The	results	of	the	ERG	models	are	reported	in	Table	2.	I	performed	the	analysis	using	
R	package	“ergm”	(Handcock,	Hunter	et	al.	2017).	The	coefficient	are	log	odds,	that	
is,	after	exponentiation,	they	 indicate	the	probability	that	an	edge	exists	between	
two	nodes,	all	else	equal,	i.e.	conditional	on	the	rest	of	the	graph	being	fixed.	Positive	
and	 high	 coefficients	 indicate	 higher	 odds,	 while	 negative	 and	 high	 coefficients	
indicate	lower	odds	of	a	tie	existing	between	two	regulators	on	the	basis	of	the	given	
parameter.	Each	explanatory	factor	was	fed	into	the	model	according	to	its	expected	
effect26	on	the	odds	of	tie	existence.	
																																																						
26	The	syntax	of	ERG	Models	comprises	a	wealth	of	terms.	The	ones	used	in	this	model	are	
outlined	here	below:		
-	“edgecov”	:	the	input	is	a	matrix	of	covariates;	a	positive	coefficient	indicates	the	probability	
that	 two	 nodes	 sharing	 the	 same	 characteristic	 are	 also	 ties	 (e.g.	 are	 part	 to	 the	 same	
Regional	grouping);	
-	“nodeicov”	:	it	tests	whether	a	certain	attribute	of	the	node	affects	its	in-degree	(e.g.	more	
resources	are	associated	with	significantly	higher	odds	of	incoming	ties);	
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Table	4-2	-	ERG	Models	of	the	network	of	European	energy	regulators	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Network	density	 -4.865***	 -5.494***	 -5.477***	 -6.015***	 -5.135***	
	 (0.376)	 (0.496)	 (0.519)	 (0.576)	 (0.451)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Homophily	according	to	Variety	of	Capitalism	
Coordinated	Market	
Economies	 1.252
***	 1.178**	 1.167**	 1.143*	 1.177**	
	 (0.484)	 (0.569)	 (0.593)	 (0.564)	 (0.553)	
	 	 	 	 	 	Dependent	Market	
Economies	 0.744
**	 1.670***	 1.836***	 2.250***	 1.168***	
	 (0.319)	 (0.514)	 (0.577)	 (0.605)	 (0.440)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Government	ownership	 0.577**	 0.800**	 0.841*	 0.928*	 0.536	
	 (0.257)	 (0.402)	 (0.444)	 (0.479)	 (0.360)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Mixed	Market	Economies	 0.586	 0.416	 0.397	 0.452	 0.911*	
	 (0.394)	 (0.507)	 (0.512)	 (0.560)	 (0.470)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Nordic	Market	Economies	 1.494*	 1.508	 1.583*	 1.625	 1.448*	
	 (0.801)	 (0.918)	 (0.917)	 (0.949)	 (0.843)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
																																																						
-	“nodeocov”	:	same	as	nodeicov,	but	for	out-degree;	
-	“nodeifactor”	:	same	as	nodeicov,	but	for	categorical	variables;	
-	“nodeofactor”	:	same	as	nodeocov,	but	for	categorical	variables;	
-	“nodematch”	:	it	tests	for	homophily,	i.e.	the	probability	that	two	nodes	that	match	on	the	
given	characteristic	 (e.g.	 two	regulators	who	are	both	 from	Western	European	countries)	
share	a	tie;	
-	“absdiff”	:	similar	to	nodematch	but	for	continuous	covariates.	
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Varieties	of	Capitalism	and	incoming	ties	
Coordinated	Market	
Economies	 	 0.980
**	 0.977**	 1.106**	 	
	 	 (0.462)	 (0.483)	 (0.502)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Dependent	Market	
Economies	 	
Reference	
category	
Reference	
category	
Reference	
category	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Government	ownership	 	 0.654	 0.635	 0.667	 	
	 	 (0.475)	 (0.498)	 (0.518)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Liberal	Market	Economies	 	 1.989***	 1.871***	 1.863***	 	
	 	 (0.517)	 (0.610)	 (0.615)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Mixed	Market	Economies	 	 0.993**	 0.958*	 0.974**	 	
	 	 (0.460)	 (0.492)	 (0.494)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Nordic	Market	Economies	 	 0.895*	 0.883*	 0.942*	 	
	 	 (0.492)	 (0.510)	 (0.523)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Effect	of	resources	on	outgoing	ties	
Staff	(2012)	 	 	 -0.144	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.188)	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Budget	(2012)	 	 	 0.197	 0.261*	 	
	 	 	 (0.172)	 (0.143)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Staff	size	(Full	time	equivalents,	2016):	
Large	(>170)	 	 	 	 Reference	
category	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Medium	(90-140)	 	 	 	 0.978***	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.353)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Medium-small	(50-75)	 	 	 	 -0.173	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.506)	 	
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Small	(12-50)	 	 	 	 0.750	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.473)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Micro	(>12)	 	 	 	 -0.173		(0.690)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Varieties	of	Capitalism	and	outgoing	ties	
Coordinated	Market	
Economies	 	 	 	 	 0.522	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.415)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Dependent	Market	
Economies	 	 	 	 	
Reference	
category	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Government	ownership	 	 	 	 	 0.465	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.434)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Liberal	Market	Economies	 	 	 	 	 1.416***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.492)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Mixed	Market	Economies	 	 	 	 	 0.059	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.458)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Nordic	Market	Economies	 	 	 	 	 0.464	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.469)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Controls	
Co-membership	in	Regional	
Initiatives	for	Electricity	
0.361**	 0.550***	 0.578***	 0.685***	 0.501***	
(0.172)	 (0.196)	 (0.204)	 (0.219)	 (0.192)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Co-membership	in	Regional	
Initiatives	for	Gas	
0.154	 0.130	 0.101	 -0.092	 0.106	
(0.238)	 (0.246)	 (0.251)	 (0.276)	 (0.247)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Cross	border	electricity	
flows	
0.627***	 0.576***	 0.580***	 0.580***	 0.588***	
(0.191)	 (0.188)	 (0.197)	 (0.181)	 (0.171)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Cross	border	gas	flows	 0.052	 0.016	 0.013	 0.085	 0.035	
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	 (0.097)	 (0.096)	 (0.095)	 (0.102)	 (0.105)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Endogenous	dependencies	 	 	 	 	 	
Reciprocity	 1.967***	 1.956***	 1.899***	 1.801***	 1.905***	
	 (0.394)	 (0.383)	 (0.393)	 (0.396)	 (0.383)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Activity	 3.022**	 2.263	 2.360	 4.099*	 2.800*	
	 (1.487)	 (1.468)	 (1.451)	 (2.126)	 (1.623)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Popularity	 -0.187	 -0.158	 -0.209	 -0.418	 -0.336	
	 (0.830)	 (0.914)	 (0.886)	 (0.928)	 (0.866)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Shared	partners	 0.051	 0.061*	 0.067*	 0.077**	 0.053*	
	 (0.031)	 (0.036)	 (0.037)	 (0.036)	 (0.028)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Transitivity	 1.073***	 0.932***	 0.908***	 0.880***	 1.008***	
	 (0.218)	 (0.223)	 (0.232)	 (0.235)	 (0.234)	
	
Akaike	Inf.	Crit.	 494.559	 489.868	 492.298	 483.653	 496.646	
Bayesian	Inf.	Crit.	 565.052	 583.858	 595.687	 601.840	 590.636	
Note:	 *p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01	
	
Table	2	offers	two	main	takeaways:	first,	regulators	do	display	a	tendency	to	maintain	
close	relationships	with	peers	from	their	same	VoC,	all	else	equal,	and	this	pattern	is	
strongest	and	most	consistent	across	specifications	for	regulators	from	Dependent	
Market	 Economies	 and	 from	 Coordinated	 Market	 Economies;	 second,	 the	 UK	
regulator	is	not	only	more	likely	to	be	at	the	receiving	end	of	a	tie	than	its	peers,	but	
also	much	more	active	than	them,	all	else	equal.	Hypothesis	one	and	two,	therefore,	
are	confirmed.	The	homophily	pattern	could	not	be	tested	 in	the	case	of	the	LME	
because	it	is	unique	in	the	dataset,	hence	cannot	form	homophilous	ties.	Overall,	all	
regulators	are	significantly	more	likely	to	receive	ties	than	regulators	from	DMEs	(the	
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reference	 category	 in	 the	 models),	 bar	 regulators	 from	 countries	 where	 the	
electricity	and	gas	sectors	are	mostly	under	public	ownership	and	control.		
In	 model	 3,	 budgetary	 and	 staff	 resources	 are	 operationalized	 via	 a	 continuous	
predictor	and	refer	to	the	year	2012,	and	appear	to	not	significantly	affect	the	odds	
of	 tie	existence.	To	shed	more	 light	on	the	matter,	 in	model	4	 I	use	more	recent,	
categorical	data	on	staff	figures	released	by	European	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	
Energy	Regulators	(ACER)27.	All	else	equal,	regulators	with	medium	staff	numbers	(i.e.	
90	to	140	full	time	equivalent	employees)	are	more	likely	to	be	active	networkers	
compared	 to	 regulators	 with	 large	 resources.	 Higher	 budgetary	 figures	 are	 also	
associated	with	higher	odds	of	outgoing	 ties,	but	 the	effect	 is	 rather	weak.	These	
results	do	not	 fully	confirm	hypothesis	 three,	which	expected	regulators	with	 low	
staff	numbers	to	send	significantly	more	outgoing	ties	than	regulators	with	higher	
staff	 numbers.	 In	 model	 5,	 I	 examine	 whether	 VoC	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 higher	
likelihood	of	being	active	networkers.	Once	again,	the	British	regulator	appears,	all	
else	equal,	more	likely	to	have	more	outgoing	ties	than	its	peers.	
Furthermore,	the	results	for	endogenous	dependencies	show	that	ties	are	very	likely	
to	 be	 reciprocated.	 The	 coefficient	 on	 the	 dependency	 called	 “shared	 partners”	
should	be	read	in	conjunction	with	transitivity.	Shared	partners	indicate	the	tendency	
for	 the	 nodes	 in	 the	 network	 to	 have	 connections	 in	 common,	whether	 they	 are	
related	or	not.	Transitivity	indicates	whether	two	regulators	that	share	a	strong	tie	
																																																						
27	Categorical	data	on	staff	figures	by	regulatory	authorities	referring	to	2016	on	the	ACER	
website,	
http://www.acer.europa.eu/official_documents/other%20documents/acer%20taking%20st
ock%20of%20the%20regulators’%20human%20resources%20summary%20of%20findings.
pdf	I	combined	the	“Large”	and	“Medium	Large”	categories,	as	the	latter	only	contained	two	
regulatory	authorities	(last	accessed	3	November	2017).		
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are	 also	more	 likely	 to	 have	 shared	partners	 than	would	 be	 expected	by	 chance.	
Hence,	 in	this	network	there	 is	a	weak	tendency	to	have	connections	 in	common,	
which	 becomes	 significantly	 higher	when	 two	 regulators	 are	 connected.	 In	 other	
words,	if	two	regulators	have	a	connection	in	common,	they	have	higher	odds	to	be	
connected	 by	 a	 strong	 tie,	 as	 well.	 Finally,	 there	 are	 signs	 that	 the	 network	 is	
centralized	on	nodes	having	high	out-degree,	i.e.	having	many	outgoing	ties,	while	
the	 parameter	 for	 centralization	 of	 the	 network	 around	 highly	 influential	 nodes,	
although	positive,	fails	to	achieve	significance.	This	suggests	that	regulators	cluster	
around	active	nodes,	but	not	around	influential	ones.	Plausibly,	regulators	use	active	
nodes	 to	 increase	 their	access	 to	 information,	 including	 their	access	 to	 influential	
nodes.		
As	for	the	other	predictors,	the	models	show	that	regulators	that	are	members	to	
the	same	Regional	Initiative	for	Electricity	are	more	likely	to	be	connected,	and	that	
the	direction	of	the	electricity	flows	across	the	EU	mirrors	the	directionality	of	ties	
across	regulators.	Gas	Regional	Initiatives	and	gas	flows	never	achieve	significance.	
Nevertheless,	 these	effects	do	not	suffice	to	explain	the	network	structure,	which	
appears	even	more	strongly	determined,	judging	by	the	parameters	in	the	models,	
by	VoC-related	variables.	The	coefficients	of	the	ERGM	should	be	interpreted	as	log	
odds	of	the	probability	of	a	tie	existing,	given	the	feature	investigated.	In	the	network	
described	by	model	2,	the	probability	of	a	tie	existing	(equivalent	to	the	intercept	in	
a	regression)	 is	0.4%.	It	there	is	a	mutual	tie,	the	probability	becomes	17%.	If	two	
nodes	are	both	from	Coordinated	Market	Economies,	the	probability	jumps	to	40%.		
In	order	to	check	the	robustness	of	the	results,	I	run	other	models	(not	shown	here	
but	available	on	request)	testing	for	homophily	with	respect	to	the	extent	of	market	
liberalization	as	operationalized	by	the	market	share	of	the	largest	generator	in	each	
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country28.	Moreover,	I	used	the	same	variable	to	check	for	whether	regulators	from	
more	 liberalized	markets	have	higher	odds	of	receiving	 incoming	or	outgoing	ties.	
The	variable	did	not	prove	significant,	however.	Additionally,	 I	used	OECD	data	on	
network	industries	regulation	(Koske,	Wanner	et	al.	2015)	concerning	the	extent	of	
government	ownership	in	the	largest	firm	active	in	each	of	the	segments	of	both	the	
electricity	and	gas	sectors:	generation	(production	or	import	for	gas),	transmission,	
distribution,	and	supply.	The	models	detected	homophily	between	regulators	with	
lower	government	ownership	percentages	in	electricity	generation	and	distribution	
(no	significance	for	gas).	Finally,	when	re-running	the	models	using	a	different	VoC	
categorisation,	where	Ireland	appears	as	LME	(as	per	Hall	and	Gingerich	2009)	and	
Member	 States	 that	 entered	 the	 EU	 in	 200429,	 200730	 and	 2013	 (Croatia)	 are	
clustered	as	a	single	“Other”	category,	the	results	are	virtually	unchanged.	
	
Model	fit.	
The	ERGM	defines	a	probability	distribution	across	all	networks	of	 the	size	of	 the	
network	in	the	model.	If	the	model	is	a	good	fit	to	the	observed	data,	then	networks	
drawn	from	this	distribution	are	likely	to	resemble	the	observed	data.	As	mentioned,	
ERGMs	are	generative	models.	They	represent	the	process	of	tie	formation	from	a	
local	 perspective:	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 factors	 that	 are	 used	 to	 predict	 tie	
probability	in	the	ERGM	itself.	These	locally	generated	processes	eventually	produce	
network	properties,	even	if	those	are	not	specified	in	the	model.	One	way	to	assess	
																																																						
28	 Eurostat	 energy	 statistics	 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/main-tables	
(last	accessed	3	November	2017)	
29	Cyprus,	the	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Hungary,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Malta,	Poland,	Slovakia,	
and	Slovenia.	
30	Bulgaria	and	Romania.		
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the	fit	of	a	model,	then,	is	to	examine	how	well	it	reproduces	network	properties	that	
are	not	 in	 it.	One	obtains	an	assessment	of	model	fit	by	comparing	the	value	of	a	
network	 statistic	 of	 choice	 between	 the	 original	 network	 and	 the	 simulated	
networks.	 I	 calculated	 goodness	 of	 fit	 over	 a	 series	 of	 network	 characteristics:	
edgewise	 shared	partner	distribution,	minimum	geodesic	distance,	 in-degree,	and	
out-degree.	 The	 four	 plots	 emerging	 from	 the	 simulation	 from	 Model	 2	 (the	
preferred	model)	are	reported	in	figure	2.	Model	2	appears	able	to	capture	network	
structure	considerably	well,	given	its	parsimonious	setup	and	clarity.	The	dark	lines,	
corresponding	to	observed	values,	fall	in	the	boxplots	(simulated	values)	for	nearly	
all	configurations.		
	
Figure	4-2	-	Goodness	of	Fit	of	Model	2:	indegree,	outdegree,	edge-wise	shared	
partners,	minimum	geodesic	distance	
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Discussion	of	the	results.	
Two	main	findings	emerge	from	this	analysis.	Firstly,	regulators	appear	more	likely	to	
maintain	connections	with	regulators	from	their	same	Variety	of	Capitalism;	this	is	
particularly	the	case	for	regulators	from	Coordinated,	Nordic	and	Dependent	market	
economies.	 Secondly	 and	 simultaneously,	 the	 regulator	 from	 the	only	 LME	 in	 the	
dataset	 (the	 UK)	 has	 much	 higher	 odds	 of	 receiving	 ties,	 given	 its	 peripheral	
geographic	 location,	 than	 its	 peers.	 Given	 that	 the	 whole	 EU	 energy	 regulatory	
framework	and	relevant	legislation	are	based	on	a	LME-type	mode	of	coordination,	
this	 finding	 can	 cautiously	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 regulatory	
convergence.	The	combination	of	these	two	patterns	appears	to	support	Thatcher’s	
(2007)	analysis,	which	diagnosed	convergence	of	other	VoC	towards	the	LME	model,	
at	least	in	network	industries,	but	at	the	same	time	noted	the	persistence	of	extant	
modes	of	coordination.		Regulators	from	Mixed	Market	Economies	are	the	least	likely	
to	be	significantly	homophilous	in	their	tie	choices;	this	suggests	that	the	variety	of	a	
regulators’	connections	is	as	important	as	their	actual	number.		
Although	coefficients	are	higher	for	regulators	from	CMEs	and	LMEs,	all	regulators	
appear	 significantly	 more	 likely	 to	 receive	 incoming	 ties	 than	 regulators	 in	 the	
reference	 category	 (DMEs),	 bar	 regulators	 from	 countries	 where	 government	
ownership	 and	 control	 across	 the	 whole	 energy	 sector	 is	 prevalent.	 These	 two	
categories	of	regulators,	for	the	most	part,	belong	to	newer	Member	States,	which	
entered	 the	 EU	 after	 2004.	 	 In	 short,	 as	 far	 as	 transnational	 energy	 regulatory	
networking	is	concerned,	there	appears	to	be	a	divide	between	regulators	from	EU-
15	and	regulators	from	newer	Member	States.		
Overall,	the	analysis	of	this	network	structure	appears	to	tell	a	story	of	policy	learning	
driven	by	expertise	as	well	as	by	commonality	in	sector	structure	and	therefore,	as	
per	my	hypotheses,	common	challenges.	The	approach	I	adopted	in	developing	the	
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model	is	very	conservative:	I	included	several	endogenous	dependencies	to	account	
for	 ties	 that	 exist	 because	 of	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 network,	 rather	 than	
homophily;	I	also	included	common	membership	in	European	Regional	Initiatives	and	
electricity	 and	 gas	 cross	 border	 flows	 in	 order	 to	 test	 the	 strength	 of	 regulators’	
associations	 against	 a	 powerful	 constraint	 for	 network	 industries,	 as	 geography.	
Furthermore,	coordination	and	collaboration	between	European	energy	regulators	
has	a	long	history,	dating	from	the	late	1990s,	and	is	embedded	in	a	very	developed	
and	well-formed	supranational	legislative	and	regulatory	framework.	These	features	
show	 in	 the	 network	 structure,	 which	 is	 overall	 dense	 and	 comprises	 a	 single	
component.	Indeed,	that	any	effect	is	visible	beyond	those	controls	is	telling	of	the	
strength	 of	 the	 national	 political	 economy	of	 the	 sector	 as	 a	 driver	 of	 regulatory	
networking.		
As	regulators	are	placed	at	the	interface	between	their	national	markets	and	market	
players	and	the	European	dimension,	they	build	their	informal	bilateral	ties	according	
to	both	homophily	and,	arguably,	convergence.	 Interestingly,	 the	British	 regulator	
also	emerges	as	significantly	more	active	than	its	peers	in	model	5,	all	else	equal.	This	
finding	resonates	with	Thatcher’s	 (2007)	remark	that	British	politicians	have	often	
complained	of	the	slow	progress	of	liberalization	reforms	in	other	Member	States.	In	
truth,	 the	British	 regulatory	 authority	 has	 repeatedly	 expressed	 concern	over	 the	
effect	that	the	lower	extent	of	liberalization	in	other	European	markets	may	have	on	
British	 consumers,	 and	 underlined	 its	 leading	 role	 in	 the	 network	 of	 European	
regulators	in	virtually	all	of	its	annual	reports	to	the	European	Commission,	released	
since	200731.	
Model	2	is	preferred	for	its	parsimony.	Indeed,	evidence	regarding	the	importance	
of	resources	for	explaining	network	ties	is	not	conclusive,	even	though	suggestive	of	
																																																						
31	 Annual	 Reports	 of	 National	 Regulatory	 Authorities	 can	 be	 downloaded	 at	
https://www.ceer.eu/eer_publications/national_reports	(last	accessed	3	November	2017).	
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interesting	patterns.	Using	categorical	 instead	of	continuous	data	for	staff	 figures,	
which	 splits	 regulators	 into	 groups	 according	 to	 the	 number	 of	 their	 full	 time	
equivalent	staff,	avoids	the	collinearity	driven	by	the	very	high	numbers	of	staff	of	
the	 British	 regulatory	 authority.	 Results	 show	 that	 regulators	 with	 intermediate	
numbers	 of	 staff	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 be	 active	 networkers.	 Regulators	 with	 small	
numbers	of	staff	appear	less	unable	to	cultivate	an	extended	network.	I	run	other	
models	which	indicate	homophily	among	regulators	with	large	numbers	of	staff	(i.e.	
>	170),	i.e.	regulators	with	large	numbers	of	staff	tend	to	network	with	each	other.	It	
bears	 pointing	 out	 that,	 perhaps	 surprisingly,	 regulatory	 authorities	 with	 large	
numbers	of	staff	are	not	necessarily	those	from	bigger	Member	States;	that	subgroup	
comprises	 regulators	 from	 the	 UK	 and	 Germany,	 but	 also	 from	Hungary	 and	 the	
Czech	Republic.	The	energy	regulatory	authority	of	a	 large	country	 like	France	has	
between	40	and	90	full	time	equivalent	staff	units,	ending	up	in	the	medium	group.	
In	 short,	 the	 impact	 of	 resources	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 tie	 existence	 is	 difficult	 to	
discern	clearly.	I	further	explore	the	link	between	resources	and	activism	in	the	next	
chapter.	
The	coefficients	for	endogenous	dependencies	indicate	that	transitivity	is	a	property	
of	this	network,	as	is	relatively	common	in	information	exchange	networks	(Fischer,	
Ingold	et	al.	2017).	Moreover,	the	model	shows	that	some	regulators	are	more	active	
than	others,	hence	have	more	outgoing	ties,	causing	the	network	to	be	centralized	
on	out-degree,	even	though	the	coefficient	is	not	always	significant	across	models.	
These	active	nodes	are	plausibly	bridging	across	the	network,	which	would	otherwise	
comprise	some	isolated	nodes	or	disconnected	communities.	
The	 literature	has	 found	 that	 very	often	policy	networks	display	 a	 core-periphery	
pattern	(Knoke	1990,	Knoke	1996,	Carpenter,	Esterling	et	al.	2003),	whereby	there	is	
a	cohesive	core	of	densely	connected	nodes	and	a	periphery	whose	members	are	
poorly	connected	both	to	the	core	and	among	themselves.	The	intuitive	conception	
of	 core-periphery	 structures	 entails	 a	 dense,	 cohesive	 core	 and	 a	 sparse,	
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unconnected	 periphery.	 Core-periphery	 structures	 have	 been	 investigated	 in	 the	
literature	on	networks	(Borgatti	and	Everett	2000)	as	well	as	in	the	literature	on	the	
European	Union	 (Magone,	Laffan	et	al.	2016).	 In	 the	context	of	 the	EU,	 the	same	
concept	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 frame	 relations	 between	 “old”	 and	 “new”	Member	
States	(Bohle	and	Greskovits	2012).		
Finally,	 the	 irrelevance	 of	 gas	 in	 explaining	 the	 patterns	 of	 European	 energy	
regulators’	networking	is	a	puzzling	results	of	the	analysis.	Neither	gas	flows,	nor	gas	
regional	initiatives	appear	to	have	statistical	or	substantive	significance	with	regard	
to	 this	network.	This	may	be	due	to	the	 lower	control	 regulators	have	on	the	gas	
sector	and	the	development	of	gas	markets	compared	to	electricity.	
	
Conclusions	
The	main	question	this	chapter	sought	to	answer	concerned	the	drivers	of	informal	
regulatory	 networking	 at	 transnational	 level.	 Specifically,	 the	 empirical	 case	
examined	in	this	chapter	is	that	of	European	National	Energy	Regulatory	Authorities,	
tasked	with	regulating	the	electricity	and	gas	sectors	within	their	national	borders	
and	 simultaneously	 asked	 to	 coordinate	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 about	 regulatory	
harmonization	 and	 foster	 market	 integration	 across	 the	 EU.	 Far	 from	 being	
straightforward,	this	task	is	ridden	with	difficulties	and	setbacks	as,	as	the	literature	
on	these	matters	has	often	discussed,	Member	States	have	different	administrative,	
legal	and	institutional	traditions.	Differences	in	their	political	economy	are	likely,	and	
have	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 equally	 important	 not	 only	 in	 affecting	 the	 design	 of	
regulatory	institutions	but	also	their	networking	practices,	as	they	seek	to	fulfil	the	
tasks	bestowed	upon	them.		
I	hypothesised	that	 regulators	would	tend	to	choose	counterparts	embedded	 in	a	
similar	 political	 economy	 as	 their	 most	 frequent	 and	 stable	 network	 partners.	 I	
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operationalized	this	concept	through	the	Varieties	of	Capitalism	framework,	slightly	
modified	to	take	account	of	the	specific	characteristics	and	structure	of	the	electricity	
and	gas	sectors	in	the	countries	considered.	I	also	hypothesised	that	regulators	from	
LMEs	would	 receive	 significantly	more	 ties,	 since	 the	European	energy	 regulatory	
policy	and	legislation	are	shaped	according	to	that	mode	of	coordination.	Finally,	I	
expected	 resources	 to	 also	 matter	 for	 regulators’	 networking	 choices,	 as	 less	
resourceful	seek	to	fill	their	informational	gaps	by	linking	to	more	resourceful	ones.		
The	results	show	that	the	VoC	framework	 is	well	suited	to	 investigate	and	explain	
transnational	 regulatory	 networking,	 and	 able	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 interplay	
between	transnational	interdependence	and	national	circumstances.	The	hypothesis	
concerning	homophily	is	confirmed	for	most	categories	of	regulators.	The	hypothesis	
concerning	the	influence	of	LME	is	also	confirmed,	and	can	be	interpreted	as	a	sign	
of	 ongoing	 convergence,	 on	 the	 background,	 however,	 of	 persisting	 dynamics	 of	
coordination	typical	of	national	political	economies,	as	found	in	Thatcher	(2007).	The	
hypothesised	 link	between	 lower	 resources	and	higher	network	activism	 failed	 to	
emerge	from	analysis:	rather,	medium	sized	regulatory	authorities	appear	as	more	
likely	to	be	active	compared	to	their	more	or	less	endowed	counterparts.	Moreover,	
higher	 budgets	 are	 associated	 with	 more	 outgoing	 ties,	 suggesting	 that	 more	
resourced	regulators	have	more	resources	to	devote	to	networking.		
The	endogenous	network	dependencies	indicate	that	ties	in	this	network	tend	to	be	
reciprocal;	the	effect	for	this	dependency	is	very	strong,	representing	an	important	
validation	of	 the	data	 as	 I	 did	not	 specify	 a	minimum	or	 a	maximum	numbers	of	
nominations	 to	 the	 respondents.	 Moreover,	 regulators	 tend	 to	 close	 triangles,	
particularly	when	two	nodes	are	already	connected;	this	testifies	to	the	importance	
of	information	exchange	relationships	in	fostering	trust	among	the	actors	involved.	
The	observed	network	structure	features	a	handful	of	regulators	having	considerably	
more	 outgoing	 ties	 than	 their	 peers;	 to	 account	 for	 this,	 I	 included	 in	 the	model	
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dependencies	accounting	for	network	centralization	around	active	networkers.	The	
effect	is	strong,	but	not	consistently	significant.		
Overall,	regulators	from	newer	EU	Member	States	(i.e.	those	who	entered	from	2004	
onwards)	 appear	 less	 integrated	 into	 the	 network	 structure,	 suggesting	 a	 core-
periphery	 pattern.	 Regulators	 from	 Dependent	Market	 Economies	 appear	 as	 the	
most	strongly	homophilous	and	the	least	likely	to	receive	incoming	ties.	Regulators	
from	countries	where	government	ownership	and	control	across	all	sector	segments	
predominate	also	emerge	as	less	likely	to	receive	ties	than	their	peers.	The	presence	
of	scarcely	connected	nodes	in	this	dense	network	of	regulators	suggest	that	forms	
of	 structured	 cooperation,	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Cooperation	 of	
Energy	 Regulators,	 are	 probably	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 energy	 market	
integration	in	the	EU.	Structured	cooperation	impedes	the	formation	of	cliques	or	
disconnected	communities	of	 regulatory	authorities,	and	encourages	 learning	and	
exchange	also	across	widely	different	institutional	contexts.		
Concluding,	this	chapter	carries	out	an	analysis	of	the	global	structure	of	the	network	
connections	considered;	exceptions	are	notable	across	all	categories	of	regulators.	
For	instance,	the	regulators	of	Hungary	and	Latvia	are	much	more	active	networkers	
than	some	of	their	EU-15	counterparts.	The	purpose	of	the	analysis	was	grasping	the	
invisible	 and	 undocumented	 drivers	 of	 transnational	 networking;	 this	 entails	 the	
important	limitation	of	the	impossibility	of	triangulating	data	with	other	sources	of	
information.	This	concern	is	assuaged	by	the	practitioner	knowledge	of	the	persons	
who	kindly	agreed,	under	promise	of	anonymity,	to	respond	to	my	inquiry.	Further	
research	may	seek	to	study	network	evolution	over	time	by	relying	on	longitudinal	
data,	as	this	may	help	capturing	the	engines	of	phenomena,	only	cautiously	alluded	
to	here,	such	as	convergence	(or	lack	thereof).		
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5. Networking	 for	 resources:	 how	 regulators	 use	
networks	to	compensate	for	lacking	resources.		
	
Introduction	
This	chapter	unpacks	the	relationship	between	regulators’	resources	and	ties	in	more	
detail.	 The	analysis	 in	 the	previous	 chapter	was	not	 conclusive	on	 this	point.	 The	
hypothesis	 concerning	 regulators’	 resources	 expected	 regulators	 with	 lower	
resources	to	be	more	active	networkers,	in	the	sense	of	possessing	significantly	more	
outgoing	ties	than	their	peers.	The	analysis	 included	continuous	data	on	staff	and	
budgetary	 figures	 (dating	 back	 from	 2013)	 and	 a	 categorical	 measure	 of	 staff	
resources	 (dating	 from	2016).	The	 latter	measure	 is	 thought	 to	be	more	accurate	
since	the	data	collection	on	regulators’	ties	was	carried	out	in	2015/2016.	The	results	
of	the	Exponential	Random	Graph	Models	(ERGMs)	showed	no	significance	for	the	
continuous	 measurements.	 As	 for	 categorical	 data,	 the	 results	 showed	 that	
regulators	 with	 medium	 resources	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 active	 compared	 to	
regulators	 with	 large	 resources.	 Regulators	 with	 medium	 small,	 small	 or	 micro-
resources	were	not	significantly	more	active	than	their	peers	with	large	resources.		
I	 investigate	the	relationship	between	staff	and	budgetary	resources	and	network	
ties	 by	 testing	 the	 same	hypothesis	 of	 linear	 relationship	 between	 resources	 and	
activism,	but	by	operationalizing	network	activism	differently.	I	introduce	a	refined	
notion	 of	 network	 activism	 that	 draws	 on	 the	 sociological	 literature	 on	 social	
networks	and	outlines	network	activism	as	the	possession	of	higher	numbers	of	weak	
ties	(Granovetter	1973).		
I	posit	that	regulators	conceive	of	their	informal	ties	as	resources,	in	a	very	practical	
sense:	 their	 peers	 are	 repositories	of	 information	 and	experience	which	 they	 can	
easily	access.	I	then	consider	that	the	regulators	who	most	need	to	rely	on	network	
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resources	are	those	possessing	lower	in-house	resources	to	fulfil	their	information	
requirements.	These	regulators	are	likely	to	reach	out	to	their	peers	more	frequently	
than	their	peers	are	likely	to	reach	out	to	them,	particularly	if	the	latter	have	higher	
resources.	This	implies	that	active,	or	proactive	networkers	have	higher	numbers	of	
non-reciprocated	ties.		
Non-reciprocated	 ties	 indicate	 an	 overall	 weaker	 relationship	 than	 reciprocated	
ones.	In	the	context	of	exchange	of	information	within	networks,	they	suggest	that	
senders	are	 information-seekers,	who	have	perhaps	 less	 information	 to	exchange	
than	within	a	reciprocal	relationship.	Stemming	from	this	reasoning,	I	use	the	count	
of	European	energy	regulators’	weak	ties	to	operationalize	network	activism.	I	use	
both	continuous	and	categorical	measurements	of	staff	and	budgets	as	predictors.	I	
carry	 out	 linear	 regression	 analyses	 to	 test	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 correlation	
between	 resources	 and	 activism.	 I	 then	 include	 indicators	 of	 independence	 and	
market	 liberalization	 in	 the	 regression.	 Thereafter,	 I	 run	 ERG	models	with	 a	 new	
specification	of	resources,	while	still	including	terms	related	to	homophily	based	on	
common	Variety	of	Capitalism,	as	emerged	in	the	previous	chapter.		
The	results	of	the	analysis	lend	support	to	the	hypothesis:	overall,	lower	resources	
are	 significantly	 associated	 with	 higher	 network	 activism.	 The	 significance	 of	 the	
association	 is	 different,	 however,	 for	 different	 categories	 of	 budgetary	 and	 staff	
resources:	medium	and	small	 levels	of	staff	resources	and	small,	but	not	medium,	
budgets	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 activism.	 Overall,	 however,	 the	 relationship	
between	staff	resources	and	activism	is	the	only	one	of	the	two	that	is	consistently	
significant.	
Recent	literature	has	featured	calls	(Mastenbroek	and	Martinsen	2018)	and	attempts	
(Maggetti	2014,	Ruffing	2014,	Boeger	and	Corkin	2017)	to	shift	scholarly	attention	
from	debating	the	rationale	of	European	regulators’	collaboration	according	to	the	
preferences	of	either	the	European	Commission	or	the	Member	States	to	studying	
the	ways	in	which	regulators	concretely	use	their	informal	networks.	Several	recent	
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contributions	 have	 begun	 exploring	 these	 aspects	 and	 found	 that	 network	
participation	 increases	 bureaucratic	 autonomy	 (Danielsen	 and	 Yesilkagit	 2014),	
thanks	 to	 the	 information	 exchange	 occurring	 within	 regulatory	 networks.	 Other	
contributions	 showed	 that	 participation	 into	 networks	 correlates	 with	 increased	
powers	for	the	regulatory	authority	(Maggetti	2014),	and	facilitates	the	sharing	of	
existing	resources	and	the	creation	of	new	ones	as	outputs	of	network	collaboration	
(Vestlund	2015).		
The	topic	of	regulators’	resources	has	often	surfaced	in	the	relevant	literature,	but	
has	rarely	been	tackled	in	its	own	merit.	Yet,	resource	constraints	significantly	affect	
regulatory	performance,	pushing	regulators	to	optimize	the	resources	they	have	in	
the	face	of	increasing	sector	complexity	(Glachant,	Khalfallah	et	al.	2013).	However,	
higher	 staff	 numbers	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 quality	 regulation	 (Koop	 and	
Hanretty	 2017).	 Hence,	 whereas	 well-resourced	 regulators	 are	 likely	 to	 possess	
sufficient	 expertise	 and	 means	 to	 acquire	 the	 information	 they	 need,	 less	 well-
resourced	regulators	may	struggle	to	accomplish	their	tasks	while	also	staying	ahead	
of	the	information	curve.		
Although	 the	 resources	 available	 to	 a	 regulatory	 authority	 positively	 correlate	 to	
country	 and	market	 size	 (suggesting	 that	 regulators	 from	 smaller	 countries	 need	
lower	resources	to	begin	with),	all	regulatory	authorities	have	a	set	range	of	expert	
tasks	to	be	fulfilled,	whatever	their	size	(Pollitt	and	Stern	2009,	Glachant,	Khalfallah	
et	al.	2013).	Therefore,	less	resourced	regulatory	authorities	may	recur	to	the	extra	
resources	they	have	available,	such	as	their	peers,	to	compensate.	
To	understand	whether	networks	can	improve	governance,	it	is	important	to	study	
how	 regulators	 use	 them	 and	 the	 benefits	 they	 derive	 from	 them.	 This	 analysis	
suggests	 that	 regulators	 use	 their	 bilateral	 network	 ties	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	
lacking	resources.	Arguably,	European	energy	regulators’	common	embeddedness	in	
the	 European	Union	 and	 its	 single	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 framework	 are	 important	
structural	premises	for	the	exchange	of	information	and	expertise	to	occur.	Absent	
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that	interdependence,	the	onset	of	a	mechanism	whereby	less	resourced	regulators	
can	 attempt	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	 lacking	 resources	 via	 networking	with	more	
resourced	peers	appears	less	plausible,	since	the	assessment	of	the	worth	of	a	non-
reciprocal	tie	is,	by	definition,	unequal	between	the	two	nodes.	Finally,	the	results	of	
this	 analysis	 suggest	 that,	 if	 European	 regulatory	networks	may	have	had	uneven	
influence	 on	 regulatory	 convergence,	 they	 probably	 have	 a	 consistent	 impact	 on	
improving	regulatory	practice	at	national	level.	
	
Networking	for	resources:	literature	review	and	hypothesis.		
One	of	the	key	questions	in	the	literature	on	regulatory	networks	concerns	the	extent	
to	which	they	are	able	to	improve	governance	(Coen	and	Thatcher	2008,	Kelemen	
and	Tarrant	2011,	 Levi-Faur	2011,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011,	Thatcher	2011,	Van	
Boetzelaer	 and	 Princen	 2012,	Maggetti	 and	Gilardi	 2014,	 Bianculli,	 Jordana	 et	 al.	
2015,	Blauberger	and	Rittberger	2015).	Assessments	of	network	effectiveness	have	
often	 tried	 to	 capture	 their	 impact	 on	 regulatory	 convergence,	which	has	 proven	
hard	to	discern	(Bach,	De	Francesco	et	al.	2016).	The	literature	has	often	maintained	
that	regulatory	networks	may	improve	governance	by	improving	regulators’	practice	
and	strengthening	their	professional	ethos	by	affording	them	access	to	high	quality	
information	and	expertise	held	by	their	peers	(Bianculli,	Jordana	et	al.	2015,	Jordana	
2017,	Papadopoulos	2017).		
In	the	context	of	the	European	Union,	the	literature	has	considered	the	necessity	of	
collaboration	and	exchanges	of	information	between	national	regulatory	authorities	
as	almost	obvious,	given	the	exigencies	of	regulatory	convergence	to	compensate	for	
the	necessary	vagueness	of	the	European	Directives,	which	bound	Member	States	to	
goals	but	not	to	means	(Dehousse	1997,	Nicolaides	2004,	Eberlein	and	Grande	2005).	
Until	 recently,	 this	 focus	 has	 been	 predominant	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 European	
Regulatory	Networks.	Contributions	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	steeped	in	
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the	 international	 relations	 literature,	 however,	 have	 flagged	 the	 issue	 that	mere	
participation	 into	networks	 reveals	nothing	of	how	 individual	 regulators	use	 their	
networks	(Bach	and	Newman	2014,	Ahdieh	2015).	Network	membership	need	not	
imply	activism.	
In	 agreement	with	 that	 statement,	 this	 paper	 does	 not	 study	 networking	 among	
European	 energy	 regulators	 in	 terms,	 functional	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	 European	
integration	goals;	rather,	this	chapter	studies	the	informal,	voluntary,	bilateral	ties	
that	regulators	entertain	with	each	other	besides	the	context	or	the	requirements	of	
the	 EU.	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 “pick-up-the-phone”	 relationships,	 i.e.	 those	 informal	
collaboration	 ties	 that	 regulators	 maintain	 besides	 the	 meetings,	 schedules,	 and	
requirements	of	European	coordination,	with	the	precise	intent	of	consulting	each	
other	 on	matters	 of	 their	 daily,	 national	 regulatory	 practice.	 The	 interest	 of	 this	
research	 is	 exploring	 the	 inner	workings	of	 actual	 network	 relationships	 between	
national	 regulators,	which	 is	 a	prominent	gap	 in	 this	 literature	 (Mastenbroek	and	
Martinsen	2018).	
Recently,	 the	 literature	 has	 begun	 filling	 this	 gap	 by	 exploring	 the	 benefits	 that	
regulators	 obtain	 by	 networking	 with	 their	 European	 peers.	 The	 relevant	
contributions	have	mostly	focused	on	independence	and	autonomy	(Thatcher	2011,	
Yesilkagit	2011,	Danielsen	and	Yesilkagit	2014,	Maggetti	and	Verhoest	2014,	Ruffing	
2014).	Several	contributions	have	mentioned	the	importance	of	adequate	resources	
for	regulatory	authorities	to	be	able	to	perform	their	tasks	(Coen	and	Thatcher	2008,	
Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2014)	but	did	not	connect	them	to	networking.	Maggetti	(2014)	
investigated	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 participation	 in	 European	 Regulatory	 Networks	
correlated	with	an	increase	in	the	budgetary	resources	made	available	to	national	
regulators.	He	 found	no	support	 for	 this	hypothesis.	Vestlund	 (2015)	explores	 the	
connection	between	networks	and	resources,	but	 in	a	different	take	than	the	one	
adopted	in	this	paper:	in	that	contribution,	networks	are	producer	of	resources,	i.e.	
the	outputs	of	regulatory	networking,	such	as	reports,	meetings	and	work	plans.	In	
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contrast,	 this	 contribution,	 focuses	 on	 financial	 and	 human	 resources,	 i.e.	 those	
resources	 that	 the	 regulatory	 authority	 needs	 in	 order	 to	 perform	 its	 duties,	 and	
whether	they	can	be	thought	to	affect	the	pattern	of	regulators’	networking.		
To	 assess	 the	 relationship	 between	networking	 and	 resources,	 as	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	I	consider	the	empirical	case	of	the	network	of	energy	regulators	from	EU	
Member	 States	 (plus	 Norway).	 The	 data	 consists	 of	 regulators’	 self-reported	
information	 on	 their	 most	 frequent	 and	 regular	 bilateral	 relationships	 with	 their	
European	peers	in	response	to	a	questionnaire	I	submitted	to	them	between	2015	
and	 2016.	 The	 data	 gathering	 process	 aimed	 specifically	 at	 investigating	 the	
regulators’	 perceptions	 of	 their	most	 frequent,	 regular	 collaborators	 among	 their	
European	 colleagues,	 i.e.	 the	 colleagues	 they	 would	 call	 upon	 for	 suggestions,	
exchanges	of	opinions,	advice,	and	experiences.		
Thus	far,	the	few	contributions	relying	on	network	data	have	linked	the	possession	
of	many	ties	to	network	influence	(Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011,	Maggetti	2013),	in	line	
with	the	key	tenets	of	network	theory.	Hence,	several	contributions	have	concluded	
that	regulators	having	high	degree	(i.e.	a	higher	number	of	ties)	compared	to	their	
peers	 are	 influential.	 Examples	 include	 Ingold,	 Varone	 et	 al	 (2013),	who	measure	
reputation	across	the	various	bureaucratic	and	political	actors	involved	in	the	Swiss	
telecommunication	 sector;	 Maggetti,	 Ingold	 et	 al	 (2013),	 who	 examine	 the	
independence	and	accountability	of	different	regulatory	authorities	in	Switzerland;	
and	 Alexander,	 Lewis	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 who	 explain	 the	 networking	 strategies	 of	
politicians	and	bureaucrats	across	multiple	municipal	governments	 in	 the	state	of	
Victoria	in	Australia.	These	contributions	have	examined	ties	as	undirected.		
Yet,	the	directionality	of	ties	is	as	informative	as	their	number:	being	at	the	receiving	
end	 of	 many	 ties	 may	 indicate	 influence,	 while	 sending	 many	 outward	 ties	 may	
indicate	 activism	 (Desmarais	 and	 Cranmer	 2012).	 The	 two	 analytically	 distinct	
concepts	of	influence	and	activism	have	often	been	conflated	under	the	assumption	
that	 influential	 regulators	 are	 also	 active	 networkers	 (Maggetti	 2014).	 This	
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contribution	assesses	activism	not	 in	terms	of	 the	absolute	number	of	 ties,	but	 in	
terms	of	the	number	of	outgoing	ties	that	exceed	regulators’	strongest	(i.e.	mutual)	
relationships,	 as	 this	 indicates	 additional	 effort	 to	 gather	 information	 from	 the	
network.	
In	 his	 seminal	 contribution	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 so-called	 “weak”	 ties,	 Granovetter	
(1973)	showed	that	the	vast	majority	of	his	interviewees	had	found	their	job	thanks	
to	information	received	from	the	friends	of	their	friends,	with	whom	they	had	only	
infrequent	 contact.	 In	 that	 article	 and	 in	 the	 conspicuous	 literature	 it	 spawned,	
“weak	ties”	bridging	across	cliques	of	strong	ties	(e.g.	close	friends)	have	thus	been	
shown	to	play	a	crucial	role	in	information	diffusion	across	networks	(Djelic	2004).	By	
obtaining	novel,	non-redundant	information,	network	nodes	with	weak	ties	are	able	
to	bridge	across	cliques	(Berardo	and	Scholz	2010)	and	to	make	better	decisions	and	
innovate	 more	 effectively	 (Aral	 2016).	 In	 Granovetter’s	 research,	 respondents	
reached	 out	 to	 their	 infrequent	 ties	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 (in	 that	 case,	 job-related)	
information.	Information	is	the	main	asset	regulators	pursue;	given	resource	scarcity,	
they	may	pursue	 it	via	other	means.	Networking	with	their	more	resourced	peers	
appears	a	particularly	suitable	and	relatively	inexpensive	one.						
In	 social	 surveys,	 respondents	 are	 typically	 asked	 to	 nominate	 their	 contacts	
according	to	the	frequency	of	their	interactions.	The	absence	of	reciprocity	suggests	
a	weaker	relation	than	would	be	inferred	from	reciprocal	nominations.	In	the	context	
of	this	inquiry,	the	absence	of	reciprocity	between	two	regulators	indicates	different	
assessments	of	the	frequency	of	their	relationship.	Activism	is	conceptualized	as	the	
active	 pursuit	 of	 information	 from	 peers,	 given	 one’s	 resources.	More	 resourced	
regulators	are	likely,	in	absolute	numbers,	to	have	more	ties	to	their	peers,	precisely	
as	a	 result	of	having	more	resources	 to	spend	on	networking.	The	 interest	of	 this	
paper,	however,	is	investigating	network	activism	relatively	to	resources.	To	do	so,	I	
operationalize	network	activism	as	 the	difference	between	a	 regulator’s	outgoing	
and	incoming	ties	or,	in	other	words,	their	non-reciprocal	ties.	
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A	count	of	non-reciprocal	ties	equal	to	zero	suggests	that	the	regulator	sticks	to	their	
strongest	ties.	A	negative	count	suggests	influence	(i.e.	the	fact	of	being	sought	by	
others	 in	 the	 network	 more	 than	 one	 seeks	 them).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	
regulatory	authority	has	a	positive	number	of	non-reciprocal	relationships	suggests	
that	they	consider	relatively	weaker	ties	as,	still,	important	resources	of	information	
and	advice.	Hence,	I	understand	the	presence	of	non-reciprocal	ties	as	indicating	an	
effort,	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 sender	 of	 the	 tie,	 to	 peruse	 its	 environment	 for	more	
information	 than	 the	 one	 available	 within	 the	 clique	 of	 their	 strong	 ties.	 I	 thus	
contend	 that	 regulators	 reporting	 non-reciprocal	 outgoing	 ties	 have	 a	 stronger	
incentive	 than	 others	 to	 seek	 information	 from	 peers.	 Given	 the	 importance	 of	
resources	to	any	organization,	I	formulate	the	hypothesis	that	this	incentive	derives	
from	lack	of	sufficient	resources	to	carry	out	their	regulatory	tasks.	Therefore,	the	
main	hypothesis	underlying	this	analysis	is:	
H1:	 The	 lower	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 regulatory	 authority,	 the	 higher	 its	 network	
activism.	
The	topic	of	regulatory	independence	has	been	very	widely	discussed	and	analysed	
in	 the	 public	 policy	 and	 public	 administration	 literatures,	 including	 in	 relation	 to	
regulatory	networks	 (Danielsen	and	Yesilkagit	2014,	Monti	2014,	Ruffing	2014).	 In	
that	regard,	several	contributions	have	shown	that	networks	empower	regulators	by	
providing	them	with	information,	not	available	to	their	domestic	political	principals.	
By	 virtue	 of	 their	 intermediary	 position	 between	 levels	 of	 governance,	 the	
information	 collected	 via	 networking	 expands	 regulators’	 autonomy	 in	 the	
transnational	policy	space	(Bach	and	Ruffing	2013,	Ruffing	2014).	Arguably,	the	effect	
of	networking	on	independence	may	push	less	independent	regulators	to	be	more	
active	networkers.	Therefore,	I	include	a	measure	of	regulatory	independence	in	the	
analysis,	to	assess	whether	it	matters	to	explain	activism	along	with	(or	instead	of)	
resources.	 The	 indicator	 refers	 to	 regulators’	 statutory,	 or	de	 jure	 independence,	
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which	may	differ	from	actual	independence	(Maggetti	2007)	but	still	has	been	found	
to	be	positively	correlated	to	it	(Hanretty	2010).	
Furthermore,	the	extent	of	market	liberalization	in	a	given	regulator’s	country	may	
also	affect	its	networking	behaviour.	Indeed,	the	European	energy	market	model	is	
premised	on	 liberalization	and	the	 introduction	of	private	capital	 in	 infrastructure	
sectors	(Jamasb	and	Pollitt	2005,	Thatcher	2007).	Hence,	regulators	overseeing	less	
liberalized	 markets	 may	 seek	 interaction	 with	 peers	 overseeing	 more	 liberalized	
markets	as	they	attempt	to	foster	 liberalization	 in	their	own	national	settings.	For	
this	reason,	I	also	include	in	the	analysis	indicators	of	market	liberalization.	However,	
these	are	 likely	to	correlate	with	the	size	of	the	market,	which,	 in	turn,	correlates	
with	the	resources	available	to	a	national	regulatory	authority.		
	
Data	and	Methods	
In	order	to	gather	data	on	regulators’	network	ties,	I	emailed	the	energy	regulatory	
authorities	from	all	EU	Member	States,	plus	Norway.	All	respondents	are	informed	
people	at	their	regulatory	authority,	who	have	excellent	knowledge	of	 its	external	
cooperation	patterns	either	because	they	are	in	charge	of	supervising	it	or	because	
they	occupy	senior	positions.	I	asked	regulators	to	name	the	regulatory	authorities	
they	are	most	often	in	touch	with	as	concerns	exchange	of	information	within	the	
EU.	 I	 specified	 that	 they	 should	 mention	 their	 most	 frequent	 informal	 contacts,	
beyond	 routine	 interaction	 and	 scheduled	network	meetings	 or	 EU-related	policy	
events.		
Under	promise	of	anonymity	of	the	respondents’	identity	as	well	as	of	their	replies,	I	
obtained	replies	from	all	29	regulatory	authorities,	bar	one.	For	that	one,	I	considered	
their	incoming	ties,	as	resulting	from	other	regulators’	nominations,	as	reciprocated.	
I	did	not	specify	an	upper	or	lower	limits	on	the	number	of	network	partners	that	
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regulators	 could	 name	 as	 their	 most	 frequent	 contacts,	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 the	
different	extents	of	individual	regulators’	networks.	Moreover,	I	also	left	the	precise	
frequency	of	contact	unspecified.	Regulators	were	asked	to	report	on	their	“most	
frequent”	 contacts.	 Clearly,	 the	 word	 “frequent”	 may	 mean	 different	 things	 to	
different	respondents.	Also,	different	regulators	may	engage	more	or	less	often	with	
peers	from	other	countries	based	on	a	variety	of	factors.	Then,	reciprocity	is	a	first	
good	 indicator	of	 the	 strength	of	 two	 regulators’	 relationship.	 Lack	of	 reciprocity,	
instead,	suggests	imbalance	in	the	two	regulators’	assessment	of	the	frequency	of	
the	relationship	and,	thus,	a	weaker	one.		
Yet,	 the	 sender	 of	 a	 non-reciprocal	 tie,	 by	 the	 very	 fact	 of	mentioning	 the	 tie	 in	
response	to	my	question,	indicates	that	they	assess	that	relationship	as	important.	
Possession	of	non-reciprocated	outgoing	ties,	then,	is	a	proxy	of	a	more	pronounced	
network	activism	compared	to	regulators	who	only	engage	in	mutual	relationships	
(an	activism	of	zero	according	to	my	operationalization)	or	display	negative	values,	
suggesting	that	information	is	sought	from	them	more	than	they	seek	information	
from	others.	A	 regulatory	authority	can	be,	of	course,	very	active	and	have	many	
mutual	ties.	This	would	imply	a	high	investment	in	network	collaboration.	However,	
it	would	also	imply	possession	of	sufficient	resources	to	support	a	broad	portfolio	of	
regular	contacts.	The	 interest	of	this	analysis	 is	capturing	whether	regulators	with	
lower	resources	are	more	active	than	their	resources	would	lead	to	expect,	as	this	
would	suggest	they	use	networks	to	compensate	for	their	resources.	
While	I	gathered	original	data	on	European	national	energy	regulators’	ties,	I	rely	on	
two	main	sources	of	secondary	data	for	staff	and	budgets:	for	staff,	I	use	categorical	
data,	as	per	the	report	on	National	Regulatory	Authorities	resources	released	by	the	
European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Cooperation	 of	 Energy	 Regulators	 (ACER)	 in	 201632;	 for	
																																																						
32 ACER	 Taking	 stock	 of	 the	 regulators’	 human	 resources	 -	 Summary	 of	 findings	 (2016),	
https://bit.ly/2GQnzFP	(last	accessed	9	April	2018)	
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budgets,	I	rely	on	figures	published	in	the	country	reports	released	by	the	European	
Commission	in	201433,	for	lack	of	more	recent	data.	
The	ACER	document	 categorising	 regulators’	 staff	 levels	 comprises	 six	 categories:	
“large”	(over	220	Full	Time	Equivalents);	“medium-large”	(between	170	and	175	FTE);	
“medium”	 (between	90	and	140	 FTE);	 “medium-small”	 (between	50	and	75	 FTE);	
“small”	(between	12	and	50	FTE)	and	“micro”	(fewer	than	12	FTE).	As	shown	in	the	
regression	model	 in	 Table	 4	 in	 the	 Appendix,	 category	 “large”	 is	 not	 significantly	
different	 from	 “medium-large”.	 Since	 the	 whole	 dataset	 only	 comprises	 29	
observations,	and	since	the	category	“medium-large”	only	comprises	two	national	
regulatory	authorities	 (from	 Italy	and	Spain),	 I	merge	 this	 category	 into	“large”	 in	
order	to	save	degrees	of	freedom.	Moreover,	I	split	regulators	in	the	“medium-small”	
category	 between	 group	 “medium”	 and	 group	 “small”	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 staff	
figures	in	2013	(derived	from	the	European	Commission	country	reports).	Hence,	the	
categorization	of	staff	figures	used	in	the	analysis	section	comprises	four	categories:	
“large”	(the	reference,	with	9	observations),	“medium”	(with	9	observations),	“small”	
(with	 7	 observations)	 and	 “micro”	 (with	 4	 observations).	 In	 further	 re-
categorizations,	I	maintained	category	“medium-small”	separate	or	merged	category	
“micro”	 into	 “small”,	 thus	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	 categories	 to	 three:	 “large”,	
“medium”	and	“small”;	the	results	of	the	analysis	do	not	change.		
Although	budgetary	figures	may	have	changed	since	2013,	they	are	unlikely	to	have	
changed	very	considerably.	 Initially,	 I	categorized	budget	figures	 in	a	variable	with	
five	 levels,	 ranging	 from	 “large”	 (over	 20	 million	 euros;	 only	 3	 observations)	 to	
																																																						
33	 European	 Commission,	 (2014),	 “EU	 Energy	 Markets	 in	 2014”,	
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_energy_market_en_0.pdf	
(last	accessed	9	April	2018)	
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“micro”	(less	than	2	million	euros;	5	observations)34.	This	categorization,	however,	
resulted	in	over-fitting;	all	regulators	are	much	more	likely	to	be	active	networkers	
than	the	three	“richest”	authorities	in	budgetary	terms.	In	additional	categorizations,	
I	created	a	single	“large”	category	merging	“large”	and	“medium-large”	budgets	(thus	
comprising	regulators	with	budgets	higher	than	10	million	euros);	I	also	reduced	the	
number	of	categories	to	three	(“large”,	“medium”	and	“small”):	the	results	change	
very	 slightly	 and	 concur	 in	 showing	 that	 regulators	 with	 small	 (but	 not	medium)	
budgets	are	more	likely	to	be	active.		
As	 for	 the	covariates,	 I	derive	data	concerning	regulators’	 independence	from	the	
OECD	Sector	Regulation	indicators,	released	in	2015	but	referring	to	the	year	201335.	
The	independence	indicator	is	the	average	of	three	indicators:	one	referring	to	the	
regulator’s	accountability,	one	to	their	regulatory	power,	and	one	to	the	extent	to	
which	they	have	to	take	instructions	from	the	executive	in	their	regulatory	practice.	
The	OECD	data	features	two	separate	indicators	for	independence;	one	for	electricity	
regulation	 and	 one	 for	 gas	 regulation.	 Although	 all	 of	 the	 European	 regulatory	
authorities	that	regulate	gas	also	regulate	electricity,	their	scores	for	electricity	and	
gas	 regulation	 may	 differ36.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 include	 each	 indicator	 in	 separate	
models.	Further,	I	 include	a	measure	of	market	liberalization	(from	the	mentioned	
OECD	Sector	Regulation	 indicators)	 to	account	for	the	possibility	that	 it	may	drive	
activism,	as	well.		
																																																						
34 Other	categories	are:	“medium-large”	(between	20	and	10	million	euros;	7	observations);	
“medium”	(between	10	and	5	million	euros;	10	observations);	and	“small”	(between	5	and	2	
million	euros;	4	observations).	
35	 OECD,	 (2015),	 Indicators	 of	 Sectoral	 Regulation,	 http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/indicators-sectoral-regulation.htm	(last	accessed	9	April	2018). 
36 Indeed,	 the	 Pearson’s	 correlation	 coefficient	 between	 the	 independence	 gas	 and	
electricity	 indicators	 is	 50%	 and	 their	 Spearman’s	 correlation	 coefficient	 is	 only	 slightly	
higher.	
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To	 test	 the	 association	 between	 resources	 and	 network	 activism,	 I	 carry	 out	 an	
Analysis	of	Variance	(ANOVA)	whereby	I	regress,	firstly,	staff	levels	and	then	budget	
levels	on	network	activism.	Secondly,	I	run	Ordinary	Least	Squared	models	including	
the	 mentioned	 covariates	 (concerning	 independence,	 liberalization	 and	
infrastructure	links).	Before	running	regressions,	however,	it	is	useful	to	provide	plots	
describing	the	relationship	between	the	variables	of	interest.	
	
Analysis	
Figure	1	and	Figure	2,	depicting,	respectively,	the	relationship	between	staff	levels	
and	 activism	and	budget	 levels	 and	 activism.	 Figure	1	 shows	 that	 regulators	with	
intermediate	levels	of	resources	are	more	likely	to	be	active	networkers	compared	
to	their	counterparts	with	large	or	very	small	resources.	The	upper	part	of	figure	2	is	
based	on	a	categorization	setting	aside	regulatory	authorities	with	very	high	budgets	
from	their	peers:	all	other	categories	show	much	higher	levels	of	activism.	Since	the	
group	 with	 much	 higher	 resources	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 European	 regulators	 only	
comprises	three	countries,	 I	 rely	on	a	different	categorization	 in	the	 lower	part	of	
figure	2,	which	reveals	a	linear	relationship	whereby	as	budgets	decrease,	activism	
increases.		
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Figure	5-1	–	Relationship	between	staff	levels	and	network	activism	
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Figure	5-2	–	Relationship	between	budget	levels	and	network	activism	
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Before	assessing	the	significance	of	 the	differences	between	 levels	of	activism	for	
regulators	with	different	levels	of	budgets	and	staff,	I	test	for	the	significance	of	both	
factor	variables,	as	a	whole,	in	explaining	the	dependent	variable.	To	do	so,	I	carry	
out	 an	 analysis	 of	 variance	 (ANOVA).	 The	 results	 of	 the	 Levene’s	 tests	 on	 the	
relationship	between,	respectively,	staff	levels	and	budget	levels	on	network	activism	
are	not	significant.	This	means	that	the	assumption	of	homogeneity	of	the	means,	
necessary	to	carry	out	analysis	of	variance	(ANOVA),	is	not	violated.	Hence,	I	carry	
out	ANOVAs	for	both	independent	categorical	variables.	The	results	show	that	the	
variable	 related	 to	 staff	 levels,	 whatever	 the	 categorization	 used,	 is	 statistically	
significant	 (i.e.	 p-values	 are	 lower	 than	 0.05).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 variable	 related	 to	
budgetary	figure	is	not	statistically	significant.		
Table	1	and	Table	237	 report	 the	results	of	Ordinary	Least	Squared	models	having	
network	activism	as	dependent	variable	and,	respectively,	staff	and	budget	levels	as	
the	main	predictor	in	the	first	model.	Subsequent	models	include,	one	by	one,	the	
covariates	selected	for	analysis.			
	
Table	5-1	-	Association	between	regulators’	network	activism	(dependent	variable),	
staff	levels	and	covariates	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	
(Intercept)	 -2.00*	 -1.82*	 -1.76*	 -1.35	 -1.67	
	 (0.79)	 (0.77)	 (0.81)	 (0.91)	 (0.81)	
Staff	category	 	 	 	 	 	
large	 reference	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
																																																						
37	The	results	of	the	regression	analyses	were	carried	out	in	R	and	exported	using	package	
“texreg”	(Leifeld	2013).		
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medium	 2.89*	 2.65*	 2.63*	 2.37	 2.42*	
	 (1.11)	 (1.09)	 (1.13)	 (1.16)	 (1.15)	
small	 3.29*	 3.18*	 2.91*	 2.39	 2.68*	
	 (1.19)	 (1.15)	 (1.22)	 (1.34)	 (1.25)	
micro	 2.25	 1.70	 1.79	 0.28	 1.69	
	 (1.42)	 (1.41)	 (1.46)	 (2.02)	 (1.85)	
Independence	(electricity)	 	 -0.73	
(0.45)	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Independence	(gas)	 	 	 -0.55	
(0.47)	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Liberalization	(electricity)	 	 	 	 -0.87	
(0.64)	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Liberalization	(gas)	 	 	 	 	 -0.74	
(0.49)		 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
R2	 0.28	 0.35	 0.32	 0.33	 0.36	
Adj.	R2	 0.20	 0.25	 0.21	 0.22	 0.24	
Num.	obs.	 29	 29	 29	 29	 27	
RMSE	 2.36	 2.28	 2.34	 2.32	 2.35	
	
	
The	 indicators	 for	 independence,	 while	 not	 significant	 in	 table	 1,	 are	 statistically	
significant	 in	 conjunction	with	budget	 levels	 and	 show	 that	 regulators	with	 lower	
independence	are	more	active.	 Lack	of	 significance	on	 the	staff	 coefficients	when	
regressed	 together	 with	 the	 extent	 of	 electricity	 market	 liberalization	 is	 due	 to	
collinearity:	regulators	with	smaller	staff	resources	tend	to	be	from	smaller	countries	
and	have	smaller	markets,	which,	in	turn,	tend	to	be	less	liberalized.	I	run	the	same	
regressions	 using	 different	 categorizations	 of	 staff	 levels,	 and	 the	 results	 are	
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remarkably	consistently	showing	that	intermediate	levels	of	staff	are	associated	with	
higher	activism.	
	
Table	 5-2	 -	 Relationship	 between	 network	 activism	 (dependent	 variable),	 budget	
levels	and	covariates	
	 Model	
1	
Model	
2	
Model	
3	
Model	
4	
Model	
5	
(Intercept)	 -1.10	 3.61	 4.65	 0.54	 2.39	
	 (0.80)	 (2.21)	 (2.87)	 (2.90)	 (2.48)	
Budget	levels	 	 	 	 	 	
large	 reference	
	 	 	 	 	 	
medium	 0.90	 0.44	 0.22	 0.80	 0.04	
	 (1.13)	 (1.07)	 (1.11)	 (1.16)	 (1.25)	
small	 1.85	 3.00	 2.20	 1.48	 1.27	
	 (1.49)	 (1.47)	 (1.41)	 (1.64)	 (1.51)	
micro	 3.10*	 2.77*	 2.81*	 2.28	 2.82	
	 (1.38)	 (1.29)	 (1.31)	 (1.98)	 (1.84)	
Independence	(electricity)	 	 -1.57*	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.69)	 	 	 	
Independence	(gas)	 	 	 -1.89*	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.91)	 	 	
Liberalization	(electricity)	 	 	 	 -0.39	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.66)	 	
Liberalization	(gas)	 	 	 	 	 -0.82	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.56)	
R2	 0.18	 0.32	 0.30	 0.19	 0.29	
Adj.	R2	 0.08	 0.21	 0.19	 0.06	 0.16	
Num.	obs.	 29	 29	 29	 29	 27	
RMSE	 2.52	 2.34	 2.37	 2.56	 2.47	
	
***p	<	0.001,	**p	<	0.01,	*p	<	0.05	
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It	bears	noting	that,	since	I	am	using	network	data,	linear	models	may	be	unreliable	
because	 they	 assume	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 errors.	 Typically,	 network	 data	
features	interdependencies.	Methods	such	as	Exponential	Random	Graphs	Models	
(ERGMs)	have	been	devised	specifically	to	deal	with	those	interdependencies.	The	
ERGMs	 run	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 showed	 that	 regulators	 with	 medium	 staff	
resources	 appeared	 to	 have	 significantly	more	 outgoing	 ties	 than	 regulators	with	
large	 resources.	 No	 other	 category	 reported	 significant	 differences.	 I	 run	 further	
ERGM	models,	which	included	the	variables	that	proved	significant	in	the	previous	
chapter	 (i.e.	 homophily	 for	 Variety	 of	 Capitalism,	 an	 effect	 for	 incoming	 ties	
depending	on	Variety	of	Capitalism,	electricity	flows,	electricity	Regional	Initiatives,	
and	dependencies	for	high	outdegree,	reciprocity,	shared	partners	and	transitivity)	
and	staff	levels	as	originally	presented	in	the	ACER	document	they	are	drawn	from.	
Next,	 I	 run	 the	 same	 model	 including	 my	 re-categorization	 of	 staff	 levels	 that	
comprised	four	instead	of	five	categories.	In	both	cases,	results	are	nearly	identical	
and	 show	 that,	 all	 else	 equal,	 regulators	 with	medium	 and	 small	 staff	 levels	 are	
significantly	more	 likely	 to	have	more	outgoing	 ties	 than	 their	 peers,	 thus	 largely	
confirming	the	results	of	the	statistical	analysis	as	well	as	the	results	in	the	previous	
chapter.	By	 the	 same	 token,	 regulators	with	 large	 staff	 resources	are	 significantly	
more	likely	to	receive	more	incoming	ties	than	their	peers.	In	contrast,	ERG	models	
including	 the	 categorical	 variable	 for	 budget	 levels	 do	 not	 result	 in	 significant	
statistical	coefficients.	
	
Discussion	of	the	results.		
The	research	interest	motivating	this	analysis	is	investigating	the	determinants	of	ties	
between	 regulators	 within	 regulatory	 networks.	 Regulatory	 networks	 are	 the	
protagonist	of	a	rich	literature	which,	however,	has	rarely	investigated	the	incentives	
driving	 ties	 across	 network	 members.	 Contributions	 on	 networks	 of	 European	
regulators	 usually	 focus	 on	 their	 potential	 or	 actual	 influence	 on	 regulatory	
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convergence,	or,	alternatively,	on	establishing	links	between	network	membership	
and	outcomes	such	as	increased	independence.	This	contribution,	instead,	attempts	
to	assess	the	quality	of	network	membership	and	the	concrete	usage	that	regulators	
make	of	their	informal	collaborative	ties	to	their	peers.	
The	 results	 of	 the	 analysis	 suggest	 that	 resource	 imbalances	 across	 European	
national	energy	regulators	matter	for	their	network	behaviour.	The	clear	result	is	that	
regulators	with	large	resources,	both	in	staff	and	budgetary	levels,	are	less	proactive	
than	their	counterparts	and	tend	to	be	at	the	receiving	end	of	their	outgoing	ties.	
Well-resourced	regulators	have	resources	that	are	several	times	larger	than	those	of	
some	of	 their	 counterparts.	 The	 small	 size	of	 the	data	does	not	 allow	 for	 a	high-
powered	 analysis.	 Yet,	 the	 relationship	 between	 numbers	 of	 staff	 dedicated	 to	
energy	regulation	(i.e.	the	ACER	categorical	data)	and	network	activism	is	consistent	
and	substantive	(with	an	eta	square	above	0.50)	and,	in	the	categorization	including	
category	 “micro”	 (i.e.	 regulators	 with	 less	 than	 12	 FTE	 dedicated	 to	 energy	
regulation)	shows	a	quadratic	trend.		
This	 suggests	 that	 lower	 resources	 correspond	 to	 higher	 activism	 up	 to	 a	 point:	
regulators	with	extremely	small	resources	are	not	significantly	more	proactive	than	
their	peers	with	large	resources.	This	suggests	that	these	regulators	are	so	resource-
constrained	that	the	opportunity	cost	of	networking	is	too	high	in	terms	of	staff	time.	
Regulators	with	intermediate	staff	resources,	instead,	may	not	have	all	the	resources	
they	 need	 but	 still	 they	 have	 enough	 for	 networking	 to	 be	 a	 cost-effective	
compensatory	strategy.	Additional	models	considering	the	additive	effects	of	budget	
and	 staff	 resources	 yield	 no	 significance	 for	 budget	 levels.	 There	 are	 too	 few	
observations	to	test	whether	staff	levels	matter	differently	at	different	budget	levels	
(and	 vice-versa)	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 to	 test	 for	 interaction	 effects.	 At	 any	 rate,	
budgetary	 and	 staff	 levels	 are	 very	 highly	 correlated	 (Spearman’s	 correlation	
coefficient	 of	 0.62).	 Yet,	 only	 staff	 levels	 are	 consistently	 significant;	 after	 all,	 a	
regulatory	network	is	a	social	network	of	individuals.	Their	number	seems	to	affect	
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the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 regulatory	 authority	 can	 strive	 to	 compensate	 for	 lacking	
resources	by	relying	on	their	peers.		
These	results	lead	to	infer	that	one	of	the	main	virtues	of	regulatory	networks	may	
well	be	their	impact	on	governance	at	national	level.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	scope	
of	European	national	regulators’	authority	is	confined	to	the	borders	of	their	country.	
Steeped	in	very	different	market	contexts,	national	regulators	need	to	set	the	right	
incentives	for	the	regulated	industry	to	achieve	efficiencies	and	re-invest	its	profit,	
monitor	their	conduct,	while	preventing	abuses,	ensuring	consumer	protection	and	
empowerment,	while	remaining	accountable	to	government	and	the	general	public.	
These	are	 tremendous	 tasks;	 in	 their	 fulfilment,	 regulators	 face	great	 information	
asymmetries	with	 the	 regulated	 industry	 (Pérez-Arriaga	 2014).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
regulators	 need	 to	 preserve	 their	 legitimacy	 and	 credibility	 as	 adequately	
accomplishing	 their	 tasks;	 otherwise,	 they	 face	 government	 intervention	 and,	
potentially,	 the	curtailment	of	 their	powers.	 Faced	with	 low	 resources,	 regulators	
tackled	the	demands	of	their	profession	by	relying	on	a	further	resource:	their	peers.		
Therefore,	 the	 understanding	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	 networks’	 potential	 for	
improving	 governance	 should	 be	 extended	 beyond	 transnational	 or	 global	
governance	 to	 encompass	 governance	 improvements	 at	 national	 level.	 In	 other	
words,	transnational	regulatory	networking	may	have	important	feedback	effects	at	
national	 level,	 which	 need	 not	 necessarily	 push	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 convergence.	
Access	 to	 informed	 and	 resourced	 peers	 may	 improve	 the	 problem-solving	 and	
analytical	capacities	of	regulatory	authorities	(Lodge	and	Wegrich	2014)	at	national	
level,	even	though	barriers	remain	to	transnational	regulatory	convergence,	which	
may	depend	on	factors	beyond	the	control	of	the	regulatory	authority	itself.	In	the	
European	 context,	 the	 results	 of	 this	 analysis	 suggest	 that	 the	 interdependence	
created	by	designing	the	single	market	(including	the	internal	energy	market)	may	
have	improved	regulatory	practice	at	national	level	beyond	what	would	have	been	
achievable	based	on	national	resources	alone.			
160	
	
	
Conclusions:	networking	for	resources.	
The	 literature	 has	 claimed	 that	 membership	 is	 a	 regulatory	 network	 does	 not	
automatically	guarantee	 regular	 involvement	 (Bach	and	Newman	2014).	Although	
agreeing	on	the	importance	of	networks	for	information	exchange	among	regulators,	
fostering	their	learning	and	even	increasing	their	de	facto	independence	from	their	
principals,	the	literature	failed	to	specify	the	mechanism	whereby	regulators	network	
for	expertise.	This	paper	makes	a	 step	 in	 the	direction	of	 tackling	 this	 issue	using	
original	 data	 on	 European	 energy	 regulators’	 ties	 to	 each	 other	 (gathered	 under	
promise	of	anonymity)	and	rare	data	on	their	budgetary	and	staff	resources.		
The	 analysis	 tests	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 difference	 between	 regulators’	
outgoing	 and	 incoming	 ties,	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 number	 of	 regulators’	 non-
reciprocal	ties,	and	the	extent	of	their	resources.	Non-reciprocal	ties	are	understood	
as	 indicating	 the	 active	 pursuit	 of	 information	 beyond	 one’s	 strongest	 ties	 (i.e.	
reciprocated	ties).	The	higher	numbers	of	non-reciprocated	ties,	the	more	active	the	
regulatory	authority.	Possession	of	non-reciprocal	ties	suggests	that	the	regulatory	
authority	branches	out	beyond	their	closest	contacts	in	the	pursuit	of	information,	
much	 like	 job-seekers	 contacted	 the	 friends	 of	 their	 friends	 in	 the	 seminal	
Granovetter’s	 article	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 weak	 ties	 for	 information	 diffusion	
(Granovetter	1973).		
Information	 is	 the	 main	 resource	 regulators	 need	 in	 order	 to	 fulfil	 their	 tasks.	
Resource-constrained	 regulators	 are	 less	 able	 to	 set	 the	 right	 incentives	 for	 the	
regulated	 industries	 (Glachant,	 Khalfallah	 et	 al.	 2013)	 and	 therefore	 less	 able	 to	
recognize	and	punish	their	wrongdoings.	Moreover,	staff	levels	have	been	found	to	
correlate	with	higher	quality	regulation	(Koop	and	Hanretty	2017).	The	hypothesis	
guiding	this	analysis	is	that	some	regulators	are	more	active	networkers	because	they	
use	 their	 informal	networks	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	 scarce	 resources	 in	 terms	of	
budget	 and	 staff.	 The	 results	 lend	 support	 to	 the	 hypothesis.	 Indeed,	 regulators	
possessing	high	 resources	 tend	 to	have	negative	activism,	 i.e.	negative	difference	
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between	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 ties,	 pointing	 to	 their	 influence	 and	 popularity	
among	their	peers.		
Although	the	interdependence	created	by	the	common	membership	in	the	European	
Union	 is	 plausibly	 at	 the	 root	 of	 these	 informal	 collaboration	 patterns,	 the	
mechanism	 whereby	 regulators	 use	 networks	 as	 substitutes	 for	 their	 lacking	
resources	has	already	been	identified	elsewhere	in	the	literature	(see	Alcañiz	2016	
on	 the	 case	 of	 nuclear	 experts	 in	 Latin	 America).	 This	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 the	
benefits	 of	 transnational	 collaboration	 do	 not	 only	 improve	 European	 regulatory	
governance	 but	 also	 spill	 over	 to	 national	 regulatory	 policy,	 providing	 for	 more	
informed	regulators	than	it	would	have	been	possible	to	achieve	on	the	sole	basis	of	
domestic	resources.		
Although	lacking	empirical	data	confirming	the	argument,	this	chapter	contributes	to	
theory	 development	 regarding	 how	 regulators	 use	 their	 networks.	 Hence,	 this	
analysis	can	spawn	further	analyses	assessing	hypotheses	concerning	the	effect	of	
networks	on	regulatory	decision-making.	For	instance,	a	case	study	analysis	focusing	
on	 a	 relatively	 less	 resourced	 regulatory	 authority	 and	 testing	 the	 causal	 chain	
leading	 from	 network	 exchanges	 to	 actual	 decision-making	 against	 empirical	
evidence	would	represent	a	suitable	follow	up	to	this	analysis.		
A	 final	word	 concerning	 the	availability	of	data	on	national	 regulatory	 authority’s	
resources:	gathering	this	data	is	exceedingly	difficult,	as	no	central	platform	appears	
to	collect	it	on	a	regular	basis	and	make	it	publicly	available.	National	reports	often	
do	not	contain	this	 information	and	often	are	not	drafted	in	other	languages	than	
the	national	one.	As	a	 result,	 research	using	 this	data	has	 to	 rely	on	 imprecise	or	
slightly	outdated	data.	Making	this	type	of	information	more	readily	available	to	the	
academic	and	scientific	community	would	not	only	improve	research,	but	probably	
also	corroborate	claims	for	adequate	resources	to	be	provided	to	national	regulatory	
authorities.	 	
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Part	II.	Conclusion:	the	rationale	for	regulatory	networking.	
	
This	second	part	of	the	thesis	shifted	the	focus	of	analysis	in	two	ways:	it	moved	from	
the	 historical	 narrative	 to	 the	 present	 and	 from	 networks	 as	 organizations	 to	
networks	 as	 structures	 resulting	 from	 regulators’	 voluntary	 connections	 to	 one	
another.	 This	 shift	 enabled	 analysis	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 regulatory	 network	
collaboration.	 The	 explanatory	 model	 of	 network	 structure	 reveal	 that	 a	 strong	
pattern	of	homophily	drives	 regulators’	 connections.	Moreover,	 the	model	 shows	
that	regulators	overseeing	more	liberalized	markets	receive	more	incoming	ties,	but	
also	have	significantly	more	outgoing	ones.	Finally,	the	analysis	in	chapter	5	showed	
that	 energy	 regulators	 with	 higher	 resources	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 receive	 more	
incoming	ties,	and	that	regulators	with	lower	staff	resources	are	more	likely	to	be	
proactively	using	networks	to	compensate	for	their	lacking	resources.		
The	policy	implications	to	be	derived	from	the	joint	considerations	of	these	results	
are	several.	On	the	one	hand,	the	strong	homophily	pattern	determining	network	
ties	suggests	that	some	form	of	structured	cooperation	(such	as	a	European	Agency	
or	a	more	formalized	network)	is	probably	necessary	to	foster	cooperation	among	
regulators,	 where	 the	 overall	 goal	 is	 market	 integration.	 Otherwise,	 network	
interactions	may	result	in	disconnected	or	weakly	connected	communities.	This	not	
only	would	slow	down	the	flow	of	information	across	the	network,	but	it	would	also	
confer	remarkable	leverage	to	bridging	nodes.	On	the	other	hand,	the	relationship	
between	resources	and	activism	emerging	from	chapter	5	shows	that	regulators	are	
strategic	 in	 their	 usage	 of	 networks;	 moreover,	 it	 suggests	 that	 regulatory	
cooperation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 probably	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 improving	
governance	 at	 national	 level	 more	 than	 national	 resources	 alone	 would	 have	
allowed.	Discerning	 the	net	effect	of	network	collaboration	on	policy	outcomes	 is	
exceedingly	 difficult,	 and	 I	 do	 not	 have	 data	 to	 empirically	 confirm	 the	 pattern	
emerging	from	that	analysis.	However,	the	chapter	strives	to	contribute	to	theory	
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development	concerning	the	reasons	why	regulators	network	and	to	the	formulation	
of	hypotheses	for	future	research	concerning	how	information	retrieved	via	informal	
collaboration	helped	regulatory	decision-making.		
The	significance	of	time	as	a	key	factor	in	explaining	the	origins	and	the	effects	of	
transnational	regulatory	cooperation	underlies	this	whole	thesis.	These	two	chapters	
utilize	data	 gathered	at	 a	precise	 time	and	 therefore	providing	a	 snapshot	of	 the	
network	 of	 European	 energy	 regulators.	 Yet,	 Exponential	 Random	 Graph	Models	
such	as	the	one	developed	 in	chapter	4	are	generative	models,	which	means	that	
they	 assume	 that	 the	 observed	 network	 is	 the	 result	 of	 an	 evolutionary	 process.	
Some	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 visibly	 at	 play	 in	 the	 foregoing	 two	 chapters	 may	 be	
idiosyncratic	for	individual	regulators;	for	instance,	a	given	regulatory	authority	may	
have	been	particularly	proactive	in	the	time	frame	of	the	research,	and	not	be	the	
following	 year.	 Yet,	 the	mechanisms	driving	 tie	 choices,	 such	as	homophily	 and	a	
compensatory	 strategy	 for	 lacking	 resources,	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 relatively	 stable	
opportunities	that	networks	offer	to	regulators.		
In	the	next	part	of	the	thesis,	I	revert	to	historical	analysis	and	to	the	comparative	
perspective	by	examining	the	phase	of	network	expansion	for	both	European	and	
American	 energy	 regulators.	 Although	 following	 entirely	 different	 evolutionary	
paths,	both	sets	of	cooperation	structures	replicated	themselves	by	generating	new	
networks	in	other	areas	of	the	world.	I	will	show	how,	faced	with	the	relative	decline	
of	 its	main	 function,	 the	NARUC	 resorted	 to	 a	 layering	 strategy	 by	 taking	 on	 the	
additional	mission	of	exporting	US	utility	regulation	to	the	four	corners	of	the	world.	
This	 contrasts	 with	 the	 conversion	 strategy	 adopted	 by	 the	 CEER	 as	 the	
establishment	of	the	European	Agency	deprived	it	of	much	of	its	policy	worth;	the	
CEER	found	new	topics	 (e.g.	consumers	and	retail	markets)	and	functions	 (e.g.	 in-
house	training)	to	keep	its	viability.	The	conditions	leading	to	either	strategy	are	also	
discussed	in	the	next	part.
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PART	 THREE	 –	 EXPORTING	 NETWORKS:	 THE	
ROLE	OF	AMERICAN	AND	EUROPEAN	REGULATORS	
IN	FOSTERING	REGULATORY	NETWORKS	ABROAD.	
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Part	III.	Introduction:	exporting	networks.	
	
This	 third	and	 final	part	of	 the	 thesis	 consists	of	 two	chapters	 focusing	on	what	 I	
define	the	“export	of	networks”.	Exporting	networks,	 in	this	context,	refers	to	the	
attempt	 to	 foster	 regulatory	 collaboration	 in	 a	 given	 governance	 context	 by	
reproducing	 the	 informal	 network	 structure	 embedding	 successful	 regulatory	
collaboration	in	another	governance	context.	To	be	specific,	in	this	part	I	investigate	
the	 reasons	 why	 the	 US	 Agency	 for	 International	 Development	 (USAID)	 and	 the	
European	 Commission	 through	 its	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 programme	
decided	 to	 invest	 on	 fostering	 regulatory	 networked	 collaboration	 in	 foreign	
jurisdictions	as	part	of,	in	the	former	case,	a	foreign	policy	agenda	and,	in	the	latter	
case,	what	the	literature	defines	as	“external	governance”	(Manners	2002).	
Tackling	 this	 question	 across	 the	 two	 chapters	 brought	 to	 the	 fore	 two	 other	
important	 themes:	 the	 theme	 of	 regulatory	 network	 evolution	 and	 the	 theme	 of	
network	entrepreneurship.	The	next	two	chapters	focus	on	the	emergence	of	two	
networks,	which	are	the	progeny	of,	respectively,	NARUC	and	CEER;	these	are	the	
Energy	Regional	Regulatory	Association	(ERRA)	and	the	Association	of	Mediterranean	
Energy	 Regulators	 (MedReg).	 The	 analysis	 shows	 that,	 although	 via	 different	
processes,	the	NARUC	and	CEER	were	essentially	exported	to	other	regions,	in	the	
explicit	attempt	to	replicate	their	success	formula.		
Investigations	of	 the	 rationale	of	 such	network	export	yielded	 important	 research	
findings	 as	 concerns	 the	 dynamics	 of	 network	 evolution,	 the	 interdependencies	
between	networks	emerged	in	different	areas	of	the	world,	and	the	ways	in	which	
entrepreneurial	 regulators	 can	 leverage	 their	 embeddedness	 in	 the	 multi-level	
governance	 system	 to	 further	 collaboration	 initiatives	 with	 strategically	 crucial	
foreign	jurisdictions.	The	following	two	chapters	show	that	donors	(in	this	case,	the	
US	government	and	the	European	Commission)	purposefully	chose	networks	as	an	
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instrument	 of	 “soft”	 foreign	 policy.	 This	 finding	 partially	 echoes	 some	 earlier	
contributions,	such	as	Raustiala	(2002),	who	argues	that	networks	can	be	synergistic	
with	more	 formal	policy	programmes	 in	 implementing	 regulatory	 transfer	of	best	
practices	 from	 more	 developed	 to	 less	 developed	 markets.	 Raustiala	 (2002),	
however,	was	concerned	with	regulatory	compliance	and	more	effective	regulatory	
enforcement.	 In	 this	 setting,	 instead,	 the	 policy	 goals	 are	 primarily	 political.	 In	
pointing	explicitly	 to	 foreign	policy	motivations,	 I	exclude	alternative	explanations	
that,	although	plausible,	are	unlikely	to	be	the	main	driver	of	network	establishment	
in	 the	 cases	 of	 ERRA	 and	MedReg.	 The	main	 competing	 argument	 to	 the	 foreign	
policy	one	is	that	the	creation	of	ERRA	and	MedReg	(the	former	located	in	Central	
and	Eastern	Europe,	the	latter	in	an	area	defined	as	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region)	
happened	as	a	result	of	a	process	of	diffusion.		
The	key	argument	of	the	(voluminous)	diffusion	literature	is	that	when	certain	policy	
or	 institutional	 solutions	become	accepted	wisdom	they	diffuse	across	 the	world.	
This	 diffusion	 process	 can	 result	 from	 different	 mechanisms.	 The	 four	 main	
mechanisms	 identified	 in	 the	 (rational-choice-inspired)	 literature	 are	 coercion,	
competition,	 learning	 and	 emulation	 (or	mimicry).	 In	 other	 words,	 countries	 and	
governments	replicate	policies	or	establish	organizations	 imitating	other	countries	
because	they	compete	with	them	for	capital	and	trade	(Elkins,	Guzman	et	al.	2006),	
because	said	policies	have	proven	to	deliver	superior	outcomes	(Shipan	and	Volden	
2014),	because	they	want	to	be	seen	as	“modern”	or	competent	(Meseguer	2004),	
or,	finally,	because	external	agents,	such	as	international	organizations,	force	them	
to	 do	 so	 (Henisz,	 Zelner	 et	 al.	 2005).	 A	more	 constructivist	 explanation	 of	 policy	
diffusion	 relies	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 sociology	 and	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 institutional	
isomorphism	(Powell	and	DiMaggio	1983)	and	emphasises	the	symbolic	properties	
of	 the	 adoption	of	 a	 policy	 that	 is	 generally	 thought	 to	 be	 effective	 and	 efficient	
(McNamara	2002).	
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The	 fact	 that	 transnational	 (or	 trans-jurisdictional)	 networks	 of	 energy	 regulators	
have	sprung	up	nearly	 in	every	region	of	the	world	(Berg	and	Horrall	2008),	often	
with	the	support	of	international	financial	institutions,	appears	to	lend	support	to	the	
diffusion	hypothesis,	particularly	the	coercion	and	mimicry	versions.	However,	the	
concept	 of	 policy	 diffusion	 applies	 to	 policy	 solutions;	 informal	 networks	 of	
regulators,	per	se,	are	not	a	policy	solution.	Networks	are	platforms	for	discussion	
and	exchange	about	policy	solutions,	not	policy	solutions	in	themselves.	Regulators	
may	choose	to	leverage	their	network	to	obtain	collective	and	individual	benefits,	as	
outlined	in	the	first	part	of	this	thesis,	but	the	mere	existence	of	a	network,	e.g.	of	
an	 acronym	 and	 a	 meeting	 schedule,	 does	 not	 imply	 any	 actual	 policy	
implementation	or	change.	Moreover,	policies	diffuse,	or	are	diffused,	because	they	
are	perceived	to	be	generally	superior	and	efficient.	
By	contrast,	the	arguments	of	foreign	policy	have	a	distinct	security	flavour.	Foreign	
policy	is	aimed	at	achieving	specific	political	goals	in	countries	that	are	perceived	as	
a	 security	 threat	 to	 the	 donor.	 As	 the	 next	 chapter	 shows,	 this	was	 the	 thinking	
underlying	the	USAID	efforts	to	shift	the	governance	paradigm	of	the	energy	sector	
in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	in	the	aftermath	of	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union.	
This	 included	 the	 establishment	 of	 regulatory	 authorities,	 according	 to	 a	 well-
established	 “recipe”	 of	 infrastructure	 sector	 governance	 that	 international	
organizations	 worldwide	 espoused	 in	 those	 years	 (Henisz,	 Zelner	 et	 al.	 2005).	
Fostering	regulatory	networking,	however,	was	not	part	of	that	recipe.	The	USAID	
decided	 to	 foster	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 network	 of	 energy	 regulators	 in	 the	 area	
autonomously,	 and	 for	 two	 reasons:	 the	 experience	 of	 NARUC	 had	 shown	 that	
regulatory	 networks	 can	 foster	 learning	 across	 members,	 and,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
technical	assistance,	 they	were	a	cost-effective	alternative	to	schooling	regulators	
individually	on	the	economics	of	energy	markets;	also,	a	direct	link	to	regulators	in	
different	 countries	 of	 the	 area	 allowed	 monitoring	 the	 reform	 progress	 and	
accompanied	their	transition	to	a	market	economy	under	the	aegis	of	the	European	
Union.	In	its	own	turn,	NARUC	utilized	the	USAID	partnership	to	revamp	itself	and	its	
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image.	The	programme	was	so	successful	that	USAID	decided	to	replicate	its	formula	
in	other	regions	of	 the	world	where	 it	was	operating,	 in	partnership	with	NARUC,	
ever	since.	
The	 following	 chapter,	 chapter	 7,	 reconstructs	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 network	 of	
energy	regulators	from	countries	facing	the	Mediterranean	Sea	(i.e.	MedReg).	The	
events	surrounding	MedReg	were	completely	different	from	those	leading	to	ERRA.		
The	establishment	of	MedReg	did	not	take	place	within	the	framework	of	a	broader	
foreign	policy	programme;	as	a	matter	of	fact,	it	was	not	even	the	initiative	of	the	
European	 Commission.	 MedReg	 was	 the	 result	 of	 a	 bold	 display	 of	 policy	
entrepreneurialism	 by	 a	 small	 group	 of	 European	 regulators,	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	
European	eastward	enlargement	of	2004	and,	most	importantly,	its	signature	of	the	
Energy	Community	Treaty	in	2005.	The	Treaty,	signed	with	South	Eastern	European	
governments,	 obliged	 those	 governments	 to	 reform	 their	 energy	 markets	 in	
compliance	with	European	legislation	as	an	interim	step	towards	their	full	accession	
as	Member	States	of	the	EU.	Contextually,	it	encased	regulatory	cooperation	in	the	
rather	formalized	setting	of	a	Board	with	advisory	functions	to	a	Board	of	Ministers.	
At	the	time,	European	regulators	disagreed	with	the	Commissions’	formalization	of	
the	regulatory	collaborative	relationships.	Determined	to	prevent	the	replication	of	
the	Energy	Community	approach	to	the	Southern	neighbourhood	of	the	EU,	in	2006	
the	Italian	regulator	and	a	few	Southern	European	colleagues	took	the	lead	in	the	
establishment	of	a	regulatory	network	encompassing	regulators	from	all	countries	
facing	the	Mediterranean,	thus	including	regulators	from	countries	in	the	Middle	East	
and	North	Africa	region:	MedReg.		
The	analysis	in	the	following	chapters	is	based	on	the	insights	gained	from	41	semi-
structured	interviews	(some	of	which	also	informed	the	writing	of	chapters	2	and	3;	
the	table	in	Appendix	4	reports	the	corresponding	interview	numbers).	As	a	matter	
of	fact,	very	 little	written	public	 information	in	available	on	the	events	recounted.	
The	information	gained	through	interviews	was	triangulated	across	different	types	
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of	 interviewees	 (international	 organizations,	 regulators,	 consultants)	 and	 cross	
checked	with	other	sources	(reports,	newsletters,	and	electronic	articles	–	quoted	in	
the	text	and	referenced	in	the	list	of	references	at	the	end	of	the	thesis).	
These	chapters	also	contribute	to	the	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	technical	
assistance	 programmes.	 In	 a	 recent	 contribution,	 Broome	 and	 Seabrooke	 (2015)	
show	 that	 international	 financial	 institutions	 (IFIs	 -	 in	particular,	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund	and	the	World	Bank)	use	technical	assistance	programmes	to	foster	
the	emergence	of	 “sympathetic	 interlocutors”	 in	 recipient	 countries	by	 socializing	
national	 officials	 through	 transnational	 policy	 training.	 In	 this	way,	 these	 authors	
argue,	international	organizations	increase	the	number	of	domestic	reformers	who	
are	sympathetic	to	their	prescriptions	for	policy	change.	Indeed,	a	stronger	emphasis	
on	socialization	followed	the	IFIs’	acknowledgement	that	lending	conditionality,	by	
itself,	was	not	achieving	the	desired	results	(World	Bank	2006).	The	key	importance	
of	 socialization	 with	 peers	 from	 more	 advanced	 economies	 as	 well	 as	 hands-on	
cooperation	over	concrete	policy	issues	has	been	proven	to	determine	the	success	
of	technical	assistance	programmes	(Freyburg	2015).	
Some	of	the	findings	emerged	elsewhere	in	this	thesis	are	confirmed	in	the	cases	of	
ERRA	and	MedReg:	primarily,	that	uncertainty	drives	regulators	to	seek	each	other	
out	 to	establish	 informal	collaborative	 relationships	 to	corroborate	 their	decision-
making	 and	 reduce	 the	 uncertainty	 they	 are	 exposed	 to;	 that	 symbiotic	
interdependence	drives	collaboration	between	different	levels	of	governance,	as	in	
the	 case	 of	 USAID	 and	 ERRA,	 when	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 one’s	 agenda	 entails	 the	
strengthening	of	the	other.	Moreover,	it	shows	that	the	evolutionary	phase	of	one	
network	can	represent	the	emergence	of	another,	as	in	the	case	of	NARUC	and	ERRA,	
and	 that	 experience	 of	 network	 collaboration	 is	 a	 valuable	 asset	 in	 regulators’	
relationships	 to	 their	 political	 principals.	 Finally,	 chapter	 7	 shows	 how	 well-
established	 regulatory	 networks	 may	 function	 as	 templates	 for	 policy	
entrepreneurialism	of	any	network	member.	
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6. The	 establishment	 of	 the	 network	 of	 energy	
regulators	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	or	 Foreign	
policy	via	networks.	
	
In	chapter	2,	I	identified	in	the	post-World	War	I	crisis	of	regulatory	credibility	and	
legitimacy	the	critical	juncture	prompting	regulators	to	consolidate	NARUC	as	their	
collective	home.	Much	later	in	time,	another	event	had	a	transformative	impact	on	
NARUC,	 representing	a	 second	critical	 juncture	 (Collier	and	Collier	1991,	Capoccia	
and	Kelemen	2007).	In	1998,	the	US	bilateral	aid	agency	(USAID)	proposed	to	NARUC	
a	cooperative	agreement	to	deliver	the	goals	of	their	mission	in	Eastern	Europe.	The	
cooperative	 agreement	 was	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	 new,	 post-Cold	 War	 guiding	
paradigm	 of	 USAID’s	work	 around	 the	world:	 from	 strategically	motivated	 aid	 to	
“transformative	development”	(Natsios	2006).	During	the	Cold	War,	USAID	gave	aid	
to	countries	irrespective	of	their	human	rights	or	governance	records,	provided	that	
they	became	or	remained	their	allies	against	the	Soviet	Union;	after	the	Cold	War,	
the	 rationale	 for	 USAID	 aid	 provision	 changed	 radically	 and	 re-oriented	 its	 focus	
towards	institutions.		
Until	 USAID’s	 request,	 the	 international	 exposure	 of	 US	 state	 utility	 regulators	
individually	and	of	NARUC	as	a	whole	was	virtually	non-existent,	except	for	sporadic	
interaction	 with	 Canadian	 counterparts.	 After	 the	 ERRA	 programme,	 USAID	
partnered	with	NARUC	for	regulatory	cooperation	programmes	in	other	areas	of	the	
world,	 including	 Asia	 and	 Africa.	 The	 federal	 grants	 that	 NARUC	 receives	 for	 its	
national	and	international	work	represent	now	over	half	of	 its	annual	budget.	The	
consequences	of	USAID’s	request	were	therefore	far-reaching	and	long-lasting.	In	its	
absence,	 it	 is	highly	unlikely	that	NARUC	would	have	mustered	the	resources,	 the	
political	support	and	the	internal	cohesion	to	develop	these	activities	independently.		
171	
	
This	 chapter	 retraces	 the	 history	 of	 ERRA	 to	 unveil	 the	 under-investigated	 link	
between	 technical	 assistance	and	networks;	 it	 also	 represents	 the	 concrete	 route	
taken	by	NARUC	to	re-invent	itself	and	evolve	by	acquiring	new	clients	(Downs	1967).	
The	establishment	of	ERRA	 is	a	case	of	brokered	network	 fostered	by	an	external	
agent	(see	Provan	and	Kenis	2008).	In	the	context	of	the	case,	USAID	plays	a	similar	
role	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 towards	 the	 embryonic	 CEER:	 it	 was	 a	 policy	
partner	placed	at	a	higher	level	of	governance,	pursuing	an	agenda	whose	fulfilment	
was	 dependent	 on	 the	 regulators	 and	 entailed	 the	 strengthening	 of	 their	 policy	
relevance.		
The	emergence	of	ERRA	is	inscribed	in	the	history	of	NARUC	and	unfolds	in	parallel	
with	 that	 of	 CEER.	 Hence,	 the	 three	 cases	 are	 nested	 within	 each	 other.	 The	
commonalities	in	their	development	are	striking:	all	three	emerged	in	a	context	of	
radical	policy	overhaul;	all	three	stemmed	from	loose,	irregular	professional	ties;	all	
three	found	in	the	symbiotic	interdependence	with	political	actors	the	key	to	their	
growth	in	size	and	importance.	However,	the	ERRA	differs	from	CEER	and	NARUC	in	
one	respect:	ERRA	members	are	regulators	from	separate	countries,	which	do	not	
form	a	single	policy	entity.	As	the	European	enlargement	englobed	seven	Central	and	
Eastern	European	countries	and	their	energy	regulators	became	members	of	CEER,	
the	 task	ERRA	was	 created	 for	was	accomplished	and	 the	multi-level	 structure	of	
governance,	 comprising	 the	 USAID	 and	 national	 governments	 (as	 well	 as	
International	 Financial	 Institutions	 and	 the	 European	 Union)	 underpinning	 it	
vanished.	The	ERRA	that	provided	input	to	policy	formulation	for	the	region	vanished	
as	 well.	 Still,	 the	 network	 did	 not	 disband.	 Regulators	 kept	 finding	 value	 in	 the	
familiarity	 of	 the	 network	 and	 its	 focus	 on	 issues	 that	mattered	 for	 that	 region.	
Hence,	the	ERRA	underwent	a	process	of	conversion	and	transformed	into	a	different	
organization,	bearing	the	same	name:	primarily	a	training	provider	and	platform	of	
regulatory	interactions	with,	declaredly,	no	intention	of	contributing	to	policy	or	of	
espousing	a	specific	policy	agenda.	This	new	identity	enabled	ERRA	to	expand	and	to	
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welcome	any	new	member:	indeed,	ERRA	members	nowadays	comprise	regulators	
from	countries	all	over	the	world.	
	
Bilateral	 aid	 and	 transnational	 regulatory	 cooperation:	 stranger	
literatures.		
The	intervention	of	USAID	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	in	the	1990s,	following	the	
demise	of	the	Soviet	Union,	was	part	of	a	bilateral	aid	programme	financed	by	the	
US	government.	 The	determinants	of	 recipient	 selection	by	aid	providers	 is	 a	 key	
topic	in	the	literature	on	foreign	aid	provision	(Alesina	and	Dollar	2000,	Berthélemy	
and	 Tichit	 2004,	Neumayer	 2005,	 Bermeo	2008,	 Younas	 2008,	 Bearce	 and	 Tirone	
2010,	Winters	2010,	Bermeo	2011,	Reinsberg	2015,	Eichenauer	and	Reinsberg	2017,	
Findley,	Milner	et	al.	2017).	This	literature	has	converged	on	several	founding	claims.	
One	 of	 them	 concerns	 the	 higher	 politicization	 of	 bilateral	 aid	 compared	 to	 aid	
provided	 by	 multilateral	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 Regional	
Development	Banks.	Bilateral	aid	agencies	are	financed	by	individual	governments,	
which	 have	 biases	 and	 preferences	 concerning	 their	 aid	 recipients.	 The	 most	
important	 bilateral	 donors	 include	 the	USA,	 the	UK,	 Japan,	 France,	Germany	 and	
other	European	countries	(Neumayer	2005).	Of	these,	the	USA	provides	the	largest	
sums	in	absolute	terms.	
During	 the	 Cold	 War,	 strategic	 and	 foreign	 policy	 considerations	 dominated	 the	
allocation	 of	 aid	 (Berthélemy	 and	 Tichit	 2004,	 Natsios	 2006),	 bringing	 USAID	 to	
provide	aid	to	countries	with	dubious	or	weak	human	rights	and	governance	records.	
After	the	Cold	War,	however,	all	Western	donors	began	to	explicitly	condition	aid	on	
the	 quality	 of	 governance	 in	 recipient	 countries	 (Dollar	 and	 Levin	 2006,	 Bermeo	
2008).	Even	though	strategic	foreign	policy	goals	remain	relevant	to	explain	bilateral	
aid	 allocation	 (Milner	 and	 Tingley	 2010),	 economic	 performance	 and	 institutional	
quality	are	at	least	as	important	(Alesina	and	Dollar	2000).	In	his	assessment	of	the	
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role	that	good	governance	indicators	play	in	aid	recipient	selection	in	the	post-Cold	
War	period,	Neumayer	(2005)	finds	that	the	only	consistent	pattern	across	the	major	
world	donors	 is	 the	 level	of	the	regulatory	burden	 imposed	on	the	private	sector.	
Respect	for	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	do	not	emerge	as	equally	important.		
The	quality	of	the	governance	structure	of	a	country	is	recognized	as	an	important	
determinant	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 aid	 (Neumayer	 2002,	 Dollar	 and	 Levin	 2006,	
Dietrich	 2013).	 Donors	 have	 always	 used	 soft	 power	 techniques	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	
compliance	with	their	desiderata	concerning	their	aid	provision:	Neumayer	(2005)	
lists	 persuasion,	 capacity	 building,	 policy	 conditionality	 and	 selectivity	 as	 the	 four	
main	 strategies	 of	 donor	 soft	 power.	 Particularly	 after	 the	 Cold	War,	 the	 donor	
community,	and	the	USA	in	particular,	have	shifted	the	targets	of	their	soft	power	
efforts:	 not	 only	 governments,	 but	 also	 institutional	 actors.	 The	 USAID	 has	 been	
found	to	provide	less	aid	to	poorly	governed	countries	(Bermeo	2008)	or	countries	
with	weak	governance	structures	(Eichenauer	and	Reinsberg	2017),	unless	it	could	
bypass	 government	 and	 target	 aid	 at	 non-state	 actors	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	
likelihood	that	it	will	achieve	its	intended	outcome	(Dietrich	2013).	This	is	true,	more	
generally,	 of	 bilateral	 donors	 from	 countries	 whose	 political	 economy	 places	 a	
premium	on	market	efficiency,	such	as	the	USA,	rather	than	on	state	 intervention	
into	the	economy	(Dietrich	2015).		
In	other	words,	after	the	Cold	War	bilateral	donors	and	the	USA	in	particular	have	
started	responding	to	good	governance	as	a	signal	of	the	recipient’s	capacity	to	use	
aid	 effectively.	Hence,	 recipient	 countries	 are	 rewarded	when	 they	 show	 signs	of	
increased	 governance	 quality	 (Neumayer	 2003).	 Since	 the	 quality	 of	 institutions	
matters	 (Booth	 2011),	 development	 aid	 has	 become	 increasingly	 targeted	 at	
improving	 it,	 in	 particular	 through	 capacity	 building	 and	 technical	 assistance	
programmes	 (Vandeveer	 and	 Dabelko	 2001,	 International	 Competition	 Network	
2003,	 Adams	 and	 Tirpak	 2008,	 Urpelainen	 2010,	 Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen	 2012,	
Broome	and	Seabrooke	2015).		
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Both	bilateral	and	multilateral	donors	have	 routinely	used	policy	 conditionality	 to	
mandate	certain	economic	reforms	 in	recipient	countries.	However,	besides	being	
blind	to	governance	indicators,	during	the	Cold	War	aid	was	also	ineffective	because	
donor	 governments	 could	 not	 credibly	 enforce	 their	 conditionality	 (Bearce	 and	
Tirone	2010).	Afterwards,	the	threat	of	conditionality	became	much	more	credible	
and	therefore	triggered	actual	reforms.	Over	time,	however,	donors	fully	realized	the	
importance	 of	 a	 sympathetic	 institutional	 environment	 for	 correct	 reform	
implementation	(World	Bank	2006).	Therefore,	they	began	investing	resources	into	
strengthening	the	capacity	of	 institutions	in	order	to	build	local	coalitions	that	are	
supportive	of	donor-promoted	reforms	(Broome	and	Seabrooke	2015).	 	As	former	
USAID	director	Natsios	(2006)	explicitly	advocates:	“As	development	professionals,	
we	should	be	trying	to	institutionalize	pressures	within	a	given	political	system	that	
are	consistent	with	one	another	and	that	work	to	favour	reformers	and	put	the	status	
quo	protectionists	at	a	disadvantage.”	(2006,	p.	137).	
The	notion	of	“transformational	development”,	elaborated	by	the	USAID	in	the	early	
2000s	 (Essex	 2013)	 is	 eminently	 focused	 on	 institutions	 and	 their	 potential	 for	
entrenching	policy	change	 in	the	direction	of	economic	neoliberalism.	The	 idea	of	
transformative	development	encapsulates	the	stated	goal	of	transforming	countries	
by	transforming	their	institutional	setup	through,	in	particular,	capacity	building	and	
partnership	with	donors.	The	launch	of	this	approach	to	development	by	the	USAID	
predates	 the	 State	 Department’s	 subsequent	 emphasis	 on	 “transformational	
diplomacy”	and	a	joint	2007	USAID/State	Department	strategic	plan	including	both	
concepts	(Essex	2013).	In	a	speech	given	at	Georgetown	University	(DC)	in	2006,	the	
then	US	Secretary	of	State	Condoleeza	Rice	remarked:		
“It	was	always	assumed	that	every	state	could	control	and	direct	the	threats	
emerging	 from	 its	 territory.	 It	 was	 also	 assumed	 that	 weak	 and	 poorly	
governed	 states	 were	 merely	 a	 burden	 to	 their	 people,	 or	 at	 most,	 an	
international	humanitarian	concern	but	never	a	true	security	threat.	Today,	
175	
	
however,	these	old	assumptions	no	longer	hold.	Technology	is	collapsing	the	
distance	that	once	clearly	separated	right	here	from	over	there.	(…)	So,	I	would	
define	the	objective	of	transformational	diplomacy	this	way:	to	work	with	our	
many	 partners	 around	 the	 world,	 to	 build	 and	 sustain	 democratic,	 well-
governed	states	that	will	 respond	to	the	needs	of	their	people	and	conduct	
themselves	responsibly	in	the	international	system.	”38		
These	 words	 echo	 the	 stances	 of	 Slaughter	 (2017)	 but	 also	 Slaughter	 (2004),	
Slaughter	(2004b)	and	even	Slaughter	(1997)	with	their	emphasis	on	trans-national	
cooperation	and	networks	of	institutional	actors	as	a	promising	avenue	for	fulfilling	
the	 goals	 of	 American	 diplomacy.	 As	 shall	 be	 seen,	 the	 partnership	 programmes	
implemented	by	the	USAID	since	the	mid-1990s	already	bear	the	characteristics	of	a	
transformational	development	approach,	testifying	to	the	entrepreneurialism	of	the	
organization	(Essex	2013).		
The	literature,	however,	lacks	investigation	of	bilateral	aid	agencies’	involvement	in	
the	field	of	regulatory	reform.	Most	importantly	for	the	purposes	of	this	research,	
the	 literature	has	overlooked	the	significance	of	networks	 in	the	field	of	 technical	
development	 assistance	 and	 therefore	 the	 role	 that	 regulators	 may	 play	 in	 the	
delivery	of	capacity	building	and	technical	assistance	programmes.		Although	many	
articles	on	regulatory	networks	quote	Slaughter’s	(2004c)	contribution,	they	lack	the	
foreign	policy/diplomacy	rationale	that	informs	it.		
Raustiala	 (2002)	 represents	 a	 notable	 exception.	 He	 suggests	 that	 trans-
governmental	cooperation	of	experts	and	regulators	via	networks	is	synergistic	with	
government	 cooperation	 via	 international	 organizations.	 This	 author	 adds	 that	
networks	promote	"regulatory	export":	the	export	of	regulatory	rules	and	practices	
from	 major	 powers	 to	 weaker	 states.	 This	 process,	 by	 facilitating	 regulatory	
																																																						
38	 https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm	 (last	 accessed	 12	 August	
2017)	
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convergence	and	by	building	bureaucratic	capacity,	can	improve	domestic	regulation	
and	 thereby	 enhance	 regulatory	 enforcement	 across	 the	 world.	 More	 recently,	
Ahdieh	(2015)	has	remarked	the	opportunities	that	coordination	via	networks	offers	
for	leveraging	a	regulators’	own	preferences	as	well	as	to	signal	the	extent	of	their	
commitment.	These	contributions,	however,	focus	on	the	legal	and	the	enforcement	
side	 of	 regulatory	 cooperation,	 not	 on	 the	 eminently	 political	 aims	 that	 can	 be	
pursued	 through	 networks.	 This	 chapter	 compensates	 for	 this	 lack	 of	 empirical	
analysis.		
	
“Consultants	were	not	enough”:	how	the	NARUC	became	involved	
in	the	USAID	mission	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	
“Let	me	set	the	context,	that’s	the	right	question.	The	context	was	back	
to	1990,	1992…	and	Central	Europe	and	the	former	Soviet	Union.	The	
broader	 reforms,	 what	 we	 called	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 centralized	
economy,	centralized	communist	government	to	decentralized	market	
economy	 and	 decentralized	 government	 required	 very	 fundamental	
reforms.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 economy	 it	meant	 breaking	 up	 centralized	
monopolies,	decentralization,	in	the	electricity	sector	unbundling	was	
the	term	that	was	used,	politically	it	meant	breaking	up	or	destroying	
a	 lot	 of	 institutions,	 procedures,	 processes…	 and…	 creating	 new	
institutions	and	radically	revising	existing	institutions”	(interview	29).	
The	 USAID	 and	 the	 World	 Bank	 played	 an	 enormous	 role	 in	 accompanying	 the	
transition	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	economies	from	the	communist	to	the	
capitalist	 economy.	 Privatization	 programmes	 were	 a	 very	 visible	 feature	 of	 the	
transition	 (World	Bank	1995,	World	Bank	2002),	whose	essential	 thrust,	however,	
resided	in	institutional	reform.	In	all	sectors	of	the	economy,	including	infrastructure,	
reforming	or	creating	institutions	quickly	became	a	key	policy	goal:	on	the	one	hand,	
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new	bodies	–	e.g.	regulatory	authorities	–	had	to	be	created	and	staffed;	on	the	other	
hand,	 the	 reform	 effort	 consisted	 in	 introducing	 new	mind-sets	 of	 economic	 and	
social	organization.		
Indeed,	energy	utilities	across	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	were	not	used	
to	 conceive	 of	 utilities	 as	 businesses,	 whose	 commercial	 viability	 needed	 to	 be	
ensured.	Many	interviewees	concurred	in	affirming	that	engineering	and	technical	
competences	abounded	among	the	professionals	in	the	area;	the	main	obstacle	was	
that	they	“had	no	idea	how	much	a	kilowatt	hour	actually	cost	to	produce,	no	idea	
how	much…	installed	capacity	cost….	depreciation	was	an	alien	concept,	why	should	
you	 ever	 allow	 an	 earned	 return,	 if	 you	 need	 more	 money	 you’ll	 get	 it	 from	
somewhere.”	(interview	15).	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 success	 of	 electricity	 sector	 or	
regulatory	reform	in	CEE/NIS	countries	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	In	actual	
fact,	 the	achievements	of	 the	 reform	period	 in	 the	electricity	 sector	were	 judged	
unsatisfactory	 for	 most	 of	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 area	 insofar	 as	 competition	 is	
concerned	 (von	Hirschhausen	 and	Opitz	 2001,	 Krishnaswamy	 and	 Stuggins	 2003),	
even	though	privatizations	have	improved	the	quality	of	service	(Vagliasindi	2004).	
The	accession	to	the	European	Union	improved	investment	levels	in	Eastern	Europe	
(Vagliasindi	 and	 Izaguirre	 2007).	 The	 countries	 of	 South	 East	 Europe	 have	 been	
struggling	with	electricity	sector	reform	for	longer;	the	establishment	of	the	Energy	
Community	(Deitz,	Stirton	et	al.	2009,	Hooper	and	Medvedev	2009,	Pollitt	2009),	a	
precondition	 to	 these	 countries’	 accession	 to	 the	 EU	 (Cambini	 and	 Franzi	 2013),	
improved	sector	performance	but	progress	has	been	uneven	and	donors	are	still	very	
much	involved	in	the	area	(interview	31).		
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The	utility	and	regulatory	partnerships.	
In	the	context	of	post-Soviet	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	identifying	what	Broome	
and	 Seabrooke	 (2015)	 define	 sympathetic	 interlocutors	 was	 one	 of	 the	 primary	
concerns.	These	are	actors	in	key	positions	at	various	level	of	governance	who	are	
willing	and	able	to	collaborate	with	the	donors	in	order	to	carry	out	the	reforms.		
“Over	time,	USAID	identified	progressive	change	agents	within	the	Ministries	
that	 championed	 sector	 reform	 and	 led	 the	 Ministry’s	 transition	 from	
operating	utility	to	the	policy	setting	and	data	collection	functions.	Once	they	
were	 identified,	USAID	provided	these	 individuals	with	 legal	and	regulatory	
technical	 assistance	 to	 draft	 new	 energy	 laws	 and	 shepherd	 their	 passage	
through	the	parliamentary	process”	(interview	31).	
The	 USAID	 organization	 comprises	 different	 regional	 Bureaus.	 Responsibility	 for	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe	fell	under	the	remit	of	the	Bureau	for	Europe	and	Eurasia.	
The	 Energy	 and	 Infrastructure	 Division	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 carrying	 out	 the	 reform	
programme	in	the	energy	infrastructure	sector	(US	Congress,	1993,	p.	96).	In	order	
to	 fulfil	 its	mission,	 the	Division	 adopted	an	 innovative	 approach,	 that	 later	went	
under	 the	name	of	“transformational	development”:	 investing	non-state	 (or	para-
state)	actors	with	political	 support	 in	order	 to	 carry	out	 the	desired	 reforms.	The	
scope	of	the	USAID	mission	in	the	area	is	clearly	outlined	in	a	2007	Special	Report	
focused	on	its	work	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	since	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	
Union	in	1990.	
“In	 this	 issue,	 we	 focus	 on	 a	 region	 where	 USAID	 has	 deployed	 a	
transformational	approach	to	development	for	the	past	15	years:	Europe	and	
Eurasia	(E&E).	The	fall	of	the	Wall	in	1989	and	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	
in	 1991	 was	 followed	 by	 a	 US	 Government	 decision	 to	 provide	 assistance	
through	USAID	 to	 assist	with	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 and	 free-market	
capitalism.	 (…)	 USAID	 focused	 most	 of	 its	 energy	 sector	 efforts	 on	
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transforming	 the	 economic	 and	 institutional	 foundations	 of	 the	 sector,	
particularly	 the	 independent	 regulation	 and	 commercial	 operation	 of	 the	
electricity	sector.	(…)	The	E&E	region	presented	several	features	that	USAID	
had	not	encountered	 in	other	 regions:	 virtually	 everyone	 in	 the	 region	had	
access	to	modern	forms	of	energy,	and	the	workforce	was	highly	literate	with	
impressive	 technical	 and	 scientific	 knowledge.	 (…)	 However,	 these	 services	
were	 provided	 on	 a	 heavily-subsidized	 and	 non-commercial	 basis	 by	
essentially	 self-regulating	 government	 departments.	 (…)	 With	 the	 end	 of	
Soviet	subsidies,	service	provision	became	increasingly	unreliable	and	limited,	
in	effect	leaving	citizens	in	the	dark”	(USAID	2007).	
This	Report	makes	explicit	the	linkage	between	energy	infrastructure	and	security	as	
well	 as	 between	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	 politics.	 The	 connection	 between	
electricity	and	politics	was	particularly	poignant	 in	 formerly	communist	 countries;	
Lenin	 himself	 had	made	 the	 electrification	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 universal	
provision	of	electricity	one	of	the	pillars	of	his	political	message.	
“The	importance	of	power	sector	reform	for	sustainable	economic	growth	is	
widely	 accepted.	 What	 is	 not	 often	 acknowledged	 are	 the	 accompanying	
political	 benefits.	 In	 the	 E&E	 region	 power	 sector	 reform	 is	 essential	 for	
successful	political	reform	as	well.	Power	systems	were	central	tools	of	former	
Communist	 governments.	 (…)	 Power	 sector	 reform	 and	 politics	 are	
interwoven.	 Lenin’s	 aphorism	 about	 socialism	 plus	 electricity	 equaling	
Communism	reflected	electricity’s	central	role”	(USAID	2007).	
Given	the	direct	link	between	electricity	and	communism,	it	was	crucial	for	USAID	to	
decouple	the	provision	of	energy	services	from	the	state.	The	first	major	step	USAID	
undertook	 in	 this	 direction	 consisted	 in	 establishing	 the	 so-called	 “utility	
partnerships”.	 Initially,	 these	 involved	 only	 four	 countries:	 Hungary,	 Poland,	 the	
Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia.	In	its	report	on	the	progress	of	the	US	intervention	in	
the	CEE/NIS	countries,	the	US	Congress	remarked:	
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“Under	this	project,	AID	has	also	entered	into	a	cooperative	agreement	with	
USEA	[United	States	Energy	Association,	a	philanthropic	organization	funded	
by	electricity	and	gas	utility	executives]	 to	 form	 the	U.S.-Eastern	European	
Utility	 Partnership	 Program	 (UPP).	 Begun	 in	 October	 1991,	 UPP	 brings	
together	electric	utilities	in	the	United	States	and	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	
for	 activities	 focused	 largely	 on	management	 issues	 but	 including	 also	 art	
annual	 regulatory	 systems	 seminar	 and	 dissemination	 of	 information	 and	
software	 resources.	 The	 Program	 has	 received	wide	 support	 from	 the	U.S.	
utility	industry,	including	the	Edison	Electric	Institute,	Electric	Power	Research	
Institute,	and	the	North	American	Reliability	Council.	U.S.	utilities	will	share	
the	costs	of	the	program,	contributing	$1	million,	or	one-fifth	of	the	program’s	
budget.	 The	 first	 partnership	 was	 formed	 between	 New	 England	 Electric	
Systems	and	a	Hungarian	power	company	in	April	1992,	and	others	are	being	
developed	 between	 Commonwealth	 Edison	 and	 the	 Polish	 Power	 Grid,	
Houston	Lighting	and	Power	and	the	Czech	Power	Co.	(CEZ),	Southern	Co.	and	
the	Slovak	Power	Utility	(SEP),	and	Central	Maine	Power	and	the	Bulgarian	
National	Electric	Co.	 Further	partnerships	are	planned	with	 the	Baltics	and	
Romania.	AID	also	reports	that	over	20	companies	have	expressed	interest	in	
joining	the	partnership	program”	(US	Congress	1993,	p.	100).	
“Electrically	known	as	CENTREL”	(interview	31),	the	utilities	of	Hungary,	the	Czech	
Republic,	Slovakia	and	Poland	were	the	target	of	the	concerted	USAID	–	USEA	effort	
to	 improve	 their	 commercial	 viability,	 compromised	 by	 under-investment,	 scarce	
revenue	collection	and	therefore	 inability	 to	 invest	 in	 infrastructure	maintenance.	
The	programme	also	had	a	strong	symbolic	importance:	the	US	government	wanted	
to	 physically	 separate	 the	 electricity	 grids	 of	 these	 countries	 from	 the	 integrated	
Soviet	grid	and	connect	them	to	the	Western	European	electrical	network	(interview	
31).	By	the	mid-1990s,	the	CENTREL	achieved	the	goal,	meeting	a	major	post-Cold	
War	policy	objective	(interview	31).	
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USAID’s	 strategy	 to	 foster	 cooperation	 and	 learning	between	US	 and	Central	 and	
Eastern	European	utility	executives	was	based	on	a	two-pronged	approach:	on	the	
one	hand,	USAID	provided	“traditional”	 technical	assistance	by	hiring	experienced	
contractors	to	work	with	aid	recipients	over	a	number	of	years,	coupled	with	short	
term	 technical	 assistance	 on	 selected	 topics;	 the	 other	 prong	 of	 the	 strategy	
consisted	of	the	innovative	twinning	element	of	the	utility	partnerships.		
“What	that	did	was	give	the	decentralized	utilities	that	were	trying	to	sort	out	
all	 kinds	 of	 issues	 direct	 contact	 and	 interaction	 for	 3	 or	 4	 years	with	 a	US	
commercial	utility	so	that	they	could	have	a	dialogue	in	terms	of	specific	issues,	
see	how	they	operated,	and	this	involved	about	4	exchanges	a	year;	at	the	first	
meeting	the	utilities	were	paired	together,	talk	about	their	issues	and	develop	
a	plan	to	meet	the	needs	of	that	unbundling	utility	and	then	they	would	visit	
the	US	for	a	week,	go	to	certain	specific	issues,	the	next	quarter	the	US	utility	
would	send	people	over	based	upon	what	they	wanted	to	talk	about	so	it	was	
decentralized	in	the	sense	of	being	very	much	defined	by	the	utility,	what	they	
needed,	but	really	focused…”	(interview	29).	
The	 decision	 to	 extend	 the	 partnership	 concept	 to	 the	 regulatory	 authorities	
emerged	relatively	soon	afterwards.	“The	USAID	led	efforts	in	the	region	to	establish	
independent	regulatory	agencies	as	a	countermeasure	to	potential	backsliding	by	the	
ministries”	 (interview	 31)	 in	 order	 to	 remove	 political	 interference	 from	 the	
operation	 of	 the	 electric	 power	 sector.	 As	 per	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 creating	
regulatory	authorities	was	deemed	necessary	to	restrain	the	monopoly	power	of	the	
newly	privatized	utilities	as	well	as	to	enhance	the	predictability	and	the	credibility	
of	the	countries’	commitment	to	reform	(Majone,	1997).	The	first	energy	regulatory	
authorities	in	the	region	were	established	in	1994	in	Hungary	and	Ukraine.	Others	
quickly	followed	suit.		
“Now,	in	the	development	of	those	organizations	we	were	really	focused	on	3	
or	 4	 characteristics,	 we	 even	 put	 it	 down	 on	 a	 piece	 of	 paper,	 the	 AAAA:	
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Autonomy,	Authority,	Accountability	and	then	as	time	went	on,	Ability,	four	As,	
autonomy,	 separation	 from	 the	 utility,	 separation	 from	 the	 government;	
authority	 to	make	decisions,	 set	 tariffs,	 approve	 licenses,	 and	accountability	
through	open	public	procedures,	removal	for	cause	only,	and	then	the	ability,	
the	training,	capacity	building	skills	and	political	skills”	(interview	29).	
USAID	 central	 managerial	 unit	 of	 the	 Europe	 and	 Eurasia	 Bureau	 convinced	 the	
decentralized	USAID	offices	in	each	country	to	closely	cooperate	in	order	to	achieve	
a	consistent	approach	and	for	the	new	institutions	to	develop	at	the	same	time	and	
learn	from	each	other.	The	success	of	the	utility	partnerships	encouraged	the	Bureau	
to	replicate	the	same	scheme	with	regulatory	authorities,	hoping	to	accelerate	their	
learning	process	given	the	speed	of	the	reform	process.	
	“So	we	 began	 again	 a	 two-pronged	 assistance	 approach.	 First	 the	 advisors	
located	 in	 the	 country,	 working	with	 the	 regulator,	 for	 passage	 of	 the	 law,	
establishment	 of	 the	 organization,	 internal	 operations,	 development	 of	
licenses,	thorough	methodologies,	very	extensive	work	on	that,	and	consultants	
are	very	useful	but	we	found	that…	regulators…	were	hearing	different	things	
from	different	consultants	and	they	highly	valued	the	concept	and	approach	of	
the	 energy	 regulatory	 partnership	 so	 we	 started	 doing	 that,	 partnering	 the	
regulators	in	central	and	eastern	Europe	with	the	US	regulators.	In	order	to	do	
that	we	did	a	cooperative	agreement,	it	was	called,	with	NARUC,	who	then	did	
manage,	 identify	and	establish	the	partnerships.	What	did	a	partnership	do?	
Again	there	was	3	or	4	visits	a	year	to	start,	the	regulators	would	get	together,	
hear	 about	 each	 other,	 define	 their	 work	 plan	 and	 then	 have	 a	 series	 of	
exchanges	 (…)	 so	we	 did	 that	 for	 3,	 4	 or	 5	 years,	 that	 built	 a	 confidence,	 a	
comfort	and	a	 trust	 that	allowed	a	 lot	of	 interaction	between	 the	European	
regulators	and	the	American	regulators”	(interview	29).	
U.S.	state	regulators	were	partnered	with	their	newly	established	counterparts	based	
on	technical	similarities	in	their	respective	energy	sectors,	their	common	interests	in	
183	
	
energy	sector	restructuring	or	simply	on	the	basis	of	a	shared	ethnicity	 (interview	
31).	 Initially,	 the	 regulatory	 partnerships	 focused	 on	 improving	 the	 institutional	
capacity	 to	 manage	 regulatory	 institutions,	 focusing	 initially	 on	 the	 appointment	
process	 for	 commissioners,	 ensuring	 independence	 from	 political	 interference,	
developing	organizational	charts,	uniform	system	of	accounts	and	the	public	hearing	
processes.	As	agencies	matured,	 the	partnerships	became	 focused	on	 introducing	
fundamental	concepts	of	energy	regulation,	e.g.	cost	of	service	regulation,	wholesale	
electricity	markets,	renewable	energy	integration,	cross	border	electricity	trade	and	
market	monitoring	functions	(interview	32).	
The	partnership	format	was	greatly	successful:	continuity	of	interaction	ensured	not	
only	 the	gradual	 familiarization	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	utility	executives	
and	regulators	with	the	new	organization	of	the	sector,	but	it	also	helped	USAID	to	
identify	the	progressive	agents	of	change	that	could	be	trusted	to	endorse	the	reform	
aims	in	their	work	practice:	“there	was	a	degree	of	trust	and	credibility	that	we	had	
with	people	 in	 the	countries	and	that	we	trusted	them	and	knew	who	you	could…	
trust	to…	to	do	the	reforms”		(interview	29).	
	
NARUC:	the	obvious	intermediary.	
Following	 the	 decision	 to	 implement	 regulatory	 partnerships,	 USAID	 needed	 to	
decide	whether	 to	manage	organizational	 aspects	 itself	 or	whether	 to	 rely	 on	 an	
external	body.	NARUC	quickly	appeared	as	the	obvious	partner	in	this	endeavour,	for	
three	main	reasons:	the	value	of	the	practical	experience	of	the	American	regulators	
involved	 (their	 cognitive	 authority);	 the	 cost	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 solution	 (as	
American	regulators	were	only	reimbursed	for	 their	 travels,	but	not	paid	 for	 their	
services);	and	the	coordinating	advantage	that	NARUC	had	as	single	point	of	contact	
for	the	whole	ensemble	of	US	state	level	utility	regulators.		
184	
	
“I	asked	them	[USAID]	not	to	send	advisors	who	are	focusing	on	theory	“only”,	
who	are	not	familiar	with	our	region	and	not	familiar	with	the	daily	regulatory	
practice	 or	 the	 daily	 utility	 practice,	 just	 have	 elegant	 advice	 on	 it,	 on	 the	
economic	 basic	 or…	 and	 they	 [USAID]	 	 followed	 our	 wish	 and	 they	 found	
partners	on	the	utilities	side	and	each	utility	in	the	region	had	a	partner	with	a	
US	 utility,	 and	we	 just	 copied	 this	model	 when	we	wanted	 to	 learn	 the	 US	
regulatory	 practice	 it	 was	 evident	 that	 they	 should	 use	 the	 NARUC	 as	 a	
facilitator	of	knowledge	transfer/exchange”	(interview	25).	
“I	believe	that…	the	basic	concept	there	was	that,	since	the	utility	executives,	or	
utility	managers,	were	already	on	salary,	and	because	the	commissioners	were	
already	on	salary,	basically	the	US	government	reimbursed	for…	out	of	pocket	
expenses,	travel,	hotels,	any	equipment	you	had	to	buy,	as	well	as	a	moderate	
management	 fee	 for	 the	 sponsoring	 organizations,	 NARUC	 and	 USEA.	 In	
retrospect	 I	 think	 it	was	 an	 innovative,	 creative,	 largely	 effective	 and	pretty	
cost-efficient	model	for	that	region”	(interview	15).	
“The	obvious	managers	of	this	process	was	NARUC,	they	are	the	association	of	
the	 50	 state	 regulators,	 they	 had	 credibility,	 they	 knew	 the	 regulators,	 they	
could	help	regulators	explain	why	this	was	in	the	US	interest,	in	the	interest	of	
the	regulators	themselves	as	well	as	helping	countries	in	central	and	eastern	
Europe	make	the	transition	so	they	were	an	obvious	choice	to	carry	this	out”	
(interview	29).	
“In	 the	 Eurasia	 region,	 there	 were	 6	 countries	 where	 their	 public	 hearing	
regulations	and	procedures	were	adapted	from	US	commission	counterparts.		
Countries	do	not	need	to	start	from	a	blank	piece	of	paper;	it	is	easier	to	look	at	
a	"good	practice"	and	modify	it	to	fit	the	local	context	and	needs.”	(interview	
39).	
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USAID	 selected	 NARUC	 primarily	 for	 its	 access	 to	 reliable	 information	 across	 US	
states.	NARUC	was	again	called	upon	to	serve	as	a	provider	of	 information	on	the	
circumstances	 of	 each	 state,	 this	 time	 to	 export	 their	 learnt	 lessons	 to	 foreign	
countries.	NARUC’s	networked	structure	of	cooperation	was	thus	put	to	a	different,	
perhaps	unexpected	use	many	decades	after	its	establishment.	This	re-orientation	of	
purpose	testifies	to	the	analytical	 leverage	to	be	gained	by	studying	and	analysing	
networks	 along	 their	 evolutionary	 trajectory,	 rather	 than	 restricting	 the	 focus	 of	
analysis	to	their	stated	aims	at	the	moment	of	their	creation.			
There	was	one	further	way	in	which	NARUC	could	serve	the	purposes	of	the	mission:	
by	teaching	regulators	how	to	network.	Donors	had	noticed	that	regulators	were,	
each	in	their	own	country,	facing	the	same	kinds	of	issues.	Moreover,	just	like	their	
EU	counterparts	in	those	very	same	years,	they	were	politically	isolated	and	struggled	
to	establish	their	legitimacy.	NARUC	held	long-standing	experience	of	defending	the	
regulators’	institutional	turf.	Its	further	contribution	to	USAID	mission,	then,	became	
schooling	CEE/NIS	regulators	about	how	to	deal	with	their	domestic	interlocutors.	
“There	we	are	with	regulators	in	15,	16	countries.	What	I	get	to	see	by	working	
in	many	of	them	was	similar	issues,	same	questions,	same	frustrations,	these	
were	organizations	with	no	predecessor,	no	history,	in	terms	of	how	to	do	things	
beyond	the	consultant’s	advice	and	looking	at	the	US	program.	(…)	For	example,	
the	Ukrainian	 regulators,	wanted	 to	 visit	 the	Georgian	 regulators	who	were	
doing	the	exact	same	thing	as	they	were,	they	jumped	at	the	chance	so	we	sent	
3	or	4	of	them	to	Tbilisi	for	3	or	4	days	to	talk	to	them.	We	did	the	same	with	
the	Moldovans,	and	then	I	think	the	Moldovans	to	Romania,	and	we	began	to	
do	these	ad	hoc	one	off	visits	and	they	greatly	valued	it.	Then	I	could	see	where	
this	was	heading,	the	value	of	that	exchange,	and	began	thinking	about	how	to	
bring	them	together	more	so	we	had	a	workshop	in	Budapest	where	we	got	11	
or	 12	 countries	 together	 and	 had	 them	 each	 over	 their	 experiences	 and	
presentations,	discussions,	and	they	we	set	up	two	technical	working	groups	
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(…)	on	tariffs	and	licenses	(…).	So	that	began	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	the	technical	
connection,	but	at	that	workshop	4	or	5	of	the	chairmen	stood	up	and	said	we	
would	like	to	propose	and	support	the	establishment	of	a	regional	organization	
(…)	So	that	was	1997,	I	think,	that	really	crystalized	the	establishment	of	the	
regional	network	or	what	became	ERRA”	(interview	29).	
	
The	establishment	of	the	Energy	Regional	Regulatory	Association	(ERRA).	
“One	of	the,	now	in	retrospective,	obvious	observation	was	that	there	was	no	
peer	group,	so	you	have	Hungary	setting	up	the	Hungarian	Energy	Office,	you	
have	Bulgaria	 (…)	with	what	was	the	State	Energy	Regulatory	Commission,	
you	have	the	ERG	in	Poland	etcetera,	and	these	were…	were	obviously	very	
committed,	 well-intended	 people,	 economists,	 lots	 of	 engineers,	 some	
lawyers,	but	no	peer	group…	and	the…	the	EU	model	that	was	emerging…	of	
associations	 of	 regulators	 as	well	 as	 the	 existing	NARUC	model	 in	 the	US,	
where	you	could	have	peer	to	peer	exchange,	you	could	look	at	best	practices,	
regionally,	 nationally,	 globally,	 you	 could	 facilitate	 dialogue.	 That	 model	
helped	shape	the	idea	that	there	should	be	a	regulatory	association	for	non-
EU	member	states	that	were	going	through	this	transition,	for	aspirational	EU	
member	 states	 and	 to	 drive	 an	 ability	 to	 tackle	 common	 issues	 together”	
(interview	15).	
By	 supporting	 the	establishment	of	 ERRA,	 the	USAID	 rendered	 the	 creation	of	 an	
informal	 cooperation	 network	 of	 energy	 regulators	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 its	
operationalization	 of	 the	 policy	 goal	 of	 fostering	market	 institutions	 in	 the	 post-
Soviet	 space.	 The	key	 reason	 for	 the	 involvement	of	US	 regulators	 in	 the	mission	
owed	more	 to	 their	 experience	 of	 network	 cooperation	 than	 to	 their	 regulatory	
expertise	per	se.	In	other	words,	consultants	could	and	did	provide	ample	advice	on	
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various	regulatory	models;	but	they	could	not	coach	regulators	on	how	to	cooperate	
with	each	other.	NARUC’s	comparative	advantage	resided	in	its	network	expertise.	
“As	the	number	of	regulatory	bodies	in	the	region	increased,	USAID	supported	
networking	 among	 the	 national	 regulators	 to	 exchange	 experiences	 and	
information.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 strong	 bottom	 up	 demand	 for	 an	 ongoing	
institutional	 arrangement	 that	 allows	 regulatory	 bodies	 to	 continue	 their	
exchanges.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Energy	Regulators	 Regional	Association	 (ERRA)	
was	 established	 in	 Budapest,	 Hungary	with	USAID	 support.	 The	 regulators	
anticipated	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 reform	process	 toward	 regional	 electricity	
market	arrangements	that	required	cross-border	regulatory	communication	
and	 cooperation.	 To	 support	 the	 establishment	 and	 development	 of	 ERRA,	
USAID	formed	a	Cooperative	Agreement	with	the	U.S.	National	Association	of	
Regulatory	 Utility	 Commissioners	 (NARUC),	 an	 association	 of	 50	 state	
regulators.	NARUC	has	provided	a	valuable	link	for	the	E&E	regulators	to	U.S.	
regulatory	 experience	 and	 practices.	 An	 indication	 of	 the	 relevance	 and	
effectiveness	of	 the	 regulatory	work	 is	 the	 fact	 that	14	E&E	Missions	have	
bought	 into	 the	 NARUC	 Agreement	 to	 complement	 Mission	 bilateral	
regulatory	development	efforts”	(USAID	2007).	
Before	 the	 partnership	 with	 USAID	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 NARUC	 had	
virtually	 no	 international	 exposure.	 US	 regulators	 had	 occasional	 meetings	 with	
regulators	 from	 neighbouring	 Canada	 and	 Mexico	 (interview	 9).	 Besides	 these,	
American	state	level	utility	regulators	were	confined	to	their	state,	and	NARUC	had	
a	 predominantly	 inward	 character	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 with	 federal	
agencies.	In	particular	since	the	de-regulation	period	of	the	1970s	and	1980	(Derthick	
and	Quirk	 1985),	 federal	 agencies	 had	 seen	 their	 authority	 expanded:	 a	 series	 of	
pronunciations	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 greatly	 expanded	 the	 scope	 of	 federal	
regulators’	 discretion	 over	 that	 of	 state	 level	 regulators.	 Therefore,	 when	 USAID	
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proposed	 to	NARUC	 to	undersign	a	 cooperative	agreement	 for	market	 reforms	 in	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	it	found	a	receptive	ear:		
“I	 think	 USAID	 realized	 they	 needed…	 they	 could	 get	 hands-on,	 very	 active	
regulators	that	are	actually	in	office	providing	those	services	so	they	came	to	
us	to	see	if	that	would	be	something	we	could	be	interested	in	and	we	were,	
and	we	are,	that’s	why	we	went	forward.	(…)	Our	charge	from	USAID	was	really	
at	 least	 two-fold:	 first	was	 to	establish	a	 regional	association	 that	would	be	
modelled	 after	 the	 NARUC	 model	 (…)	 the	 other	 task	 was	 to	 help	 the	
commissions	of	individual	countries,	establish	independent	missions	in	their…	
to	their….	legislators	or	governments	and	the	like,	so	we	had	a	lot	of	bilateral,	
we	call	them	partnerships,	between	an	individual	state	regulatory	body	here	in	
the	US	with	a	partner”	(interview	9).	
The	 founding	members	 of	 ERRA	were	 the	 energy	 regulators	 of	 Albania,	 Armenia,	
Bulgaria,	Estonia,	Georgia,	Hungary,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyz	Republic,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	
Moldova,	 Poland,	 Romania,	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 and	 Ukraine.	 Several	
interviewees	recalled	that	 the	 idea	of	a	network	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	
regulators	was	aired	primarily	by	the	regulators	themselves.	Nevertheless,	laying	the	
foundation	 for	 cooperation	 was	 not	 an	 entirely	 smooth	 process.	 As	 emerged	 in	
interviews	 concerning	 the	 early	 days	 of	 CEER,	 regulators	were	 suspicious	 of	 each	
other,	unused	to	share	information	and	to	cooperate	with	peers,	and	insecure	about	
their	own	national	role.		
“It	was	not	easy,	because	when	you	were	 sitting	on	a	meeting	many	of	 the	
participating	commissions	did	not	speak	English	at	all	and	not	even	Russian,	
they	were	not	used	to	stand	up	and	speaking	their	opinion,	perhaps	they	were	
afraid	of	the	Americans…	this	is	something	else	than	cooperation,	I	guess	there	
was	suspicion	towards	this	whole	exercise…	and	the	energy	sector	was	always	
a	very	sensitive	one	also	in	that	region	so	information	sharing	was	something	
very	 new	 and	 suspicious	 for	 those	 people…	 they	 were	 motivated	 to	 come	
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because	they	really	wanted	to	learn	and	get	the	experience	but	in	the	beginning	
it	was	much…	it	was	a	difficult	start…”	(interview	27).	
Despite	these	hesitations,	sustained	cooperation	quickly	ensued	from	the	first	ad	hoc	
meetings.	The	network	registered	as	a	regional	association	of	energy	regulators	with	
legal	headquarters	in	Budapest	in	2001.	In	that	year,	the	regulators	of	Slovakia,	the	
Czech	 Republic	 and	 Mongolia	 also	 officially	 joined.	 They	 were	 followed	 by	 the	
regulators	of	Croatia	and	Turkey	in	2002	and	a	few	years	later	by	the	regulators	of	
South	East	Europe.	The	choice	of	casting	the	network	in	a	regional	framework	reflects	
the	enthusiasm	of	the	time	with	the	re-launch	of	the	EU	Single	Market	Programme	
in	the	mid-80s,	completed	in	1992	with	the	Maastricht	Treaty.	The	US	aspiration	was	
that	former	communist	countries	would	gradually	and	finally	be	englobed	in	the	EU	
and	therefore	in	the	Euro-Atlantic	sphere	of	influence	(interview	29).	
Practical	considerations	also	played	a	role	in	the	decision	to	foster	the	ERRA	network;	
not	 least,	 the	 budgetary	 constraints	 faced	 by	 regulatory	 authorities	 in	 small	
countries.	By	convening	in	a	single	platform,	regulators	were	able	to	access	state	of	
the	art	knowledge	at	contained	costs.	The	additional	advantage	of	being	able	to	talk	
to	peers	in	the	region	in	an	informal	context	considerably	strengthened	the	case	for	
the	network	to	be	established.	
“It	was	frankly	an	effective	and	efficient	way	of	bringing	expertise	that	would	
be	probably	economically	unfeasible	on	a	regulator	by	regulator	basis,	 the	X	
regulator	I	suspect	would	have	great	difficulty	marshalling	enough	budget	to	
bring	in	leading	economists,	licensing	experts,	financing	parties,	to	talk	to	them	
and	work	with	them	in	workshops	in	their	capital	city	about	how	X	should	be	
looking	at	the	future	to	evolve	to	a	diversified,	competitive,	sustainable	power	
system	that	it	would	like,	but	if	X	is	one	of…	24	members,	and	you	can	send	your	
tariff	experts	 to	the	annual	 tariff	workshop,	and	your	 licensing	expert	 to	the	
annual	 licensing	workshop,	 and	 your	 commissioners	 to	 the	 annual	 investors	
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conference,	 you’ve	 really	 gotten	 this	 ability	 and	 access	 to	 extraordinarily	
knowledgeable	people	at,	quite	frankly,	1/24th	of	the	price”	(interview	15).	
“In	that	time,	the	major	driving	force	for	ERRA	members	was	to	learn	what	does	
it	mean	energy	restructuring	and	how	to	involve	private	capital	into	the	energy	
industry.	The	members	wanted	to	learn	from	practicing	regulators	outside	of	
ERRA	but	some	subject	was	already	prepared	and	developed	in	ERRA	member	
countries.	For	example	the	Hungarian	regulator	has	already	been	established	
and	 functioning	 and	 the	 country	 went	 through	 the	 privatization	 and	
restructuring	so	some	of	the	knowledge	transfer	was	not	only	from	US	or	from	
Europe	but	among	the	ERRA	member	countries	and	it	was	very…	there	was	a	
real	appetite	from	the	countries	in	the	region,	because	step	by	step	every	year	
another	regulator	was	established	or	another	licensing	department	was	set	up;	
they	had	to	issue	license	conditions,	to	set	tariffs,	and	they	did	not	know	how	
to	do	it.	That	is	why	the	meetings	were	full	of	real	life	discussion,	like;	hey	guys,	
what	to	put	into	the	license	conditions?”	(interview	25).	
It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	CEER	and	ERRA	were	evolving	in	parallel.	Closer	
analysis	reveals	that	they	were	also	making	use	of	similar	opportunity	structures.	In	
the	late	1990s	–	early	2000s,	EU-15	energy	regulators	began	cooperating	in	order	to	
build	their	own	legitimacy	under	the	political	support	of	the	European	Commission;	
meanwhile,	Central	and	Eastern	European	regulators	were	achieving	the	same	goal,	
under	the	aegis	and	with	the	support	of	USAID	and	NARUC.	Although	circumstances	
were	different,	both	groups	of	regulators	consisted	of	newly	established	institutions	
having	 to	 assert	 themselves	 on	 their	 national	 scene	 and	 to	 overcome	 national	
governments’	and	constituencies’	resistances.				
“Especially	 when	 you	 are…	 yeah…	 being	 part	 of…	 those	 networks…	 really	
provides	 you	 with	 a	 very	 strong	 professional	 background	 and	 community…	
many	 times	 regulators	 deal	 with	 international	 companies	 operating	 in	 the	
countries,	 having	 very	 strong	 global	 networks	 and	 very	well	 paid	 lawyers,	 I	
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mean,	tremendous	resources,	now,	you	have	to	regulate	these	companies,	you	
have	to	hurt	them,	essentially,	because	without	regulation	they	would	behave	
otherwise	and	you	have	to	say	no,	you	can	do	this	but	not	that,	and	then	when	
you	 do	 this	 you	 get	 into	 a	 conflict	 and	 you	 have	 to	 argue	 and	 defend	 your	
decisions,	 and	 I	 think	 these	 associations	 what	 they	 mostly	 help	 for	 their	
members	is	that	they…	they	also	provide	that	sort	of…	international	network…	
that	the	regulated	companies	also	have…	you	get	closer	into	a	similar	position	
that	 just	 knowing	how	 they	behave	 in	other	 countries,	what	 solutions	other	
colleagues	found	all	around,	it’s	very	important…”	(interview	27).	
“	The	real	driving	force	was	the	discussion,	the	knowledge	transfer,	and	giving	
a	strong	background	for	the	members	who	can	use	it	when	they	are	arguing	
home	they	can	say	that…hey	guys,	10	ERRA	members	are	following	the	same	
way,	 then	 my	 position	 should	 be	 good	 -	 this	 strong	 basis	 was	 important,	
because	 there	were	 no	 booklets,	 no	 theory	 for	 regulation	 in	 that	 region,	 so	
that’s	why	it	was	a	real	technical	support	for	the	regulators	who	started	from	
scratch	regulating	the	industry”	(interview	25).	
Like	CEER	represented	the	channel	of	regulators’	influence	on	the	configuration	of	
the	 nascent	 Internal	 Energy	 Market,	 ERRA	 helped	 the	 regulators	 of	 Central	 and	
Eastern	Europe	to	play	a	role	in	influencing	the	content	and	the	direction	of	reform	
in	the	face	of	lukewarm	governments’	commitment	to	change.	In	both	the	EU-15	and	
Eastern	Europe,	the	realization	of	the	necessity	that	the	electricity	and	gas	sectors	
had	to	be	reformed	clashed	with	the	political	implications	that	reforms	would	have	
had	in	terms	of	hurting	consolidated	incumbents’	assets	and	market	shares	as	well	
as	affecting	the	income	of	energy	consumers,	big	and	small.		
“At	that	time	we	had	the	feeling	that	the	governments	 in	South	and	Eastern	
Europe…	we	realized	that	the	governments,	they	didn’t	follow	the	international	
tendencies,	they	were	not	interested	in	restructuring,	so	that	the	ERRA	and	the	
regulators	 in	 the	 region	 they	 were	 there	 facilitators	 of	 the	 changes,	 they	
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convinced	the	governments	why	to	restructure,	what	is	the	reason	for	it,	why	is	
it	useful,	so	that’s	why…	in	most	cases	there	was	no	political	wish	to…	to	have	
a…	stable	regulatory	framework…	
But	why	do	you	create	a	regulator	if	you	are	not	interested	in	reform?	
It	was	fashionable,	it	was	a	wish	from	different	international	organizations	and	
lending	institutions,	there	were	EU	requirements,	and	the	governments	realized	
that	all	the	neighbours	do	it,	there	should	be	a	reason	behind	it,	and	because	
later	on	they	realized	they	would	like	to	restructure,	they	would	like	to	attract	
private	 capital	 so	 they	 need	 this	 regulatory	 framework.	 	 The	 details	 were	
prepared	 by	 the	 regulators;	 in	 most	 of	 the	 cases	 the	 regulators	 forced	 the	
governments	to	restructure,	to	prepare,	to	draft	bills	and	to	amend	the	market	
structure.	For	us	it	was	evident	that	when	we	learn	from	each	other	and	from	
the	rest	of	the	world	regarding	the	best	regulatory	practice	then	we	could	be	
on	the	good	way.	(…)	It	was	not	just	because	of	ERRA,	there	was	a	need	of	the	
national	markets	 to	 change	 and	 they	 had	 no	 guidance	 how	 to	 change,	 the	
governments	could	not	give	them	any	advice,	there	was	no	literature	to	learn	it	
and	it	was	evident	for	them	that…	when	several	other	ERRA	members	are	going	
into	one	direction,	why	not	to	do	the	same…	it	was	a	very	good	moment,	during	
the	 restructuring	 and	 establishing	 the	 regulation,	 learning	 from	 other	 ERRA	
members”	(interview	25).	
Funded	 by	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	 foreign	 policy	 goals	 of	 the	 US	 government,	 the	
programme	 enjoyed	 a	 rare	 opportunity	 for	 bilateral	 aid	 provision:	 continuity	 and	
coordination.	Very	often,	donors	are	criticized	for	the	short	lengths	of	their	mandates	
and	for	the	lack	of	inter-donor	coordination	(Klein	and	Harford	2005).	The	length	of	
the	programme	and	the	approach	adopted	made	for	an	actual	partnership	between	
donors	and	local	elites	and	for	an	articulated	approach	to	reform.			
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“The	approach	became	three-pronged:	 two	prongs	was	 technical	assistance,	
secondly	the	partnerships	that	were	national	in	scope	and	then	the	third	prong	
of	assistance	was	the	regional	network,	so	from	the	perspective	of	an	energy	
regulator	sitting	in	Moldova,	you’ve	had	a	technical	advisor	who	can	help	you	
on	 the	 tariff	 methodology,	 you	 had	 access	 to	 the	 US	 pricing	 tariff	 process	
through	the	partnership	and	then	you	could	go	sit	down	with	your	neighbours	
and	hear	a	tariff	committee	and	see	what	they	were	doing,	what	problems	they	
had	etc.	so	three	points	of	test	before	they	make	decisions,	 I	think	that	gave	
them	 enough	 confidence	 and	 capability	 to	 try	 to	 pursue	what	 they	 could	 in	
difficult	 political	 environments…	 We	 found	 that	 consultants	 only	 were	 not	
enough.	That’s	the	bottom	line”	(interview	29).	
The	near-simultaneity	of	events	in	the	EU-15	and	in	Eastern	Europe	might	explain	the	
conspicuous	absence	of	the	EU	in	the	processes	outlined	in	this	chapter:	while	ERRA	
was	 being	 created,	 the	 CEER	 did	 not	 officially	 exist	 yet,	 and	 its	 members	 were	
grappling	 with	 the	 same	 issues	 as	 their	 Eastern	 European	 counterparts.	 As	 one	
interviewee	recalled:	
“We	did	have	some	personal	contacts,	you	know…	but	the	CEER	was	too	slow,	
we	were	not	ready.	We	got	there	when	everything	had	already	been	done,	so	
we	did	not	really	play	a	role	back	then.	(…)	They	were	very	forward-looking,	
they	understood	something	that	the	European	Commission	made	its	own	only	
later	on:	we	prevent	future	wars	if	we	create	many	levels	of	cooperation;	not	
only	at	head	of	state	level	but	also	among	the	governance	structures.	(…)	They	
understood	you	had	to	do	institution-building	in	countries	that	you	want	to	be	
democratic:	 you	 cannot	 just	 go	 there	 and	 tell	 them	 you	 have	 to	 hold	 free	
elections	otherwise	you	are	not	democratic,	under	conditionality	threats;	you	
have	 to	 do	 something	 more,	 like	 encouraging	 learning	 and	 cooperation	
among	the	intermediate	levels	of	the	establishment”	(interview	3).	
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The	end	of	ERRA	as	a	regulatory	network	and	the	beginning	of	ERRA	as	training	
provider.	
A	few	years	into	their	cooperation,	ERRA	regulators	realized	that	their	accumulated	
experience	would	 be	 helpful	 training	material	 for	 future	 staff	 of	 their	 regulatory	
authorities.	They	envisaged	the	ERRA	to	continue	into	the	future	and	the	socialization	
mechanism	 triggered	 by	 common	 regulatory	 training	 to	 sustain	 network	
cooperation,	as	it	had	been	for	NARUC	and	CEER.	In	February	2003,	ERRA	and	CEER	
joined	efforts	to	organize	the	first	ERRA	course	–	introduction	to	energy	regulation	–	
addressed	to	electricity	regulators	from	EU	accession	countries.	In	the	summer	of	the	
2003,	 this	 introductory	 course	was	 held	 again,	 organized	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	
Central	 European	 University	 (CEU),	 and	 offered	 to	 all	 ERRA	 members.	 After	 the	
European	 enlargement,	 ERRA	 developed	 a	 comprehensive	 package	 of	 training	
courses	that	comprise	both	face	to	face	and	online	tuition	and	that,	today,	represents	
its	main	source	of	income.		
The	 expansion	 of	 ERRA	 began	 soon	 after	 the	 European	 eastward	 enlargement	 in	
2004,	which	involved	seven	countries,	whose	energy	regulators	had	been	founding	
members	 of	 ERRA:	 Estonia,	 Latvia	 and	 Lithuania	 and	 four	 former	 satellites	 of	 the	
USSR	(Poland,	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary	and	Slovakia).	A	subsequent	enlargement	
took	 place	 in	 2007,	when	Bulgaria	 and	Romania	 became	EU	Member	 States.	 The	
corresponding	energy	regulators	joined	the	CEER	almost	by	default.	The	integration	
of	 Eastern	 European	 countries	was	 finally	 underway,	 and	 their	 energy	 regulators	
would	be	obliged	to	comply	with	and	 implement	EU	energy	 legislation;	would	the	
ERRA	fall	apart?			
With	the	enlargement,	ERRA’s	initial	mandate	was	finished.	In	order	to	remain	viable,	
the	networked	organization	had	 to	 re-invent	 itself.	 It	 decided	 to	 convert	 its	main	
mission	from	politically	 loaded	role	of	accompanying	the	transition	of	Central	and	
Eastern	European	energy	sectors	to	market	principles	to	the	less	consequential	role	
of	 regulatory	 training	provider,	with	a	 specific	 focus	on	 regulators	 from	countries	
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where	 the	energy	sector	 is	 still	wholly	or	mostly	under	 full	governmental	control.	
Initially,	it	expanded	its	membership	to	include	regulators	from	South	East	European	
countries	between	2002	and	2006	(i.e.	except	Albania,	who	was	among	the	founders,	
Croatia,	 Serbia,	 Bosnia-Herzegovina,	 Montenegro,	 UNM	 in	 Kosovo,	 FYR	 of	
Macedonia).		
Later	on,	ERRA	began	promoting	itself	worldwide	as	a	point	of	reference	for	energy	
regulatory	 training,	with	 the	support	of	USAID	and	NARUC.	Since	the	early	2010s,	
energy	regulatory	authorities	from	an	impressive	range	of	countries,	from	Pakistan	
to	Saudi	Arabia	to	Nigeria,	have	joined	the	ERRA	as	affiliate	or	associate	members,	
thereby	obtaining	discounts	on	training	and	event	attendance.	International	donors	
fuel	 this	 expansion	 by	 referring	 to	 ERRA	 as	 the	 regulatory	 training	 provider	 for	
emerging	 markets.	 Nowadays,	 ERRA	 explicitly	 refrains	 from	 being	 perceived	 as	
providing	 policy	 recommendations	 or	 from	 aspiring	 to	 do	 so.	 This	 shift	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 aimed	 at	 gathering	 as	 ample	 a	membership	 as	 possible,	 including	
regulators	that	are	not	independent	and	whose	mandate	is	to	oversee	state-owned	
vertically	 integrated	 companies	 rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 achieve	 competitive	
markets.	
	
Network	expansion	and	foreign	policy	goals.		
In	 examining	 the	 case	 of	 financial	 services	 regulators,	 Macey	 (2003)	 argues	 that	
national	regulators	become	involved	into	coordination	and	cooperation	with	peers	
from	 other	 countries	 (what	 he	 termed	 “regulatory	 globalization”)	 in	 response	 to	
three	phenomena:	their	potential	irrelevance	due	to	the	opportunity	for	companies	
to	 engage	 in	 regulatory	 arbitrage;	 the	 impossibility	 of	 achieving	 their	 domestic	
mandate	because	of	the	regulatory	practices	 in	other	countries	 (which	trigger	the	
export	of	their	regulatory	standards	to	other	countries	-	what	Macey	calls	“regulatory	
imperialism”	 –	 thereby	 gaining	 them	 considerable	 domestic	 prestige);	 or	 the	
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regulatory	agency’	pursuit	of	its	own	policy	preferences	when	faced	with	domestic	
opposition	from	affected	constituencies.			
The	 first	 phenomenon	 is	 unlikely	 to	 find	 strong	 application	 in	 the	 world	 of	
infrastructure	 investment:	 regulatory	 stability	 and	 predictability,	 rather	 than	 the	
laxity	 of	 regulatory	 provisions,	 are	 among	 the	 main	 determinants	 of	 foreign	
investment	 in	 infrastructure	 (Spiller	 and	 Tommasi	 2005).	 Therefore,	 the	
phenomenon	of	regulatory	arbitrage	is	unlikely	to	apply	to	this	context.	The	second	
motivation	 that	 Macey	 (2003)	 adduces	 to	 explain	 transnational	 regulatory	
cooperation	points	to	interdependence.	Whenever	a	regulatory	agency	is	prevented	
from	fully	accomplishing	its	mandate	as	a	result	of	its	enforcement	interdependence	
with	a	regulator	from	another	country,	it	will	invest	political	capital	into	persuading	
the	 regulators	 from	that	country	 to	adopt	common	rules.	Yet,	 there	 is	hardly	any	
interdependence	between	the	energy	sectors	or	utility	businesses	of	the	USA	and	the	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe.		
The	 third	 of	Macey’s	 hypotheses	 resonates	more	 clearly	 with	 the	 context	 of	 the	
establishment	 of	 ERRA	 (and	 of	 all	 comparable	 regulatory	 networks):	 periods	 of	
radical	 policy	 change,	 in	particular	 in	 sectors	with	direct	 and	 visible	distributional	
consequences,	 such	 as	 the	 utilities,	 create	winners	 and	 losers.	 The	 losers	 oppose	
reform.	Eastern	European	regulators,	exactly	like	their	EU	counterparts	in	the	same	
years,	 faced	 opposition	 from	 all	 sides	 who	 stood	 to	 lose	 from	 reform.	 The	
endorsement	 of	 USAID	 and	 NARUC	 as	 well	 as	 the	 collective	 leverage	 of	 ERRA	
represented	an	important	source	of	legitimacy.			
“Sometimes,	 however,	 we	 observe	 the	 government	 expending	 significant	 political	
capital	to	affect	international	practice	in	order	to	impose	its	will	on	the	international	
community,	even	when	such	regulatory	globalization	will	not	affect	domestic	policy	
or	practice	at	all”	(Macey	2003,	p.	1369).	This	statement	captures	the	rationale	of	
the	US	government’s	support	to	the	mission:	the	desire	to	eradicate	the	remnants	of	
communism	 from	 Eastern	 Europe	 represented	 a	 potent	 motivation	 to	 devote	
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resources	to	the	programme	even	though	it	had	no	real	impact	on	domestic	policy.	
Rather,	 it	 was	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 foreign	 policy	 strategy	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 the	
backsliding	of	the	democratization	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	and	
their	transformation	into	liberal	market	economies.	
USAID	chose	networks	over	other	options	as	instruments	of	professional	socialization	
able	to	foster	sympathetic	interlocutors/change	agents	in	recipient	countries.	In	turn,	
NARUC	exploited	 this	opportunity	 to	add	a	 layer	 to	 its	 functions	and	 increase	 the	
breadth	 of	 the	 organization.	 By	 informing	 the	 recent	 history	 of	 NARUC	 and	
juxtaposing	 itself	to	that	of	CEER,	the	case	of	ERRA	provides	a	useful	comparative	
case	within	a	case.	CEER	and	ERRA	developed	in	parallel	and	never	came	in	contact	
as	they	were	emerging.	Yet,	regulators	from	both	networks	faced	similar	challenges,	
e.g.	uncertainty	and	domestic	opposition,	and	picked	similar	strategies,	e.g.	use	their	
peers	 as	 a	 source	 of	 epistemic	 knowledge	 and	 legitimacy,	 and	 exploiting	 their	
symbiotic	 interdependence	 with	 actors	 at	 higher	 levels	 of	 governance	 to	 obtain	
access	to	policy	formulation.		
Moreover,	the	comparison	of	these	cases	suggests	that	the	precise	timing	of	each	
phase	and/or	the	length	of	time	each	of	the	phases	identified	in	this	analysis	lasts	
varies	 across	 networks.	 Whereas	 in	 the	 case	 of	 NARUC	 and	 ERRA	 formalization	
occurred	relatively	soon,	CEER	became	legally	registered	six	years	after	its	inception.	
These	differences	do	not,	however,	change	the	substance	and	the	significance	of	the	
evolutionary	phases	each	of	these	networks	went	through.	This	is	an	acknowledged	
fact	in	comparative	historical	studies	(Mahoney	and	Rueschemeyer	2003),	which	are	
agnostic	as	to	the	precise	length	of	the	spans	between	phases	but	convinced	of	the	
occurrence	and	the	relevance	of	the	phases	themselves.		 	
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7. Networks	 as	 “first	 best”?	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	
network	of	Euro-Mediterranean	energy	regulators.	
	
If	 the	study	of	European	networks	has	been	continuously	growing	and	deepening	
during	 the	past	 two	decades,	 the	 study	of	 the	European	external	governance	has	
remained	rather	more	confined	to	its	formal	manifestations.	Moreover,	the	potential	
or	actual	relationships	between	European	regulators	and	regulators	from	countries	
neighbouring	the	EU	have	been	overlooked	 in	the	 literature.	This	chapter	 fills	 this	
gap.	It	provides	an	empirical	case	of	what	I	term	“network	entrepreneurship”:	the	
furtherance	of	network	emergence	by	policy	entrepreneurs.	
Moreover,	it	reveals	an	important,	neglected	aspect	of	regulators’	preferences.	The	
literature	considers	informal	networks	a	fall-back	option	when	formal	arrangements	
cannot	 be	 achieved;	 a	 “second-best”	 solution	 (Sutherland	 1992,	 Hancher	 1996,	
Dehousse	 1997).	 This	 chapter	 shows	 that,	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 regulators,	
networks	 are	 a	 “first-best”	 option	 for	 regulatory	 collaboration.	 More	 precisely,	
regulators	 think	 that	 formal	 arrangements	 should	 always	 follow,	 never	 precede,	
informal	 collaboration.	 Collaboration	 between	 previously	 disconnected,	 stranger	
regulators	needs	 to	start	 informally,	or	 it	will	be	unworkable.	Regulators	consider	
that	prolonged	informal	collaboration,	not	legally	binding	arrangements,	can	breed	
trust.	 This	 finding	 is	 important,	 because	 regulators	 are	 the	 subjects	 of	 regulatory	
collaboration	 within	 networks.	 The	 policy-maker	 wishing	 to	 foster	 regulatory	
collaboration	should	care	about	which	format	of	collaboration	that	can	be	expected	
to	achieve	the	desired	result,	and	which	doesn’t.	The	findings	of	this	chapter	should	
motivate	further	study	 in	the	 informal	dynamics	of	European	external	governance	
(Lavenex	2004,	2008,	2009)	and	foreign	policy	in	energy	matters	(Youngs	2014	and	
Judge	and	Maltby	2017).		
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The	narrative	 focuses	on	 	 the	 establishment	of	 the	Association	of	Mediterranean	
Energy	Regulators	(MedReg).	MedReg	differs	from	the	other	three	cases	examined	
so	far	in	several	respects.	Firstly,	MedReg	emerged	due	to	the	initiative	of	an	agent	
(the	 Italian	energy	 regulatory	authority)	who	played	 the	 role	of	 lead	organization	
(Provan	and	Kenis,	2008)	by	providing	for	network	establishment.	Hence,	MedReg	
differs	from	CEER,	which	emerged	due	to	the	collective	initiative	of	a	small	group	of	
regulators,	 and	 from	 NARUC	 and	 ERRA,	 which	 emerged	 from	 a	 combination	 of	
regulators’	initiative	and	an	external	agent’s	support	(ICC	and	USAID).	Frustrated	with	
the	standstill	of	energy	cooperation	between	the	EU	and	the	countries	in	the	Euro-
Mediterranean	region,	a	small	subset	of	European	regulators	from	Southern	Member	
States	 invited	 their	 foreign	 counterparts	 to	 join	 efforts	 to	 create	 a	 new	 informal	
network	focused	on	the	region.	Crucially	for	this	research,	they	led	this	initiative	on	
the	basis	of	their	own	experience	of	informal	network	cooperation	within	the	CEER	
and	from	observation	of	the	success	of	ERRA	in	socializing	and	uniting	regulators	in	
Eastern	Europe.		
Secondly,	MedReg	does	not	involve	all	EU	energy	regulators,	but	only	the	subset	from	
Southern	Member	 States.	 Therefore,	MedReg	 gathers	 a	mix	 of	 energy	 regulators	
from	 EU	 and	 non-EU	 countries,	 drawn	 from	 an	 EU-defined	 “Euro-Mediterranean	
region”	whose	boundaries	comprise	a	broad	range	of	very	diverse	countries,	from	
Eastern	Europe	to	North	Africa.		
Thirdly,	as	this	chapter	shows,	MedReg	was	established	in	the	wake	of	a	bold	policy	
initiative	(the	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community	of	South	East	Europe)	but	in	
absence	of	a	strong	momentum	for	policy	change	(as	 it	occurred	 in	the	EU	and	in	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe	beginning	in	the	late	1990s)	or	during	a	policy	crisis	(as	it	
happened	in	19th	century	USA	with	the	discontent	towards	the	railroads).	Fourthly,	
the	regulators	in	MedReg	have	no	symbiotic	interdependence	with	a	supranational	
policy	actors	furthering	a	specific	agenda.	Ten	years	after	its	establishment,	MedReg	
is	 not	 perceived	 as	 an	 influential	 player	 in	 the	 energy	 policy	 of	 the	 countries	
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concerned	or	of	the	region	as		a	whole	(Cambini	and	Franzi	2013).	Recently,	however,	
the	European	Commission	has	endorsed	MedReg	and	committed	to	keep	supporting	
the	network	for	the	fourth	cycle	of	its	operations.		
	
The	 EU’s	 external	 energy	 regulatory	 governance:	 top-down	 and	
legalistic.	
Relations	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 countries	 to	 its	 southern	 border	 have	 a	 long	
history.	The	 first	attempts	 to	 forge	an	external	EU	policy	 towards	 these	countries	
date	back	to	the	1970s,	when	the	Global	Mediterranean	Policy	was	put	forward	by	
the	 then	 European	 Community,	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 oil	 crisis	 (Cardwell,	 2011).	
However,	 it	 was	 only	 with	 the	 Maastricht	 Treaty	 and	 the	 stated	 objective	 of	
increasing	 the	 EU	 presence	 abroad	 that	 a	 structured	 policy	 was	 planned	 for	 the	
Mediterranean	 (Cavatorta	 and	 Rivetti	 2014).	 It	 took	 the	 form	 of	 the	 so-called	
Barcelona	Process,	initiated	with	the	Barcelona	conference	of	1995	and	bearing	the	
official	name	of	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership	(EMP	or	EuroMed).	The	EMP	was	a	
broad	policy	 programme,	 covering	 items	 from	democracy	 to	 trade.	However,	 the	
centrality	of	energy	issues	was	acknowledged	in	the	only	EC	Communication	entirely	
dedicated	 to	 energy	 cooperation	 in	 the	 so-called	 “Euro-Mediterranean	
region”(European	Commission	1996).	The	EMP	energy	vector	was	characterized	by	a	
two-fold	regional	approach:	political	dialogue	between	Energy	Ministers	from	both	
shores	 in	 the	 Inter-Ministerial	 Conferences	 and	 expert	 dialogue	 between	
representatives	 of	 the	 partner	 countries	 and	 the	 EC	 in	 the	 Euro-Mediterranean	
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Energy	Forum.	Both	the	Conferences	and	the	Forum	began	convening	soon	after	the	
Barcelona	Conference,	but	fell	short	of	regular	meetings	thereafter39.		
In	2004,	the	EU	accomplished	three	major	policy	efforts:	it	carried	out	the	European	
eastward	enlargement;	the	launch	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	(ENP);	and	
the	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community	of	South	East	Europe	(officially	in	force	
since	2006,	but	prepared	in	the	preceding	years).	The	enlargement	brought	ten	new	
Member	 States	 into	 the	 EU.	 The	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 (ENP)	 was	 an	
umbrella	programme	grouping	the	various	cooperation	programmes	linking	the	EU	
and	its	Southern	and	Eastern	neighbourhood.	The	ENP	marked	the	boundaries	of	the	
EU,	 separating	 Members	 and	 Accession	 countries	 from	 countries	 without	 a	
membership	perspective	(Smith	2005,	Cardwell	2011).	Moreover,	the	ENP	combined	
regional	aspects	with	a	pronounced	bilateral	dimension:	the	Commission	proposes	
bilateral	 Action	 Plans	 to	 each	 of	 its	 “neighbours”,	 framing	 cooperation	 around	 a	
series	of	mutually	agreed	issues.	The	Action	Plans	specify	the	extent	of	regulatory	
convergence	that	each	country	is	willing	to	undertake	in	different	economic	sectors	
(Escribano	 2010).	 Energy	 is	 an	 important	 topic	 in	 these	 bilateral	 relations,	 which	
revolve	 also	 around	 the	 harmonization	 or	 adoption	 of	 the	 European	 energy	
regulatory	framework.	Inasmuch	as	network	governance	is	a	characterising	feature	
of	 the	 EU	 (Boeger	 and	 Corkin	 2017),	 the	 external	 dimension	 of	 its	 regulatory	
																																																						
39	 The	 Inter-Ministerial	 conferences	 convened	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 Trieste	 in	 1996.	Other	
meetings	 followed	 in	Rome	and	Athens	 in	2003.	They	were	 then	discontinued	until	 2007	
(meeting	in	Limassol,	Cyprus)	and	2014	(meeting	in	Rome,	Italy).	The	Euro-Mediterranean	
Energy	Forum	convened	for	the	first	time	 in	Brussels	 in	1997,	then	 in	Granada	 in	2000.	 It	
proved	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 retrace	 the	 chronology	 of	 Forum	meetings	 thereafter.	 The	
Athens	meeting	of	2003	appears	 to	mix	 the	Forum	and	 the	 Inter-Ministerial	Conferences	
together.	 Following	 the	Athens	meeting,	 the	 Energy	 Forum	as	 conceived	within	 the	 EMP	
seems	to	have	been	discontinued.		
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governance	 is,	 instead,	 highly	 formalized	 and	 premised	 on	 the	 extension	 of	 the	
European	acquis	(Bicchi	2006).	
At	 the	very	beginning	of	 the	2000s,	 the	EU	and	 the	USA	crossed	 roads	 in	Eastern	
Europe.	This	resulted	in	the	creation	of	the	Energy	Community	of	South	East	Europe	
(ECSEE)	in	2005.	The	ECSEE	is	a	Treaty-based	organization,	originally	comprising	the	
countries	 that	 were	 deemed	 unprepared	 to	 join	 the	 EU	 as	 Member	 States	
immediately,	 yet	maintained	 Accession	 status:	 namely,	 SEE	 countries	 and	 Turkey	
(that	only	 joined	as	associate,	not	as	full	member).	The	premise	of	this	essentially	
political	 initiative	was	 to	 extend	 the	 EU	 energy	 legislation	 to	 the	 countries	 in	 its	
neighbourhood,	 as	 a	preparatory	 step	 to	 full	 accession	 (Deitz,	 Stirton	et	 al.	 2009,	
Karova	2009,	Padgett	2012,	Schulze	2015).	The	European	Commission,	CEER,	USAID	
and	ERRA,	as	well	as	the	World	Bank	and	other	international	donors	were	all	involved	
in	the	setting	up	of	the	ECSEE.		
“We	had	very	very	common	interest	with	the	EU	in	terms	of	the	integration	of	
the	 Balkans	 into	 the	 Euro-Atlantic	 community	 and	 integration	 into	Western	
Europe,	the	EU…	it	was	a	very	very	staunch	support,	(…)	within	the	AID	but	also	
within	 the	 state	 department	 they	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 that”	
(interview	29).	
The	 political	 rationale	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 ECSEE	 was	 two-fold:	 the	 EU	
wanted	 to	expand	 to	 reach	of	 its	market	 framework	 to	 foster	 investments	 in	 the	
infrastructure	 that	 would	 allow	 it	 to	 diversify	 its	 energy	 imports	 (Karova	 2009,	
Padgett	2012);	moreover,	the	integration	of	South	Eastern	European	networks	would	
end	the	electrical	isolation	of	Greece.	The	Treaty	binds	its	signatories	to	implement	
relevant	pieces	of	the	EU	energy	legislation.	The	significant	costs	of	adaptation	for	
SEE	countries	would	be	rewarded	by	EU	membership	(Karova,	2009).	The	ECT	has	
also	been	understood	as	a	 sign	of	 the	EU’s	 “enlargement	 fatigue”	 (Renner	2009),	
driving	 it	 to	 postpone	 full	 Accession	 while	 still	 increasing	 political	 stability	 in	 its	
neighbourhood.	Both	the	enlargement	and	the	Energy	Community	were	perceived	
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as	important	political	achievements	for	the	EU:	they	portrayed	its	success	at	exerting	
and	 exporting	 its	 normative	 (Manners	 2015)	 and	market	 (Damro	 2015)	 power	 to	
third	 countries.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Euro-Mediterranean	 Partnership	 was	 embedded	
into	the	ENP.		
The	Energy	Community	Treaty	 foresaw	the	adoption	of	EU	energy	 legislation	 tout	
court	 in	 the	 countries	 of	 South	 East	 Europe	 via	 a	 formalized	procedure	 typical	 of	
accession	 processes	 (Schimmelfennig	 2012).	 After	 2004,	 the	 EU	 policy	 message	
concerning	 regional	 energy	 cooperation	 became	 centred	 on	 the	 extension	 of	 the	
“Energy	Community	approach”	to	the	Euro-Mediterranean	(Tholens	2014).	External	
energy	governance	became	premised	on	the	notion	of	extending	“the	EU’s	internal	
market,	through	expansion	of	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	to	include	relevant	ENP	
countries.”	 (Joint	 Paper	 2006,	 p.	 6),	 whereas	 a	 decade	 earlier	 the	 European	
Commission	 affirmed	 that	 regional	 energy	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Mediterranean	
should	aim	“to	develop	energy	planning	tools	based	on	the	highly	complementary	
nature	of	the	Northern	and	Southern	Mediterranean	markets	and	supply	networks”	
(European	Commission	1996,	p.	4)	and	left	room	for	co-ownership	of	the	legal	and	
regulatory	aspect	of	energy	cooperation	(“An	appropriate	legal	framework	should	be	
devised	to	encourage	and	promote	regional	and	transregional	trade”,	p.	6).		
In	 the	 following	years,	however,	slow	progress	 in	 the	achievement	of	 the	 Internal	
Energy	 Market	 and	 deterioration	 of	 energy	 relations	 with	 Russia	 increased	 the	
perception	 of	 threat	 to	 the	 EU’s	 energy	 security.	 The	 gas	 disruption	 episodes	
involving	 Russia	 and	 Ukraine	 in	 2006	 and	 2009	 prompted	 renewed	 European	
Commission’s	interest	in	the	Mediterranean.	This	took	the	form	of	bilateral	strategic	
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partnerships	with	ENP	countries	(such	as	Algeria,	Morocco,	Egypt),	as	well	as	the	re-
launch	of	regional	cooperation	in	both	gas	and	electricity40.		
Soon	afterwards,	in	2008,	the	then	President	of	France,	Nicolas	Sarkozy,	announced	
the	establishment	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean,	foreseeing	closer	cooperation	
in	economic	 issues	between	 the	 two	borders	of	 the	Mediterranean.	The	 initiative	
should	 have	 concerned	 only	 EU	 members	 bordering	 the	 Mediterranean.	 The	
European	 Commission,	 however,	 opposed	 the	 initiative,	 pointing	 out	 that	 an	
economic	 cooperation	 programme	 that	 excluded	 most	 EU	 Member	 states	 was	
inacceptable.	 The	 idea	 was	 therefore	 repackaged	 as	 another	 re-launch	 of	 the	
EuroMed	 Partnership/Barcelona	 Process;	 its	 full	 name	 became	 the	 “Barcelona	
Process:	Union	 for	 the	Mediterranean”.	The	 revamp	of	 the	Partnership,	however,	
was	not	accompanied	by	substantial	change	in	the	European	approach	towards	its	
Southern	neighbours	(Darbouche	2011).	 Importantly,	none	of	the	European	policy	
initiatives	included	a	regulatory	cooperation	or	regulatory	partnership	component,	
nor	a	capacity	building	aspect.		
Even	after	the	revamp	of	Euro-Mediterranean	energy	cooperation	following	the	gas	
crises	in	Eastern	Europe,	the	Commission’s	stance	did	not	change:	in	March	2011,	a	
Joint	Communication	of	the	Commission	and	the	High	Representative	of	the	EU	in	
reaction	to	the	“Arab	spring”	encouraged	the	extension	of	the	Energy	Community	
approach	to	the	Southern	Mediterranean	(Joint	Communication	2011a,	p.	10).	The	
idea	was	 reiterated	 in	 the	May	2011	Review	of	 the	 ENP:	 “a	 form	of	 EU-Southern	
Mediterranean	Energy	Community.	Extending	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	with	the	
Union's	 Eastern	 and	 South-Eastern	 neighbours,	 or	 building	 on	 its	 experience,	 this	
																																																						
40	At	the	fifth	EuroMed	Energy	Ministers	conference,	held	in	Limassol	(Cyprus)	in	2007.	On	
that	 occasion,	 the	 European	 Council	 jointly	 with	 the	 European	 Commission	 launched	 a	
renewed	Euro-Mediterranean	Energy	Partnership.	An	Action	Plan	 for	 the	 region	was	also	
launched	 on	 that	 occasion,	 covering	 the	 2008	 –	 2013	 time	 span.	 On	 that	 occasion,	 the	
MedReg	was	publicly	praised	for	its	efforts	at	bringing	about	regulatory	harmonization.	
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community	should	cover	relevant	parts	of	the	EU's	energy	legislation	with	a	view	to	
promoting	a	real	and	reliable	convergence	of	South	Mediterranean	partners'	energy	
policies	with	EU	policy.”	(Joint	Communication	2011b,	p.	15).		
The	 European	 Commission’s	 approach	 stands	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 assessments	 of	
regulators,	 system	 operators	 and	 other	 technical	 experts	 involved	 in	 Euro-
Mediterranean	 energy	 cooperation:	 according	 to	 recent	 research,	 these	 are	
convinced	that	the	idea	of	extending	the	Energy	Community	is	unworkable	in	that	
context	 and	 should	 not	 be	 used	 to	 frame	 the	 cooperation,	 lest	 jeopardizing	 its	
progress	(Tholens	2014).		
	
The	establishment	of	the	MedReg:	networks	as	“first-best”.		
“There	was	the	enlargement…	The	EU	was	ambitious	and	it	started	to	 look	
around	 itself.	 Inevitably	 they	 saw	 that	 both	 South	 East	 Europe	 and	 the	
Mediterranean	were	crucial	for	energy	issues,	but	they	focused	first	on	South	
East	Europe.	The	Commission,	grabbing	space	as	usual,	imagined	this	“Energy	
Community”.		I	immediately	tried	to	get	involved	because	I	thought	we	needed	
to,	as	the	closest	European	countries…	but	then	we	kind	of	lost	the	handle	of	
this	and	the	countries	ended	up	being	represented	by	the	EU.	(…)	On	the	basis	
of	that	experience,	I	thought,	well,	I’ll	take	a	shortcut	and	be	pro-active,	I’ll	try	
to	 anticipate	 the	 Commission…	 We	 will	 invent	 the	 community	 of	 the	
Mediterranean…	and	so	I	created	MedReg”	(interview	4).	
The	only	occasion	when	CEER	collaborated	with	the	European	Commission	to	deliver	
foreign	 policy	 goals	 presented	 itself	 with	 the	 processes	 leading	 to	 the	 official	
signature	of	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	(interviews	2,	7,	8	and	42).	In	those	years,	
the	role	of	CEER	was,	in	cooperation	with	the	then	Directorate	General	for	Transport	
and	Energy	of	the	European	Commission,	as	well	as	USAID	and	other	international	
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donors,	to	facilitate	the	setup	of	the	Energy	Community	Regulatory	Board	(ECRB)	–	a	
board	of	energy	regulators	with	advisory	powers	that	would	represent	integral	part	
of	the	Energy	Community	organizational	structure	(interview	7,	42).	CEER	set	up	an	
ad	hoc	working	group	and	hosted	joint	trainings	and	meetings	with	ERRA	as	well	as	
the	regulators	from	the	ECSEE.	After	that	period,	however,	CEER	was	never	involved	
again	in	the	delivery	of	European	external	energy	policy	objectives41,	which	are	led	
by	the	European	Commission.		
The	quotation	opening	this	section	naturally	leads	to	asking	a	rather	straightforward	
question:	 why	 would	 EU	 national	 regulators	 care	 what	 approach	 the	 European	
Commission	 does	 or	 does	 not	 take	 as	 concerns	 energy	 cooperation	 with	
neighbouring	countries?	Limitations	on	space	do	not	allow	an	exhaustive	response	
to	 this	 question,	 since	 a	 full	 account	 would	 need	 to	 discuss	 the	 institutional	
boundaries	of	national	regulatory	institutions	and	the	ways	in	which	they	understand	
their	role	in	domestic	and	European	politics.	For	the	purposes	of	this	research,	a	few	
details	 concerning	 the	 energy	 sector	 of	 the	 countries,	 whose	 regulators	 led	 the	
initiative,	may	shed	light	on	their	reasons.		
The	 initiative	 to	 set	 up	 MedReg	 came	 from	 a	 small	 group	 of	 EU	 regulators,	 in	
particular	 the	 Italian	 Regulatory	 authority,	 in	 2006.	 Italy	 is	 the	 country	 with	 the	
highest	electricity	prices	in	the	European	Union42	and	depends	on	fossil	fuel	imports	
(particularly	from	Russia	and	Algeria)	for	its	supply.	Moreover,	the	energy	strategy	
developed	 by	 the	 Italian	 government	 foresees	 transforming	 the	 country	 into	 an	
																																																						
41	 The	 CEER’s	 International	 Strategy	 working	 group	 coordinates	 the	 network’s	 informal	
relations	 with	 similar	 networks,	 such	 as	 the	 NARUC,	 and	 the	 CEER	 participation	 in	
international	events	on	energy	regulation,	but	does	not	remotely	resemble	the	structure,	
the	scope	or	the	resources	of	the	NARUC	International	Affairs	division.	
42	Eurostat,	http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_price_statistics	(last	accessed	13	August	2017)	
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energy	hub	for	the	transit	of	gas	and	electricity	generated	through	renewable	energy	
sources	to	the	rest	of	Europe43.		
Spain	also	depends	on	Algerian	gas	and	is	interconnected	with	Morocco,	which	has,	
in	turn,	been	heavily	investing	in	renewable	energy	generation	in	order	to	reduce	its	
import	dependence	from	fossil	fuels	and	trade	electricity	with	the	EU44.	France	is	a	
former	colonial	master	in	North	Africa	and	was	unlikely	to	remain	indifferent	to	the	
creation	of	a	network	of	regulators	including	French-speaking	countries	in	the	MENA	
(interview	6).	By	the	same	token,	a	country	like	Greece	is	notably	interested	in	the	
progress	of	electricity	market	integration	in	South	East	Europe,	whose	regulators	are	
also	members	of	MedReg	as	well	as	of	the	Energy	Community.	Italy,	Spain	and	Greece	
are	important	transit	countries	for	the	electricity	and	gas	that	would	be	generated	in	
the	region	and	exported	to	Northern	Europe	(Escribano	and	Jordán	1999,	Escribano	
2010,	Escribano	2011,	Escribano	and	San	Martín	González	2014).	In	turn,	countries	
like	Egypt	and	Tunisia,	but	also	Turkey	and	Algeria	are	interested	in	leveraging	their	
resources	and/or	their	geographical	position	to	improve	their	energy	use	and	engage	
in	energy	trade	with	the	EU.		
Despite	 the	 clear	 rationale	 for	 energy	 trade	 and,	 in	 the	 longer	 term,	 market	
integration	across	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region,	the	myriad	dedicated	initiatives	
have	lacked	noticeable	progress.	Intergovernmental	initiatives	invariably	collapsed,	
EU	 policy	 programmes	 covered	 many	 issues	 besides	 energy,	 and	 Mediterranean	
countries	 are	 unwilling	 to	 undertake	 privatization	 and/or	 liberalization	 reforms.	
																																																						
43	Italian	Government	Energy	Strategy	
http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/images/stories/documenti/SEN_EN_marzo2013.pdf	
(last	accessed	15	August	2017)	
44	 Quartz	 Africa,	 https://qz.com/533187/tired-of-importing-almost-all-its-energy-morocco-
has-built-africas-biggest-solar-farm/	(last	accessed	15	August	2017)	
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Moreover,	there	is	hardly	such	a	thing	as	a	Mediterranean	region:	ancient	conflicts	
and	divisions	permeate	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA)	(interview	3,	11).		
In	the	wake	of	the	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community,	the	Commission	began	
leveraging	that	policy	success	towards	the	countries	in	the	Southern	neighbourhood.	
Fearing	this	would	further	hamper	progress	in	the	direction	of	energy	trade	and/or	
market	 integration	 with	 the	 Southern	 neighbours	 (both	 options	 are	 technically	
already	possible,	but	political	and	regulatory	obstacles	persist,	see	Khalfallah	(2015)),	
regulators,	in	a	display	of	extraordinary	policy	initiative,	made	the	first	move.		
	“I	sent	the	first	 invites,	we	had	two	or	three	meetings,	and	then	you	know	
how	these	things	go…	you	have	the	meetings	then	you	begin	thinking	well	we	
should	maybe	jot	down	some	rules,	then	you	draft	a	statute,	then	you	go	to	
the	 notary	 and	 in	 the	 space	 of	 a	 year…	 there	we	were.	 It	 was	 impressive	
because	sometimes	when	you	begin	these	things	you	can	face	some	lukewarm	
reactions	but	no,	everyone	responded	to	the	invite,	also	the	representative	of	
Ministries	 where	 regulators	 did	 not	 yet	 exist.	 Everyone	 was	 eager	 to	
understand	their	own	mandate	and	profession,	 it	was,	you	know,	the	same	
mechanism	at	the	time	[of	the	CEER],	you	seek	a	table	to	sit	at	where	you	can	
dialogue	with	peers	in	order	to	help	each	other	grow,	stand	on	our	feet,	and	
everyone	was	very	enthusiastic”	(interview	4).	
The	 association	 of	 Mediterranean	 electricity	 and	 gas	 regulators	 (MedReg)	 was	
established	 as	 the	Mediterranean	Working	 Group	 on	 Electricity	 and	 Natural	 Gas	
Regulation	 in	May	 2006	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Euro-Med	 Partnership45.	 In	
																																																						
45	MEDREG,	today	a	Regional	Regulatory	Association,	brings	together	Energy	Regulators	for	
Electricity	 and	Gas	 of	 the	 following	 countries:	 Albania,	 Algeria,	 the	 Palestinian	Authority,	
Bosnia-Herzegovina,	 Cyprus,	 Croatia,	 Egypt,	 France,	 Jordan,	 Greece,	 Israel,	 Italy,	 Lybia,	
Malta,	Morocco,	Montenegro,	 Portugal,	 Slovenia,	 Spain,	 Tunisia	 and	 Turkey.	 All	member	
regulators	of	MedReg	are	also	regulators	of	countries	that	are	part	of	the	Energy	Community.	
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2007,	MedReg	was	 legally	 registered	under	 Italian	Law.	Hence,	 the	 time	between	
network	 emergence	 and	 consolidation	 was	 remarkably	 short.	 Soon	 after	 legal	
registration,	regulators	addressed	the	European	Commission	for	support	in	ensuring	
the	viability	of	the	network.	“They	were	happy	about	it,	because	we	had	done	all	the	
work.	We	provided	them	with	a	ready-made	framework	for	cooperation.”	(interview	
4).	MedReg	is,	since	then,	supported	by	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	funds46.	
MedReg’s	“Concept	and	Strategy	Paper”47	highlights	the	parallel	between	the	Energy	
Community	 itself.	 It	 also	 stresses	 the	 possible	 involvement	 of	 Mediterranean	
countries	into	an	energy	cooperation	relationship	on	the	basis	of	market	integration,	
but	with	a	different	approach:	“Considering	the	strategic	energy	challenges	of	 the	
Mediterranean	region,	Mediterranean	Energy	Regulators	consider	as	their	duty	[my	
emphasis]	 to	 constitute	 a	 strong	 institutional	 basis	 promoting	 a	 “bottom	 up”	
approach	 (…)	 to	 guarantee	 greater	 harmonization	 of	 the	 energy	 markets	 and	
legislations	and	to	seek	progressive	market	 integration	 in	 the	Euro-Mediterranean	
region”.	
	
																																																						
46	It	is	useful	in	this	regard	to	re-use	a	quotation	from	an	interview	that	I	used	in	chapter	3	
when	 discussing	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 CEER,	 for	 it	 aptly	 frames	 the	 context	 of	 MedReg	
establishment	and	the	regulators’	success	in	securing	funds	from	the	European	Commission:	
“Let’s	put	 it	 this	way,	 if	my	goal	would	be	to…	implement	or	to	achieve	very	nationalistic,	
specific	solutions,	probably	it	would	not	be	successful	to	do	it	at	EU	level.	But	if	the	goal	is	to	
develop	solutions	that	make	sense	in	a	general	economic	way	in	a	European	perspective	then	
you’re	much	better	off	to	try	to	push	that	at	EU	level”.	(interview	25)	
47MeReg	Concept	and	Strategy	Paper	
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/200/200903/20090
316Medreg_concept_EN.pdf	(last	accessed	12	August	2017)	
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Replicating	the	CEER	experience.	
MedReg	would	probably	not	exist,	had	it	not	been	for	the	initiative	of	the	regulators.	
The	regulators	would	probably	not	have	taken	the	initiative,	had	it	not	been	for	their	
experience	of	cooperation	within	CEER,	which	they	considered	successful	because	it	
allowed	them	to	feed	into	European	energy	policy-making.		
	“The	 CEER	 was	 a	 bottom-up	 association	 born	 to	 preserve	 the	 regulators’	
autonomy	from	the	Commission,	as	well…	MedReg	was	created	on	the	same	
basis,	well	actually	all	institutions	that	have	been	created	in	the	area	are	kind	
of	replicating	things	that	“worked”	in	the	EU.	Of	course,	this	does	not	mean	
they	 would	 immediately	 “work”	 in	 the	 Euro-Med.	 The	 CEER	 helped	 the	
European	harmonization	process	immensely.	With	time,	it	showed	its	obvious	
limits	and	therefore	it	has	been	necessary	to	create	the	Agency.	But	for	many	
many	years	it	has	been	a	crucial	forum	for	discussion	(…)	So	MedReg	could	be	
considered	 as	 mirroring	 the	 CEER	 but	 the	 thing	 is	 that	 they	 have	
representativeness	problems;	even	on	very	technical	topics	of	regulation	you	
immediately	encounter	institutional	and	geopolitical	obstacles”	(interview	5).	
“Yes,	absolutely,	the	MedReg	was	set	up	like	a	photocopy	of	the	CEER.	There	
are	 two	 main	 differences.	 One	 is	 that	 regulators	 have	 less	 incentives	 to	
cooperate	within	the	MedReg,	because	the	MedReg	has	less	impact	on	what	
happens	at	national	level.	The	CEER	has	always	been	voluntary	but	what	they	
say	counts,	both	for	the	European	energy	policy	and	at	domestic	 level.	The	
second	difference	is	the	Secretariat.	The	MedReg	Secretariat	would	need	more	
resources	in	order	to	coordinate	the	working	groups	more	effectively.	It	being	
financed	by	the	European	Commission,	 there	 is	not	much	scope	concerning	
how	to	allocate	resources	differently.	The	CEER	was	always	self-financed	so	
the	regulators	organized	it	as	they	saw	fit”	(interview	14).	
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“Well,	 you	 know,	 the	 founding	members	 of	 the	MedReg	 all	 had	 the	 CEER	
experience	in	their	background,	as	well	as	the	Florence	School,	so	they	were	
used	 to	 starting	 and	 carrying	 forward	 this	 type	 of	 conversations,	 of	
cooperation”	(interview	10).	
The	mechanism	 leading	 from	CEER	 to	MedReg	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 leading	 from	
NARUC	 to	 ERRA:	 in	 both	 cases,	 a	 previous	 successful	 experience	 of	 regulatory	
cooperation	 inspired	 its	 replication	 in	 a	 different	 context.	 However,	 there	 are	
profound	differences	between	the	two	cases.	The	establishment	of	MedReg	did	not	
derive	from	a	coordinated	European	foreign	policy	strategy,	but	from	the	initiative	
of	 national	 regulatory	 institutions.	 These	 institutions	 purposefully	 chose	 the	
informal,	networked	approach	not	only	because	it	was	the	one	they	knew	best,	but	
also	because	it	allowed	them	to	bypass	the	rigidities	of	the	system	of	governance	of	
the	EU.	As	mentioned	above,	Sarkozy’s	initiative	to	launch	a	French-led	Union	for	the	
Mediterranean	was	immediately	blocked	by	the	Commission	and	transformed	into	a	
European	policy.	According	to	testimony	from	interviews	conducted	for	this	thesis,	
however,	 the	 energy	 policy	 preferences	 of	 the	 various	 Member	 States	 are	 too	
different;	some	of	them	are	simply	not	interested	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region	
(interview	4,	5,	6).	Moreover,	Commission-led	policy	programmes	are	premised	on,	
once	again,	compliance	with	EU	legislation.	Informal	networks,	instead,	can	gather	
as	many	or	as	few	European	regulators	as	needed.		
	“I	 think	 it	 is	 important	 to	 cooperate	 voluntarily,	 because	 if	 you	 impose	
legislation	top-down	it	has	to	be	able	to	bring	about	solutions.	Otherwise	it	
becomes	an	obstacle	to	cooperation,	rather	than	an	enabling	factor.	This	is	
the	fundamental	difference;	the	origins	of	the	CEER	were	the	opposite	[of	the	
Energy	Community].	There,	you	had	new	institutions	that	were	faced	with	a	
radically	new	context	and	decided	to	cooperate	on	concrete	things.	MedReg	
was	inspired	by	the	same	logic.	I	mean,	there	have	been	initiatives	in	the	Euro-
Med	where	you	had	agreements	signed	by	governments	and	yet	they	were	
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never	implemented.	So	the	idea	was	let’s	do	it	starting	from	the	institutions	
that	are	directly	involved	in	these	processes,	let’s	see	if	we	can	work…	and	it	
was	 immediately	 successful	 because	 everyone	 needs	 to	 understand	 how	
things	 work	 in	 order	 to	 make	 progress.	 The	 Mediterranean	 is	 a	 natural	
market,	you	are	basically	condemned,	and	I	say	this	in	a	very	positive	sense,	
condemned	to	work	together”	(interview	5).	
The	words	in	the	previous	quotation	confirm	the	relevance	of	CEER	in	inspiring	the	
establishment	of	MedReg	while	also	hinting	at	the	main	difference	between	the	two	
networks.	 MedReg	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 replicate	 the	 process	 of	 influential	
transnational	regulatory	cooperation	that	unfolded	in	CEER	in	absence,	however,	of	
sweeping	policy	change.	To	the	contrary,	the	rationale	for	creating	MedReg	was	the	
frustration	 with	 the	 protracted	 standstill	 in	 energy	 cooperation	 in	 the	 Euro-
Mediterranean.	More	precisely,	regulators	appear	to	have	conceived	of	MedReg	as	
an	 initiative	 that	 would	 be	 able	 to	 bypass	 the	 political	 deadlocks	 in	 the	 Euro-
Mediterranean	 cooperation	 by	 focusing	 on	 concrete,	 win-win,	 solutions.	 After	
MedReg	was	established,	regulators	pushed	for	the	creation	of	electricity	and	gas	
system	operators,	on	the	model	of	the	European	ones	(called	ENTSO-E	and	ENTSO-
G).	 From	 their	 point	 of	 view,	 no	 political	 institution	 was	 needed	 in	 order	 for	
regulators	to	identify	barriers	to	integration	and	agree	on	solutions	to	lift	them.		
“We	did	MedTso	and	[have	proposed]	MedTso	for	Gas,	they	were	born	in	kind	
of	the	same	way,	so	you	have	the	symmetry	with	the	CEER,	the	ENTSO-E	and	
the	ENTSO-G	and	you	really	don’t	need	anything	else”	(interview	4).	
In	 other	 words,	 the	 establishment	 of	MedReg	 was	 based	 on	 the	 conviction	 that	
cooperation	between	technical	experts	 (regulators	and	operators)	could	suffice	to	
deliver	 investment	 in	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	 eventually	 markets	 and	 market	
integration.	This	conviction	seems	to	have	been	based	on	the	assuredness	that	this	
was	 what	 had	 happened	 in	 the	 case	 of	 CEER:	 the	 obvious	 benefits	 of	 market	
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integration	had	overcome	domestic	reluctance	to	energy	sector	reform	as	precursor	
to	an	integrated	European	energy	market.		
As	chapter	3	shows,	however,	the	desirability	of	energy	market	integration	and	the	
capability	of	CEER	to	propose	concrete	regulatory	solutions	to	achieve	it	were	only	
part	 of	 the	 story.	 The	 other	 part	 concerns	 specific	 political	 circumstances:	 most	
importantly,	 the	 opening	 of	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 caused	 by	 the	 enormous	
uncertainty	surrounding	energy	sector	reform	across	European	Member	States,	and	
the	parallel	 formation	of	 a	 European	 energy	 policy	 framework	 that	 entwined	 the	
European	Commission	and	the	CEER	into	a	symbiotic	dependence	on	one	another.	
The	 latter	 provided	 information	 and	 an	 impartial,	 technical	 input	 into	 the	 policy	
process	while	the	former	backed	the	regulators’	cooperation	politically.	Moreover,	
the	 Commission	 and	 other	 European	 institutions	 (particularly	 the	 European	
Parliament)	 supported	 regulators	 and	 could	muster	 the	 authority	 to	 pressure	 all	
different	 Member	 States	 into	 compliance	 with	 the	 legislation.	 In	 a	 completely	
different	setting,	USAID	could	exert	its	clout	over	the	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe	that	received	its	aid.	The	creation	of	these	partnership	relations	with	actors,	
external	to	the	domestic	political	setting	of	individual	regulatory	authorities,	was	in	
itself	a	necessary	condition	for	network	influence.		
If	European	MedReg	members	appear	overly	optimistic	on	the	potential	of	regulatory	
network	cooperation	to	impact	on	policy	outcomes,	the	members	of	MedReg	from	
the	 Southern	 neighbourhood	 appear	 more	 aware	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 network’s	
impact	 on	 domestic	 contexts	 in	 absence	 of	 political	 commitment	 to	 reform.	 The	
quotation	below	presents	a	different	perspective	on	the	rationale	and	the	usefulness	
of	MedReg,	 that	 conceives	 of	 network	 cooperation	 as	 laying	 suitable	 ground	 for	
reform,	 so	 that	when	 reform	occurs,	no	 time	shall	be	wasted	on	working	out	 the	
details	of	regulatory	framework	implementation.	
“Strategic	decision	is	not	being	taken	by	regulators,	it’s	taken	by	government,	
we	have	a	challenge	for	example	in	the	X	project,	which	is	a	market	for	energy,	
214	
	
it’s	quite	clear	that	this	poses	of	lot	of	blocks	because	the	relations	between	Y	
and	Z	countries	are	not	that	smooth.	MedReg	played	a	role	in	this	project	first	
in	 providing	 capacity	 building,	 secondly,	 we	 decided	 to	 resolve	 technical	
challenges,	so	whenever	there	is	a	political	opening	in	the	process,	it	will	not	
be	halted	because	there	 is	a	 lack	of	technical	knowledge.	(…)	Waiting	for	a	
political	decision	and	then	start	working	from	that	time	will	take	much	longer,	
so	MedReg	in	capacity	building,	in	converging	ideas,	in	making	people	in	the	
same	way	of	thinking,	all	of	this	is	very	much	important”	(interview	21).	
	
The	 limits	 and	 the	 potential	 of	 MedReg	 for	 Euro-Mediterranean	
energy	cooperation.		
The	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community	of	South	East	Europe	was	perceived	as	
an	 outstanding	 policy	 success	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 in	 exporting	 its	 energy	
governance	 framework	 (Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfennig	 2009).	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 that	
experience,	there	was	momentum	for	the	idea	of	a	pan-European	Energy	Community	
encompassing	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 so-called	 European	 neighbourhood.	 Seizing	 the	
momentum	first,	a	small	group	of	energy	regulatory	authorities	took	a	bold	policy	
initiative	and	set	up	an	informal	network	gathering	regulators	from	countries	as	close	
to	the	borders	of	the	EU	geographically	as	they	are	distant	from	its	market	model	
politically.		
MedReg	is	an	ambitious	attempt	to	have	informal	regulatory	coordination	succeed	
where	 many	 other	 formal	 policy	 frameworks	 have	 failed:	 building	 infrastructure	
around	 the	EU	borders	 (the	 so-called	“energy	corridors”,	 see	Ahner	and	Glachant	
(2014)	 as	well	 as	 Escribano	 (2010),	 Escribano	 (2011),	Abbasov	 (2014))	 that	would	
achieve	 many	 important	 objectives	 at	 once:	 increase	 its	 security	 of	 supply	 by	
diversifying	its	supply,	represent	new	markets	for	its	energy	companies,	greening	its	
energy	production	and	consumption	and	eventually	lowering	its	energy	prices.		
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The	 experience	 of	 CEER	 had	 shown	 the	 remarkable	 influence	 that	 informal	
transnational	regulatory	cooperation	could	have	on	regulatory	policy	and	even	on	EU	
legislation	as	such;	regulators	wished	to	replicate	that	experience	in	the	context	of	
the	 Euro-Mediterranean	 energy	 cooperation.	 The	 experience	 of	 ERRA	had	 shown	
that	 hands-on	 cooperation	 between	 regulators	 from	 advanced	 and	 emerging	
markets	 could	not	only	quickly	 familiarize	 the	 latter	with	 the	principles	of	energy	
markets	but	also	transform	them	into	“agents	of	change”	in	their	domestic	setting.		
Therefore,	EU	regulators	saw	the	establishment	of	a	network	of	regulators	as	a	“first-
best”	strategy	to	foster	energy	market	integration,	rather	than	a	second-best	option	
to	obviate	to	the	lack	of	willingness	of	Southern	neighbours	to	comply	with	the	EU	
regulatory	 framework.	 Interviewees	 explicitly	 argued	 that	 informal	 networked	
cooperation	would	be	more	effective	than	top-down	imposition	of	uniform	rules	on	
wildly	different	economies.	Three	cited	ERRA	as	an	example	the	initiative	to	set	up	
MedReg	was	inspired	to.	One	added	that,	however,	MedReg	is	much	more	ambitious	
in	 that	 its	 aim	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 realization	of	market	 integration	across	 the	
shores	 of	 the	 Mediterranean,	 not	 just	 transforming	 into	 a	 training	 providing	
organization	(interview	3).	
Yet,	 the	MedReg	 thus	 far	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 able	 to	 exert	 a	 real	 impact	 on	
regulatory	 policy	 concerning	 the	 region	 (Cambini	 and	 Franzi	 2013).	 Several	
interviewees	 from	 within	 and	 without	 the	 MedReg	 have	 expressed	 scepticism	
concerning	its	ability	to	influence	policy	 in	the	near	future.	They	have	argued	that	
differences	between	the	two	shores	of	the	Mediterranean	are	still	too	significant.		
“For	now,	 the	MedReg	 is	diffusing	knowledge,	best	practices,	 you	know.	 It	
does	 not	 have	any	 influence	on	 legislation,	 however,	 not	 even	an	advisory	
function.	It’s	not	like	MedReg	makes	proposals	that	are	then	discussed…	It	is	
succeeding	 in	 providing	 capacity	 building,	 in	 creating	 a	 shared	 body	 of	
knowledge	 also	 by	 sharing	 the	 progress	made	 in	 the	 various	 countries	 on	
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different	topics,	for	instance,	Italy	and	Spain	can	share	their	experience	with	
renewables	etc.”		(interview	5).	
Indeed,	 the	 evolutionary	 trajectory	 of	MedReg	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 the	 networks	
previously	examined.	Virtually	no	time	has	elapsed	from	the	beginning	of	dialogue	to	
semi-formalization.	 In	 the	 other	 three	 cases,	 regulators	 transformed	 the	
accumulated	 output	 of	 their	 cooperation	 into	 training	 courses	 and	 repository	
material	for	future	staff	at	their	regulatory	authorities;	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	
case	 for	 MedReg.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 sort	 of	 radical	 policy	 overhaul	 that	
characterized	 the	 cases	 previously	 considered	 seems	 missing.	 Therefore,	 most	
national	 regulatory	 authorities	 in	 the	 Southern	 neighbourhood	 (as	 shown	 by	 the	
missing	 links	 and	 nodes	 in	 chapter	 5)	 appear	 mostly	 confined	 to	 their	 national	
boundaries.	 There	 is	 no	 interdependence	 motivating	 continuous	 and	 growing	
interaction.	
Although	falling	short	of	the	ambitious	goals	its	founders	had	set	for	it,	MedReg	has	
managed,	in	the	past	ten	years,	to	positively	affect	its	members	via	the	socialization	
mechanisms	that	many	contributors	 (Ikenberry	and	Kupchan	1990,	Sabatier	1991,	
Checkel	2005,	Beecher	2012,	Bianculli	2013,	Bianculli,	Jordana	et	al.	2015,	Freyburg	
2015)	and	this	thesis	have	recognized	to	policy	networks	generally	and	to	regulatory	
networks	in	particular:	
“MedReg	has	enabled	a	regional	vision	(…).	Cooperating	between	regulators	
without	any	kind	of	commitment	from	the	government	is	very	important	to	
create	 mutual	 understanding.	 (…)	 	 Second,	 it	 created	 what	 we	 can	 call	 a	
MedReg	community,	we	know	each	other	now,	we	are	an	association	(…)	 I	
just	pick	the	telephone,	I	call	somebody,	I	know	them	in	person,	ask	what	you	
do,	I	get	normally	an	appropriate	response	because	they	also	understand	they	
respond	to	a	person	who	knows	them	and	expects	them	to	respond,	so	this	
has	created	a	kind	of	cooperation	even	on	a	bilateral…	which	was	very	much	
important	 for	 exchanging	 experience.	 Third	 one	 is	 exchanging	 experience,	
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which	 is	 basically	 either	 from	 success	 story	or	 failed	 story,	 both	are	of	 the	
same	value.	Fourth	one	 is	 capacity	building	programmes	 (…).	The	 fifth	one	
which	is	very	much	important	is	working	jointly	in	the	working	groups,	actually	
they	 represent	a	 forum,	or	a	 think	 tank	 for	 regulators	 to	 stick	 together,	 to	
come	up,	actually	we	don’t	have	any	agenda	imposed	on	us	by	somebody	else,	
we	 created	 our	 agenda	 and	 work	 plan,	 this	 has	 helped	 in	 developing	 the	
knowledge	of	each	other,	through	developing	these	reports,	and	I	believe	the	
reports	 MedReg	 is	 producing	 are	 high	 quality	 and	 address	 many	 of	 the	
problems	in	a	way	that	makes	them	clearly	understood”	(interview	21).	
However,	certain	circumstances	must	be	present	for	informal	transnational	networks	
of	energy	regulators	to	actually	affect	transnational	policy	formulation:	the	presence	
of	 common	 goals,	 sufficient	 uncertainty	 to	 open	 opportunity	 structures,	 network	
entrepreneurs	willing	and	able	to	shape	and	implement	the	network’s	agenda,	and	
partnership	 with	 a	 supra-national	 source	 of	 political	 authority.	 These	 conditions	
were,	and	still	are	lacking	in	the	case	of	MedReg.	The	Parliamentary	Assembly	of	the	
Mediterranean	 (PAM)48	 could	 be	 a	 suitable	 interlocutor,	 but	 lacks	 the	 necessary	
cohesion	and	legitimacy	(interview	3,	4).		
At	any	rate,	the	case	of	MedReg	has	broader	implications	for	our	understanding	of	
the	dynamics	that	play	out	in	the	external	dimension	of	European	governance	and	
the	role	of	individual	policy	entrepreneurs	navigating	them.	The	existing	literature	on	
these	topics	is,	once	again,	overwhelmingly	focused	on	the	European	Commission’s	
initiatives	and	stances.	The	Commission	is	described	as	overly	prescriptive	and	rigid	
in	 its	approach	to	the	countries	surrounding	the	current	borders	of	the	EU	(Bicchi	
2006)	 and	 overall	 unable	 to	 deal	 with	 countries	 whose	 will	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
European	 legislative	and	 regulatory	 framework	cannot	be	 shaped	by	membership	
conditionality	 (Schimmelfennig	2012).	Responses	 to	 these	 statements,	which	may	
include	consideration	of	the	kind	of	institution	the	European	Commission	is	and	the	
																																																						
48	PAM	website	http://www.pam.int/?m=news&id=575	(last	accessed	15	August	2017)	
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well-defined	limits	to	its	discretion	in	devising	tailored	policy	solutions	to	its	diverse	
neighbourhood,	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	
The	chapter	showed	that	informal	networks	can	be	conceived	as	“first-best”	solution	
to	thorny	political	and	economic	issues.	However	incomplete	in	terms	of	necessary	
conditions	 for	 success,	 the	 regulators’	 perception	 that	 informal	 cooperation	 can	
succeed	in	influencing	regulatory	policy	in	order	for	market	integration	and	trade	to	
take	place	was	based	on	the	reality	of	their	lived	experience	and	in	observation	of	
developments	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 world.	 This	 fact	 alone	 testifies	 to	 the	
appropriateness	 of	 investigating	 transnational	 expert	 cooperation	 using	methods	
that	 stem	 from	acknowledgement	of	 interdependencies	between	policy	decisions	
and	outcomes.		
Finally,	the	cases	of	CEER	and	MedReg	embed	a	common	call	for	the	study	of	policy	
entrepreneurship	in	the	EU	as	resulting	from	the	ability	of	individual	actors,	be	they	
placed	at	national	level	or	in	any	of	the	loci	of	policy	pressure,	to	further	their	policy	
goals	by	dovetailing	them	to	the	policy	priorities	of	the	EU.		
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Part	III.	Conclusion:	networks	from	networks.	
	
Recent	contributions	(e.g.	Slaughter,	2017)	strongly	advocated	for	more	reliance	on	
social	 networks	 in	 the	 context	 of	 foreign	 policy.	 The	 bulk	 of	 the	 literature	 on	
transnational	regulatory	networks	concerns	regulators	from	economically	advanced	
countries.	In	this	literature,	the	issue	of	network	establishment	is	usually	tackled	in	
either	 functional	 or	 intergovernmental	 terms,	 depending	on	whether	 emphasis	 is	
placed	 on	 the	 advantages	 of	 coordination	 or	 on	 the	 incentives	 that	 powerful	
countries	 have	 to	 set	 global	 standards	 close	 to	 their	 own.	 A	 smaller	 set	 of	
contributions	 focuses	on	networks	of	 regulators	 from	developing	countries;	 these	
contributions	are	usually	descriptive	and	rarely	emphasise	network	establishment.	
Some	mention,	 in	 passing,	 the	 support	 of	 international	 organisations	 or	 financial	
institutions.	 To	 my	 best	 knowledge,	 the	 literature	 does	 not,	 as	 yet,	 feature	
contributions	highlighting	 and	 investigating	 the	 link	between	 regulatory	networks	
and	foreign	policy.		
The	narratives	developed	in	the	foregoing	chapters	provide	some	insight	concerning	
how	concretely	network	fit	foreign	policy	agendas.	The	chapters	show	that,	in	both	
cases,	informal	regulatory	networks	were	relied	upon	to	foster	experts’	collaboration	
in	creating	the	conditions	for	policy	change	to	occur.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	retrace	the	
process	of	establishment	of	the	network	of	energy	regulators	of	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe,	which	emerged	in	1998	and	has,	since	then,	benefited	from	the	unwavering	
support	of	the	US	Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID)	and	NARUC.	In	the	
second	chapter,	I	retrace	the	processes	leading	to	the	establishment	of	the	network	
of	 Euro-Mediterranean	 energy	 regulators;	 a	 unique	 case	 of	 strong	 institutional	
entrepreneurship	 of	 European	 national	 regulators	 to	 establish	 and	 consolidate	
expert	collaboration	with	energy	regulators	in	the	European	neighbourhood.				
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The	 reconstruction	 of	 their	 respective	 histories	 shows	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	
regulatory	 networks,	 particularly	 in	 emerging	markets,	may	 not	 just	 follow	policy	
change,	but	rather	accompany	or	underpin	it.	Moreover,	the	chapters	show	that	the	
emergence	 of	 ERRA	 and	 MedReg	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 exclusively	 as	 the	
consequence	of	international	institutions’	coercive	pressures,	with	little	or	no	agency	
on	the	part	of	regulators.	To	the	contrary,	in	both	settings,	regulators	took	an	active	
stance	in	advocating	for	support	to	their	collaborative	activities	from	international	
institutions.	The	 interview	data	 informing	both	chapters	 juxtaposes	the	regulatory	
and	the	donor	perspective,	and	demonstrates	 the	co-ownership	of	 the	process	of	
network	establishment.	Hence,	 in	 these	 two	 cases,	 network	 formation	 involved	a	
dialogic	process	between	donors	and	recipients.		
Seizing	the	window	of	opportunity	created	by	the	European	enlargement,	Southern	
European	 pre-emptied	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 typically	 institutionalized	
approach	to	external	governance	by	espousing	and	promoting	the	concept	of	bottom	
up	cooperation	and	the	benefit	of	peer-to-peer	 interaction.	Thereafter,	 leveraging	
the	access	that,	arguably,	a	decade	of	within-CEER	collaboration	had	afforded	them	
to	the	European	Commission,	they	were	able	to	brand	their	initiative	as	promoting	
the	 goals	 of	 the	 European	 external	 governance	 and	 obtain	 funding	 for	 it.	 Twelve	
years	later,	MedReg	is	at	its	fourth	funding	renewal	and	expanding	both	its	staff	and	
the	scope	of	its	initiatives.		
As	one	MedReg	regulator	(from	the	Southern	neighbourhood)	put	 it,	MedReg	 is	a	
success	 story	 in	 terms	of	promoting	 the	benefits	of	 regulation	per	 se	 in	emerging	
markets:	
“Spreading	regulatory	culture	is	very	important	but	most	important	is	to	prove	
that	regulators	can	bring	added	value	to	the	system	because	many	countries	
feel	 like,	 we	 have	 electricity,	 we	 are	 a	 running	 system,	 we	 don’t	 have	 a	
shortage,	why	do	we	need	a	regulator?	It’s	important	to	prove	from	a	kind	of	
success	story	that	this	is	very	much	important,	there	is	a	conflict	of	interest	in	
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the	system	if	the	supplier	is	a	planner,	if	the	supplier	is	a	decision-maker,	if	the	
supplier	sets	the	tariffs,	or	the	government	sets	the	tariffs.	This	is	a	kind	of	a	
culture	which	needs	to	be	proved	so	as	we	build	a	success	story	I	believe	this	
would	be	a	good	export	to	others”	(interview	21).	
The	 initial	 aim	 of	 ERRA	 was	 socializing	 regulators	 with	 each	 other	 and	 with	 the	
principles	 of	 the	 market	 economy,	 in	 preparation	 for	 their	 transition	 to	 liberal	
democracy	and	their	entrance	into	the	European	Union.	Once	European	accession	
occurred,	ERRA	lost	its	initial	function	and	had	to	reinvent	itself	in	order	to	maintain	
its	 viability.	 ERRA	 operated	 a	 strategy	 of	 conversion,	 whereby	 it	 substituted	 its	
previous	main	rationale	with	a	new	one.	In	contrast,	MedReg	has	not	yet	reached	the	
point	 when	 its	 initial	 goal	 (promoting	 infrastructure	 investments	 and	 regulatory	
alignment	 in	 order	 to	 foster	 energy	markets	 integration	 across	 the	 shores	 of	 the	
Mediterranean	Sea)	is	exhausted.	While	the	existing	distance	between	the	EU	and	its	
neighbours’	 institutions	and	market	models	 is	still	very	wide,	the	 long	road	ahead	
may	also	imply	that	MedReg	will	be	needed	for	the	years	to	come.		
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8. Conclusions	
	
The	findings	and	strengths	of	this	research.	
Since	the	early	2000s,	the	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	has	literally	
boomed.	Numerous	contributions	on	regulatory	networks	in	the	European	Union	and	
elsewhere	 have	 debated	 the	 rationale	 of	 their	 establishment,	 their	 composition,	
their	stated	aims,	and	their	functioning.	The	literature	has	rarely,	if	ever,	empirically	
investigated	the	evolution	of	 regulatory	networks	over	 time,	 thereby	portraying	a	
static	 image	 of	 regulatory	 cooperation.	 Importantly,	 existing	 literature	 has	
overwhelmingly	 focused	on	the	formal	attributes	of	networks:	statutes,	meetings,	
work	plans,	membership	lists	etc.,	overlooking	the	informal	dimension	of	regulatory	
networking	 which,	 arguably,	 underlies	 and	 sustain	 their	 very	 existence.	 Further,	
existing	literature	looks	at	networks	from	the	outside.	It	rarely	examines	the	inner	
workings	 of	 regulatory	 networked	 collaboration,	 the	 drivers	 of	 the	 choices	 that	
regulators	 make	 concerning	 how	 to	 use	 their	 informal	 ties	 to	 each	 other.	 This	
research	 has	 addressed	 these	 important	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 regulatory	
networks	by	examining	four	empirical	cases	of	transnational	(or	trans-jurisdictional)	
networks	of	energy	regulators	(in	the	USA,	in	the	EU,	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	
and	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	area)	in	comparative	perspective.		
In	other	words,	existing	literature	has	overlooked	a	great	extent	of	the	policy	and	the	
politics	 of	 regulatory	 networking.	 In	 addition,	many	 empirical	 puzzles	 concerning	
networks	have,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	never	been	addressed.	For	instance,	if	
the	 impact	 of	 networks	 on	 regulatory	 convergence	 and/or	 global	 governance	 is	
scarcely	discernible,	as	extant	literature	concluded,	why	do	they	still	exist	and	keep	
being	 established	 around	 the	 world?	 The	 literature	 agrees	 that	 networks	 are	
instruments	for	the	exchange	of	information	and	experiences	and	experiences,	but	
rarely	endeavoured	to	study	how	exactly	this	exchange	takes	place,	which	incentives	
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drive	 regulators	 to	 choose	 their	 closest	 network	 partners	 and	 how	 concretely	 do	
regulators	 benefit	 from	 networks.	 Moreover,	 the	 literature	 seems	 to	 implicitly	
assume	 that	 regulatory	 networks	 remain	 confined	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 their	
members	 (like	 organisations	 do).	 This	 research	 shows	 this	 assumption	 to	 be	
incorrect,	 thereby	 opening	 a	 promisingly	wide	 avenue	 for	 future	 research	 on	 the	
export	of	regulatory	networks	to	other	jurisdictions	and	the	underlying	rationale.		In	
point	of	fact,	this	research	uncovers	the	role	played	by	informal	networks	in	linking	
very	distant	(geographically	and	politically)	areas	of	the	world	virtually	seamlessly.	
This	thesis	tackles	these	open	questions	by	means	of	a	research	design	that	focused	
on	four	inter-related	stories	of	regulatory	network	establishment	and	evolution,	as	
well	as	quantitative	network	analysis	of	regulators’	interactions	within	networks	and	
their	motives.	I	situated	the	four	networks	analysed	in	this	thesis	in	their	institutional	
environment	and	underlined	the	opportunities	and	constraints	it	posed	to	them	at	
different	moments,	as	well	as	the	incentives	motivating	their	interaction	as	they	co-
evolve	(Trein	2017)	with	their	external	environment	and	with	the	priorities	of	their	
main	institutional	interlocutors.		
The	preceding	six	empirical	chapters	are	divided	in	three	parts.	In	part	1,	I	investigate	
the	 spontaneous	 emergence	 of	 regulatory	 networking,	 its	 consolidation	 and	 its	
persistence	over	 time.	 In	part	2,	 I	 investigate	how	regulators	 choose	 their	 closest	
network	interlocutors;	 I	find	that	similarity	 in	the	political	economy,	expertise	and	
resources	 drive	 network	 ties.	 In	 part	 3,	 I	 investigate	 how	 networks	 foster	 the	
establishment	of	other	networks,	as	part	of	their	political	principals’	foreign	policy	
agendas,	 in	 order	 to	 re-invent	 themselves	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 institutional	
entrepreneurship.	The	narratives	of	 the	 four	networks	 I	examine	 inter-relate	over	
time;	 they	 are	 all	 interconnected	 and,	 arguably,	 none	would	 have	 existed	 as	 it	 is	
without	the	others.		
In	part	1,	I	carry	out	a	comparative	historical	analysis	of	the	emergence,	consolidation	
and	evolution	of	spontaneous	regulatory	networking	 in	 the	empirical	cases	of	 the	
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National	Association	of	Regulatory	Utility	Commissioners	(NARUC)	of	the	USA	and	of	
the	Council	of	European	Energy	Regulators	(CEER)	of	the	EU.	The	former	gathers	the	
50	 Public	 Utility	 Commissions	 (PUCs)	 of	 the	 USA;	 the	 latter,	 the	 29	 National	
Regulatory	Authorities	(NRAs)	of	the	EU.	I	rely	on	inductive	reasoning	to	identify	the	
conditions	for	spontaneous	regulatory	cooperation	to	emerge,	to	consolidate	into	a	
semi-formal	 networked	 organization	 (this	 is	 the	 point	 of	 departure	 of	 existing	
literature),	 and	 to	 evolve	 as	 their	 initial	 rationale	 declines	 in	 importance.	 The	
historical	narrative	shows	that	networks	emerge	as	regulatory	authorities	do.	In	both	
the	USA	and	 the	EU,	 the	establishment	of	 regulatory	authorities	at	national/state	
level	 represented	 a	 radical	 overhaul	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 the	 energy	 sector.	
Appointed	regulators	have	to	contend	with	many	conflicting	interests	and	learn	the	
ropes	of	a	completely	new	profession.	Being	uniquely	responsible	for	the	regulation	
of	 the	 sector	 in	 their	 territorial	 jurisdiction,	 they	 have	 no	 counterparts	 and	 no	
precedent	to	refer	to.	Hence,	they	start	reaching	out	to	one	another	to	compare	and	
contrast	the	challenges	they	face	and	the	possible	solutions.	At	this	stage,	regulatory	
networking	has	no	structure;	regulators	keep	in	contact	occasionally.		
The	 nature	 of	 the	 ties	 linking	 regulators	 changes	 and	 becomes	 more	 politically	
consequential	as	regulators	face	the	prospect	of	losing	their	powers	or	of	seeing	the	
scope	 of	 their	 authority	 greatly	 restricted.	 The	 fact	 of	 facing	 a	 common	 threat	
cements	 their	 collaboration	 into	 an	 institutional	 structure	 with	 a	 name,	
headquarters,	a	budget,	working	groups	and	a	work	plan;	in	other	words,	with	the	
intention	of	 lasting.	As	federal	agencies	were	established	in	the	nascent	American	
Regulatory	 State,	 they	 faced	 the	 same	 informational	 gap	 as	 their	 state	 level	
counterparts	a	few	decades	earlier:	a	new	profession,	consequential	tasks,	and	very	
little	 information	or	 guidance	on	how	 to	 carry	 them	out.	Hence,	 they	 sought	 the	
collaboration	of	their	state	level	counterparts	and	used	part	of	their	federal	funds	to	
provide	for	a	structured	dialogue	with	them	in	the	form	of	an	association	(NARUC)	
headquartered	in	Washington	DC,	close	to	federal	agencies	offices.	Hence,	federal	
agencies	provided	the	seed	funding	for	NARUC.	As	time	went	by,	however,	legislation	
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increasingly	empowered	federal	agencies,	effectively	establishing	their	primacy	over	
state	 regulation.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 state	 level	 regulators	 witnessed	 the	 federal	
agencies’	 progressive	 empowerment	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 their	 own	 control	 over	
utilities	within	the	boundaries	of	their	state.	As	it	became	evident	that	the	tension	
between	 state	 and	 federal	 level	 regulatory	 agencies	 would	 become	 a	 trait	 of	
American	 regulatory	 federalism,	 the	 foundations	 for	 NARUC	 to	 last	 as	 PUCs’	
collective	representation	towards	federal	regulators	and	government	were	laid.	
At	 first	 sight,	 European	 regulators	 had	 no	 supra-national	 contenders	 to	 their	
authority,	 as	Member	 States	 always	 opposed	 the	 creation	 of	 supranational	 Euro-
regulators.	For	European	regulators,	the	main	threat	to	their	autonomy	and	authority	
was	their	national	governments.	As	the	UK	infrastructure	sector	reforms	introduced	
private	capital	and	competition	into	the,	thus	far,	monopolistic	energy	sector,	they	
set	the	example	for	several	other	European	Member	States	and,	most	importantly,	
for	the	European	Commission.	As	European	legislation	mandated	the	liberal	market	
model	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 across	 all	 of	 the	 EU,	 Member	 States	 had	 to	 create	
independent	 regulatory	 institutions.	 A	 century	 later	 than	 their	 US	 counterparts,	
European	regulators	were	tasked	with	immensely	consequential	market	reforms,	for	
which	 they	had	 to	design	 the	 rules.	They	started	 reaching	out	 to	each	other,	and	
meeting	occasionally	and	informally	in	various	European	capitals.		
As	 the	 market	 reforms	 envisaged	 by	 European	 legislation	 triggered	 societal	 and	
business	 backlash,	 governments	 across	 Member	 States	 sought	 to	 intervene	 in	
regulatory	 decisions	 and	 to	 restrict	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 regulatory	 powers	 they	 had	
delegated.	As	it	became	evident	that	the	tension	between	government	interference	
and	regulatory	autonomous	decision-making	would	remain	a	trait	of	the	European	
system	of	multi-level	governance,	European	regulators	decided	to	consolidate	their	
informal	network	ties	 into	an	 institutional	structure	with	a	name,	headquarters	 in	
Brussels,	 i.e.	 close	 to	 the	 EU	 decision-making,	 budgetary	 contributions,	 etc.	
Transforming	 their	 collaborative	 ties	 into	 the	 CEER	 provided	 them	 with	 a	 solid	
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platform	 of	 resistance	 to	 government’s	 intervention	 and	 of	 influence	 into	 the	
European	policy	process.	Differently	from	their	US	counterparts,	European	regulators	
self-financed	their	networked	collaboration	from	the	very	start.	The	CEER	has	always	
been	a	completely	independent	network.		
Hence,	whereas	the	emergence	of	a	higher	layer	of	authority	constrained	US	PUCs’	
powers,	as	those	were	subject	to	the	federal	agencies’,	 it	partially	freed	European	
regulators	 from	 government	 interference.	 In	 both	 cases,	 however,	 the	 glue	 of	
regulatory	networking	for	their	joint	pursuit	of	control,	and	authority.	The	quest	for	
preserving,	 if	 not	 expanding,	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 authority	 was	 the	 benefit	 that	
outweighed	 the	 costs	 of	 cooperation	 and	 the	 partial	 sharing	 of	 authority	 that	 is	
implied	in	regulatory	collaboration	and	coordination	(Macey	2003).	This	is	the	first	
key	 empirical	 finding	 of	 this	 thesis	 and,	 arguably,	 one	 of	 its	 main	 theoretical	
contributions.		
If	control	was	the	ideational	rationale	underlying	the	consolidation	of	occasional	ties	
into	 a	 semi-formal	 organisational	 arrangement	 with	 a	 name,	 a	 budget,	 and	
headquarters	close	to	the	centre	of	policy	and	power	in	their	respective	jurisdiction,	
information	 and	 expertise	 are	 the	 assets	 that	 regulators	 aimed	 at	maximizing	 via	
their	collaboration.	In	chapters	4	and	5	I	analyse	the	structure	of	the	CEER	network	
as	a	typical	case	of	regulatory	network	with	a	long	history	of	intense	cooperation	and,	
therefore,	 one	 single	 component	 and	 no	 isolated	 members.	 Via	 the	 network	
structure	of	their	collaborative	ties,	regulators	can	reach	any	of	their	peers	in	a	small	
number	of	steps.	However,	regulators	are	unlikely	to	be	regularly	in	contact	with	all	
of	 their	 counterparts	 in	 their	 network.	 More	 plausibly,	 individual	 regulators	 will	
maintain	regular,	frequent	bilateral	ties	with	a	subset	of	their	peers.	The	motivations	
driving	 the	 choice	 of	 that	 subset	 are	 the	 dependent	 variables	 of	 the	 quantitative	
network	analysis	carried	out	 in	chapters	4	and	5.	A	model	of	 the	determinants	of	
network	 structure	 showed	 that	 regulators	 choose	 partners	who	 oversee	 similarly	
structured	markets	as	theirs,	as	those	are	the	peers	who	are	most	likely	to	have	come	
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across	similar	challenges	as	theirs.	However,	all	tend	to	pursue	regular	relationships	
with	 regulators	 overseeing	 more	 advanced	 markets,	 as	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 have	
accumulated	more	expertise	as	concerns	designing	functioning	energy	markets.	 In	
chapter	5,	 I	 investigate	 the	 link	between	resources	and	network	activism	(already	
emerged	in	chapter	4)	in	detail.	The	findings	are	that	network	activism	is	determined	
by	scarce	resources,	and	indicates	that	regulators	use	informal	ties	to	compensate	
for	their	lacking	resources.	Staff	numbers	are	more	relevant	than	budgets.	Moreover,	
the	 relationship	 between	 resources	 and	 activism	 appears	 to	 follow	 a	 quadratic,	
rather	 than	 linear,	 trend:	 active	 regulators	 are	 those	 with	 intermediate	 to	 small	
resources,	while	regulators	with	 large	or	very	small	 resources	are	not	significantly	
different.	This	shows	rationality	in	the	usage	of	networks	and	points	to	the	categories	
of	 regulators	 for	 which	 it	 may	 be	 most	 useful;	 for	 very	 resource-constrained	
regulators,	informal	networking	becomes	prohibitively	costly.		
Ultimately,	both	chapters	concur	in	showing	that	the	literature’s	emphasis	on	global	
governance	when	discussing	the	worth	of	regulatory	networks	is	not	misplaced,	but	
it	 is	 seriously	 incomplete.	 Regulators	 possess	 statutory	 powers	 over	 a	 specific	
territorial	jurisdiction;	they	have	no	official	powers	beyond	it.	Hence,	they	use	their	
networks	 to	 improve	 their	 regulatory	 practice	 in	 their	 own	 jurisdiction,	 alongside	
attempting	 to	 coordinate	 to	 achieve	 more	 regulatory	 convergence	 across	
jurisdictions.	This	is	the	second	key	empirical	finding	and	theoretical	contribution	of	
this	 thesis.	 Regulators	 need	 information	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 quality	 regulation.	
Quality	regulation	is	the	only	asset	they	hold	and	can	wield	to	protect	their	authority.	
In	order	to	regulate	effectively	and	to	build	their	credibility	and	legitimacy,	regulators	
need	resources.	Wherever	they	lack	sufficient	resources	to	carry	out	their	tasks,	they	
resort	to	their	network	to	compensate.	
The	third	and	final	part	of	the	thesis	tackles	the	issue	of	network	export:	namely,	the	
conscious	decision	to	export	networks	(their	 formal	and	 informal	structures)	 from	
economically	advanced	jurisdictions	to	emerging	markets	jurisdictions.	I	tackle	this	
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issue	in	chapters	6	and	7,	by	reconstructing	the	emergence	of	two	networks,	which	
can	be	considered	the	progeny	of,	respectively,	the	NARUC	and	the	CEER:	the	Energy	
Regional	Regulatory	Association	(ERRA)	and	the	Association	of	Mediterranean	Energy	
Regulators	(MedReg).	The	US	government,	through	its	development	agency,	stood	
behind	the	establishment	of	ERRA	and	supported	it	for	its	first	ten	years	of	existence.	
In	turn,	the	European	Commission	stands	behind	the	existence	of	the	MedReg,	and	
has	been	supporting	it	since	its	establishment	11	years	ago.	The	primary	aim	of	these	
chapters	 is,	 therefore,	 to	 inductively	 identify	 the	reasons	why	the	US	government	
and	the	European	Commission	financed	the	establishment	of	 regulatory	networks	
modelled	on	their	own	in	other	parts	of	the	globe,	and	why	they	supported	them	for	
a	 very	 long	 time.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 aim	 of	 these	 chapters	 is	 discovering	 why	
informal	 regulatory	 networks	 have	 been	 deemed	 capable	 of	 entrenching	 policy	
change.	
As	the	analysis	unfolded,	however,	two	very	important	additional	themes	emerged	
from	the	data.	The	first	one,	emerged	in	chapter	6	(dedicated	to	ERRA),	is	the	theme	
of	network	 survival	 and,	 specifically,	of	network	evolution	over	 time	as	a	 survival	
strategy.	As	 the	main	 rationale	of	network	existence	declines	 in	political	 salience,	
network	 managers	 and	 members	 seek	 to	 re-invent	 their	 network	 to	 prevent	 its	
decay.	In	the	case	of	NARUC,	the	unexpected	opportunity	to	contribute	in	the	effort	
of	facilitating	the	transition	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	to	the	market	
economy	represented	a	layering	strategy,	adding	to	the	baseline	functions	of	NARUC	
an	international	prong,	which	quickly	rose	to	being	its	main	source	of	income.	The	
other	one,	emerged	in	chapter	7	(dedicated	to	MedReg),	is	the	theme	of	institutional	
–	 or,	 in	 this	 case,	 network	 –	 entrepreneurship.	 In	 this	 case,	 I	 define	 network	
entrepreneurship	as	the	decision,	on	the	part	of	an	individual	regulator	or	a	small	set	
of	 individual	 regulators,	 to	 further	 regulatory	 coordination	 purposes	 by	
autonomously	initiating	informal	networks,	thereby	pre-empting	political	principals	
from	pursuing	those	same	objectives	through	top-down	initiatives,	such	as	setting	up	
of	 formal	organizations.	 In	other	words,	network	entrepreneurs	 anticipate	 formal	
229	
	
institutional	action	by	their	political	principals	and	decide	to	short-circuit	 them	by	
initiating	informal	networks.	In	addition,	they	manage	to	present	their	initiative	as	
legitimate	and	proactive	and	to	successfully	advocate	for	financial	support	of	their	
efforts.		
Chapter	6	narrates	of	how	NARUC	became	the	face	of	energy	regulation	worldwide.	
In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 USAID	 undertook	 an	
institution	building	programme	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	with	the	ultimate	aim	
to	plant	the	seeds	of	the	liberal	market	economy	and	foster	the	accession	of	Eastern	
European	countries	to	the	EU.	Regulatory	institutions	for	the	energy	markets-to-be	
were	 created	 in	 the	 first	 recipient	 countries	with	 the	 aid	 of	 external	 consultants.	
Soon,	 the	 mechanisms	 identified	 in	 chapters	 2	 and	 3	 started	 operating:	 newly	
established	regulators	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	realized	the	magnitude	of	their	
task	and	started	informally	reaching	out	to	each	other	to	compare	their	experiences	
and	challenges.	The	USAID	staff	monitoring	the	process	proactively	decided	to	foster	
that	spontaneous	collaborative	 incentive;	they	contracted	NARUC	to	provide	their	
expert	support	to	the	emerging	regulatory	cooperation.	NARUC	accepted	the	task:	
by	working	with	USAID	 in	Eastern	Europe,	 it	 gained	a	new,	politically	 crucial	 role;	
moreover,	its	members	obtained	the	possibility	to	travel	internationally	and	diffusing	
the	 principles	 of	 long-standing	 American	 regulators	 to	 the	 formerly	 communist	
world.	 Collaboration	 within	 ERRA	 quickly	 gained	 pace	 and	 regulators	 grew	more	
secure	 in	 their	 role	 and	 in	 their	 decision-making	 authority.	As	 regulators	 on	both	
sides	 of	 the	 European	 continent	 (the	 liberal	 and	 the	 communist)	 matured,	 the	
European	big	eastward	enlargement	of	2004	brought	seven	ERRA	members	into	the	
CEER.	The	task	underpinning	the	creation	of	ERRA	was	accomplished.	
Two	events	in	the	early	2000s	created	huge	political	momentum	for	what	was	named	
the	“external	governance”	dimension	of	the	European	Union.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
2004	 eastward	 enlargement	 convinced	 many	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 EU	 to	 export	
prosperity;	on	the	other	hand,	the	2005	signature	of	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	
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represented	 a	 first	 step	 towards	 the	 future	 accession	 of	 the	 countries	 of	 ex-
Yugoslavia,	then	renamed	as	South	East	Europe,	which	were	deemed	unfit	to	enter	
the	EU	in	2004.	The	Treaty	mandated	the	integration	of	the	energy	markets	of	South	
East	Europe	with	the	EU’s	through	a	highly	formalized	set	of	rules	and	institutional	
structures.	 According	 to	 European	 regulators	 (primarily,	 the	 Italian,	 French	 and	
Spanish),	the	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community	as	an	international	legal	treaty	
had	put	a	 straightjacket	on	 regulatory	cooperation	by	stifling	 regulators’	 initiative	
and	tying	their	collaboration	to	Ministerial	decision-making.		
Hence,	they	decided	to	prevent	the	extension	of	the	“Energy	Community	formula”	
to	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 European	 neighbourhood:	 the	 Southern	 neighbourhood,	
comprising	countries	from	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA).	By	exploiting	
their	existing	informal	contacts	with	regulators	in	the	area	and	their	own	experience	
of	collaborative	governance	within	the	CEER,	European	regulators	joined	forces	with	
their	MENA	counterparts	and	created	MedReg	in	a	very	short	time.	Contrarily	to	the	
literature	 on	 European	 integration,	 which	 saw	 networks	 as	 “second-best”	
instruments	 of	 convergence	 (Dehousse	 1997),	 European	 regulators	 proclaimed	
networks	as	a	“first-best”	option	for	framing	transnational	regulatory	collaboration,	
offering	 regulators	 freedom	 from	 political	 interference,	 confidentiality	 and	 open	
discussion.	However,	this	chapter	also	confirms	the	findings	of	chapters	2	and	3,	as	
well	 as	 chapter	 6,	 as	 concerns	 the	 importance	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 windows	 of	
opportunity	for	regulators	to	leverage	their	network	to	influence	policy,	by	showing	
their	absence	in	the	case	of	MedReg.		
This	 thesis	 shows	 that	 informal	 regulatory	 networks	 are	 levers.	 Regulators	 use	
networks	as	levers	that	raise	their	domestic	legitimacy	and	help	them	fend	off	attacks	
to	their	authority;	they	shape	their	networks	according	to	the	information	and	the	
resources	they	need	most;	they	leverage	their	networks	to	continue	networking	and	
retaining	a	precious,	 cost-effective,	 resilient	 instrument	of	 regulatory	governance.	
Collectively,	the	findings	of	this	research	show	that	networks	are	neither	rationally	
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designed	 by	 policy-makers,	 nor	 do	 they	 functionally	 descend	 from	 specific	 policy	
targets,	as	most	of	the	literature	maintains.	There	is	no	external	“mastermind”	to	the	
inception	 of	 cooperation:	 rather,	 regulatory	 networks	 are	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 very	
spontaneous	aggregation	process	driven	by	 the	 regulators’	quest	 for	 information,	
resources,	and	control.	
This	 research	 also	 makes	 a	 statement	 concerning	 the	 research	 approach.	 The	
questions	 guiding	 the	 research	 (What	 explains	 network	 emergence?	 Why	 do	
networks	 last?	 How	 can	 they	 influence	 policy?	What	 is	 the	 agency	 of	 regulators	
within	networks?)	need	 to	be	answered	by	 relying	on	a	combination	of	methods.	
Comparative	 historical	 analysis	 helps	 identifying	 the	 critical	 junctures	 setting	 in	
motion	emergent	processes	of	network	formation	and	appreciating	the	evolutionary	
trajectory	 of	 networks,	 pointing	 to	 the	 lasting	 importance	 of	 sequencing	 and	
feedback	effects	for	determining	which	options	of	network	evolution	are	available	at	
any	 given	 time.	 Understanding	 regulatory	 networks	 as	 interdependent	 sets	 of	
relationships,	 rather	 than	 as	 independent	 observations	 resulting	 from	 political	 or	
administrative	 functional	 calculation,	 allows	 the	 identification	 of	 the	
interdependencies	 linking	 regulators	 and	 networks	 across	 time	 and	 space;	
quantitative	network	analysis	allows	explaining	network	structure	parsimoniously.	
	
The	limits	of	this	research.	
There	are	many	issues	in	the	literature	on	networks	that	lie	outside	the	scope	of	this	
thesis.	I	did	not	investigate	policy	outcomes	that	are	conducible	to	network	influence	
either	at	supranational	(federal)	or	at	national	(state)	level.	Two	main	mechanisms	
of	interaction	across	levels	of	governance	emerged	from	the	analysis:	the	mechanism	
whereby	 the	 coordination	 within	 networks	 and	 the	 resulting	 policy	
recommendations	or	positions	influence	supra-national	(federal)	policy,	which	is	also	
the	 most	 studied	 in	 the	 literature;	 and	 the	 mechanism	 whereby	 information	
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gathered	from	the	network	affects	the	regulators’	ability	to	achieve	policy	outcomes	
at	home.	Such	a	focus	would	undoubtedly	enrich	the	existing	conspicuous	literature	
on	policy	diffusion	across	networks	(Mintrom	and	Vergari	1998,	Cao	2009,	Cao	2010,	
Cho	2013,	Desmarais,	Harden	et	al.	2015,	Boehmke,	Rury	et	al.	2016).	There	are	two	
reasons	 why	 I	 did	 not	 engage	 in	 analysis	 of	 these	 two	 immensely	 important	
mechanisms	of	network	 impact	on	policy:	my	main	 interest	 lied	 in	 identifying	 the	
reasons	why	regulators	network,	the	benefits	they	obtain	from	networks	that	they	
could	not	achieve	otherwise;	setting	out	to	ascertaining	the	impact	of	networking	on	
policy	requires	detailed	data,	a	completely	different	research	design,	and,	in	short,	
another	PhD	thesis.	
A	second	limitation	of	this	research	is	its	focus:	it	is	very	regulator-centric.	I	do	not	
investigate	how	and	why	regulators	network	(individually	or	collectively)	with	other	
stakeholders.	Nor	do	I	research	interactions	between	regulators’	and	stakeholders’	
networks,	which	is	another	important,	but	under-investigated	topic	(Kalaitzake	2017)	
that	cropped	up	in	several	of	my	interviews.	A	number	of	interviewees	reported	that	
regulators	 network	 in	 response	 to	 industry	 networks.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	
establishment	of	networks	of	regulators	always	follows	the	establishment	business	
or	industry	networks:	business	organises	earlier,	faster,	and	in	a	more	concerted	way	
from	the	start,	given	their	common	goal	of	ensuring	their	own	profit.	This	political	
economic	 angle	 on	 regulatory	 networking	 ties	 in	 with	 extant	 literature	 on	 the	
importance	of	business’	advocacy	for	market	integration	in	the	EU	(Mattli	1999)	and	
integrates	my	explanation	of	regulatory	networking	on	the	basis	of	regulators’	self-
interests	well.	Once	again,	however,	this	important	topic	would	need	to	be	addressed	
on	 its	 own	 and	 would	 require	 a	 dedicated	 data	 gathering	 process	 and	 research	
design,	or,	in	other	words,	a	separate	PhD	thesis.	The	topic	of	stakeholders’	networks	
links	with	the	recent	emphasis	placed	on	epistemic	capture	(Sebenius	1992,	Dunlop	
2009)	 and	 the	 growing	 interest	 in	 the	 frames	 through	which	 regulatory	 policy	 is	
made.	 Epistemic	 capture	 means	 that,	 by	 interacting	 with	 regulated	 interests,	
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regulators	increasingly	see	the	sector	and	the	policy	issues	through	the	frames	of	the	
regulatees	(Sunstein	2014).		
Finally,	 a	 third	 important	 topic	 that	 is	 missing	 from	 this	 research	 is	 the	 topic	 of	
accountability.	 Slaughter	 (2000a)	 affirms	 that	 regulators’	 accountability	 duties	 at	
national	level	suffice	to	lessen	the	problem	of	the	opacity	of	network	collaboration.	
Helleiner	and	Porter	(2010)	and	Papadopoulos	(2007),	however,	would	disagree	and	
propose	various	mechanisms	of	control	by	democratic	institutions	over	the	design,	
the	 composition	 and	 the	 output	 of	 these	 networks.	 This	 research	 shows	 that	
regulators	cherish	the	confidentiality	and	privacy	of	their	network	communication	
above	all.	This	is	perhaps	particularly	the	case	for	European	regulators;	the	only	ones,	
of	the	cases	examined	in	this	thesis,	to	have	self-financed	their	cooperative	activities	
from	 the	 start	 with	 the	 explicit	 aim	 of	 preserving	 their	 independence.	 Placing	
network	under	political	control	may	weaken	the	mechanisms	of	productive	network	
collaboration,	while	not	necessarily	 submitting	networks	 to	public	 scrutiny;	 this	 is	
what	 prompted	 Southern	 European	 regulators	 to	 establish	MedReg:	 avoiding	 the	
straightjacket	 of	 formalized	 cooperation	 overseen	 by	 politicians.	 These	 are	
normative	issues	of	extreme	importance,	which	deserve	separate	consideration	and	
could	not	find	space	in	the	context	of	this	research.	
	
General	implications	of	this	research	and	future	research	agenda.	
The	implications	of	the	findings	of	this	research	are	wide-ranging,	and	concern	both	
academic	 investigation	 and	 policy-making.	 From	 an	 academic	 point	 of	 view,	 the	
findings	of	the	research	testify	to	the	necessity	of	taking	a	broader	perspective	when	
investigating	 networks	 of	 regulators.	 Functional	 explanations	 of	 network	
establishment	 and	 rationale	 only	 examine	 the	 surface	 of	 regulatory	 interactions.	
Focusing	attention	on	the	incentives	and	interests	of	political	principals	with	regard	
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to	 networks	 only	 tells	 a	 part	 of	 the	 whole	 story,	 and	 not	 necessarily	 the	 bigger	
portion.		
Regulators	network	for	information,	resources,	and	control.	Once	created,	regulatory	
institutions	can	be	expected	to	strive	to	remain	by	re-inventing	the	purposes	of	their	
cooperation	 as	 needed.	 Regulators	 are	 homophilous	 in	 their	 tie	 choices,	 which	
implies	 that	 spontaneous	 interaction	 may	 lead	 to	 cliques	 and	 disconnected	
communities	or	isolated	nodes.	This	fact	encourages	the	creation	of	some	form	of	
structured	cooperation	in	the	form	of	agencies,	as	was	the	case	in	ACER,	particularly	
if	regulatory	coordination	has	to	be	functional	to	the	achievement	of	common	goals.	
Moreover,	 the	 creation	 of	 agencies	 paralleling	 networks	 may	 assuage	 worries	
concerning	 network	 accountability,	 yet	 avoid	 the	 temptation	 of	 setting	 external	
constraints	 on	 informal	 networking,	 lest	 potentially	 hampering	 its	 advantages.	
Networks	are	structures	where	entrepreneurial	regulators	can	thrive	and	potentially	
propose	policy	solutions	to	pressing	policy	problems.	At	the	same	time,	the	findings	
of	 this	 research	point	 to	 the	 importance	of	 time	and	 repeated	 interaction	 for	 the	
emergence	 of	 mutual	 trust.	 Particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 emerging	 markets,	
withdrawing	donor	support	too	early	may	risk	network	disbandment.	For	the	policy-
maker	intending	to	foster	networks,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	importance	of	
nurturing	but	not	piloting	networks.	
The	 ongoing	 technological	 overhaul	 in	 energy	 systems	may	 provide	 the	 next	 big	
opportunity	windows	for	networks	of	energy	regulators	to	pool	their	resources	and	
contribute	to	policy-making,	in	the	economically	advanced	as	well	as	the	developing	
world.	Indeed,	the	world	of	energy	production,	transportation	and	consumption	is	
already	 experiencing	 the	 so-called	 “energy	 transition”.	 The	 shift	 away	 from	 fossil	
fuels	 will	 cause	major	 reshuffles	 of	 winners	 and	 losers,	 and	 is	 already	 proving	 a	
polarizing	 factor	 politically,	 with	 governments	 dividing	 between	 “green”	 and	
“brown”	and	nurturing	corresponding	constituencies	(Aklin	and	Urpelainen	2013).		
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The	importance	of	regulation	in	this	context	is	hardly	ever	mentioned	in	the	relevant	
policy	 debates.	 This	 is	 surprising,	 given	 that	 the	 energy	 transition	 is	 already	
technically	possible;	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	it	is	not	yet	accomplished	is	the	
absence	 of	 regulatory	 frameworks	 able	 to	 take	 simultaneously	 into	 account	
technological	novelty,	the	stranded	costs	of	extant	infrastructure,	the	framework	for	
investments,	 the	 allocation	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	 across	multiple	 actors,	 and	 the	
myriad	other	issues	that	characterize	the	sector.	Indeed,	modes	of	governance	are	
an	important	part	of	the	relationship	between	technology	and	institutions	(Künneke,	
Groenewegen	et	al.	2010).	The	pursuit	of	coherence	between	the	two	should	be	one	
of	main	objectives	of	infrastructure	policy	(Finger,	Groenewegen	et	al.	2005).		
The	reason	why	regulatory	networks	are	plausibly	going	to	be	crucial	actors	in	the	
implementation	 of	 the	 energy	 transition	 is	 the	 uncertainty	 it	 entails.	 Making	
decisions	 under	 uncertainty	 is	 difficult	 and,	 as	 shown	 in	 this	 thesis,	 creates	
opportunity	 structures	 for	 shaping	 the	 emerging	 new	 regime.	 In	 this	 perspective,	
regulation	is	not	just	a	set	of	rules	designed	exogenously	and	regulatory	authorities	
are	 not	 just	 organizations	 tasked	 with	 enforcing	 them.	 Rather,	 regulation	 is	 an	
emergent	 property	 of	 a	 complex	 system	 (Vazquez	 and	 Hallack	 2017).	 Regulatory	
networks	also	are.	As	regulators	learn	from	the	outcomes	of	the	technology	and	from	
the	outcomes	of	political	decision-making,	they	adapt	and	they	shape	the	regulatory	
environment	(and	therefore,	the	regulation)	at	the	same	time	(Künneke	2008).	The	
regulatory	 framework	of	 the	 future	will	 need	 to	 keep	displaying	 the	attributes	of	
credibility,	 commitment,	 and	 sustainability	 in	 a	 radically	 changed	 technological	
landscape	and	an	uncertain	political	environment	(e.g.	the	recent	withdrawal	of	the	
USA	from	the	Paris	Agreement).		
Upcoming	transformations	such	as	electricity	decentralization	(where,	in	short,	every	
consumer	can	be	a	“prosumer”,	or	a	producer	of	electricity)	and	the	integration	of	
Information	and	Communication	Technologies	(ICT)	and	electricity	grids	are	likely	to	
multiply	the	scales	at	which	regulation	is	needed	from	the	very	local	to	the	European	
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(or	 regional)	 to	 the	 international.	Decentralization	 is	 likely	 to	expand	 the	 scale	of	
regulatory	monitoring	by	demanding	much	closer	oversight	of	Distribution	System	
Operators	(grid	operators	in	charge	of	low	voltage	electricity	grids)	than	performed	
at	present.	In	a	decentralized	future,	the	low	voltage	grid	will	be	under	a	much	higher	
stress	 than	 it	 currently	 is,	 given	 that	 the	 number	 of	 consumers	 who	 are	 also	
producers	(i.e.	people	with	sufficient	installed	solar	power	to	be	able	to	feed	into	the	
grid)	 is	 set	 to	 increase	 thousand-fold.	Digitalisation	will	 enable	 the	 full	 control	 of	
one’s	 electrical	 consumption	 from	 remote	 –	 engendering	 significant	 privacy	
concerns.	In	other	words,	the	world	of	energy	regulation	is	set	to	change	in	ways,	
unpredictable	at	the	outset.	The	accumulated	network	expertise	of	energy	regulators	
may	turn	providential	in	managing	the	new	set	of	relationships	that	are	likely	to	arise	
across	 level	 of	 governance	 and	 dealing	 with	 uncertainty.	 The	 scope	 for	
interdependence	is	all	but	enlarging,	as	all	infrastructure	sectors	have	to	respond	to	
the	challenges	of	climate	change	mitigation	and,	increasingly,	start	developing	legal	
and	economic	frameworks	for	financing	adaptation.	Regulators	at	all	levels	are	likely	
to	 stand	 to	 exploit	 the	 structural	 properties	 of	 networks	 (reachability,	 flexibility,	
interdependencies)	 as	 well	 as	 their	 relational	 properties	 (trust,	 routinized	
communication,	 rapid	 access	 to	 information)	 to	 face	 upcoming	 challenges	 and	
contribute	to	new	policy.	
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Appendix	1	–	Interviews	informing	Chapter	2	and	3	
Interview	number	 Currently	or	formerly	involved?	 Role	 Topic	of	interview	
1	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
2	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
3	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
4	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
5	 Current	 Academic	 CEER	
6	 Former	 Consultant	 CEER	
7	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
8	 Former	 Executive	 CEER	
9	 Former	 Executive	 CEER	
10	 Current	 Executive	 CEER	
11	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
12	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
13	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
14	 Former	 Consultant	 CEER	
15	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
16	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC	
17	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
18	 Current	 Consultant	 CEER	
19	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
20	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
21	 Current	 Consultant	 NARUC	
22	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
23	 Former	 Regulator	 NARUC	
24	 Current	 Academic	 CEER	
25	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
26	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
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27	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
28	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC	
29	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
30	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
31	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
32	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
33	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
34	 Current	 Academic	 NARUC	
35	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
36	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
37	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC	
38	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
39	 Current	 Academic	 NARUC	
40	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
41	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
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Appendix	2	–	Data	used	in	Chapter	4	-	Electricity	sector	structure	in	EU	countries	
	
Country	 Electricity	sector	structure	 Main	companies	operating	in	
	 	 Generation	 Transmission	 Distribution	 Retail	
Austria	 The	 Republic	 of	 Austria	 owns	 51%	 of	 Verbund's	 share	
capital.	The	federal	province	Lower	Austria	holds	(through	a	
holding	company)	51%	of	the	share	capital	of	EVN.	The	main	
Austrian	TSO	is	Austrian	Power	Grid	AG	owning	94%	of	the	
Austrian	 high	 voltage	 electricity	 grid.	 Verbund	 AG	 holds	
100%	of	the	shares	in	Austrian	Power	Grid	AG.	There	are	14	
DSOs	 and	distribution	 areas	 in	Austria.	Wien	Energie,	 Linz	
Strom,	Salzburg	Netz	and	Kelag	are	the	main	participants	in	
this	sector.	Of	the	roughly	130	retailers,	many	operate	only	
at	 local	 or	 regional	 level.	 The	 three	 largest	 suppliers	 are	
Verbund,	EVN	and	Wien	Energie.		
Verbund;	EVN	 Verbund;	EVN	 Verbund;	
EVN;	
provinces	
Verbund,	
EVN,	 Wien	
Energie	
Belgium	 Traditional	 suppliers,	 notably	GDF	 Suez	 and	 its	 subsidiary	
Electrabel,	 continue	 to	 hold	 dominant	 positions	 for	 both	
generation	 and	 supply.	 Other	 key	 generating	 companies	
operating	 in	Belgium	 include	EDF	and	E.ON.	 In	 the	supply	
sector,	in	addition	to	Electrabel,	some	of	the	large	players	
include	EDF,	Eni	and	Lampiris.	In	Belgium,	DSOs	are	mainly	
Electrabel;	 EDF;	
E.ON	
Elia	 regional	 Electrabel;	
EDF;	 ENI;	
Lampiris	
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grouped	together	in	organisations	like	ORES	in	Wallonia	and	
Eandis	 in	 Flanders.	 For	 example,	 Eandis	 is	 comprised	 of	
seven	 Flemish	 electricity	 and	 gas	 distribution	 system	
operators,	which	are	also	its	shareholders.	Elia,	the	TSO,	has	
a	legal	monopoly	as	Belgium’s	sole	electricity	TSO.		
Bulgaria	 The	 100%	 state-owned	 company,	 BEH	 is	 the	 parent	
company	of	most	generating	companies	and	owns	the	TSO.	
Electricity	 distribution	 companies	 were	 fully	 privatised	 in	
2012.	Thus	EVN	(Austria)	and	Energo-Pro	(E.On	now	Czech	
ENergoPro)	 own	 100%	 of	 the	 shares	 of	 the	 respective	
subsidiary	companies	and	CEZ	(Sofia	and	Western	Bulgaria)	
owns	over	90%.	Captive	customers	and	those	who	have	not	
decided	to	change	their	supplier	buy	their	electricity	from	
NEK	 (if	 they	 are	 connected	 to	 a	 high	 voltage	 grid)	 or	 the	
distribution	companies	(if	they	are	connected	to	a	medium	
or	low	voltage	grid).	
BEH	 BEH	 Private:	 EVN	
(Austria);	
Energo-Pro	
(CEZ);	CEZ	
Private:	EVN	
(Austria);	
Energo-Pro	
(CEZ);	 CEZ;	
NEK	
Croatia	 The	state-owned	holding	company	HEP	d.d.	is	the	owner	of	
the	infrastructure,	which	is	managed	by	its	subsidiaries	(e.g.	
HEP-DSO,	 HEP	 Generation).	 The	 transmission	 grid	 is	
operated	 by	 the	 state-owned	 TSO	 HOPS.	 There	 are	 28	
companies	active	in	the	generation	sector.	The	majority	of	
these	are	privately	owned.	Their	market	share	is	dwarfed	by	
HEP	 HOPS	 HEP-DSO	 HEP-
Opskrba	
d.o.o.	 (part	
of	 the	 HEP	
group)		
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the	generation	capacities	of	state-owned	companies.	There	
are	 18	 companies	 covering	 the	 supply	 business.	 Three	 of	
these	companies	are	state-owned	and	hold	the	majority	of	
the	market	 share.	 The	privately	owned	 supply	 companies	
with	 the	 highest	 market	 share	 in	 2014	 were:	 GEN-I	
(approximately	 6.07%),	 RWE	 Energy	 (former	 Energija	 2	
Sustavi	 with	 approximately	 4.52%)	 and	 Proenergy	
(approximately	2.32%).	
Cyprus	 The	 incumbent	Electricity	Authority	of	Cyprus	 (EAC)	owns	
both	the	transmission	and	the	distribution	system.	The	TSO	
is	legally	but	not	functionally	unbundled	from	EAC,	since	all	
its	staff	is	seconded	from	EAC.	The	obligation	of	ownership	
unbundling	 of	 the	 TSO	 does	 not	 apply,	 since	 Cyprus	 has	
obtained	 a	 derogation	 from	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 2009/72/EC	
Directive.	The	DSO	 is	 responsible	 for	managing,	operating	
and	 developing	 the	 network,	 safeguarding	 access	 to	 the	
distribution	network	and	equal	treatment	for	all	users.	EAC	
has	 unbundled	 the	 accounts	 of	 the	 DSO.	 No	 wholesale	
market	 is	 currently	 operating.	 EAC	 is	 the	 sole	 electricity	
supplier.	
EAC	 EAC	 EAC	 EAC	
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Czech	republic	 A	 large	 part	 of	 the	 generation,	 distribution	 and	 supply	
segments	are	integrated	businesses	owned	by	CEZ,	a.s.	and	
its	 subsidiaries	 (CEZ	 Group).	 CEPS	 is	 the	 sole	 owner	 and	
operator	of	the	transmission	grid,	which	is	fully	owned	by	
the	Czech	state.	The	distribution	system	 is	predominantly	
owned	and	operated	by:	EZ	Distribuce	a.s.,	E.ON	Distribuce	
a.s.	and	PREdistribuce	a.s.	(DSOs).	The	Czech	Republic	has	
retained	a	controlling	shareholding	of	approximately	48%	of	
each	of	 the	distribution	companies.	 In	2014,	 the	3	 largest	
Czech	 electricity	 suppliers	 were	 EZ	 Prodej	 s.r.o.,	 E.ON	
Energie	a.s	and	Praskö	energetika	a.s.		
CEZ	 CEZ	 EZ	
Distribuce;	
E.ON	
Distribuce;	
PREdistribuc
e	
CEZ;	 E.ON	
Energie	
Denmark	 Two	 companies,	 DONG	 and	 Vattenfall,	 share	 70%	 of	
market's	capacity.	Both	grids	are	managed	by	Energinet.dk,	
an	 independent	 public	 enterprise	 owned	 by	 the	 Danish	
State	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Climate	 and	 Energy.	 DONG	
Energy	covers	a	 leading	position	holding	a	21%	of	market	
shares,	followed	by	Energiden	(10%	circa),	Energi	Fyn,	SEAS-
NVE	 and	 Natur-Energi.	 The	 largest	 DSO	 DONG	 Energy	
Distribution	 has	 more	 than	 a	 million	 customers	 which	 is	
more	than	20	%	of	the	Danish	population	while	the	smallest	
DSOs	only	have	a	couple	of	thousand	customers.		
DONG;	Vattenfall	 Energinet.dk	 DONG	
Energy	
Distribution	
DONG	
Energy	
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Estonia	 In	 Estonia	 the	 TSO	 Elering	 AS	 and	 the	 main	 electricity	
producer	 and	 seller	 AS	 Eesti	 Energia	 along	 with	 its	
subsidiary,	the	distribution	network	operator	Elektrilevi	OU,	
belong	100%	to	the	State.	Electricity	production	in	Estonia	
is	dominated	by	the	state-owned	company,	Eesti	Energia.	In	
2011,	its	share	of	the	wholesale	electricity	market	was	90%,	
while	its	share	of	the	retail	market	was	76%.	Transmission	
was	unbundled	from	production	in	2010.	The	state-owned	
company,	 Elering,	 provides	 the	 transmission	 networking	
service,	 but	 also	 acts	 as	 the	 single	 transmission	 system	
operator.	There	are	38	distribution	networks,	the	largest	of	
which	 is	 owned	 by	 Eesti	 Energia,	 with	 86%	 share	 of	 the	
distribution	market.	
Eesti	Energia	 Elering	AS	 Electrilevi	
OU	
Eesti	
Energia	
Finland	 The	 electricity	 market	 is	 dominated	 by	 Fortum,	 whose	
market	 share	 in	 Finland’s	electricity	market	 is	 close	 to	27	
percent.	Fortum	Oyj	is	a	publicly	listed	energy	company,	in	
which	the	state	holds	50.8%	of	shares.	Pohjolan	Voima	Oy	
(PVO)	 is	 the	 second	biggest	 Finnish	energy	 company.	 The	
Finnish	transmission	grid	is	owned	by	Fingrid,	another	state-
owned	 company.	 Distribution	 companies	 are	 owned	 by	
municipalities	or	private	companies.	The	DSOs	with	largest	
Fortum;	PVO	 Fingrid	 Fortum;	
Vattenfall;	
municipaliti
es	
Fortum	
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market	share	are	Fortum	with	a	market	share	of	19	%	and	
Vattenfall	with	a	market	share	of	12	%.		
France	 In	 November	 2004,	 the	 two	 incumbent	 monopoly	
companies,	Electricité	de	France	 (EDF)	and	Gaz	de	France	
(GDF),	 both	 of	 which	 were	 100%	 state-owned,	 became	
limited	companies	with	a	board	of	directors.	The	next	year,	
minority	stakes	in	the	two	companies	were	sold	to	private	
investors.	As	of	December	2014,	the	state	retains	an	84.5%	
stake	 in	 EDF,	 which	 dominates	 the	 sector	 -	 90%	 of	
generation;	100%	of	RTE	(the	TSO);	100%	of	ERDF	(DSO,	95%	
of	 the	 market);	 91%	 of	 retail.	 The	 remaining	 5%	 of	 the	
distribution	 network	 are	 managed	 by	 local	 authorities	
(collectivités	 territoriales),	 who	 also	 own	 the	 entire	
network.	
EDF	 RTE	 ERDF	 EDF	
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Germany	 The	German	energy	industry	has	traditionally	been	privately	
owned,	 though	 there	 are	 still	 a	 large	 number	 of	 small	
electricity	 and	 gas	 distribution	 companies	 that	 are	 either	
wholly	 or	 partially	 owned	 by	 municipalities.	 Despite	
reforms,	 the	 incumbent	 operators	 in	 the	 wholesale	 and	
retail	markets	have	retained	large	market	shares.	E.ON	and	
RWE	have	been	among	 the	dominant	players	 in	both	 the	
natural-gas	 and	 the	 electricity	 markets.	 EnBW	 (Baden-
Wuttenberg),	E.On,	RWE,	Vattenfall	 leading	in	generation,	
distribution	 and	 supply.	 There	 are	 four	 TSOs:	 Transnet	
(EnBW);	 Tennet	 (Holland	 govt);	 Amprion	 (Commerzbank,	
RWE);	50Hertz	(Elia	and	IFM)	
E.On,	RWE,	EnBW	
(Baden-
Wuttenberg)	
Transnet	
(EnBW);	
Tennet	
(Holland	 govt);	
Amprion	
(Commerzbank
,	 RWE);	
50Hertz	 (Elia	
and	IFM)	
E.On,	 RWE,	
EnBW	
(Baden-
Wuttenberg
);	
municipaliti
es	
E.On,	 RWE,	
EnBW	
(Baden-
Wuttenberg
)	
Greece	 The	 electricity	 sector	 remains	 dominated	 by	 the	 state-
controlled	 Public	 Power	 Corporation	 (PPC)	 and	 its	
subsidiaries.	 The	 PPC’s	 generation	 market	 share	 has	
declined	from	98.6%	in	2003	to	65%	in	2013.	The	company	
continues	to	control	almost	all	electricity	supply	on	the	non-
interconnected	 islands.	 In	 the	 electricity	 transmission	
sector,	the	PPC	owns	all	transmission	lines	and	holds	a	49%	
share	of	 assets	 in	 the	 transmission	 system	and	wholesale	
market	operator	(HTSO)	with	the	rest	owned	by	the	Greek	
state.	
PPC	 PPC	 PPC	 PPC	
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Hungary	 The	state-owned	MVM	is	the	biggest	player	in	the	market,	
controlling	 a	 considerable	 part	 of	 Hungary’s	 generation	
capacity.	 MAVIR,	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 state-owned	 MVM,	
owns	 and	 operates	 the	 transmission	 system.	 The	
distribution	 networks	 are	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 six	
privately	 owned	 DSOs	 (ÛDSZ	 (100%	 E.ON);	 DÛDSZ	 (100%	
E.ON);	 TITSZ	 (100%	 E.ON);	 DÛMSZ	 (100%	 EDF);	 ÛMSZ	
(54.3%	 RWE;	 25%	 EnBW;	 12%	MVM;	 18.7%	 others(;	 ELM	
(55.3%	 RWE;	 25%	 EnBW;	 15.6%	 MVM;	 4.1%	 others).	
Outside	the	universal	service	sector	(DSOs),	there	currently	
are	more	than	50	licensed	traders	selling	electricity	to	end	
users	at	market	based	prices.		
MVM	 MVM	 ÛDSZ;	
DÛDSZ;	
TITSZ;	
DÛMSZ;	
ÛMSZ;	ELM	
ÛDSZ;	
DÛDSZ;	
TITSZ;	
DÛMSZ;	
ÛMSZ;	ELM.	
Ireland	 State-owned	 companies	 dominate	 the	 electricity	 and	
natural-gas	sectors.	The	Electricity	Supply	Board	(ESB)	holds	
two-thirds	of	generating	capacity,	though	its	share	has	been	
falling	as	new	power	producers	have	entered	the	market.	It	
also	owns	the	transmission	system,	the	operation	of	which	
is	the	responsibility	of	another	state-owned	body,	EirGrid,	
as	well	as	the	distribution	network.	Bord	Gais	Eireann	(BGE)	
owns	 the	 gas	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 network,	
operating	 the	 transmission	 system	 through	 a	 subsidiary	
ESB	 EirGrid	 BGE	 BGE	
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company.	 Retail	 competition	 has	 developed	 to	 only	 a	
relatively	small	degree.	
Italy	 The	major	player	in	the	electricity	generation	market	is	Enel.	
Enel	is	controlled	by	the	Italian	government.	Edison,	ENI	and	
E.ON	are	also	key	market	players.	Enel	Distribuzione	is	the	
main	distribution	network	operator	(DNO),	with	86%	of	the	
distributed	electricity	volumes.	Other	DNOs,	significant	by	
market	shares,	are:	A2A	(3.9%),	Acea	Distribuzione	(3.2%)	
and	Aem	 Torino	Distribuzione	 (1.4%).	 Enel	 is	 the	 primary	
supplier	with	about	37%	of	the	overall	sales	of	electricity.	
The	 other	 major	 suppliers	 by	 market	 share	 are:	 Edison	
group,	with	a	market	share	of	8.2%,	followed	by	Acea,	with	
a	 share	 of	 4.6%,	 and	 Eni,	 with	 a	market	 share	 of	 almost	
4.3%.	
Enel,	 Edison,	 ENI,	
E.ON	
Terna	 Enel	
Distribuzion
e;	 ACEA;	
A2A	
Enel;	
Edison;	
ACEA;	Eni	
Latvia	 Latvenergo	 enjoys	 a	 monopoly	 position	 as	 the	 largest	
producer	 of	 electricity	 in	 Latvia	 and	 controls	 all	 of	 the	
country’s	 public	 electricity	 distribution	 networks.	 The	
Ministry	 of	 Economy,	 via	 Latvenergo,	 is	 also	 the	 ultimate	
beneficiary	 shareholder	 of	 Latvenergo	 subsidiaries.	 The	
Ministry	 of	 Finance	 owns	 100%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 the	
Latvenergo	 Augstspriegum
a	tikli	
Latvenergo	 Latvenergo	
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electricity	transmission	company,	Augstsprieguma	tīkli.	The	
company	 is	a	 former	Latvenergo	subsidiary	that	was	spun	
off	in	2012	in	order	to	comply	with	Directive	2009/72/EC	of	
the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	13	July	2009	
concerning	 common	 rules	 for	 the	 internal	 market	 in	
electricity.	
Lithuania	 The	Ministry	of	Energy	exercises	state	ownership	rights	 in	
UAB	 EPSO-G	which	 has	 two	 listed	 subsidiaries:	 AB	 Litgrid	
and	 AB	 Amber	 Grid,	 which	 operate	 respectively	 the	
electricity	 and	 the	 natural	 gas	 transmission	 grid.	 State	
ownership	 rights	 in	 Lithuanian	 Energy	 were	 previously	
exercised	by	the	Ministry	of	Energy	but	were	transferred	to	
the	Ministry	of	Economy	and	then	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	
in	 2012-13	 in	 implementation	 of	 the	 2009	 Third	 Energy	
Package	of	 the	European	Parliament,	which	 required	 that	
the	ownership	of	energy	generation	and	sale	be	separate	
from	the	ownership	of	energy	transmission	networks.		
Lietuvos	Energia	 AB	Litgrid	 AB	Lesto	 AB	Lesto	
Luxembourg	 Creos	 Luxembourg	 S.A.	 (formerly	 SOTEG)	 owns	 and	
operates	 the	 transmission	 system,	 and	 it	 supplies	 the	
majority	of	the	market.	Most	of	Creos's	shares	are	owned	
by	 various	 private	 utilities,	 though	 the	 State	 maintains	
minority	 ownership.	 Creos	 also	 operates	 one	 of	 the	 two	
Enovos	
International	
Creos	 Municipaliti
es	
Creos	
281	
	
main	 electricity-transmission	 systems	 in	 the	 country.	 The	
other	 main	 electricity	 grid	 operator	 is	 the	 Societe	 de	
Transport	 de	 l'Electricite	 (SOTEL).	Most	 of	 the	 electricity-
distribution	companies	are	owned	by	municipalities.		
Malta	 There	are	no	transmission	systems	or	transmission	system	
operators	 in	Malta.	 The	 distribution	 system	 covering	 the	
whole	 country	 remains	 under	 the	 responsibility	 of	 one	
distribution	system	operator	which	forms	part	of	a	vertically	
integrated	company,	Enemalta	plc.	Unbundling	is	required	
at	internal	management	accounts	level	only.	The	electricity	
generation	market	 is	open	to	competition	and	generators	
may	produce	electricity	for	their	own	consumption	and/or	
sell	to	Enemalta	plc.	The	retail	of	electricity	is	not	open	to	
competition.	
Enemalta	 n/a	 Enemalta	 Enemalta	
Netherlands	 Most	 electricity	 is	 generated	 by	 Essent	 (owned	 by	 RWE),	
Nuon	 (owned	 by	 Vattenfall),	 Eneco,	 E.ON,	 Delta	 and	
Electabel.	 The	 electricity	 distribution	 and	 transmission	
networks	 are	 publicly	 managed	 and	 owned.	 The	
Netherlands	 has	 one	 electricity	 transmission	 system	
operator	(TSO),	TenneT,	which	is	owned	by	the	state.	Since	
the	liberalisation,	a	number	of	new	supply	companies	have	
Essent	 (RWE);	
Nuon	(Vattenfall);	
Eneco,	E.ON.	
TenneT	 Municipaliti
es	
Nuon	
(Vattenfall);	
Essent	
(RWE);	
Eneco;	Delta	
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joined	the	market	including	Doug	Energy	and	E.ON	The	four	
largest	energy	companies	 -	Nuon	(acquired	by	Vattenfall),	
Essent	(acquired	by	RWE),	Eneco	and	DELTA	-	still	have	the	
largest	share	of	the	retail	market.	
Norway	 The	Norwegian	power	sector	comprises	a	large	number	of	
mostly	 publicly	 owned	 participants.	 Around	 90%	 of	
generating	 capacity	 is	 in	 public	 ownership,	 with	 local	
municipalities	 and	 county	 authorities	 alone	 owning	 just	
over	half.	 The	 state-owned	utility,	 Statkraft,	 is	 the	 largest	
generator.	 There	 are	 more	 than	 160	 small	 distribution	
system	operators	(DSOs)	in	Norway,	most	of	them	publicly	
owned.	 The	 dominant	 supplier	 within	 a	 network	 area	 is	
most	 often	 a	 vertically	 integrated	 supplier	 or	 a	 supplier	
within	the	same	corporation	as	the	DSO.		
Statkraft	 Statnett	 regional	and	
local	
companies	
regional	and	
local	
companies	
Poland	 State-owned	 entities	 have	 been	 organised	 into	 four	
vertically	 integrated	groups	and	partially	privatised.	These	
groups	 are	 PGE	 Polska	 Grupa	 Energetyczna	 S.A.	 (PGE),	
TAURON	Polska	Energia	S.A.	 (TAURON),	ENEA	S.A.	 (ENEA)	
and	 ENERGA	 S.A.	 (ENERGA).	 All	 of	 these	 companies	
combine	 generation,	 distribution	 and	 trading	 (including	
supply)	activities.	 In	2012	PGE,	TAURON	and	EDF	had	 the	
largest	market	share	in	the	generation	sector.	The	sole	TSO,	
PGE;	 TAURON;	
EDF	
PSE	 PGE	
Dystrybucja;	
TAURON	
Dystrybucja;	
ENERGA	
Operator;	
ENEA	
Operator	
PGE;	
TAURON;	
ENERG;	
ENEA	
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Polskie	Sieci	Elektroenergetyczne	S.A.	(PSE),	is	a	fully	state-
owned	 joint	 stock	 company	 and	 owner	 of	 all	 the	
transmission	assets.			
Portugal	 During	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2012,	 the	 Portuguese	 energy	
sector	 saw	 the	 privatisation	 of	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 the	
transmission	 operator's	 share	 capital	 (Redes	 Energeticas	
Nacionais	 -	 REN)	 and	 of	 the	 incumbent's	 share	 capital	
(Energias	de	Portugal	-	EDP),	a	former	vertically	integrated	
company,	 which	 now	 develops,	 through	 its	 subsidiaries,	
generation,	 distribution	 and	 supply	 activities.	 Electricity	
suppliers	 entail	 not	 only	 Portuguese	 companies	 (EDP	
Comercial	 and	 Galp	 Power)	 but	 also	 several	 Spanish	
companies	 (such	as	 Endesa,	 Iberdrola,	Uniãn	 Fenosa,	 EGL	
Energêa	Iberia	and	Nexus	Energêa).		
EDP;	Galp	 REN	 Private	 EDP	
Comercial;	
Galp	Power;	
Endesa;	
Iberdorla	
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Romania	 In	 Romania,	 89%	 of	 the	 national	 electricity	 output	 is	
generated	by	state-owned	generators.	The	Romanian	state	
owns	the	majority	of	the	shares	in	the	TSO	(Transelectrica	
SA).	Five	of	the	eight	distribution	operators	are	privatised:	
CEZ	 Distribute	 SA;	 ENEL	 Distributie	 Banat	 SA;	 ENEL	
Distributie	Dobrogea	SA;	E.ON	Moldova	Distributie	SA;	ENEL	
Distributie	 Muntenia	 SUD	 SA;	 FDEE	 Electrica	 Distributie	
Muntenia	Nord	 SA;	 FDEE	 Electrica	Distributie	 Transilvania	
Sud	SA;	and	FDEE	Electrica	Distributie	Transilvania	Nord	SA.	
Electrica	 SA	 (owner	 of	 the	 three	 companies	 (vi)	 to	 (viii)	
above)	 holds	 the	 largest	 market	 share	 (39.27%)	 and	 was	
majority	state	owned	by	the	Ministry	of	Economy.		
Hidroelectrica	 SA;	
SN	
Nuclearelectrica	
SA;	 Complexul	
Energetic	 Oltenia	
SA;	
Termoelectrica	
Deva	SA	
Transelectrica	
SA	
Private:	 6	
DSOs		
Electrica	
Furnizare;	
Enel	
Energie;	
Enel	Energie	
Muntenia;	
E.ON	
Energie	
Romania;	
CEZ	Vanzare	
Slovak	Republic	 The	main	player	in	the	Slovak	electricity	generation	market	
is	 Slovensk	 elektrörne,	 a.s.	 (SE),	 a	 joint	 stock	 company	of	
which	66%	is	owned	by	Enel	-	the	Italian	based	multinational	
group,	with	the	other	34%	owned	by	the	Slovak	state.	The	
entire	electricity	transmission	network	is	owned	by	SEPS,	a	
wholly	 state-owned	 company.	 Three	 are	 regional	
Distribution	 System	 Operators	 (DSO),	 co-owned	 by	 the	
state	(51%)	and	a	private	 investor	 (49%	and	management	
control).	 E.ON	 indirectly	 holds	 49%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 ZSE	
Distribucia	 a.s.;	 EDF	 holds	 49%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 SSE	 -	
SE	 SEPS	 ZSE	 (E.ON);	
SSE	 (EDF);	
RWE	
ZSE	 (E.ON);	
SSE	 (EDF);	
RWE	
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Distribucia	a.s.;	and	RWE	Energy	AG	holds	49%	of	the	shares	
in	Vchodoslovenskö	distribunö	a.s.	
Slovenia	 The	 key	 companies	 operating	 in	 the	 Slovenian	 electricity	
market	 are:	 Elektro-Slovenija,	 d.o.o.	 (ELES),	 the	
Transmission	System	Operator	(TSO);	SODO	d.o.o.	(SODO),	
the	 Distribution	 System	 Operator	 (DSO);	 6	 distribution	
companies;	 Holding	 Slovenske	 Elektrarne	 d.o.o.	 (HSE),	 a	
generation	 company	 and	 GEN	 energija	 d.o.o.	 (GEN),	 a	
generation	 company.	 All	 the	 generators,	 distributors	 and	
suppliers,	as	well	as	the	TSO,	are	predominantly	or	wholly	
state-owned	 and	 no	 international	 investment	 is	 present.	
Due	 to	 the	 level	of	 state	ownership,	 the	whole	electricity	
sector	is	arguably	fully	vertically	integrated.	
HSE;	GEN	 ELES	 SODO	 GEN-I	
Spain	 Three-quarters	 of	 electricity	 is	 generated	 by	 three	
companies:	Iberdrola,	Endesa	(almost	100%	owned	by	the	
Italian	utility	firm	ENEL)	and	Union	Fenosa	(owned	by	Gas	
Natural).	Iberdrola	and	Endesa	alone	account	for	the	bulk	of	
retail	sales.	REE	(Red	Electrica	de	Espana),	in	which	the	state	
holds	 a	 20%	 stake,	 serves	 as	 the	 transmission	 system;	 it	
owns	almost	 the	entire	400	kV	grid	and	 two-thirds	of	 the	
220	 kV	 grid.	 Iberdrola,	 Endesa	 and	Union	 Fenosa	 are	 the	
Endesa	 (100%	
ENEL);	 Iberdrola;	
Union	Fenosa	
REE	 Private:	
Iberdrola,	
Endesa,	
Union	
Fenosa	
Iberdrola,	
Endesa	
286	
	
largest	distributors,	although	there	are	more	than	300	small	
local	distributors.	
Sweden	 The	 state-owned	 company	 Vattenfall	 is	 one	 of	 the	major	
players	in	the	Swedish	electricity	market.	Most	of	the	small	
local	 electricity	 distribution	 companies	 are	 owned	 by	
municipalities.	 Three	 companies	 -	 Vattenfall,	 Fortum	
(majority-owned	 by	 the	 Finnish	 government),	 and	 E.ON	
Sverige		-	generate	the	bulk	of	power	in	Sweden,	own	most	
of	 the	 distribution	 assets	 and	 account	 for	 around	 half	 of	
retail	 sales.	 The	 E.ON	 and	 Vattenfall	 groups	 have	 several	
DSO	 areas.	 The	 market	 share	 for	 the	 three	 dominant	
companies	 is	51,4	%	 (E.ON	19,0	%,	Fortum	and	Vattenfall	
16,2	%	each).	The	state	owned	utility	Svenska	Kraftnät	is	the	
Transmission	 System	 Operator	 (TSO)	 for	 the	 electricity	
market.	
Vattenfall;	
Fortum;	 E.ON	
Sverige	
Svenska	
Kraftnät	
Municipaliti
es;	
Vattenfall;	
Fortum;	
E.ON	
Sverige	
Vattenfall;	
Fortum;	
E.ON	
Sverige	
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United	Kingdom	 The	 National	 Grid	 owns	 and	 operates	 the	 England	 and	
Wales	 transmission	 system;	 the	 Scottish	 transmission	
system	 is	 owned	 by	 Scottish	 Power	 and	 Scottish	 and	
Southern	 Energy,	 and	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 network	 by	
Northern	 Ireland	 Electricity.	 Licences	 for	 14	 distribution	
areas	 in	 Great	 Britain	 are	 currently	 held	 by	 six	 different	
companies	 (Electricity	 North	 West	 Limited,	 Northern	
Powergrid,	SSE,	ScottishPower	Energy	Networks,	UK	Power	
Networks,	and	Western	Power	Distribution).	Retail	supply,	
which	 is	unbundled	from	distribution,	 is	dominated	by	six	
large	 companies	 (EDF	 Energy,	 E.ON,	 RWE,	
Iberdrola/ScottishPower,	 Centrica	 and	 SSE)	 which	 supply	
virtually	all	consumers.		
EDF	Energy;	E.ON;	
RWE;	
Iberdrola/Scottish
Power;	 Centrica;	
SSE	
4	TSOs	 Private:	 14	
DNOs	 are	
owned	by	six	
different	
groups.	
EDF	 Energy;	
E.ON;	 RWE;	
Iberdrola/Sc
ottishPower
;	 Centrica;	
SSE	
Compiled	by	the	author	from	various	sources,	primarily	OECD	Factsheets	(2015)	and	CMS	Law	e-guides	(data	from	2013/2014)	
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Government	ownership	across	different	segments	of	electricity	sector	in	EU	countries	
	
Country	 Percentage	 of	 government	 ownership	 of	 the	 largest	
company	active	in	electricity…	
	 Generation	 Transmission	 Distribution	 Retail	
Austria	 51	 51	 51	 51	
Belgium	 0	 45.4	 79	 0	
Germany	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Luxembourg	 7.5	 57.3	 57.3	 25.4	
Netherlands	 0	 100	 100	 33	
Bulgaria	 60	 100	 0	 0	
Czech	
Republic	
69.8	 100	 69.8	 69.8	
Hungary	 99.9	 100	 0	 0	
Poland	 61.9	 100	 40.5	 40.5	
Romania	 80	 74	 0	 0	
Slovak	
Republic	
34	 100	 51	 51	
Croatia	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Cyprus	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Estonia	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Ireland	 95	 100	 95	 95	
Latvia	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Lithuania	 96.1	 97.5	 82.6	 82.6	
Malta	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Slovenia	 100	 100	 100	 50	
United	
Kingdom	
0	 0	 0	 0	
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France	 84.4	 84.4	 84.4	 84.4	
Greece	 51	 51	 51	 51	
Italy	 31.2	 29.9	 31.2	 31.2	
Portugal	 0	 10.3	 0	 0	
Spain	 0	 20	 0	 0	
Denmark	 80	 100	 80	 80	
Finland	 50.8	 53.1	 50.8	 50.8	
Norway	 100	 100	 0	 100	
Sweden	 100	 100	 100	 100	
OECD	 Product	 Market	 Regulation	 Indicators	 -	
http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm#i
ndicators	
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Appendix	3	–	Additional	models	for	Chapter	5	
Association	between	staff	categories	(ACER	2016)	and	population	figures	
(dependent	variable,	Eurostat	2016)	
	 Model	1	
(Intercept)	 17.79***	
	 (0.52)	
large	 -0.90	
	 (0.59)	
medium-large	 reference	
medium	 -1.33*	
	 (0.60)	
medium-small	 -2.08**	
	 (0.62)	
small	 -2.79***	
	 (0.62)	
micro	 -4.28***	
	 (0.64)	
R2	 0.78	
Adj.	R2	 0.73	
RMSE	 0.74	
Num.	obs.	 29	
	
***p	<	0.001,	**p	<	0.01,	*p	<	0.05	
	
Relationship	between	network	activism	(dependent	variable)	staff	levels	(different	
categorization)	and	covariates	
	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	
(Intercept)	 -2.00*	 0.97	 0.77	 1.30	 0.60	
	 (0.79)	 (2.12)	 (3.00)	 (2.76)	 (2.19)	
Staff	levels	 	 	 	 	 	
large	 reference	
	 	 	 	 	 	
medium	 3.33*	 2.99*	 3.02*	 2.69	 2.83*	
	 (1.25)	 (1.24)	 (1.29)	 (1.33)	 (1.32)	
medium-small	 2.20	 2.19	 2.16	 1.74	 2.06	
	 (1.32)	 (1.28)	 (1.32)	 (1.36)	 (1.34)	
small	 3.60*	 3.48*	 3.17*	 2.84	 2.83	
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	 (1.32)	 (1.29)	 (1.39)	 (1.44)	 (1.46)	
micro	 2.25	 1.73	 1.86	 0.45	 1.72	
	 (1.42)	 (1.43)	 (1.48)	 (2.02)	 (1.88)	
Independence	(electricity)	 	 -0.95	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.63)	 	 	 	
Independence	(gas)	 	 	 -0.88	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.92)	 	 	
Liberalization	(electricity)	 	 	 	 -0.75	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.60)	 	
Liberalization	(gas)	 	 	 	 	 -0.64	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.51)	
R2	 0.31	 0.37	 0.34	 0.35	 0.36	
Adj.	R2	 0.19	 0.23	 0.19	 0.21	 0.21	
Num.	obs.	 29	 29	 29	 29	 27	
RMSE	 2.36	 2.30	 2.37	 2.34	 2.39	
	
	 ***p	<	0.001,	**p	<	0.01,	*p	<	0.05	
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Appendix	4	–	Interviews	informing	Chapter	6	and	7	
Interview	
number		
Previous	
interview	
number	
Currently	or	formerly	
involved?	
Role	 Topic	of	interview	
1	 1	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
2	 2	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
3	 3	 Former	 Regulator	 MEDREG/ERRA	
4	 4	 Former	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
5	 5	 Current	 Academic	 MEDREG/ERRA	
6	 6	 Former	 Consultant	 MEDREG/ERRA	
7	 7	 Former	 Regulator	 MEDREG/ERRA	
8	 8	 Former	 Executive	 ERRA	
9	 16	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC/ERRA	
10	 	 Current	 Executive	 MEDREG	
11	 17	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG/Energy	
Community	
12	 18	 Current	 Consultant	 MEDREG/ERRA	
13	 	 Current	 Executive	 MEDREG	
14	 	 Current	 Executive	 MEDREG	
15	 21	 Current	 Consultant	 ERRA	
16	 23	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
17	 	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
18	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
19	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
20	 25	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
21	 	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
22	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
23	 26	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
24	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
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25	 	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
26	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
27	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
28	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
29	 28	 Former	 Executive	 ERRA	
30	 	 Current	 Executive	 Energy	Community	
31	 31	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA/Energy	
Community	
32	 33	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA/Energy	
Community	
33	 	 Current	 Regulator	 Energy	Community	
34	 35	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
35	 34	 Current	 Academic	 ERRA	
36	 37	 Former	 Executive	 ERRA	
37	 38	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
38	 39	 Current	 Academic	 ERRA	
39	 41	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
40	 	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
41	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
42	 19	 Former	 Regulator	 Energy	Community	
	
